By Fahra Rajabali, Kate Turcotte, Alex Zheng, Roy Purssell, Jane A. Buxton, Ian Pike

Poisoning, from substances such as illicit drugs, prescribed and over-the-counter medications, alcohol, pesticides, gases and household cleaners, is the leading cause of injury-related death and the second leading cause for injury-related hospital admission in British Columbia. We examined the health and economic costs of poisoning in BC for 2016, using a societal perspective, to support public health policies aimed at minimizing losses to society. Methods: Costs by intent, sex and age group were calculated in Canadian dollars using a classification and costing framework based on existing provincial injury data combined with data from the published literature. Direct cost components included fatal poisonings, hospital admissions, emergency department visits, ambulance attendance without transfer to hospital and calls to the British Columbia Drug and Poison Information Centre (BC DPIC) not resulting in ambulance attendance, emergency care or transfer to hospital. Indirect costs, measured as loss of earnings and informal caregiving costs, were also calculated. Results: We estimate that poisonings in BC totalled $812.5 million in 2016 with $108.9 million in direct health care costs and $703.6 million in indirect costs. Unintentional poisoning injuries accounted for 84% of total costs, 46% of direct costs and 89% of indirect costs. Males accounted for higher proportions of direct costs for all patient dispositions except hospital admissions. Patients aged 25–64 years accounted for higher proportions of direct costs except for calls to BC DPIC, where proportions were highest for children younger than 15 years. Interpretation: Hospital care expenditures represented the largest direct cost of poisoning, and lost productivity following death represented the largest indirect cost. Quantifying and understanding the financial burden of poisoning has implications not only for government and health care, but also for society, employers, patients and families.

CMAJ Open. 2023 Feb 14;11(1):E160-E168.

By Hannah E. Meyers

In November 2014, California voters approved a criminal justice reform measure, Proposition 47 (“Prop 47”), with almost 60% support. Ten years later, California voters are now considering rolling back some of its soft-on-crime policies. Prop 47 identified six “petty” crimes—grand theft, larceny, personal drug use, forgery, and two types of check fraud—and reclassified them. It downgraded these crimes, including thefts with property values under $950 and illegal drug possession for personal use, from felonies to misdemeanors. This paper presents a data-based argument on how Prop 47 shifted dynamics in both offender behavior and prosecutorial decision-making that damaged public safety and public health. Representative data from Riverside, one of California’s largest counties, suggest that Prop 47 increased re-offending, including serious felony re-offending, detention times, failures to appear in court, warrants issued on offenders, case dismissals in conjunction with plea deals, and the persistence levels of drug and theft offenders. Additional data collected from both Riverside and San Bernardino law-enforcement agencies show a significant drop in sentencing and in arrests, due partly to the diminished incentive for businesses to promptly report thefts. These shifts have also resulted in fewer defendants participating in in-custody drug treatment programs or other mandatory, supervised services because the incentives for doing so (avoiding prosecution and significant sentences) have evaporated. And, as California business owners can attest, reducing the cost of repeatedly committing theft removes the incentive for offenders to change their behavior. This has fueled increases in organized retail theft and fencing rings. Prop 47 also strained the resources of counties, by increasing the number of defendants sentenced to serve in overcrowded jails rather than prison.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2024. 20p.

By: Helen Toner, John Bansemer, Kyle Crichton, Matthew Burtell, Thomas Woodside, Anat Lior, Andrew Lohn, Ashwin Acharya, Beba Cibralic, Chris Painter, Cullen O’Keefe, Iason Gabriel, Kathleen Fisher, Ketan Ramakrishnan, Krystal Jackson, Noam Kolt, Rebecca Crootof, and Samrat Chatterjee

The concept of artificial intelligence systems that actively pursue goals—known as AI “agents”—is not new. But over the last year or two, progress in large language models (LLMs) has sparked a wave of excitement among AI developers about the possibility of creating sophisticated, general-purpose AI agents in the near future. Startups and major technology companies have announced their intent to build and sell AI agents that can act as personal assistants, virtual employees, software engineers, and more. While current systems remain somewhat rudimentary, they are improving quickly. Widespread deployment of highly capable AI agents could have transformative effects on society and the economy. This workshop report describes findings from a recent CSET-led workshop on the policy implications of increasingly “agentic” AI systems.

