By Hamutal Bernstein  , Dulce Gonzalez, and Diana Guelespe

To understand the experiences of immigrant families in the wake of the 2024 election, we report December 2024 results from the Urban Institute’s Well-Being and Basic Needs Survey, a nationally representative survey of adults ages 18 to 64. Data were collected prior to the 2025 administration taking office and its initial immigration policy changes and expanded enforcement efforts, which have likely heightened concerns.

Why this matters

The new federal administration has aggressively prioritized immigration enforcement, including recission of guidance limiting enforcement in “sensitive locations” (also known as “protected areas,”), such as schools, places of worship, and health care settings.

Targeting immigrant communities with threats of widespread enforcement will have a variety of impacts for the well-being and safety of immigrant families and the broader communities where they live. Fear of or exposure to immigration enforcement harms adults and children with detrimental psychological impacts, reductions in access to needed health and nutrition services, and adverse health and educational outcomes. Immigration enforcement is likely to have spillover effects on the broader community and contribute to “chilling effects” on participation in public life, whereby immigrant families avoid interactions with health care or social services, police, schools, or other community spaces where they perceive risk of detection and potential exposure to immigration enforcement. Children stand to be particularly affected. As immigration policies continue to shift, it will be crucial to track reactions and impacts on immigrant families’ health and well-being, as well as the spillover effects on their communities, to inform efforts to minimize short- and long-term harms.

What we found

Essential activities. Twenty-nine percent of adults in all immigrant families and 60 percent in mixed-status families worried “a lot” or “some” about participating in essential activities in their communities because they did not want to draw attention to their or a family member’s immigration status.

• Seventeen percent of adults in all immigrant families with children and 32 percent in mixed-status families with children worried “a lot” or “some” about sending their kids to school or daycare.

• Thirteen percent of adults in all immigrant families and roughly 30 percent in mixed-status families worried “a lot” or “some” about visiting a doctor’s office or health clinic, or hospital.

• Eleven percent of adults in all immigrant families and over 22 percent in mixed-status families worried “a lot” or “some” about attending religious services or community events.

• Nineteen percent of adults in all immigrant families and 44 percent in mixed-status families, worried “a lot” or “some” about driving a car.

• Sixteen percent of adults in all immigrant families and 38 percent in mixed-status families, worried “a lot” or “some” about going to work.

• Twenty percent of adults in all immigrant families and 44 percent in mixed-status families worried “a lot” or “some” about talking to the police.

Deportation concerns. Thirty-two percent of adults in all immigrant families worried “a lot” or “some” that they, a family member, or a close friend could be deported. In mixed-status families, this was 58 percent.

Protective actions. Nineteen percent of adults in all immigrant families and 38 percent in mixed-status families reported taking protective steps to prepare for a potential change in their or a family member’s immigration status.

• Among adults who reported worry about deportation, nearly half (48 percent) had taken one or more protective steps.

• Ten percent of adults in all immigrant families and 22 percent in mixed-status families reported setting up a plan in case a family member gets detained or deported.

• Eleven percent of adults in all immigrant families and 27 percent in mixed-status families reported seeking legal advice to prepare for a potential change in immigration status.

• Twelve percent of adults in all immigrant families and 18 percent in mixed-status families reported renewing their or a family member’s immigration status or applying for another status or citizenship.

How we did it

We used the Urban Institute’s 2024 Well-Being and Basic Needs Survey, a nationally representative survey of adults ages 18 to 64 designed to monitor changes in individual and family well-being as policymakers consider changes to federal safety net programs. We focus on adults in immigrant families in the sample and report on their concern about drawing attention to immigration status when doing essential activities, worry about deportation, and preparation for potential changes to immigration status

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2025. 

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2025. 20p.

By Bruce Meyer, Angela Wyse, and Douglas Williams

Data from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) indicate an unprecedented 43 percent increase in the number of people residing in homeless shelters in the United States between 2022 and 2024, reversing the gradual decline over the preceding sixteen years. Threequarters of this rise was concentrated in four localities – New York City, Chicago, Massachusetts, and Denver – where large inflows of new immigrants seeking asylum were housed in emergency shelters. Using direct estimates from local government sources and indirect methods based on demographic changes, we estimate that asylum seekers accounted for about 60 percent of the twoyear rise in sheltered homelessness during this period, challenging media and policy narratives that primarily attribute this rise to local economic conditions and housing affordability

WORKING PAPER · NO. 2025-49

Chicago: University of Chicago, The Becker Friedman Institute for Economics 2025. 21p.

By Tony Payan, José Iván Rodríguez-Sánchez

Irregular migration at the U.S.-Mexico border has emerged as a defining political issue in the 21st century. One challenge has been the U.S. government’s ongoing struggle to manage surges in border arrivals. Streamlining asylum processing — deporting those who do not qualify and resettling those who do — could help reduce political tensions. Migration patterns also fluctuate for reasons beyond U.S. control. Encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border reached record highs in 2023 before dropping sharply in 2024, a trend seen repeatedly over the past 15 years.

