By Lord Verdirame KC and Professor Richard Ekins KC (Hon)

The International Criminal Court Act 2001 is an Act to give effect to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (the ICC Statute or Rome Statute). Part 2 of the Act makes provision for the arrest, detention and delivery up to the International Criminal Court (ICC) of persons against whom the ICC has issued an arrest warrant. But section 23 of the Act does not allow any action under Part 2 of the Act to be taken in relation to a person to whom state or diplomatic immunity attaches by reason of a connection with a state that is not a State party to the Rome Statute. The only exceptions to this limitation are if (a) the ICC obtains a waiver from that state or (b) the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) makes a resolution. The ICC has issued an arrest warrant against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel. Israel is not a State party to the Rome Statute and has not waived state or diplomatic immunity. There is no relevant UNSC resolution. As a matter of customary international law, a Head of Government is entitled to absolute immunity against arrest. For this reason, it would be unlawful, as a matter of UK law and international law, to attempt to arrest Prime Minister Netanyahu. If the Government were to attempt to comply with the arrest warrant it would be acting beyond the parameters of the powers conferred on it by an Act of Parliament and would be violating the UK’s obligations in international law to respect state or diplomatic immunity. To the extent that the Government has indicated that it would attempt to execute an arrest warrant, its actions warrant strong denunciation. Any court hearing an application from the Secretary of State under Part 2 of the Act should reject the application on the grounds that it is incompatible with section 23 and with the rules about state or diplomatic immunity incorporated into and having effect in UK law

London: Policy Exchange, 2024. 17p.

By Brian Johnson, Kiminori Nakamura, Lydia Becker, Raquel Hernandez

Firearms violence is a major policy concern in America. How criminal courts address firearm crimes represents a critical opportunity for improving public safety. The overwhelming majority of criminal cases are settled by guilty plea, yet little is known about the ways that plea deals impact criminal punishment for firearms-involved offenders, or how they shape subsequent recidivism. This project investigates the association between plea bargaining, sentencing, and recidivism outcomes in state-wide sample of firearms-involved offenders. It provides a descriptive overview of case characteristics and outcomes in firearms cases, examines the scope and impact of plea bargaining for these offenses, and considers how plea discounts potentially impact future reoffending. Findings indicate that plea negotiations are common in firearms-related offenses – a majority of cases involve multiple filed charges but a single conviction charge, and more than half of all cases include a reduction in the severity of the top charge between filing and conviction. The mean distance traveled, or average magnitude of plea discounts, results in a significant reduction in the likelihood of incarceration and expected sentence lengths. Results also reveal significant relationships between plea discounts and recidivism. Defendants who are convicted and sentenced to longer incarceration terms have lower odds of coming back into the system for a new offense, whereas those who receive charge reductions and are given larger plea discounts are more likely to recidivate during our study period. Because average sentences in firearms cases are substantial, and because our follow-up period is limited, these results likely reflect the short-term incapacitation effects of lengthier incarceration terms. Overall, the current study suggests there may be significant public safety implications of plea discounts in firearms cases, though future research is needed before strong policy recommendations can be offered.

College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2024. 88p.

Edited by Andrea Krizsán

Domestic violence, one of the most prevalent forms of gender-based violence, is a policy ield where spectacular progress took place worldwide in the last decades. Importantly the issue was put on the policy agenda across diferent regions and countries almost invariably by women’s movements (Htun and Weldon 2012). Awareness of domestic violence as a policy issue which needs state intervention has also showed spectacular progress in the last decade or so in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, considerable variety emerges in the achieved policy outputs and the extent to which these outputs are gender equality sensitive and serve the interests of women victims/survivors (Krizsan and Popa 2014). his volume asks how this variation can be connected to women’s movements in the region. Is women’s rights advocacy and autonomous women’s organizing an equally important component of progress in countries of this region?

The literature on women’s movements in the region has widely discussed their weakness and dependency on foreign donors, in the context of transition to democracy. Weak capacity to mobilize as well as to generate policy change, vulnerability to the inluence of foreign donor agendas, as well as the wide refusal of the feminist label because of its association with the communist project, were among the reasons for skepticism. he very existence and potential of women’s movements was sometimes questioned (McBride and Mazur 2010, Stetson and Mazur 1995, Jaquette and Wolchik 1998, Rueschemeyer 1993, Einhorn 1993). Even though major progress in policies advancing women’s rights took place in the irst two decades after the transition, two main caveats were attached to this progress. On the one hand, the newly adopted policies were attributed to international influence coming from global and regional human rights instruments as well as conditionality linked to European Union accession, rather than women’s rights activism and women’s movements’ mobilization (Avdeyeva 2007, Miroiu 2004). On the other hand, research has shown that many policies were adopted for window-dressing purposes, their implementation failed, was limited or oppositional to the initial gender equality intents, thus, ultimately minimizing their potential for gender transformation. Indeed, gender policies remained largely disconnected from domestic realities and domestic women’s rights advocacy.

