By Jonathan Gu

AIM To estimate the association between judge-alone trials and the probability of acquittal, trial length, and sentence severity. METHOD We compared 5,064 jury and 805 judge-alone criminal trials finalised in the NSW District Court and Supreme Court between January 2011 and December 2019, excluding cases where the defendant entered a guilty plea to their principal offence or had a special verdict of “not guilty by reason of mental illness” (under s. 25 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW)). Entropy balancing was used to match judge-alone cases with jury cases on available covariates. We then estimated the association between trial type (judge-alone vs jury) and four criminal justice outcomes, adjusting for relevant observable factors. The analysis was repeated for two subsets of offences: violent offences and offences with a higher likelihood of having prejudicial elements or complex evidence (prejudicial and complex offences). We also interviewed 12 legal practitioners, including District and Supreme Court judges, prosecutors, and defence lawyers, to identify factors motivating judge-alone applications that may be correlated with the outcomes of interest. RESULTS We estimated that compared to jury trials, judge-alone trials are associated on average with a statistically significant nine percentage point increase in the probability of acquittal and a shorter prison sentence by 7.6 months. Within prejudicial and complex offences, we found that judge-alone trials were associated with a statistically significant decrease in average trial days. Judge-alone trials were also associated with a statistically significant decrease in prison sentence length for the violent offences subgroup. Interviewees suggested that increased use of written submissions may influence both shorter trial length in judgealone matters and reduced prison sentences (i.e., via discounts from efficiencies resulting from pre-trial cooperation or time saved by submitting tendered evidence). Interviewees stated that judge-alone applications in NSW are mostly made in cases with prejudicial elements (e.g., evidence that cannot be separated from prior proven offending) or complex evidence (e.g., cases with substantial scientific or financial evidence). CONCLUSION Judge-alone trials are associated with an increased probability of acquittal, shorter trials, and a shorter prison sentence. However, we cannot determine whether these differences are driven by confounding factors (such as strength of the prosecution’s case) and/or causal factors.

Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2024. 49p.

Edited by Douglas Edlin

Are judges supposed to be objective? Citizens, scholars, and legal professionals commonly assume that subjectivity and objectivity are opposites, with the corollary that subjectivity is a vice and objectivity is a virtue. These assumptions underlie passionate debates over adherence to original intent and judicial activism.

In Common Law Judging, Douglas Edlin challenges these widely held assumptions by reorienting the entire discussion. Rather than analyze judging in terms of objectivity and truth, he argues that we should instead approach the role of a judge's individual perspective in terms of intersubjectivity and validity. Drawing upon Kantian aesthetic theory as well as case law, legal theory, and constitutional theory, Edlin develops a new conceptual framework for the respective roles of the individual judge and of the judiciary as an institution, as well as the relationship between them, as integral parts of the broader legal and political community. Specifically, Edlin situates a judge's subjective responses within a form of legal reasoning and reflective judgment that must be communicated to different audiences.

Edlin concludes that the individual values and perspectives of judges are indispensable both to their judgments in specific cases and to the independence of the courts. According to the common law tradition, judicial subjectivity is a virtue, not a vice.

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016. 281p.

By Brandon L. Garrett, Brett O. Gardner , Evan Murphy, Patrick Grimes

In criminal cases, forensic science reports and expert testimony play an increasingly important role in adjudication. More states now follow a federal reliability standard, which calls upon judges to assess the reliability and validity of scientific evidence. Little is known about how judges view their own background in forensic scientific evidence, and what types of specialized training they receive on it. In this study, we surveyed 164 judges from 39 different U.S. states, who attended past trainings at the National Judicial College. We asked these judges about their background in forensic science, their views concerning the reliability of common forensic disciplines, and their needs to better evaluate forensic science evidence. We discovered that judges held views regarding the scientific support for different forensic science disciplines that were fairly consistent with available literature; their error rate estimates were more supported by research than many estimates by laypersons, who often assume forensic methods are nearly infallible. We did not find any association between how judges rate forensic reliability and prior training. We did, however, find that training corresponded with judges’ views that they should, and do in fact, take on a more active gatekeeping role regarding forensics. Regarding the tools judges need to vet forensic experts and properly evaluate forensic science evidence, they reported having very different backgrounds in relevant scientific concepts and having forensic science education needs. Judges reported needs in accessing better material concerning reliability of forensic science methods. These results support new efforts to expand scientific evidence education in the judiciary.

Forensic Science International. Volume 321, April 2021, 110714