In the absence of a consensus definition of an “agent,” we describe four characteristics of increasingly agentic AI systems: they pursue more complex goals in more complex environments, exhibiting independent planning and adaptation to directly take actions in virtual or real-world environments. These characteristics help to establish how, for example, a cyber-offense agent that could autonomously carry out a cyber intrusion would be more agentic than a chatbot advising a human hacker. A “CEO-AI” that could run a company without human intervention would likewise be more agentic than an AI acting as a personal assistant.

At present, general-purpose LLM-based agents are the subject of significant interest among AI developers and investors. These agents consist of an advanced LLM (or multimodal model) that uses “scaffolding” software to interface with external environments and tools such as a browser or code interpreter. Proof-of-concept products that can, for example, write code, order food deliveries, and help manage customer relationships are already on the market, and many relevant players believe that the coming years will see rapid progress.

In addition to the many potential benefits that AI agents will likely bring, they may also exacerbate a range of existing AI-related issues and even create new challenges. The ability of agents to pursue complex goals without human intervention could lead to more serious accidents; facilitate misuse by scammers, cybercriminals, and others; and create new challenges in allocating responsibility when harms materialize. Existing data governance and privacy issues may be heightened by developers’ interest in using data to create agents that can be tailored to a specific user or context. If highly capable agents reach widespread use, users may become vulnerable to skill fade and dependency, agents may collude with one another in undesirable ways, and significant labor impacts could materialize as an increasing range of currently human-performed tasks become automated.

To manage these challenges, our workshop participants discussed three categories of interventions:

• Measurement and evaluation: At present, our ability to assess the capabilities and real-world impacts of AI agents is very limited. Developing better methodologies to track improvements in the capabilities of AI agents themselves, and to collect ecological data about their impacts on the world, would make it more feasible to anticipate and adapt to future progress.

• Technical guardrails: Governance objectives such as visibility, control, trustworthiness, as well as security and privacy can be supported by the thoughtful design of AI agents and the technical ecosystems around them. However, there may be trade-offs between different objectives. For example, many mechanisms that would promote visibility into and control over the operations of AI agents may be in tension with design choices that would prioritize privacy and security.

• Legal guardrails: Many existing areas of law—including agency law, corporate law, contract law, criminal law, tort law, property law, and insurance law—will play a role in how the impacts of AI agents are managed. Areas where contention may arise when attempting to apply existing legal doctrines include questions about the “state of mind” of AI agents, the legal personhood of AI agents, how industry standards could be used to evaluate negligence, and how existing principal-agent frameworks should apply in situations involving AI agents.

While it is far from clear how AI agents will develop, the level of interest and investment in this technology from AI developers means that policymakers should understand the potential implications and intervention points. For now, valuable steps could include improving measurement and evaluation of AI agents’ capabilities and impacts, deeper consideration of how technical guardrails can support multiple governance objectives, and analysis of how existing legal doctrines may need to be adjusted or updated to handle more sophisticated AI agents.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology, October 2024

By: Lauren Stienstra, Diane P. Horn, Erica A. Lee, Bruce R. Lindsay, William L. Painter, Elizabeth M. Webster

On October 9, 2024, Hurricane Milton made landfall as a Category 4 hurricane in Florida’s Tampa Bay area bringing heavy rain, storm surge, and floods to many counties on the coast and in the interior of the state. Some areas in the state are still actively recovering from Hurricane Helene.

President Biden had previously issued an emergency declaration for this storm on October 7, under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq.), authorizing Public Assistance (PA) for emergency protective measures put into action beginning October 5, 2024. On October 8, 2024, President Biden issued another emergency declaration authorizing federal assistance to Seminole Tribe of Florida.

As of October 11, President Biden declared a major disaster for Hurricane Milton in Florida, authorizing PA, Individual Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation Assistance. President Biden also increased the federal share of eligible response costs; the federal government will cover 100% of eligible costs of PA provided for emergency protective measures and debris removal for a period of 90 days.

The situation remains dynamic; additional declarations, or additional forms of assistance are expected given Milton’s impact.

Information about state and county disaster assistance is published in FEMA’s declaration database. FEMA’s Hurricane Milton web page provides information on how to apply for disaster assistance. FEMA has also created another site to dispel rumors and misinformation related to aid to survivors, evacuation, and relief funding.