While these trends may apply in general terms to post-communist countries, recent research has challenged the idea of regional homogeneity and is increasingly pointing to diversity in terms of gender equality policy processes and their outputs across the diferent countries of the region (Krizsan et al. 2010). In some countries of the region there is a staggering lack of gender equality progress, while other countries are deinitely faring better, adopting better policies, having more participatory policy processes and as a result are better at implementing gender policies. Furthermore, some gender policy issues are discussed more than others, and some bring more gender equality progress than others. Some gendered issues are discussed in more gendered ways, others in either non-gendered or outright hostile ways. he signiicant variation between countries points to the crucial inluence of domestic factors on gender policy change: most importantly for this volume the signiicance of domestic women’s movements and their interactions with domestic structures.

This volume aims to contribute to the debate on gender policy change in Central and Eastern Europe by placing the emphasis on the importance and relevance of domestic policy dynamics, and primarily domestic women’s rights advocacy vis-a-vis the state for understanding gender equality policy change in various countries of the region. It aims to challenge the general understanding about the weakness and lack of capacity of women’s groups for successfully advocating for policy change, and to highlight various domestic dynamics in diferent countries that have led to gender equality sensitive change and success. Our starting point in the volume is that diverse women’s movements exist in the region, and that they are the main protagonists of policy change in this ield in multiple and diferently eicient ways.

Central European University in 2012-2013.

By Scottish Government, Safer Communities Directorate

This paper presents a review of quantitative evidence on women in the justice system. It is drawn from a range of data sources, of which the most prominent are Official Statistics produced by the Scottish Government's Justice Analytical Services.

Whilst the analysis in this paper seeks to highlight (and quantify) the differences and similarities between women and men in the justice system, it does not by itself explain why these may exist. Social research and other qualitative evidence would be more appropriate in providing further context for this. For example, qualitative research with victims-survivors of rape and sexual assault as they journey through the justice system in Scotland is available from the Scottish Centre for Crime & Justice Research[1]. Qualitative evidence which provides an insight into the impact of Coronavirus (COVID-19) restrictions on people experiencing domestic abuse and other forms of violence against women and girls is available on the Scottish Government website[2].

Key findings from these statistics are that:

• Women account for a much smaller proportion of those involved across Scotland's justice system than men (for example prosecutions, convictions, people in prison). This pattern has been constant over time, and is similar to what is seen in other parts of the UK[3].

• Women and men tend to experience crime in different ways, with a significant factor being the type of crime experienced, including violence. Women are much more likely to experience sexual victimisation and to be victims of partner abuse, while men are more likely to experience serious non-sexual violence (such as homicide and serious assault).

• Feelings of safety have improved over the longer term for women, but have remained consistently behind those of men. This may, at least in part, explain why a greater proportion of women are worried about experiencing crime than men – despite actual experiences of overall crime victimisation being similar for both women and men in Scotland.

• Women represent a minority of those convicted of a crime and of the prison population in Scotland, a feature that is consistent over time. Women also tend to be convicted of different types of crime when compared to men.

• Women generally receive shorter sentences than men, are less likely to receive a custodial sentence and are reconvicted less often on average.

• Looking at views on the criminal justice system, women are less confident in the system than men on a number of measures asked about in the Scottish Crime and Justice Survey (for example, confidence that the criminal justice system allows all those accused of crimes to get a fair trial regardless of who they are).

• Justice organisations in Scotland show a mixed picture in terms of their workforce composition. Generally, females continue to make up a minority of more senior roles across the board. While there is targeted effort within organisations in terms of improving diversity, some continue to have a widely male dominated workforce, while others have female employees as the clear majority of their staff.

Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2022. 34p.

By Nisha Waller

The legal dragnet examines the law and prosecution practice concerning secondary liability, often referred to as 'joint enterprise'. Focusing on homicide cases, it highlights the risks posed by the current ambiguous law and makes a case for creating a safer framework for prosecution.

The report finds joint enterprise laws are vague and wide in scope, causing systemic injustice, including overcriminalisation, over punishment, discriminatory outcomes, and convictions where there is no compelling evidence of intent and a defendant’s physical contribution is minimal.

