By Elisabeth Semel, Dagen Downard, Emma Tolman, Anne Weis, Danielle Craig, and Chelsea Hanlock

Racial discrimination is an ever-present feature of jury selection in California. This report investigates the history, legacy, and continuing practice of excluding people of color, especially African Americans, from California juries through the exercise of peremptory challenges. Unlike challenges for cause, each party in a trial has the right to excuse a specific number of jurors without stating a reason and without the court’s approval. In California, peremptory challenges are defined by statute. Historically, the main vice of peremptory challenges was that prosecutors wielded them with impunity to remove African Americans from jury service. These strikes were part and parcel of the systematic exclusion of Blacks from civil society. We found that prosecutors continue to exercise peremptory challenges to remove African Americans and Latinx people from California juries for reasons that are explicitly or implicitly related to racial stereotypes. In 1978, in People v. Wheeler, our state supreme court was the first court in the nation to adopt a three-step procedure intended to reduce prosecutors’ discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Almost a decade later, in Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court approved a similar approach with the goal of ending race-based strikes against African-American prospective jurors. An essential feature of the “Batson/Wheeler procedure” is that it only provides a remedy for intentional discrimination. Thus, at step one, the objecting party must establish a sufficient showing—known as a “prima facie case”—of purposeful discrimination. At step two, if the trial court agrees that the objecting party has made such a showing, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the striking party to give a “race-neutral” reason. At step three, the trial court decides whether the objecting party has established purposeful discrimination. If the court finds that the striking party’s reason was credible, it denies the Batson objection. In his concurring opinion in Batson, Justice Thurgood Marshall warned that Batson’s three-step procedure would fail to end racially discriminatory peremptory strikes. He anticipated that prosecutors would easily be able to produce “race-neutral” reasons at Batson’s second step, and that judges would be ill-equipped to second-guess those reasons. Further, Justice Marshall doubted Batson’s efficacy because the procedure did nothing to curb strikes motivated by unconscious racism—known more often today as implicit bias. Justice Marshall was prescient: 34 years after Batson was decided, prosecutors in California still disproportionately exercise peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans and Latinx people from juries. The Berkeley Law Death Penalty Clinic explored the shortcomings of the Batson procedure. Our report investigates how the California Supreme Court went from a judiciary that championed the eradication of race-based strikes to a court that resists the United States Supreme Court’s limited efforts to enforce Batson. We conclude that Batson is a woefully inadequate tool to end racial discrimination in jury selection.

Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley, School of Law, 2020. 166p.

By Mugambi Jouet

The role of systemic racism in criminal justice is a growing matter of debate in modern Western democracies. The United States’ situation has garnered the most attention given the salience of its racial issues and the disproportionate attention that American society garners around the world. This has obscured major developments in Canadiansociety with great relevance to increasingly diverse Western democracies where minorities are highly over-incarcerated. In recent years, the landmark Anderson and Morris decisions recognized that the systemic racism that Black people face in Canada should be considered as mitigation at sentencing. These historic cases partly stem from the recognition of social-context evidence as mitigation for Indigenous defendants under a groundbreaking 1996 legislative reform that remains little known outside Canada’s borders. While Australia and New Zealand have also recognized certain mitigation principles for Indigenous defendants, Canada is arguably the country that is now making the most concerted effort to tackle systemic racism in criminal punishment.

Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this approach in McCleskey v. Kemp, an influential 1987 precedent holding that statistical proof of systemic racism in sentencing is essentially irrelevant. The situation might someday change in America, as suggested by the Washington State Supreme Court’s 2018 abolition of the death penalty in State v. Gregory, which deviated from McCleskey in accepting evidence of systemic racism. However, Gregory was only decided under state law and it is too early to tell whether more American states will inch toward the developments occurring in Canada.

These ongoing shifts should be situated in a wider historical context, as they do not merely reflect modern debates about systemic racism or Canada-specific matters. This Article captures how they are the next step in the long-term, incremental evolution of criminal punishment in the Western world since the Enlightenment. For generations, the principles of individualization and proportionality have enabled judges to assess mitigation by considering a defendant’s social circumstances. Considering evidence of systemic racism or social inequality as mitigation at sentencing is a logical extension of these principles. The age-old aspiration toward humanity in criminal justice may prove a stepping stone toward tackling the over-incarceration of minorities in modern Western democracies.

New York University Review of Law & Social Change, forthcoming 2023. 60p.

