By Thomas Frampton

Supreme Court opinions involving race and the jury invariably open with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, or landmark cases like Strauder v. West Virginia (1880). Legal scholars and historians unanimously report that free people of color did not serve as jurors, in either the North or South, until 1860. In fact, this Article shows, Black men served as jurors in antebellum America decades earlier than anyone has previously realized. While instances of early Black jury service were rare, campaigns insisting upon Black citizens’ admission to the jury-box were not. From the late 1830s onward, Black activists across the country organized to abolish the all-white jury. They faced, and occasionally overcame, staunch resistance. This Article uses jury lists, court records, convention minutes, diaries, bills of sale, tax rolls, and other overlooked primary sources to recover these forgotten efforts, led by activists who understood the jury-box to be both a marker and maker of citizenship. A broader historical perspective—one that centers Black activists in the decades before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868—offers a new way of thinking about the relationship between race, rights, citizenship, and the jury.

 New York University Law Review, 2024, 66 pages

By Nisha Waller and Naima Sakande

In England and Wales, the requirement for a unanimous jury verdict in criminal cases was abolished in 1967, marking a significant departure from a centuries-old legal tradition. Majority verdicts are now common practice, yet no research to date explores the origins of this sudden change to the jury system. In contrast, recent research in the US uncovered a connection between the conception of majority verdicts in Louisiana and Jim Crow era law-making, finding that majority verdicts were strategically introduced to suppress the black juror vote and facilitate quicker convictions to fuel free prison labour. The US Supreme Court later outlawed majority verdicts in a case known as Ramos v. Louisiana, amid recognition of their racist origins. Adopting the critical epistemological position guiding the US research, we consider how race and class underpinned the decision to introduce majority verdicts in England and Wales. Drawing on Home Office files and other archival materials, we find that an increase in eligible jurors from different racial and class backgrounds led to a perceived decline in the ‘calibre’ of jurors – reflective of wider public anxieties about Commonwealth immigration, Black Power and white disenfranchisement. We conclude that a desire to dilute the influence of ‘coloured’ migrants on juries contributed to the introduction of majority verdicts in England and Wales.

Race & Class, online first, 2024.

Edited by Douglas Edlin

Are judges supposed to be objective? Citizens, scholars, and legal professionals commonly assume that subjectivity and objectivity are opposites, with the corollary that subjectivity is a vice and objectivity is a virtue. These assumptions underlie passionate debates over adherence to original intent and judicial activism.

In Common Law Judging, Douglas Edlin challenges these widely held assumptions by reorienting the entire discussion. Rather than analyze judging in terms of objectivity and truth, he argues that we should instead approach the role of a judge's individual perspective in terms of intersubjectivity and validity. Drawing upon Kantian aesthetic theory as well as case law, legal theory, and constitutional theory, Edlin develops a new conceptual framework for the respective roles of the individual judge and of the judiciary as an institution, as well as the relationship between them, as integral parts of the broader legal and political community. Specifically, Edlin situates a judge's subjective responses within a form of legal reasoning and reflective judgment that must be communicated to different audiences.

Edlin concludes that the individual values and perspectives of judges are indispensable both to their judgments in specific cases and to the independence of the courts. According to the common law tradition, judicial subjectivity is a virtue, not a vice.

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016. 281p.

By Brandon L. Garrett; William E. Crozier.; and Rebecca Grady

Forensic examiners regularly testify in criminal cases, informing the jurors whether crime scene evidence likely came from a source. In this study, we examine the impact of providing jurors with testimony further qualified by error rates and likelihood ratios, for expert testimony concerning two forensic disciplines: commonly used fingerprint comparison evidence and a novel technique involving voice comparison. Our method involved surveying mock jurors in Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 897 laypeople) using written testimony and judicial instructions. Participants were more skeptical of voice analysis and generated fewer “guilty” decisions than for fingerprint analysis (B = 2.00, OR = 7.06, p = <0.000). We found that error rate information most strongly decreased “guilty” votes relative to no qualifying information for participants who heard fingerprint evidence (but not those that heard voice analysis evidence; B = 1.16, OR = 0.32, p = 0.007). We also found that error rates and conclusion types led to a greater decrease on “guilty” votes for fingerprint evidence than voice evidence (B = 1.44, OR = 4.23, p = 0.021). We conclude that these results suggest jurors adjust the weight placed on forensic evidence depending on their prior views about its reliability. Future research should develop testimony and judicial instructions that can better inform jurors of the strengths and limitations of forensic evidence.

Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2020

By Charlotte Herriott

This book provides an in-depth examination of current, high-profile debates about the use of sexual history evidence in rape trials and its impact on jurors. In doing so, it presents findings of the first mock jury dataset in England and Wales to explore how jurors interpret, discuss, and rely upon such evidence within their deliberations. Drawing on both qualitative and quantitative insights from the 18 mock jury panels, the book highlights the complex, nuanced and intersectional impact of sexual history evidence within the deliberative ideal. Indeed, findings exemplified routine and ongoing prejudicial framings of sexual history amongst jurors, and frequent endorsement of rape myths that served to mistakenly infer relevance and undermine the perceived credibility of the complainant. The findings discussed within this book are therefore key to addressing the current knowledge gap around the impact of sexual history evidence and are embedded within broader discussions about evidential legitimacy in rape trials. The book draws on good practice observed in other jurisdictions to makes numerous recommendations for change. Aiming to inform academic, policy, and legislative discussions in this area, Sexual History Evidence in Rape Trials will be of great interest to students and scholars of Criminal Law and Criminology, as well as policy makers and legal practitioners.

London; New York: Routledge, 2023. 191p.

Edited by Daniel A. Krauss and Joel D. Lieberman

"Expertise in Court: Perspectives on Testimony" is the second of a two-volume set on the "Psychology of the Courtroom". The authors, a renowned group of psychology and legal scholars, offer definitive coverage of the use of psychological expert testimony and evidence in a variety of legal contexts. They explore the controversies that surround it, from questions of its admissibility to its effects on eventual juror decisions. A wide range of topics are covered including system and estimator variables in eyewitness identification, expert testimony on psychological syndromes, the insanity defence and sexual harassment, how child sexual abuse is used by the courts, and recent research on false confessions. They also provide a comparative analysis exploring how different types of psychological expert testimony and evidence are used by different countries' legal systems. All the chapters conclude by making specific recommendations for how psychological research and information could be better utilized by courts around the world.

Abingtdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2009. 204p.

Edited by Joel D. Lieberman and Daniel A. Krauss

This is the first volume of an important new two-volume work on the Psychology of the Courtroom. Taken together, the two volumes offer a definitive account of the problems created by or influencing courtroom procedure and trial outcome from a psychological perspective. Each volume is also designed to be consulted separately. In "Jury Psychology: Social Aspects of the Trial Processes" a highly respected group of scholars explore the influence of trial procedures on juror decision-making. A wide range of topics are covered including pretrial publicity and inadmissible evidence, jury selection, jury instruction, and death penalty cases, as well as decision-making in civil trials. In addition, a number of global issues are discussed, including procedural justice issues and theoretical models of juror decision-making. A consideration of methodological issues relevant to the study of juror behavior is provided. All of these topics are discussed from a psychological perspective. Throughout the volume the authors make recommendations for improving trial procedures where jurors are involved, and they discuss how the problems and potential solutions are relevant to courts around the world.

Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge. 2009. 240p.