In particular, the current law:

• was not ‘fixed’ by the Supreme Court in 2016.

• does not have clear parameters on secondary parties’ conduct and contribution to an offence.

• lacks clarity about what counts as assistance and encouragement (the latter in particular).

Under the current vague law, suspects are routinely charged and cases constructed with an absence of rigour, quality, and precision as to the role of each defendant. The law encourages:

• the police and Crown Prosecution Service to charge suspects based on poor-quality evidence.

• ‘storytelling’ and highly speculative prosecution case theory to take precedence over strong evidentiary foundations.

• the use of gang narratives and vague concepts such as ‘in it together’ to construct collective intent. The risks of legal vagueness are particularly borne by young Black men and teenagers, who are most likely to be labelled and stereotyped as gang members.

Given the gravity and long-standing nature of concerns about the current law, the scope of secondary liability law needs to be narrowed in favour of a clearer and safer legal framework. Preventing wrongful convictions and their grave implications should take priority over the ease of prosecution.

The government must make good on their commitment to reform the laws of secondary liability as soon as is practically possible.

A minimum next step is for the government to request a Law Commission review. In addition to legal reform, urgent action is required regarding the various unjust processes that have flourished under the current vague law, highlighted in this report, particularly police and Crown Prosecution Service charging decisions, the overuse and misuse of gang evidence, and speculative and far-reaching prosecution case theory

Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2024. 32p.

By Phoebe Donnelly, Dyan Mazurana, and Evyn Papworth

Peacekeeping missions. In reality, however, many women (and some men) deployed as military or police peacekeepers are subjected to sexual abuse by other members of the organizations they serve. Until now, there has been little research specifically focused on this sexual abuse by uniformed peacekeepers against their peacekeeping colleagues. This paper helps fill that gap, drawing on a survey of peacekeepers as well as data from interviews and a closed-door workshop. T his research reveals that sexual abuse is a major threat to uniformed peacekeepers, especially women. Among all survey participants, approximately one in ten said they experienced sexual abuse while serving in a peacekeeping mission, while a similar proportion witnessed sexual abuse against another peacekeeper. The proportion was significantly higher for women (28 percent experienced and 26 percent witnessed) than for men (2 percent experienced and 4 percent witnessed). A large share of the incidents of abuse were perpetrated by higher-ranking men within the mission. The main factor enabling this abuse was the internal organizational cultures of the police and military forces of troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs). Despite the prevalence of sexual abuse within peacekeeping missions, the UN and T/PCCs have not put in place adequate policies to effectively respond to the issue. This lack of attention is in contrast to the relatively robust architecture for reporting on and investigating sexual exploitation and abuse of host communities. Policies and attention to the sexual abuse of peacekeepers and sexual exploitation and abuse of host communities have been artificially separated, but these forms of abuse are fueled by similar dynamics of militarism and inequality. The responsibility for addressing sexual abuse within peacekeeping operations lies both with T/PCCs and with the UN, which should require the highest standards for behavior within peacekeeping missions. Existing systems for addressing sexual exploitation and abuse of host communities are generally not designed for or used to address sexual abuse of peacekeepers. As a result, peacekeepers have little confidence in mechanisms for reporting sexual abuse that they experience or witness against their colleagues. Moreover, when incidents are reported, the prevailing sentiment is that perpetrators are not held accountable due to a culture of impunity within peacekeeping missions. Because current systems are insufficient and ineffective, women peacekeepers often have to protect themselves and respond to sexual abuse on their own. If the UN and T/PCCs do not prevent and respond to sexual abuse and dismantle the patriarchal cultures that enable it, their initiatives to increase women’s meaningful participation in peacekeeping operations will fail. The UN needs to take the sexual abuse of peacekeepers as seriously as it takes peacekeepers’ sexual exploitation and abuse of host communities, especially considering the interconnected systemic causes of both types of abuse. Toward this end, the UN and T/PCCs could consider the following recommendations: 1. Transform the organizational cultures that enable sexual abuse of peacekeepers: Because they have a particularly important role to play in changing the organizational culture, mission leaders should be evaluated, in part, based on whether they create and maintain a diverse, tolerant, inclusive, safe, secure, and respectful workplace. 2. Mandate robust training to prevent sexual abuse of peacekeepers: The UN should ensure that all peacekeepers receive thorough training specifically focused on all forms of sexual abuse within militarized organizations. 3. Require T/PCCs to address sexual abuse of peacekeepers within their contingents: Among other steps, the UN should update memoranda of understanding with T/PCCs to include explicit language on preventing and addressing the sexual abuse of peacekeepers. 4. Create a robust, confidential, and victim-centric reporting and investigation infrastructure: The UN should build the capacity of existing mechanisms for addressing sexual abuse of host communities to also address sexual abuse of peacekeepers. This system must be outside of the peacekeeping mission and T/PCCs’ chain of command.

