By Colin P. Clarke

Because terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have been successful in adapting and innovating in response to counterterrorism measures, it is important to develop a flexible, responsive sanctions regime similar to the 1267 regime, but that can include new organizations and bodies designed to keep it relevant and applicable— and any new regime considered for violent far-right groups should be similarly flexible—both in terms of the various measures employed, but also concerning the individuals and assets to be targeted. • Due to ISIS’ relatively unique ability to capture and administer large swaths of territory as it built a proto-state and diversified its funding portfolio, it is somewhat difficult to assess how effective sanctions were against the group. • If certain terrorist threats concern only a limited number of states—for example, the rightwing threat is likely to be more prominent in North America, Europe, and Oceania, though it certainly exists elsewhere—there may be less of an impetus, or little sense of urgency, for states outside of those immediately impacted to act. In that sense, the threats posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS) were more transnational, and as a result, generated global consensus more easily. Therefore, it will be crucial to work toward creating consensus, as well as to explore other applications of sanctions to counter the violent far-right threat. • One of the primary challenges to evaluating the impact of sanctions against terrorist groups is the lack of an effective assessment framework, in addition to data gaps. The sensitive nature of data related to terrorism and counterterrorism is one of the primary reasons why it has been difficult to provide a comprehensive assessment of the United Nations’ overall impact in this area. • Recommendations include: focus on tailor-made sanctions regimes that can adapt to the terrorist threat, considering both multilateral and national options; establish metrics to assess implementation and impact of sanctions regimes; and invest in international cooperation for implementation. 

New York: Soufan Center, 2022. 72p.

By Leigh Goodmark

The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) has been hailed as the federal government's signature legislation responding to gender-based violence. VAWA, passed in 1994 and reauthorized three times since then, has created several new programs and protections for victims of gender-based violence. VAWA is, however, primarily a funding bill and what it primarily funds is the criminal legal system. But the criminal legal response to gender-based violence has not been effective in decreasing rates of gender-based violence or deterring violence. A VAWA that discontinued funding for the criminal legal system and instead focused on economics, prevention, and community-based resources—a noncarceral VAWA—could better meet the needs of victims of gender-based violence and target the underlying causes of that violence.

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2022. 5:115–31

By Steven A. Camarota and Karen Zeigler

Under current policy all persons — not just citizens — are included in the population count when apportioning seats to states in the U.S. House of Representatives and for votes in the Electoral College, which is based on House seats. Although we focus on the next census in 2020, the impact of immigration has been building for decades as the number of people settling in the country has increased dramatically. This report examines the cumulative impact of immigration, both legal and illegal, on the apportionment of House seats; this is not an analysis of the impact of immigration only since the previous census. Apportionment is a zero-sum system; by adding more population to some states rather than others, immigration will continue to significantly redistribute political power in Washington.

Among the findings:

The 2020 census will show that the presence of all immigrants (naturalized citizens, legal residents, and illegal aliens) and their U.S.-born minor children is responsible for a shift of 26 House seats. This is the cumulative impact of immigration, not the change from the previous census.To put this number in perspective, changing the party of 21 members of the current Congress would flip the majority in the U.S. House. The 26 seats represent the effect of all immigrants and their children 17 years of age and younger, and is not the change from one census to another.Ohio will have three fewer seats in 2020 than it otherwise would have had but for the presence of all immigrants and their minor children in other states. Michigan and Pennsylvania will have two fewer; and Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin will each have one fewer seat. California will have 11 more seats in 2020 than it otherwise would have; New York and Texas will have four more seats each; Florida will have three more seats; New Jersey will have two more seats; and Illinois and Massachusetts will each have one additional seat.Of the 26 seats that will be lost, 24 are from states that voted for Donald Trump in 2016. Of states that will gain House seats because of immigration, 19 seats will go to the solidly Democratic states of California, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Illinois. Texas is the only solidly Republican state that gains, while Florida is a swing state.Doing the same calculation, but counting only immigrants themselves (naturalized citizens, legal permanent residents, guestworkers, foreign students and illegal aliens), but not their U.S.-born minor children, will redistribute 18 seats in the House in 2020. Ohio will have two fewer seats than it otherwise would have had but for the presence of immigrants in other states. Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia will each have one fewer seat. California will have seven more seats in 2020 than it otherwise would. New York and Florida will have three more each; Texas and New Jersey will have two more seats; and Illinois will have one more seat.Looking at non-citizens and their U.S.-born minor children redistributes 10 seats, with Ohio, Michigan, Alabama, Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri, West Virginia, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island each having one fewer seat. California will have four more seats than it otherwise would have; Texas will have three more seats; and New York, Florida, and New Jersey will have one additional seat each.Looking at only non-citizens (legal residents and illegal immigrants) redistributes eight seats, with Ohio, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, Alabama, Idaho, West Virginia, and Rhode Island each having one fewer seat in 2020 due to the presence of non-citizens in other states. California will have three additional seats; Texas will have two more seats; and Florida, New Jersey, and New York will each have one more seat.Illegal immigrants and their U.S.-born minor children will redistribute five seats in 2020, with Ohio, Michigan, Alabama, Minnesota, and West Virginia each losing one seat in 2020 that they otherwise would have had. California and Texas will each have two additional seats, and New York will have one additional seat.Illegal immigrants alone in the 2020 census will redistribute three seats, with Ohio, Alabama, and Minnesota each having one fewer seat than they otherwise would have had, while California, New York, and Texas will have one additional seat.

Center for Immigration Studies, 2019. 11p.

By Evarn J. Ooi

Aim

To investigate the impact of the Practice Guide for Intervention (PGI) on re-offending and imprisonment among supervised offenders serving a community-based order in New South Wales (NSW), specifically, either a good behaviour bond or a suspended sentence.

Method

Introduced in June 2016, PGI led to a substantial overhaul in the delivery of supervision services by NSW Community Corrections Officers (CCOs). Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy, we compare re-offending (imprisonment) between supervised and unsupervised offenders serving a good behaviour bond (suspended sentence) before and after the introduction of PGI. Re-offending (imprisonment) is measured as the probability of committing a new and proven offence (being imprisoned) within 12 months of index court finalisation. The pre-PGI period includes offenders with a finalised court appearance between June and December 2014. There are two post-PGI periods. The first post-PGI period includes offenders with a finalised court appearance between June and December 2016 (the first six months after PGI was introduced). The second post-PGI period includes offenders with a finalised court appearance between June and December 2017, when the use of PGI across NSW was approaching its peak.

Results

Among supervised offenders serving a good behaviour bond, the DiD estimates indicate a small 1 to 2 percentage point increase in re-offending after the introduction of PGI compared with unsupervised offenders. However, the difference is not statistically significant. For supervised offenders sentenced to a suspended sentence, we also find a slight increase in the probability of imprisonment, but the increase is not statistically significant.

 Conclusion

Overall, we do not find evidence that the introduction of PGI led to a reduction in re-offending among supervised offenders sentenced to a good behaviour bond, nor do we find a reduction in the probability of imprisonment among supervised offenders serving a suspended sentence.

(Crime and Justice Bulletin No. 229). Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 2020. 27p.