CRS Insight, IN12438; Oct. 13, 2024

By: Yasmin Afina and Sarah Grand-Clément

Data plays a critical role in the training, testing and use of artificial intelligence (AI), including in the military domain. Research and development for AI-enabled military solutions is proceeding at breakneck speed, and the important role data plays in shaping these technologies has implications and, at times, raises concerns. These issues are increasingly subject to scrutiny and range from difficulty in finding or creating training and testing data relevant to the military domain, to (harmful) biases in training data sets, as well as their susceptibility to cyberattacks and interference (for example, data poisoning). Yet pathways and governance solutions to address these issues remain scarce and very much underexplored.

This paper aims to fill this gap by first providing a comprehensive overview on data issues surrounding the development, deployment and use of AI. It then explores data governance practices from civilian applications to identify lessons for military applications, as well as highlight any limitations to such an approach. The paper concludes with an overview of possible policy and governance approaches to data practices surrounding military AI to foster the responsible development, testing, deployment and use of AI in the military domain.

CIGI Papers No. 308 — October 2024

By: US Election Assistance Commission

The security of voting systems is essential to a trustworthy election. Every state and local jurisdiction utilizes common-sense procedures and tools to safeguard the voting process. Common best practices include using locks, tamper-evident seals, security cameras, system testing before and after elections, audits, and physical and cybersecurity access controls. This guide outlines some of the many best practices local election officials follow to secure voting systems through an election cycle. It's important to note this is a broad list of common security measures and procedures to protect the integrity of an election. The types of security measures may vary based on the voting systems in use in state and local jurisdictions.

United States. Election Assistance Commission, Oct 2024

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Colombia’s government has made environmental protection a priority. But armed groups control large parts of the endangered Amazon rainforest, making that goal hard to achieve. One group in particular, the Central Armed Command, or EMC, has shown it has the power to slow or accelerate deforestation at will. Why does it matter? Armed groups’ tightening grip on the Colombian Amazon has further jeopardised the health of a forest that plays a crucial role in the planet’s climate. People living under these groups’ yoke have been left vulnerable to the whims of criminals bent on expanding their illicit businesses. What should be done? Colombia’s government should pursue negotiations with armed groups and plot ways to curb deforestation. But it should also assert its authority in the Amazon through development programs fostering livelihoods that do not harm the environment, efforts to combat large-scale environmental offenders and reinforced coordination of security, peace and environment policies.

Bogotá/New York/Brussels, International Crisis Group,   2024. 32p.

By Ania Moroz and Tamar Dinisman

“Looking back now, I wouldn’t have gone to the police, because it is one of the hardest things you can ever do in your whole life. I can’t even sum up in words what it does to you mentally and physically. You can be the world’s strongest person ever in the world, but going to court can break you. It’s awful.” Victim-survivor It is estimated that 1 in 4 women and 1 in 18 men have been subjected to some form of sexual violence since the age of 16 and that 1 in 6 children have been sexually abused.1 The majority of victim-survivors will not report the offence to the police. Of those who do report it, a very low proportion will receive a charge and have their case go to court. The number of victim-survivors of sexual violence who give evidence in trial is not openly available. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) data shows that in the year ending June 2023, 11,506 defendants were proceeded against for sexual offences2 and, in 2022–23, 3,004 defendants were charged with rape-related offences.3 This report focuses on the experience of sexual violence victim-survivors where the defendant has been charged and their case has gone through the court process. It focuses on the three main stages of this experience – before, during and after giving evidence – and highlights the main challenges victim-survivors face at each stage. This report also makes recommendations for changes in policy and practice to address these challenges. To meet the aims of the research, a multimethod approach, combining qualitative and quantitative methods, was used. These include: 12 semi-structured interviews with victim survivors; focus groups and interviews with Victim Support sexual violence practitioners; and Victim Support sexual violence cases analysis.

Cardiff: Victim Support, 2024. 63p.  

By Oisin Stronach, Paul Dietze, Michael Livingston, Amanda Roxburgh

Background

Over the past two decades methamphetamine-related harms have increased in Australia. Previous analysis of methamphetamine-related deaths has covered limited timeframes, and largely focused on drug-toxicity deaths. This paper examines long-term trends in methamphetamine-related deaths over 20 years, including deaths due to a range of specific causes.

Methods

Descriptive analyses were conducted on Australian methamphetamine-related deaths (2001–2023) by cause, extracted from the National Coronial Information System, an online database containing deaths reported to coroners in Australia and New Zealand. Joinpoint trend analyses were used to assess changes over time between 2001 and 2020 (with data from 2021 to 2023 likely incomplete and thus excluded).