New York: International Peace Institute 2022. 34p.

By Jennifer Skeem, Lina Montoya, Christopher Lowenkamp

IN THE U.S., many jurisdictions are trying to reduce incarceration by improving pretrial decision-making. The pretrial decision is either to release the defendant until the court date or keep the defendant in jail to prevent re-offending or absconding. Rates of pretrial detention can be remarkably high, particularly in the federal system. There, the majority of defendants are detained before trial, even though less than 10 percent are arrested for a new crime or fail to appear while on pretrial release (Cohen & Austin, 2018; see also Rowland, 2018). Pretrial detention has serious consequences, including an increased likelihood of conviction, a harsh sentence, future re-offending, and unemployment (Dobbie et al., 2018; Leslie & Pope, 2017; Lowenkamp, 2022; Oleson et al., 2017). These consequences, in turn, are disproportionately borne by Black defendants (Didwania, 2021; Dobbie et al., 2018; Kutateladze et al., 2014; Leslie & Pope, 2017). Based on a sample of over 337,000 defendants drawn from 80 federal districts, Didwania (2021) found that 68 percent of Black defendants were detained - - - - - pretrial, compared to 51 percent of White defendants. Increasingly, efforts to improve pretrial decision-making include the goal of reducing racial disparities. In pursuing this goal, stakeholders probably assume that personal bias is to blame—i.e., that racial disparities in pretrial detention reflect the influence of implicit racism on human decision-making, and therefore that (perhaps) diversity training for practitioners would prevent such discrimination (see Devine & Ash, 2022). The majority of Americans frame racism as an interpersonal rather than structural problem—meaning that they focus on “a few bad apples” who discriminate, rather than on laws, policies, and systems that have a disparate impact (Rucker & Richeson, 2021). But disparities can also reflect “upstream” structural forces like socioeconomic and geographic conditions that lead to racial differences in the likelihood of rearrest or failure to appear. Black defendants tend to have more serious criminal histories and other potential risk factors for poor pretrial outcomes than White defendants (Didwania, 2021; Grossman et al., 2022; Spohn, 2008). Because risk of rearrest or flight are legitimate considerations for pretrial release, disparities related to differences in risk are hard to address via pretrial reform. Efforts to address disparities that flow from these kinds of structural forces would better be directed toward approaches like well-timed and well-targeted early prevention programs. In short, understanding the extent to which structural factors play a role in racial disparities is a matter of primary concern for shaping effective solutions (see Beck & Blumstein, 2018). In this study, we use federal data to explore the association between place—in this case U.S. district and geographic region—and racial disparities in pretrial officers’ recommendations for detention. We focus on officers’ recommendations in the federal system for three reasons. First, pretrial officers play a central role in assisting federal judges with the pretrial release decision, and officers’ detention recommendations strongly predict detention itself (see below, Pretrial Recommendation Context). Second, we conducted this work with the Probation and Pretrial Services Office of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, as part of their effort to reduce disparities by specifying targets for change. Third, the vastness and diversity of the federal system provide a unique opportunity to characterize the districts and regions of the U.S. where racial disparities in pretrial detention are greatest, so that they can be prioritized in problem-solving efforts. The federal system encompasses 93 districts that differ geographically, socially, and culturally—but they are governed by a common set

Federal Probation, 2022.

By The United States Sentencing Commission

This report examines variations in sentencing practices—and corresponding variations in sentencing outcomes—in the federal courts since the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in United States v. Booker. The United States Sentencing Commission analyzed the sentencing practices of federal district judges in 30 major cities located throughout the country to determine the extent of the judges’ variations in imposing sentences in relation to the city average. This report is the second in a series of reports updating the analyses and findings of the Commission’s 2012 Report on the Continuing Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing.

Washington, DC: United States Sentencing Commission, 2019. 138p.

By Vera M. Kachnowski and Amanda Russell

 In 2016, the United States Sentencing Commission promulgated an amendment that comprehensively revised the guideline covering illegal reentry offenses—§2L1.2 (Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States). The amendment, Amendment 802, became effective November 1, 2016, and represented the most comprehensive revision of a major guideline in the last two decades. This report examines the impact of Amendment 802 by looking back at sentencings under §2L1.2 over the last ten fiscal years. The report first describes the concerns leading to the amendment, including that §2L1.2’s 12- and 16-level increases were overly severe and led to variances, and that using the “categorical approach” to apply enhancements was overly complex, resource intensive, and increased litigation and uncertainty. After outlining the changes made by Amendment 802, the report assesses its impact on guideline application for §2L1.2 offenders and on appeals involving §2L1.2.