An increasing number of Americans view immigration as a long-term issue that requires stronger measures. Diverging views on immigration have contributed to deep divisions within the American electorate, with candidates advocating for stricter policies gaining support. President Donald Trump, for example, has linked irregular migration with risks to national security, public safety, and the economy. In both of his presidential campaigns, he pledged swift action on immigration, with mass deportation of undocumented migrants being a cornerstone of his second term program.

This brief explores the impacts of Trump’s immigration policy, with particular attention to the economic and social costs of large-scale deportations.

Houston, TX: Baker Institute for Public Policy, 2025. 15p.

By Elana Fogel, Kate Evans

Traffic stops are the most common form of police-initiated contact with members of the public. The sheer volume of traffic stops combined with their use as a pretext to surveil Black and Latiné communities has generated substantial scholarship and movements for police reform. Yet this commentary assumes that the subjects of traffic stops are U.S. citizens. At the same time, scholarship on the intersection of criminal and immigration law and the convergence of their enforcement methods focuses on traffic stops as the immediate entry point for removal proceedings. This Article addresses the gap in literature by describing the experience of noncitizens who endure frequent traffic stops that result in neither immediate criminal nor immigration proceedings but nonetheless produce significant legal and nonlegal consequences-consequences that are likely to grow under a second Trump administration.

This Article frames the experience of traffic stops for noncitizens as a form of "slow deportation." It describes how the use of traffic stops to police noncitizens extends the system of racialized social control to immigrant communities with the effect of surveilling both race and status. It surveys scholarship across disciplines, racial categories, and citizenship status and uses our clients' stories to map the cumulative, compounding, and subterranean harms of traffic stops that culminate in the emotional, social, and sometimes legal exclusion of noncitizens and families. The Article concludes by proposing new approaches to counseling, policy reform, and coalition building informed by the lens of slow deportation.

Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2025-18,

By David J. Bier

America traditionally had few immigration restrictions, but since the 1920s, the law has banned most aspiring immigrants. Today, fewer than 1 percent of people who want to move permanently to the United States can do so legally. Immigrants cannot simply get an exception to immigrate any more than restaurateurs in the 1920s could simply get an exception to sell alcohol. Instead, just as Prohibition granted only a few exemptions for religious, industrial, or medical uses of alcohol, people seeking an exception to immigration prohibition must also fit into preexisting carve-outs for a select few. Many Americans have the false impression that these carve-outs are realistic options for potential immigrants to join American society, but the government’s restrictive criteria render the legal paths available only in the most extreme cases. Even when someone qualifies, annual immigration caps greatly delay and, more frequently, eliminate the immigrant’s only

chance to come to the United States. Legal immigration is less like waiting in line and more like winning the lottery: it happens, but it is so rare that it is irrational to expect it in any individual case. This study provides a uniquely comprehensive, jargon-free explanation of U.S. rules for legal permanent immigration. Some steps are simple and reasonable, but most steps serve only as unjustified obstacles to immigrating legally. For some immigrants, this restrictive system sends them into the black market of illegal immigration. For others, it sends them to other countries, where they contribute to the quality of life in their new homes. And for still others, it requires them to remain in their homeland, often underemployed and sometimes in danger. Whatever the outcome, the system punishes both the prospective immigrants and Americans who would associate, contract, and trade with them. Congress and the administration can do better, and this paper explains how.

Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2023. 88p.

By Eric P. Baumer, Min Xie

Research Summary

Our understanding of how immigration enforcement impacts crime has been informed exclusively by data from police crime statistics. This study complements existing research by using longitudinal multilevel data from the National Crime Victimization Survey for 2005–2014 to simultaneously assess the impact of the three predominant immigration policies that have been implemented in local communities. The results indicate that the activation of Secure Communities and 287(g) task force agreements significantly increased violent victimization risk among Latinos, whereas they showed no evident impact on victimization risk among non-Latino Whites and Blacks. The activation of 287(g) jail enforcement agreements and anti-detainer policies had no significant impact on violent victimization risk during the period.

Policy Implications

Contrary to their stated purpose of enhancing public safety, our results show that the Secure Communities program and 287(g) task force agreements did not reduce crime, but instead eroded security in U.S. communities by increasing the likelihood that Latinos experienced violent victimization. These results support the Federal government's ending of 287(g) task force agreements and its more recent move to end the Secure Communities program. Additionally, the results of our study add to the evidence challenging claims that anti-detainer policies pose a threat to violence risk.

Criminology & Public Policy, 22, 417–455. 2023, 39p.