Results

Unintentional drug toxicity was the cause of 49.8 % of methamphetamine-related deaths, intentional self-harm (including toxicity) 23.3 %, unintentional injury 15.1 %, natural causes 9.6 %, and assaults 2.3 %. Between 2001 and 2020, joinpoint analysis showed three trend change points among all-cause methamphetamine-related mortality rates, resulting in four distinct periods: two periods where they increased (2001–2006 – annual percentage change (APC) = 15.4 %; 2009–2016 – APC 25.5 %), and two where they decreased (2006–2009 – APC = –11.8 %; 2017–2020 – APC = –2.9 %). Similar patterns were evident among rates of intentional self-harm and unintentional injury. Deaths caused by unintentional drug toxicity saw two trend change points (2011, 2016), and rates increased across all three periods. Natural cause deaths had three trend change points (2007, 2010, 2015), and rates continued to rise after 2015, largely driven by increases in circulatory diseases.

Conclusion

Cause-specific models highlighted diverse trends. Recent trends show unintentional drug toxicity deaths have slightly increased, intentional self-harm stabilised, and unintentional injury and assault deaths have declined. Deaths from natural causes involving methamphetamine continued to increase, highlighting a public health concern and a potential need for early circulatory disease screening among people who use methamphetamine.

International Journal of Drug Policy Volume 131, September 2024, 104548  

By Ariel G. Ruiz Soto

Immigrants in the United States commit crimes at lower rates than the U.S.-born population, notwithstanding the assertion by critics that immigration is linked to higher rates of criminal activity. This reality of reduced criminality, which holds across immigrant groups including unauthorized immigrants, has been demonstrated through research as well as findings for the one state in the United States—Texas—that tracks criminal arrests and convictions by immigration status. A growing volume of research demonstrates that not only do immigrants commit fewer crimes, but they also do not raise crime rates in the U.S. communities where they settle. In fact, some studies indicate that immigration can lower criminal activity, especially violent crime, in places with inclusive policies and social environments where immigrant populations are well established. A Look at the Overall Immigrant Population National studies have examined incarceration rates and prosecutions of immigrants in the country, overwhelmingly finding that immigrants of all legal statuses commit crimes at lower rates than those who were born in the United States. Immigrants Are Prosecuted and Imprisoned at Lower Rates than the U.S. Born Immigrants in the United States have had lower incarceration rates than the native-born population since at least 1870 (when such data were first recorded). In 2020, immigrants were 60 percent less likely to be incarcerated than the U.S. born, according to a study by the National Bureau of Economic Research. And though a 2021 Justice Department study points out prosecutions of immigrants increased between 1990 and 2018, nearly 90 percent were for violations of immigration-related laws. Notably, U.S. born citizens were ten times more likely than immigrants to be incarcerated for committing weapons- related offenses, five times more likely for violent offenses, more than twice as likely for property crimes, and nearly twice as likely for drug offenses.  At the state level, multiple studies have found there is no clear relationship between violent crime and immigration. And research at the city level suggests that increases in immigration can be associated with declining homicide rates, with the largest effect on municipalities with long histories of immigration, as well as reductions in property crimes and robbery. This makes immigrants  less likely to be either offenders or victims of crime at the local level compared to the U.S.-born population

Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Institute, 2024. 5p.   

By Christopher Dowling, Siobhan Lawler, Laura Doherty, Heather Wolbers

This review was commissioned to support implementation of the Standing Council of Attorneys-General Work Plan to Strengthen Criminal Justice Responses to Sexual Assault 2022–2027, which emphasises the importance of strengthening legal frameworks where required to ensure victims and survivors have improved justice outcomes and protections. The review includes an analysis of Commonwealth, state and territory legislation, a review of national and international research, reviews and inquiries, and consultations with victims and survivors and expert stakeholders. It explores any gaps and inconsistencies in the legislative landscape and their implications for victims and survivors who have contact with the criminal justice system. It also investigates the barriers and challenges to achieving greater consistency in legislation. The review broadly addresses these research questions: 1. What is the nature and scope of sexual assault and child sexual abuse legislation in Australia? 2. What differences and similarities (if any) are there between sexual assault and child sexual abuse legislative frameworks in Australia? 3. What impact (if any) do legislative inconsistencies have on: a. the investigation and prosecution of sexual assault and child sexual abuse matters in the criminal justice system; and b. the ability of victims and survivors to receive the support they require? 4. What are the barriers/challenges to achieving consistency in child sexual abuse and sexual assault legislation in Australia? 5. What are the gaps in current legislation for responding to new and emerging trends in sexual violence? 6. What does ‘best practice’ in relation to sexual assault and child sexual abuse legislation look like?  