Washington, DC: United States Sentencing Commission, 2022. 38p.

By Somjen Frazer, Richard Saenz, Andrew Aleman, and Laura Laderman

OUR VOICE IS OUR POWER: In 2022, Lambda Legal, in partnership with Black and Pink National, launched the Protected and Served? community survey. With this project, we aimed to learn more about the experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer/questioning (LGBTQ+) people and people living with HIV with the criminal legal system, to assess these communities’ levels of trust in government institutions, and to create a new resource for community members, advocates, policymakers, and researchers for LGBTQ+ and HIV liberation.

This report describes the findings of Protected and Served?. In addition to asking structured questions that provide a quantitative (numerical) account of the participants’ experiences, the survey also asked for qualitative data (open-ended questions); these answers were analyzed systematically, and the qualitative findings are included throughout the report.1 Protected and Served? focuses on the widespread harm caused to LGBTQ+ people and people living with HIV by the criminal legal system, including the adult carceral system, immigration system, juvenile systems, the courts, and schools. The report also examines intersectional disparities within these impacted groups of people.

Lambda Delta, 2022. 82p.

By Maine Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

The Maine Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights submits this report regarding indigent legal services in Maine. The Committee submits this report as part of its responsibility to study and report on civil rights issues in the state. The contents of this report are primarily based on testimony the Committee heard during public meetings held via video-conference on October 20, 2022; November 15, 2022; and December 15, 2022. The Committee also includes related testimony submitted in writing during the relevant period of public comment.

This report begins with a brief background of the issues to be considered by the Committee. It then presents primary findings as they emerged from this testimony, as well as recommendations for addressing areas of civil rights concerns. This report is intended to focus on civil rights concerns regarding the right to legal defense for indigent persons. While additional important topics may have surfaced throughout the Committee’s inquiry, those matters that are outside the scope of this specific civil rights mandate are left for another discussion.

Washington, DC: USCCR, 2023. 32p.

By Clare Anderson & Martin Halliwell

This article considers the intersecting geographical, social, medical and political frameworks necessary to construct an understanding of mental health in Guyanese prisons, historically and in the present day. Taking an interdisciplinary approach to integrate archives, modern records and interviews, it looks first at colonial and independent state management of mental health impacts with respect to sentencing, incarceration and rehabilitation. It moves on to reflect on recent efforts to provide co-ordinated policies and practices at national level to tackle more effectively moderate to severe mental health conditions. Here it shows that, as in the colonial period, prisoners and prison officials are typically neglected. Overall, our appreciation of the importance of what we term the coloniality of incarceration and public health enables us to deepen an understanding of the development and ongoing significance of approaches to mental ill health in the modern state, following Guyana's independence from colonial rule in 1966.

United States, The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice. 2022, 19pg

