By Hannah Rose and Gina Vale

Also‑called ‘new generation of extremists’ has attracted significant media attention but has suffered from a lack of transparent data and comprehensive, youth‑specific analysis. Against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving threat landscape, this report presents the first in‑depth research into child terrorist activity in England and Wales. Through the construction of a unique dataset of children convicted of terrorism offences in England and Wales since 2016 – published live alongside this report – it investigates how domestic policing and the criminal justice system understand child‑terrorism offending. Key Data Points In the UK since 2016, 43 individuals have been convicted of terrorism offences they committed as minors. Of these, 42 were boys, with only one girl. While the oldest offenders were days before their respective 18th birthdays, the youngest was only 13 years old. Two clear waves of child terrorism offending can be identified. The first, dominated by Islamist cases, runs concurrently with the peak of Islamic State’s territorial ‘caliphate’ until its collapse in 2018. The second wave predominantly comprises extreme‑right cases, emerging in 2018 in the context of post-National Action and the decentralisation of extreme‑right online networks. In total, 16 cases relate to Islamist activity, 25 to the extreme right, and two to unknown or unclear ideologies. Almost a third of the children were convicted of preparing an act of terrorism, including the construction of improvised explosive devices, the plotting of complex mass‑casualty attacks, and attempts by seven children to travel independently overseas for the purpose of engaging in terrorism. Eight children – five extreme right and three Islamist – planned to commit domestic acts of terrorism on UK soil. Eleven minors were convicted of encouraging terrorism, one for providing training for terrorism, one for membership of a banned organisation and one for inviting support for a banned organisation. The most common offence, committed by 26 minors, was the collection of terrorist propaganda. Children created their own propaganda, engaged with violent extremist literature and downloaded operational materials. 19 minors disseminated banned materials with friends, family and anonymous online networks. Proportionally, more extreme right than Islamist offenders pleaded guilty, with many denouncing previously held views, citing adverse childhood experiences, explaining their isolation and desire to fit in with online ecosystems, and claiming childhood innocence. The most common sentence was non‑custodial, accompanied by a rehabilitative and monitoring order, which was handed down to twel  sentence, awarded in two separate Islamist cases, was eleven years to life. The disparity in sentencing between ideological categories may be shaped by four factors: the age at sentencing, greater severity of offence, stronger mitigating circumstances among extreme‑right offenders and a higher proportion of not‑guilty pleas entered by Islamist defendants. A New Threat? Children did not merely mimic the actions or do the bidding of older individuals, but proved to be innovators and amplifiers in their own right. Many attempted and managed to recruit peers and older family members, prepare acts of terrorism without the help of adults, and create their own propaganda images, videos and manifestos. In anonymous transnational online extremist ecosystems, which are widely available and have very low barriers to participation, the potential impact of extremist minors is on a par with adults. Children’s support of terrorist networks presents a new threat. While no attack has been committed by a child in the UK to date, late‑stage foiled plots and transnational activism demonstrate this potentiality. However, children cannot merely be treated as ‘small adults’ with heavily securitised policies. An outcome‑focused system must balance the interests of the public and targeted communities with the best interests of the child to address root causes of radicalisation and secure successful reintegration and threat mitigation.  

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2023. 76p.

By Fionnuala Ratcliffe

Our criminal justice system in its current form is unsustainable. Long court backlogs, few crimes resolved, probation staff shortages. An ever-rising prison population despite prisons costing a disproportionate amount of taxpayer money and not working to reduce reoffending. One problem is that our criminal justice services - prisons, probation, courts, prosecution, and to some extent policing - are incredibly centralized. There is a lack of local ownership for crime prevention and reducing reoffending. Local agencies go cap in hand with the central government for funding, rather than fostering and supporting innovative solutions locally. Another issue is that many of the levers to prevent crime and reoffending - including health, employment, education, and housing - lie outside the criminal justice system. Local actors are not financially incentivized to tackle these drivers and invest to solve problems upstream. Public services work in silos rather than together toward common goals. We can reduce crime and make our communities safer by giving local leaders the right levers and incentives to tackle crime at a local level – by localizing justice services and budgets. What would localized justice services look like? — Delegation of justice budgets for prison places, magistrates’ courts’ administration, policing, prosecution, and probation to police and crime commissioners or mayors — Pooling of criminal justice resources so that local services work together towards a shared aim and share any savings made — Financially incentivizing local services to shift investment upstream from enforcement to prevention, by allowing them to benefit from the savings from investment — Local management of probation and of the administration of magistrates’ courts and the CPS. Prisons and Crown Courts continue to be managed nationally  Prosecutorial and judicial independence are maintained through the continued use of nationally agreed prosecution and sentencing guidelines. — Standards monitored through inspectorate, effective community scrutiny, and a newly created interdepartmental board This paper sets out how localizing criminal justice services will: — Reduce crime — Reduce waste in criminal justice system spending — Increase trust and confidence in the criminal justice system — Improve the experience of victims

2023. 13p.

By Katie Hunter https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7811-5666 k.hunter@mmu.ac.uk, Claire Fitzpatrick https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4662-2342, […], and Julie Shaw

In 2018, the National Protocol on Reducing Unnecessary Criminalisation of Looked-after Children and Care Leavers was published in England. The protocol represented national recognition of the issue and called for local authorities to implement their own agreements. However, the protocol was given no statutory status, which immediately raised questions about its potential impact. Drawing on analysis of 36 local protocols from across England and Wales, this article explores the challenges and possibilities of using local agreements to divert children in care and care leavers away from formal justice systems contact.

Youth Justice Volume 24, Issue 1, April 2024, Pages 53-69

By Nisha Waller and Naima Sakande

In England and Wales, the requirement for a unanimous jury verdict in criminal cases was abolished in 1967, marking a significant departure from a centuries-old legal tradition. Majority verdicts are now common practice, yet no research to date explores the origins of this sudden change to the jury system. In contrast, recent research in the US uncovered a connection between the conception of majority verdicts in Louisiana and Jim Crow era law-making, finding that majority verdicts were strategically introduced to suppress the black juror vote and facilitate quicker convictions to fuel free prison labour. The US Supreme Court later outlawed majority verdicts in a case known as Ramos v. Louisiana, amid recognition of their racist origins. Adopting the critical epistemological position guiding the US research, we consider how race and class underpinned the decision to introduce majority verdicts in England and Wales. Drawing on Home Office files and other archival materials, we find that an increase in eligible jurors from different racial and class backgrounds led to a perceived decline in the ‘calibre’ of jurors – reflective of wider public anxieties about Commonwealth immigration, Black Power and white disenfranchisement. We conclude that a desire to dilute the influence of ‘coloured’ migrants on juries contributed to the introduction of majority verdicts in England and Wales.

Race & Class, online first, 2024.