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 2024. 375p.

By Prithwish Ganguli      

The rise of Cybercrime-as-a-Service (CaaS) represents a new frontier in the evolution of cybercrime, where sophisticated tools and malicious services are made readily available to a broad range of users through online marketplaces, often on the dark web. CaaS has democratized cybercrime, enabling even low-skilled attackers to launch powerful cyberattacks such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), phishing campaigns, and ransomware attacks with ease. This paper explores the operational structure of CaaS, including the use of cryptocurrencies for transactions and the global reach of these illicit platforms. The implications of this shift extend beyond economic losses, threatening national security, corporate stability, and personal privacy. While governments and law enforcement agencies are struggling to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these services, the paper examines legal and regulatory challenges in combating CaaS, as well as the role of international cooperation. Furthermore, it discusses technological countermeasures, including artificial intelligence and machine learning, as potential solutions to mitigate the threat. Ethical considerations surrounding the surveillance and control of online spaces are also addressed. The paper concludes by highlighting future trends in CaaS and stressing the need for a balanced approach between innovation and security to effectively counter this growing threat.

International Journal for Multidisciplinary Research (IJFMR), 2024.

By Katharine Neill Harris, Christopher F. Kulesza

Roughly half of the U.S. population now lives in a state that permits recreational cannabis use and sales. Still, the criminal legal system continues to play a primary role in determining who receives treatment for cannabis use. It remains the single largest treatment referral source, and in 2019 more than 100,000 people who were admitted to treatment for cannabis use were referred by a legal entity. This raises questions regarding the extent to which individuals who interact with the legal system are monitored and punished for cannabis use in the post-legalization era. Moreover, the issue has not been addressed by state legalization measures. We examined trends in legal system referrals to treatment for cannabis use in legal and nonlegal states from 2007 to 2019. We also tested the relationship between recreational cannabis legalization and legal system treatment referrals for Black, Hispanic, and white adults and juveniles. The legal system’s practice of requiring individuals to participate in drug treatment warrants scrutiny because of its potentially negative and long-lasting consequences. While mandated treatment may be appropriate in some cases, the legal system often requires treatment participation from individuals who do not meet the criteria for a substance use disorder, and it does a poor job of connecting those who do have substance use disorders with appropriate care. The legal system’s limited efficacy in this arena is problematic because mandated treatment carries the possibility of additional legal consequences if program expectations are not met. The harmful effects of legal involvement include fewer education and employment prospects, reduced earning potential, destabilized family structures, negative mental and physical health outcomes, and diminished quality of life. Communities of color are disproportionately targeted by drug enforcement and disproportionately impacted by its collateral consequences. Recreational cannabis legalization (RCL) is intended to remedy, in part, the harmful and racially disparate effects of cannabis prohibition. However, the continuation of compulsory treatment for cannabis use, and the legal involvement it entails, is a potential pathway through which the systemic harms and inequities of cannabis prohibition can persist. The problematic nature of this arrangement is enhanced when it occurs alongside a commercial cannabis industry that profits from greater levels of cannabis use 

Houston, TX: The Baker Institute, 2023. 44p.   

By Katharine Neill Harris

There were a lot of reasons to think that 2021 would be a pivotal year for criminal justice reform in Texas: widespread popularity of relaxing cannabis laws, public support for addressing police violence and systemic racism in the justice system, and the pandemic turning overcrowded jails from a simmering public health risk into a crisis too big to ignore. Two weeks after a Minneapolis police officer killed George Floyd, a Houston native, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott indicated there was a bipartisan appetite for reform when he floated the idea of a “George Floyd Act, to make sure that we prevent police brutality like this from happening in the future in Texas.” Calling Floyd’s death “the most horrific tragedy [he had] ever personally observed,” the governor insisted that those “who have suffered because of racism for far too long” would lead the way on reform.1 During the 87th legislative session, not only did Governor Abbott neglect these concerns, he actively worked against them, opposing modest proposals to improve the justice system and prioritizing legislation that further harms the very communities he claimed to support. As other states work to address justice system inequities, recent developments in Texas expose the persistent challenges to ending the war on drugs and other policies that propagate systemic racism.