By Paul Heaton

Today we know much more about the effects of pretrial detention than we did even five years ago. Multiple empirical studies have emerged that shed new light on the far-reaching impacts of bail decisions made at the earliest stages of the criminal adjudication process.1 This new evidence calls into question longstanding approaches to managing pretrial risk that provide limited due process protection and emphasize cash bail. Making appropriate decisions about who to release pretrial and under what conditions requires an understanding of the impacts of particular bail requirements. For example, for a given defendant, how would their risk of failure to appear (“FTA”) or future criminal activity change if they were subjected to condition A (which might include preventative detention) versus condition B (which might include an alternative to detention, such as text message reminders of scheduled court appearances)? Armed with such information, decisionmakers could appropriately balance society’s dual interest in preserving public safety and holding the accused accountable with defendants’ liberty interests. However, until recently, the actual evidence necessary to analyze the trade-off described above has been virtually nonexistent, leading judges and magistrates to rely on a combination of personal experience (possibly including conscious or unconscious bias), heuristics, and local norms in formulating their bail decisions. One reason it has been so difficult to develop good evidence of the effects of pretrial detention is because the bail system, when operating as intended, sorts defendants in a manner that limits the value of the outcome data it produces for demonstrating whether and how bail conditions matter. In general,  because bail conditions are typically assigned based on perceived defendant risk, if we observe elevated violation rates for defendants with condition A versus condition B, it is difficult to determine empirically whether this reflects an adverse causal effect of condition A or simply the fact that those assigned condition A were different from those assigned condition B to begin with. For example, proponents of cash bail often cite low FTA rates among those released with assistance from commercial bonding agents and argue from such statistics that private bondsmen are a necessary component of the system to manage nonappearance risk.2 However, comparing FTA rates for those with and without commercial sureties is misleading. To maximize profits, commercial operations have an incentive to accept only clients who are at low risk of nonappearance in the same way that an auto insurer would make money by identifying and then insuring only the safest drivers.3 Thus, low FTA rates might simply reflect defendant sorting and tell policymakers little about commercial sureties’ effectiveness. The new generation of pretrial detention studies addresses this difficulty and provides a much stronger footing on which to base legal decisions and criminal justice policy. Recent studies improve upon past work in at least three respects. First, they make use of large administrative datasets, typically involving the near universe of criminal offenses within a particular jurisdiction, allowing researchers to describe the functioning of the criminal justice system as a whole rather than generalizing from a few specific incidents or cases. Second, they carefully consider the problem of differentiating correlation from causation, making use of natural experiments to measure the causal effects of detention and resolving the sorting problem described above. Finally, they consider a broader range of outcomes, focusing not just on the resolution of the case at hand, but on long-term ramifications, such as future criminal activity, earnings, and unemployment. The takeaway from this new generation of studies is that pretrial detention has substantial downstream effects on both the operation of the criminal justice system and on defendants themselves, causally increasing the likelihood of a conviction, the severity of the sentence, and, in some jurisdictions, defendants’ likelihood of future contact with the criminal justice system. Detention also reduces future employment and access to social safety nets. This growing evidence of pretrial detention’s high costs should give impetus to reform efforts that increase due process protections to ensure detention is limited to only those situations where it is truly necessary and identify alternatives to detention that can better promote court appearance and public safety.   

United States, North Carolina Law Review. 2020, 11pg

By Hedwig Lee

I describe how cultural and structural racism operate the entire contemporary American criminal justice system via five features: devaluation of certain human lives, ubiquitous adaptation, networked structure, perceived neutrality, and temporal amnesia. I draw from specific historical and contemporary examples in policing, courts, and corrections to further emphasize the foundational nature of racism and its role in shaping racial/ethnic inequities not just in relationship to criminal justice outcomes but also in relationship to health, economic, and social well-being.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 233 - 255

By Ali Rowhani-Rahbar, Amy Gallagher, Deborah Azrael , and Matthew Miller 

Little is known about the frequency and features of firearm carrying among adult handgun owners in the United States. In fact, over the past 30 years, only a few peer-reviewed national surveys, conducted in 1994, 1995, 1996, and 2015, have provided even the most basic information about firearm carrying frequency.1–4 Since the first of these surveys, reasons offered by firearm owners for why they own firearms have shifted from hunting and sports shooting toward personal protection. In 1994, for example, 46% of firearm owners reported owning firearms for protection2; by 2015, that number had reached 65%,5 and, by 2019, it had reached 73%.6 As personal protection became the predominant motivation for owning firearms, handgun ownership increased disproportionately from 64% in 1994 to 83% in 2021.2,7

These trends have been accompanied by a loosening of state laws governing who can carry handguns in public places. State laws regulating concealed handgun carrying are typically divided into the following types: (1) permitless: no permit is required; (2) shall issue: the issuing authority is required to grant a permit to anyone who meets certain minimal statutory requirements with no or limited discretion; (3) may issue: the issuing authority has substantial discretion to approve or deny a concealed carry permit to an applicant.8 In 1990, only 1 state allowed permitless handgun carry; at the time of this writing, that number had risen to 21.8

To our knowledge, the only contemporary national estimates of handgun carrying among US adults come from the National Firearms Survey in 2015 (NFS-2015). NFS-2015 found that 23.5% of adult handgun owners (9 million adults) had carried a loaded handgun on their person in the month before the survey; of those, 34.5% (3 million) had done so every day.4 Of handgun owners who carried, 4 in 5 carried primarily for protection, 4 in 5 had a concealed carry permit, 2 in 3 always carried concealed, and 1 in 10 always carried openly.4 The prevalence of handgun carrying was similar in states with permitless carry laws and states with shall issue carry laws. By contrast, the prevalence of carrying was notably lower in states with may issue carry laws.4

In the current study (NFS-2019), we used nationally representative survey data collected from July 30, 2019, to August 11, 2019, to update information pertaining to the proportion of handgun owners who carried a handgun over the previous month (and, of those, the fraction who carried daily), the characteristics of those who carried, and the prevalence of handgun carrying by handgun owners in states that did versus did not require a permit for concealed carrying at the time of the survey.