By John William Wertheimer

Race and the Law in South Carolina carefully reconstructs the social history behind six legal disputes heard in the South Carolina courts between the 1840s and the 1940s. The book uses these case studies to probe the complex relationship between race and the law in the American South during a century that included slavery, Reconstruction, and Jim Crow. Throughout most of the period covered in the book, the South Carolina legal system obsessively drew racial lines, always to the detriment of nonwhite people. Occasionally, however, the legal system also provided a public forum—perhaps the region’s best—within which racism could openly be challenged. The book emphasizes how dramatically the degree of legal oppressiveness experienced by Black South Carolinians varied during the century under study, based largely on the degree of Black access to political and legal power. During the era of slavery, both enslaved and nominally “free” Black South Carolinians suffered extreme legal disenfranchisement. They had no political voice and precious little access to legal redress. They could not vote, serve in public office, sit on juries, or testify in court against whites. There were no Black lawyers. Black South Carolinians had essentially no claims-making ability, resulting, unsurprisingly, in a deeply oppressive, thoroughly racialized system. Most of these antebellum legal disenfranchisements were overturned during the post-Civil War era of Reconstruction. In the wake of abolition, Reconstruction-era reformers in South Carolina erased one racial distinction after another from state law. For a time, Black men voted and Black jurors sat in rough proportion to their share of the state’s population. ……

Amherst, MA: Amherst College Press, 2023.  346p.

By Stacey J. Bosick

An analysis of felony cases accepted for prosecution by the Denver District Attorney’s Office in the City and County of Denver REPORT HIGHLIGHTS: • The researcher found racial and ethnic differences across three of the four points of prosecutorial discretion examined: dismissals, deferred judgments, and referrals to drug court. • There was no evidence of racial and ethnic differences in plea offers, the fourth point of prosecutorial discretion examined. • Results of the study demonstrate a persistent set of disadvantages faced by Black and Hispanic defendants. • The findings point to the importance of increasing structures and processes to support racial justice, including collecting and examining data across multiple points of prosecutorial discretion.

Denver: University of Denver, 2021. 44p.

By David Arnold, Will Dobbie, and Peter Hull

 We develop new quasi-experimental tools to measure racial discrimination, due to either racial bias or statistical discrimination, in the context of bail decisions. We show that the omitted variables bias in observational release rate comparisons can be purged by using the quasi-random assignment of judges to estimate average race-specific misconduct risk. We find that approximately two-thirds of the average release rate disparity between white and Black defendants in New York City is due to racial discrimination. We then develop a hierarchical marginal treatment effects model to study the drivers of discrimination, finding evidence of both racial bias and statistical discrimination. Outcome-based tests of racial bias therefore omit an important source of racial discrimination in bail decisions, and cannot be used to rule out all possible violations of U.S. anti-discrimination law.   

Chicago: University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics, Working Paper, 2020. 83p.

By Sara Bastomski, Matt Herman, Alison Martin and Sara Friedman

Between April 2021 and February 2022, The Council of State Governments (CSG) Justice Center conducted an analysis of racial equity across Montana’s criminal justice system in partnership with Montana judicial branch stakeholders. This work identified decision-making points in Montana’s criminal justice system in which there are disparities between American Indian and White people. Key findings include American Indian people are more likely to be incarcerated for felony criminal endangerment and public order offenses relative to comparable White people; American Indian people are incarcerated for longer than similarly situated White people; and American Indian people are more likely to be revoked from probation, conditional release, and parole than comparable White people. Based on these findings, the CSG Justice Center proposed five recommendations to improve racial equity in Montana’s criminal justice system.

New York: Council of State Governments (CSG) Justice Center, 2022. 49p.

By Michael J. Lynch and E. Britt Patterson.

Collection of original and authoritative articles covering role and definition of race in criminal justice research, bias crimes, race and policing, juvenile justice, and much more. CONTENTS: 1. Law, Justice, and "Americans": An Historical Overview/Bailey. 2./Garofalo. 3.Minorities and the Police/Smith,Graham and Adams. 4.Bias in Formalized Bail Procedures/Patterson and Lynch. 5. Ethnic, Racial, and Minority Disparity in Felony Court Processing/ Farnworth,Teske and Thurmond. 6. Race and the Death Penalty in the United States/ Bohm. 7.The Over-representation of Blacks in Florida'sJuvenile Justice System/Tollett and Close. 8. American Indians and Criminal Justice/ Zatz, Chiago, Lujan and Snyder-Joy. 9. An Examination of Ethnic Bias in a Correctional Setting:The case of the Mariel Cubans/Clark .10. Racial Codes in Prison Culture/Thomas. RECOMMENDED: Adopted widely throughout the United States for courses on Race and Crime or Criminal Justice. The comprehensive coverage, avoidance of ideological jargon, and use of scientifically controlled studies makes this text is excellent for class use. Use with companion volume, "Justice with Prejudice," which examines the criminal justice management and personnel side of Race and Criminal Justice, and uses a more qualitative and theoretical approach.

Harrow and Heston Publishers. 1985. 205p.