Houston, TX: The Baker Institute, 7p.

By Mark Shaw | Ian Tennant Ana Paula Oliviera | Daren Brookbanks

In 2000, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), also known as the Palermo Convention, was adopted in a milestone moment for fostering global cooperation to combat organized crime. With 192 state parties, the convention and its protocols have provided a crucial legal framework for addressing types of crime such as human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and firearms trafficking. However, as transnational criminal networks continue to expand, new challenges are emerging, and the global community must take decisive action to ensure the UNTOC reaches its full potential. Our latest report highlights key obstacles to effective implementation: inconsistencies in national legislation, a lack of centralized data, and delays and restrictions in the convention’s Independent Review Mechanism (IRM). While the UNTOC’s widespread ratification is an achievement, these gaps hinder its ability to deliver impactful results. Without timely evaluations and better international cooperation, the global response to organized crime remains fragmented and insufficient. We believe that strengthening the UNTOC requires more robust data collection, greater transparency, and deeper engagement with civil society. Our report recommends the creation of an independent research center to monitor organized crime trends and track the convention’s progress. Additionally, we call for increased political will and resources to accelerate the IRM, ensuring that the UNTOC becomes a more powerful tool in the fight against evolving criminal markets.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 48p.

By Pauline Moore, Melissa Kay Diliberti, Brian A. Jackson

Violent incidents, such as shootings, and threats of such violence, have become relatively common occurrences in kindergarten through grade 12 (K–12) schools across the United States. One common way that schools help their staff and students train for the possibility of an active shooter or other threats is by conducting practice drills. The prevalence of these drills — combined with the mixed results of how these drills affect staff and students' feelings of preparedness, safety, fear, and stress — highlights the need for more research. To better understand what teachers across the United States think about school safety generally and active shooter drills in particular, RAND researchers administered a survey to a randomly selected sample of 1,020 K–12 teachers using the American Teacher Panel. The survey focused on teachers' perceptions of school safety, including their main safety concerns and their experiences with incidents of gun violence, and with drills designed to prepare students and staff for school shootings and other violent incidents. The survey specifically asked whether such drills made teachers feel more or less safe and prepared to respond to active assailant events and teachers' perceptions of their students' feelings about such drills, as well as whether support was available to students and staff during and following drills. Survey results indicate that more work is needed to understand the impact of drills on staff and students and what schools can do to better support the well-being of students and staff who are required to participate in these activities.

Key Findings

• One in six K–12 teachers nationally works in a district that has been touched by gun violence since the 2019–2020 school year.

• Relative to the previous school year, teachers reported more concern in 2023–2024 about being victims of an attack at their schools and were even more concerned for their students.

• In the 2023–2024 school year, a greater share of female teachers than male teachers (27 percent versus 14 percent, respectively) reported fear of being harmed or attacked at school. In the previous year, female teachers were no more likely than male teachers to report such fears.

• Variability in the elements and response actions involved in drills highlights the need for more standardized implementation.

• Schools do not typically announce when an active shooter drill will occur to students and parents, and many schools are not providing support to help students and staff manage any stress or anxiety that such drills might cause.

• Teachers are split on whether participation in drills makes them feel more prepared to respond to active shooter incidents: Slightly less than half said that drills make them feel more prepared, and half perceived drills as having no impact on preparedness. A slight majority of teachers (54 percent) reported that drills make students feel more prepared to respond to such incidents.

• Most teachers (69 percent) indicated that participating in active shooter drills has no impact on their perceptions of safety at school, and only one-fifth said that drills make them feel safer.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 36p.

By Lina Jakob, Caroline Anderson

This summary presents findings from research that estimates that childhood maltreatment causes up to 40 percent of common mental health disorders and highlights the need to address the underlying drivers of child maltreatment. A University of Sydney study, published in JAMA Psychiatry, found that childhood maltreatment causes up to 40 per cent of common, life-long mental health conditions. It is the first research in Australia to estimate the proportion of mental health conditions directly caused by childhood maltreatment, independent from other influences such as genetics and social environments. 

State of New South Wales 2024.

By Lenny Roth, Tom Gotsis, Christine Lamerton, Ali Rabbani

Government policy to address the use of illicit drugs is a topic of ongoing debate. 