United States, American Journal of Public Health. 2022, 8pg

By Everytown for Gun Safety and Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions 

Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) laws create an opportunity to intervene and prevent firearm violence when there are warning signs that an individual poses a risk of harm to self or others. While ERPO laws are relatively new, a growing body of research demonstrates the potential for these laws to prevent firearm violence, particularly firearm suicide, and multiple victim/mass shootings. Interest in ERPO laws has increased in recent years, with 16 states having enacted these laws between 2018 and 2023. Implementation varies widely across and within states. As a result of strong ERPO implementation efforts in some jurisdictions, more information is now available for state and local leaders about how to implement and adapt ERPO laws for their own communities. In addition, the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act of 2022 included $750 million in new federal grant funding for states, some of which is designated to support ERPO implementation. To meet this moment, the Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund and the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions have partnered to compile this guide of the best available practices and promising approaches to effective implementation of extreme risk laws. These recommendations are informed by conversations with individuals who are pioneering ERPO implementation, in addition to the best practices shared at a December 2022 convening of ERPO leaders from around the country.   

New York: Everytown for Gun Safety. 2023, 52pg

By Andrew Willinger

Extreme Risk Protection Orders (ERPOs) are civil court orders that temporarily prohibit gun purchase and possession by people who are behaving dangerously and at risk of committing imminent violence. As of September 2023, ERPOs are available in 21 states and the District of Columbia. This Article presents an overview of ERPO laws, the rationale behind their development, and a review and analysis that considers emerging constitutional challenges to these laws (under both the Second Amendment and due process protections) in the post-Bruen era. This Article notes that the presence of multiple constitutional challenges in many ERPOrelated cases has confused judicial analysis and argues that, especially in light of Bruen’s novel text, history, and tradition test, courts should be especially careful to clarify how cumulative-rights arguments are impacting their analysis. An examination of Second Amendment court decisions concerning another type of civil protection order, Domestic Violence Protection Orders, informs the approach used to further consider ERPO rights deprivation claims and the constitutionally relevant distinctions among different civil dispossession proceedings. The Article further considers the state of ERPO law in the context of the evolving evidence documenting the uptake and impact of ERPOs on gun violence in the United States, including a review of scholarship that seeks to  understand how ERPO statutes are being implemented and to determine whether the laws prevent interpersonal gun violence and suicide. Finally, this Article concludes with a commentary and set of recommendations to inform the practice and future scholarship of ERPO as a tool for preventing gun violence in the United States, in accord with constitutional protections in the post-Bruen age.

United States, Number 1 Public Health, History, and the Future Of Gun Regulation after Bruen. 2023, 64pg

By Rebecca Valek, Cassandra Crifasi, and Alex McCourt 

Gun violence rates in the U.S. have reached all-time highs in recent years.1 Overall, in 2022, more than 48,000 Americans died by guns.2 Since 2019, the rate of gun deaths in the U.S increased 21%.3 These increases in gun deaths have especially impacted young Americans.4 Between 2013 and 2022, rates of gun deaths among children and teens increased 87%.5 Nearly 4,600 American youth (aged 1–19) were killed by guns in 2022, fueled by increases in both homicide and suicide.6 Increased deaths have prompted Americans to call for legislative action.7 Despite the growth in dissatisfaction with U.S. gun laws and high levels of support for stricter gun legislation, some gun laws have become more permissive in the past two decades, particularly in states with Republican majorities.8 Supreme Court decisions have accelerated this shift, beginning with District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008, which expanded the understanding of the Second Amendment to include an individual right to own handguns for self-defense, and McDonald v. City of Chicago in 2010, which held that the Second Amendment applies to state and local governments.9 These decisions, along with the 2022 decision preventing states from requiring proper cause to obtain concealed carry licenses in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen, have expanded gun rights and limited the abilities of state legislatures and Congress to regulate gun violence.10 John Feinblatt, president of the nonprofit gun violence prevention advocacy group Everytown for Gun Safety, described the Bruen decision as “out of step with the bipartisan majority in Congress that is on the verge of passing significant gun safety legislation, and out of touch with the overwhelming majority of Americans who support gun safety measures.”11 At a time when gun violence has become the leading cause of death of Americans under 20 years old, the successful enactment and implementation of such highly supported policy is essential.12 Public opinion can directly affect legislative and executive actions and, while the effect on the judiciary may be less clear, there is often a connection between public opinion and court decisions.13 Many scholars have noted a significant influence of public mood and public opinion on the decisions of the Supreme Court.14 The Supreme Court’s sociological legitimacy, a term used by legal scholars to refer to the public’s view and respect of the Court, depends largely on the extent to which the Court’s decisions align with public opinion.15 When the Court’s decisions are affected by public opinion to promote sociological legitimacy, the Court’s legal legitimacy — or its Justices’ consistent application of their preferred approach to interpreting the law — may be diminished.16 In Bruen, the majority of the justices adopted an approach that uses elements from originalism and textualism without adhering completely to either.17 The Bruen standard requires courts to evaluate gun laws by looking to text, history, and tradition to determine whether the law at issue is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”18 To date, very few courts have evaluated age-restrictive gun laws, but legislatures continue to adopt new gun laws and courts, including the Supreme Court, are hearing new Second Amendment-related challenges.19 Public opinion will play a role in this process. The views of the public — both nationwide and in specific constituencies — may affect what gun policies are introduced and enacted by legislators, what laws are challenged in court, and what decisions courts reach in those challenges. In addition, as courts continue to grapple with Bruen and its standards, public opinion — whether historical or modern — may shape how judges think about history and tradition. Age-related gun laws may be of particular interest as rates of gun violence among youth have elevated and government officials evaluate existing laws and explore new laws in their search for solutions.    

