By Colette Ashton

Strengthening existing institutions, prioritising prevention and engaging the private sector are needed to end corruption.

This report analyses South Africa’s anti-corruption institutions in relation to international good practice. It highlights problems with their functional independence and organisational culture. It identifies a serious gap in the area of prevention. Among the recommendations are that South Africa undertake feasible, incremental improvements to existing institutions and engage the private sector to help prevent and detect corruption.

Key findings There is insufficient empirical research on corruption in South Africa to inform context sensitive policy reform. Anti-corruption institutions are governed by a parallel informal system of social norms held in place by incentives such as promotion and disincentives such as bullying. This organisational culture prioritises obedience to authority over ethics, eroding integrity. A culture of mistrust and competition exists between law enforcement agencies, hampering collaboration. Feasible, incremental reforms of anti-corruption institutions are needed in the short term, focusing on organisational culture. Recommendations Strengthen existing agencies Amend the National Prosecuting Authority Act so that: the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) is the accounting officer; the budget is allocated by Parliament; there are merit-based appointment processes and security of tenure for senior leaders; and the NDPP has control over human resources. Develop context-sensitive prosecutorial prioritisation policy that focuses on the criteria of redress for economic harm and is mindful of the need for political stability. Revise performance targets of law enforcement agencies to incentivise cooperation, not competition. Build cultures of integrity, trust and cooperation in and among anti-corruption agencies. Prioritise prevention Work towards an independent anti-corruption prevention agency. Urgently provide the Public Administration Ethics Integrity and Disciplinary Technical Assistance Unit in the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation with increased funding and independence. 2 The NPA should be given control over its own budget and human resources, which are currently controlled by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. Effective anti-corruption agencies in developing countries may trigger political instability. Political stability is a precondition for economic growth, which in the long term creates conditions for more effective anti-corruption institutions. Equitable economic development is a precondition for the transformation of more economically harmful types of corruption, e.g. plunder, into less harmful types, e.g. lobbying. The private sector is a key partner for government in the prevention and detection of corruption. Prioritise integrity in government by promoting ethical employees. Prioritise corruption prevention in the South African Police Service. Change the incentive structure for the private sector Introduce a statute providing for non-trial resolutions of corporate corruption cases to incentivise companies to self-police corruption. Develop capacity in the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission to support companies to develop effective anti corruption compliance programmes. Partner with the private sector to run collective action programmes in key sectors such as health, construction and shipping. Research Conduct a risk analysis for a proposed Chapter 9 anti-corruption super-agency with investigative and prosecutorial powers. Conduct research into a two-track criminal and administrative anti-corruption enforcement system. Conduct more empirical, sector-specific research into corruption

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 28p,

By Colette Ashton

Developing country theorists claim that strategies should focus on human behaviour and economic incentives, not legal measures.

To remedy systemic corruption in South Africa, policymakers must look beyond the discourse of transparency and accountability to emerging anti-corruption theory. Policy research in this field should be multi-disciplinary, grounded in empirical research and informed by decolonial thought. There is a need for more research into the unique types and drivers of corruption at national, local and sector-specific levels, to inform policy reform.

Key findings There is international consensus that anti-corruption reforms often fail or backfire, particularly in developing countries. The dominant Western good governance approach should be supplemented by theory emerging from other schools of thought from developing countries. The good governance approach recommends transparency and accountability, prioritising better laws and improved enforcement as the primary solutions. Theorists from developing countries claim that where there is systemic corruption, it is more helpful to focus on human behaviour and economic incentives to prevent corruption. Legalistic measures tend to be one-dimensional, ineffective and sometimes harmful. Recommendations Government should: Reconsider policies in light of emerging theory and evidence from global anti- corruption practices. Develop a strategy for communicating alternative perspectives and approaches to heads and staff of anti-corruption agencies and other government institutions. Researchers should: 2 Conduct localised and sector-specific empirical research into corruption in South Africa. Conduct qualitative research into the social norms governing government institutions and the private sector. Critically analyse the South African anti corruption discourse through a decolonial lens. Social norms – what people expect others to do – are the unwritten rules governing institutions and are a primary driver of corruption. For many, obeying these rules is a logical response to structural conditions, including economic incentives and disincentives. Research shows that most people are inclined to behave ethically if their environment facilitates it. Reframing corruption as a collective action problem, where policy is designed to influence the behaviour of groups, is likely to result in more effective anti-corruption initiatives. Economic development that delivers more equitable distribution of opportunities and wealth is a precondition for building a state with the capacity to reduce corruption. Determine who the rule-following elites are and devise ways to incentivise them to exert pressure on non-rule-following elites. NGOs should: Develop partnerships with institutions working with alternative theoretical/policy approaches. Explore opportunities for cooperation with business and government in developing sector specific anti-corruption projects. Develop and execute a strategy for communicating alternative perspectives to civil society and media, and in doing so, highlight success stories. Develop pilot anti-corruption reform projects based on emerging alternative perspectives

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 12p.

ByThomas D. Akoensi, Justice Tankebe

Using an experimental vignette design, the study inves-tigates the effects of criminal records on the hiring deci-sions of a convenience sample of 221 human resource(HR) managers in Ghana. The HR managers were ran-domly assigned to read one of four vignettes depicting job seekers of different genders and criminal records:male with and without criminal record, female with and without criminal record. The evidence shows that a criminal record reduces employment opportunities for female offenders but not for their male counter-parts. Additionally, HR managers are willing to offer interviews to job applicants, irrespective of their crim-inal records, if they expect other managers to hire ex-convicts. The implications of these findings are dis-cussed.