The purpose of this paper is to provide an update on key policy developments since the report of the NSW Special Commission of Inquiry into the Drug Ice in January 2020. The paper summarises the former government's response to the inquiry recommendations and notes progress that has been made since then. Significant reforms in other states and territories are outlined and the decriminalisation of personal drug use in three overseas jurisdictions is also discussed.

Key points

• The NSW Special Commission of Inquiry into the Drug Ice was established in 2018 to investigate and advise on how best to tackle use of amphetamine-type stimulants. Its report was released in January 2020 and made 109 recommendations.

• The former government’s response to the inquiry supported 86 of these recommendations. The government announced a $500 million funding package over 4 years including $358 million for health-related programs and $140 million to expand justice initiatives. 

• Recommendations that the government rejected included decriminalising the personal use of illicit drugs, introducing pill testing, and expanding supervised drug consumption facilities.

• In February 2024 NSW Health provided an update on progress in implementing the recommendations that the government had supported. 

• A new police diversion program for possessing small quantities of illicit drugs commenced in February 2024 (the Early Drug Diversion Initiative). Critics have argued that police are diverting only a small proportion of those who are eligible for the program. 

• In 2023 the ACT enacted laws to decriminalise personal use of small amounts of various illicit drugs. Pill testing services have continued in the ACT, were introduced in 2024 in Queensland, and will commence in Victoria in the summer of 2024–25. 

• Oregon decriminalised the personal use of illicit drugs in 2021 and British Columbia also did so in 2023. In 2024 Oregon reinstated criminal penalties while recent changes in British Columbia have restricted the public places where personal drug use is legal. 

• In 2022–23 most respondents to Australia’s Drug Strategy Household Survey did not support legalising the personal use of illicit drugs but most respondents did support pill testing and regulated injecting centres.

NSW Parliamentary Research Service, 2024

By Oliver Bennett MBE, Ali Shalchi

The precise scale of economic crime in the UK is unknown, but it could run to tens or hundreds of billions of pounds per year. The extent of these crimes – which include money laundering, fraud, and corruption – led the Intelligence and Security Select Committee in its July 2020 report on Russia to note that London is considered a ‘laundromat’ for corrupt money. In December 2019 the Treasury Committee found various regulatory and legislative failings in the way in which these crimes are being tackled. It urged the Government to make improvements to the supervisory system and to introduce new powers to combat economic crime. A February 2022 Treasury Committee follow-up report concluded that the Government was still not prioritizing economic crime sufficiently. In 2019 The Financial Action Task Force (the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog) praised the UK’s efforts on the issue, but also found failings and identified a lack of resources for investigating these crimes. The Economic Crime Plan The Government agrees about the need to tackle economic crime, which it says causes “much harm to individuals and communities and damage to legitimate business and the UK’s reputation.” It set out its overall approach to tackling the issue in its July 2019 Economic Crime Plan. The Plan covers the years 2019-2022 and draws together all the work being conducted by the public and private sector. A number of the 52 actions contained in the plan may involve future legislative reforms, including changes to: • the Proceeds of Crime Act to improve how the proceeds of crime can be confiscated; • corporate criminal liability, to punish and prevent economic crimes when committed on behalf of or in the name of companies; • block company stock exchange listings on national security grounds; • improve transparency over UK property ownership; • Companies House powers to enable it strike off from its register dissolved or inactive limited partnerships. Progress with the Plan In February 2022, the Royal United Services Institute said that 40% of actions in the Plan had been completed, 17% were in progress, 23% were overdue, and 19% of actions had no due date. The Government says it is “on course to deliver 49 of the 52 actions” in the Plan. The Treasury Committee has recommended that the Plan be adapted and renewed for a further three years.   

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2022. 22p.

By Dorothy Dillard, Howard Henderson,  Johnny Rice II, Amy D. Goldstein, Maurice Mangum,

In this article, we explore the responses of 357 African American men between 15- and 24 years old living in four high-crime violence cities to better understand their perception of their environment and its impact on community violence. We focus on study participants’ perceptions of their cities, explanations of violence, and their perceived contribution to the level of violence. Respondents describe their cities in grim terms with few opportunities. And, from their perspective, the dangerous environment in which they live necessitates gun possession, potentially perpetuating community violence. Our findings affirm that as with any other public health issue, the perception of place matters in understanding community violence. Further, our findings underscore the importance of seeking and responding to the lived experience of those most likely to be victims and perpetrators of community violence in crafting and implementing interventions 

Delaware Journal of Public Health, 2024.