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Posts tagged judicial discretion
The Four Faces of Intoxication in the Botswana Criminal Justice System: “Defence”, Extenuation, Mitigation, and Aggravation

By Baboki Jonathan Dambe & Badala Tachilisa Balule 

Intoxication plays a role in the commission of crimes in most, if not all, jurisdictions. Botswana is no exception. Our law reports are replete with cases in which intoxication is alleged to have contributed to the commission of the offence. In this regard, courts continually find themselves contending with the consideration that they ought to give to the intoxication, in respect to both the criminal culpability of the accused person and their moral blameworthiness when it comes to sentencing. This paper highlights that, in the context of Botswana, intoxication may be treated as a defence, an extenuating circumstance, a mitigating factor, or an aggravating factor. It interrogates the approaches adopted by the courts in considering intoxication in these four roles. Given the divergence of judicial approach to intoxication in sentencing, the paper highlights the necessity of sentencing guidelines in order to attain a measure of predictability and consistency. Consequently, the paper assesses the sentencing guidelines adopted by other jurisdictions in respect of intoxication and the lessons to be drawn from such guidelines.

 Crim Law Forum 35, 289–318 (2024).

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Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines: A Case Study in Policy Transfer

By Arie Freiberg & Julian V. Roberts

Over the past few decades, the traditional, discretionary approach to sentencing has been progressively replaced by structured regimes often administered by sentencing commissions or councils. Sentencing guidelines of one kind or another have proliferated across the common law world and constitute the most significant development in sentencing in a century.

In 1972 Judge Marvin Frankel of the US District Court for the Southern District of New York published a book Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order which sparked a revolution in sentencing in the US that ultimately spread around the world. His brief book provided a trenchant critique of the highly discretionary approach to sentencing which then prevailed in the US and had resulted in widespread unjustified disparity, an absence of proportionality, and racial injustice in sentencing outcomes. He proposed three major solutions to what he described as essentially a “lawless” process: (i) a permanent independent commission on sentencing; (ii) an articulation of policies or guidelines for judges to follow, and (iii) meaningful appellate review. The issues of sentencing guidance, sentencing guidelines and sentencing commissions or councils have been extensively debated in the literature since the publication of Frankel’s book. It is seldom possible to identify with accuracy the origin of an institution or concept which is then adopted, adapted, or rejected by jurisdictions beyond its original scope and geographic boundaries. How has this quiet revolution come about? How and why have the concepts of guidelines and commissions spread so rapidly?

This article examines the creation and subsequent proliferation of sentencing commissions since the establishment of the first commissions in Minnesota and Pennsylvania in 1978. From that date until the present nearly 50 commissions have been proposed, established, disestablished or considered. Much of the literature to date has focused not on the nature of the commissions themselves, but on the forms of their sentencing guidelines. These take two differing approaches, one primarily numerical, the prevailing model in the US, and one primarily narrative, the prevailing model in England and Wales and most other jurisdictions.

We explore the process by which the idea of a sentencing commission and its guidelines has spread to other jurisdictions. This process, referred to as policy transfer, diffusion, transplantation, convergence, translation or policy learning, modelling or borrowing, can provide insight into why a policy innovation in one jurisdiction is emulated or adapted in another, and the means by which such innovations are communicated over time and between jurisdictions. The study of policy transfer or diffusion also requires an analysis of the processes of indigenisation or mutation across jurisdictions.

Overview

Part II of this article examines the nature of sentencing commissions or councils and the very different US and UK models which have inspired other jurisdictions. Part III discusses what is meant by policy transfer or diffusion and the various frameworks used to describe and explain the process. Part IV examines why transfers may occur, what is transferred, the sequence of transfer, who is involved in policy transfer, its mechanisms and the conditions for transfer. Part V examines jurisdictions where they were considered but rejected, Part VI notes policy transfer failures and Part VII provides a conclusion to the article.

Crim Law Forum 34, 87–129 (2023)

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Ending the Presumption of Reasonableness and Using Data to Reduce Sentencing Disparities

By Brandon MordueFollow

The idea that one’s punishment should depend on the crime committed rather than which judge happens to do the sentencing strikes most as uncontroversial, if not a requirement for a fair sentencing regime. Forty years ago, the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act promised just that result. Increased data availability allows us to evaluate the project’s success. The results are not encouraging.

Federal defendants are sentenced using guidelines issued by the United States Sentencing Commission that sometimes bear little relation to the underlying wrongdoing. This has created a split among judges, with some following the guidelines and others rejecting them. The consequences are arbitrariness in sentencing and unwarranted disparities across offenders.

In 2007, the Supreme Court permitted appellate courts to presume the reasonableness of guideline sentences, largely insulating those sentences from judicial review. Much has changed since then, and it is time for the presumption to go. The findings of the original data analysis presented in this Article, as well as developments since the Court’s decision, show that the claims made in support of the presumption are unfounded. In fact, some of the related case law rests upon provably false empirical premises.

Today, most sentences are not within the range set by the guidelines. Favoring the minority of sentences that are within the range results in a sentencing regime incompatible with the overriding statutory aim of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities. Rather than presuming the reasonableness of within-guideline sentences, the courts can chart a course correction by prioritizing the data on actual sentences from the Sentencing Commission. Such a shift would achieve more consistent sentences across offenders convicted of similar crimes.

115 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 133 (2025), 73p.

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