United States, Fordham Urb. L.J. 117. 2023, 40pg

By Bernadeta Lelonek-Kuleta

Despite the abandonment of the criterion of committing illegal acts in the diagnosis of pathological gambling in fifth edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), research confirms the significant link between crime, gambling, and gambling addiction. In Poland, this connection is observed by psychologists working in the prison service, who simultaneously report the need for more structured interactions that would solve gambling problems among prisoners. The lack of any data on the involvement of persons committing crimes in gambling in Poland formed the basis for the implementation of a survey of gambling behaviour and gambling problems among male offenders in Polish correctional institutions. A total of 1,219 sentenced men took part in the study. The research tool included 75 questions, including queries from the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS). Based on SOGS, the prevalence rate of severe problem gambling was 29.4% over the lifetimes of the prisoners. As many as 13.1% of respondents admitted to having gambled in prison. This activity usually involved cards, bets or dice. More than 74% of incarcerated men who gambled in prison met the criteria for pathological gambling. Prisoners who gambled more in prison than at liberty made up 27.7%. As many as 69.3% of respondents declared that while in prison, they had met fellow convicts experiencing problems because of gambling. The study shows that criminals continue gambling after detention, especially those who are problem gamblers, an overall finding which implies the need to implement preventive and therapeutic interventions in correctional institutions. 

Lublin, Poland, Journal of Gambling Issues Volume 44. 2020, 18pg

By The Philadelphia District Attorney's Office

  Under District Attorney Larry Krasner, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office (DAO) has moved to end mass supervision. It has primarily done so through two policies, both aimed at reducing the amount of time people spend on county and state probation and parole. The first policy was announced in February 2018, the second in March 2019. • The policies were guided by public safety considerations and research showing that long community supervision sentences are ineffective and harmful. The policies apply to all situations except two categories of cases (sexual assault and potential felonies reduced to misdemeanors for non-trial resolutions) that allow discretion to seek longer supervision in appropriate cases. • Overall, supervision lengths decreased markedly after the DAO policies were implemented: median community supervision sentence lengths decreased 25% for sentences reached through negotiated guilty pleas. • Under District Attorney Krasner, the average community supervision sentence reached through negotiated guilty plea is almost 10 months shorter than under previous DAs. • Since 2018, the number of people on county community supervision has dropped from 42,000 to fewer than 28,000. • 42% fewer years of community supervision were imposed in the first two years of the Krasner administration than in the two years prior, accounting for all DAO policies and practices since 2018, as well as changing incident and arrest patterns. We estimate that the effects of the DAO Sentencing Policies will lead to 20% fewer newly sentenced people remaining on community supervision sentences five years after reforms than if the policies hadn’t been implemented. • Community supervision lengths were dramatically reduced under the policies without a measurable change in recidivism (being charged with a new criminal offense). • These anti-racist policies reduced disparities in supervision sentence lengths between Black, Latinx, and white defendants, though sentencing disparities still exist. • The vast majority of recent pleas have been compliant with the new DAO sentencing standards: 3 of 4 negotiated guilty pleas fall within the 2019 policy’s guidelines.  

Philadelphia, United States, District Attorneys Office. 2021, 42pg