The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, online first, May 2024

by Osborne Jackson and Riley Sullivan

Criminal justice reform has been a high-priority policy area in New England and the nation in recent years. States are generally seeking legislation that would help reintegrate ex-offenders into society while still prioritizing the welfare of all members of the public and the achievement of fiscal goals. The research findings presented in this report indicate that raising felony larceny thresholds—that is, increasing the dollar value of stolen property at or above which a larceny offense may be charged in court as a felony rather than a misdemeanor, a policy adopted by three New England states over the last decade—seems to balance these objectives. Policymakers interested in criminal justice reform should consider incorporating felony larceny threshold increases into the suite of policy changes implementing such reform.

When assessing larceny incidents as a whole, this report concludes that enacting higher felony larceny thresholds does not lead to an escalation of crime in the short run. Even upon considering the subset of larceny incidents where escalation is most likely to occur and where analysis is potentially not affected by other concurrent changes in larceny penalties, this report finds only a small, 2 percent short-run increase in the intensity of larceny crime (value of stolen property) and still no increase in the amount of larceny crime (rate of occurrence).

New England Public Policy Center,  Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 2020, 29pg

By Douglas Husak

The allegation that criminal justice systems (and that of the United States in particular) have become guilty of overcriminalization is widely accepted by academics and practitioners on nearly all points along the political spectrum (Dillon 2012). Many commentators respond by recommending that states decriminalize given kinds of conduct that supposedly exemplify the problem. I urge those who are theoretically minded to proceed cautiously and address several preliminary matters that must be resolved before genuine progress is possible. In the absence of a position on several controversial normative and conceptual issues, discussions of overcriminalization and decriminalization are bound to be oversimplified and superficial. My review is organized around six of these issues. I invite commentators to examine (a) what the criminal law is; (b) what overcriminalization means; (c) why overcriminalization is thought to be pernicious; (d) whether overcriminalization is a de jure or de facto phenomenon, i.e., whether it is a function of the law on the books or the law in action; (e) what normative criteria might be invoked to alleviate the predicament; and (f) whether and to what extent overcriminalization is a serious concern in our penal system. Even though these six issues are analytically distinct, positions about one invariably blur into commitments about the others. Although theorists rarely dissent from the claim that states are guilty of something called overcriminalization, uncertainties about the foregoing topics mar their treatments. I conclude that a deep understanding of the problem of overcriminalization depends on how these six issues are resolved.

Annual Review of Criminology, v. 6. 2023, 19pg

By David Garland

This review situates the recent, radical challenges to American criminal justice—calls to end mass incarceration, defund the police, and dismantle systemic racism—within the broader social and economic arrangements that make the US system so distinctive and so problematic. It describes the social structures, institutions, and processes that give rise to America's extraordinary penal state—as well as to its extraordinarily high rates of homicide and social disorder—and considers what these portend for the prospect of radical change. It does so by locating American crime and punishment in the structural context of America's (always-already racialized) political economy—a distinctive set of social structures and institutional legacies that render the United States more violent, more disorderly, and more reliant on penal control than any other developed nation. Drawing on a broad range of social science research findings, it argues that this peculiar political economy—a form of capitalism and democratic governance forged on the anvils of slavery and racial segregation and rendered increasingly insecure and exclusionary in the decades following deindustrialization—generates high levels of social disorganization and criminal violence and predisposes state authorities to adopt penal control as the preferred policy response.

Annual Review of Criminology v. 6. 2023, 20pg

By The Center for Justice Innovation

The Center for Justice Innovation and RxStat convened together stakeholders in the criminal justice, court, and public health systems to discuss the treatment of drug use and prevention of fatal overdoses in the context of the criminal justice system, as well as the integration of harm reduction principles. This document, which maps many of the court-based problem substance use interventions currently utilized across New York City, came out of this forum of experts.

On September 19, 2023, the Center for Justice Innovation and RxStat convened together stakeholders in the criminal justice and court systems, clinicians, and public health experts to discuss the treatment of drug use and prevention of fatal overdoses in the context of the criminal justice system, as well as the integration of harm reduction principles into these and related programs. Among the pre-conference materials distributed were this document, which maps many of the court-based problem substance use interventions currently utilized across New York City. We divided these initiatives into four stages within the timeline of a criminal case: pre-arraignment, arraignment, pre-plea, and post-plea. This categorization is intended to highlight the distinct role that each stage plays within the larger system of treatment and prevention.

New York: The Center for Justice Innovation. 2023, 16pg

By James Austin, Todd Clear, and Richard Rosenfeld

Illinois is one of several states considering how to reduce its prison population amid the pandemic and calls for an end to mass incarceration. In recent years, the state has taken steps to reduce its prison population through judicial discretion, bail reform, and diversion programs. As Illinois’ prison population declines and policymakers, prosecutors, and courts consider alternatives to incarceration, what is the risk to public safety? Is crime likely to increase or decline in the state as those convicted of crimes are released or diverted to other programs? In this study, funded by The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, the authors conclude that Illinois crime rates, which have been on the decline since the 1990s, will continue to decline in a fluctuating pattern, with moderate year-to-year changes. This will be true even if Illinois reduces its prison population by an additional 25% over five years. The authors reached this conclusion by constructing a quantitative model that accounts for Illinois crime trends over nearly four decades and provides a basis for predicting crime rates in the near future. This study is a companion to the 2020 Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation report Explaining the Past and Projecting Future Crime Rates, which examined national crime trends and reached similar conclusions about crime rates in the near future.   

New York: Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. 2020, 23pg