By Amalia Campos-Delgado, Karine Côté-Boucher

By focusing on the externalisation of US bordering into Mexico, we consider the institutional setting that both limits and channels gestures of care and empathy in migrant detention. Working within a framework that highlights the connections between the global and the intimate, and by proposing to read these connections as they unfold into an intimate geopolitics of humanitarian borderwork, we unpack the effects of Mexico’s recent shift towards humanitarian border politics on the interactions between detained migrants and border agents. Together with the material scarcity in which border officers operate, horrendous detention conditions and increased investments in detention facilities, this shift produces care-control dynamics that are specific to bordering in transit countries. We identify three ‘tactics of empathy’ deployed by Mexican border officers as they attempt to morally legitimise border control in this new environment, while concurrently avoiding legal liabilities and taming migrants under their custody. We argue that these tactics are less a manifestation of an ethics of care than a response to situations occurring in transit migrant detention where morality and instrumental rationality become entangled.

Geopolitics, 29:2, 471-494, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2022.2039633, 2024., 22p.

By ioleta Moreno-Lax EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service

This study constitutes a targeted substitute impact assessment of the Commission's proposal for a revised Facilitation Directive (COM(2023) 755), presented on 28 November 2023 as part of a package to address migrant smuggling. It provides a critical review of the existing legal and policy framework at EU level and its shortcomings regarding transposition and implementation. It also undertakes a critical and thorough appraisal of the proposed objectives and measures in terms of coherence, effectiveness and efficiency, including with a view to assessing the adequacy of the interplay between this proposal and the related draft regulation on enhancing police cooperation (COM(2023) 754). It highlights the misalignment of the proposal with relevant international and key European Union legal standards. It raises concerns about definitional issues, the lack of sufficient human rights safeguards, and the absence of a clear distinction between facilitation offences and the legitimate provision of services and humanitarian assistance. The study also examines the legality and proportionality of the proposed measures and stresses the need for a thorough evaluation of wider impacts on civic space and democracy at large.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2025. 120p.

By Robert M. Adelman , Yulin Yang , Lesley Williams Reid , James D. Bachmeier & Mike Maciag

The debate about undocumented immigration and its potential relation to crime continues to boil in the United States. We study this relationship by using two sets of estimates for the 2014 undocumented foreign-born population in U.S. metropolitan areas acquired from the Pew Research Center and the Migration Population Institute, 2013-2015 FBI Uniform Crime Report data, and 2011-2015 American Community Survey data from the U.S. Census Bureau, to model the association between undocumented immigration and violent and property crime. Findings are consistent across all estimates of metropolitan undocumented populations. Net of relevant covariates, we find negative effects of undocumented immigration on the overall property crime rate, larceny, and burglary; effects in models using violent crime measures as the outcomes are statistically non-significant. Although the results are based on cross-sectional data, they mirror other research findings that immigration either reduces or has no impact on crime, on average, and contributes to a growing literature on the relationship between immigration and crime.

Journal of Crime and Justice, Volume 44, Issue 4 (2021)

By American Immigration Council

Over the past decade, an increasing number of states, counties, and cities have adopted a variety of policies intended to promote a greater level of trust and cooperation between local law enforcement and communities with sizeable immigrant populations, regardless of immigration status. These policies include offering English-language classes; issuing municipal identification documents and driver’s licenses to all residents; ensuring that immigrants have equal access to bail; establishing policies to make it easier for noncitizen victims of crime to obtain necessary documents from law enforcement agencies in order to pursue certain immigration relief; and training criminal prosecutors and public defenders on the immigration consequences of convictions and plea deals.  

One subset of these policies concerns a state’s or locality’s role in cooperating with federal authorities to enforce immigration law. These laws, policies, or resolutions are sometimes referred to as “sanctuary” policies, although no legal or standard definition of the term exists. There are many reasons jurisdictions adopt sanctuary policies, such as: a desire to protect public safety by allowing immigrants to work with police in reporting and investigating crimes without fear of retribution or potential deportation; allowing state and local governments to determine how they will prioritize and allocate their resources; and shielding local law enforcement agencies from liabilities resulting from local enforcement of federal immigration laws. 

Despite the nationwide debate, there is no one clear definition of what it means for a state or local government to adopt sanctuary policies. Sanctuary policies take many forms and generally fall into the following categories: 

• policies restricting the ability of state and local police to make arrests for federal civil immigration violations, or to detain individuals on civil immigration warrants;  

• policies prohibiting “287(g)” agreements through which Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deputizes local law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration law; 

• policies that prevent local governments from entering into a contract with the federal government to hold immigrants in detention; 

• policies preventing immigration detention centers; 

• policies restricting the police or other city workers from asking about immigration status; 

• policies restricting the sharing of certain information on immigrants with the federal government; 

• policies restricting local police responses to federal immigration detainers; and 

• policies refusing to allow ICE into local jails without a judicial warrant. 

The common theme behind these categories is that under a sanctuary policy, state and local officials will limit their cooperation with federal immigration officials but do not actively prevent federal officials from carrying out their immigration enforcement duties. 

One of the most common forms of sanctuary policy is a restriction on holding immigrants in state or local jails following a “detainer” issued by ICE. A detainer is an official but nonbinding request from ICE that a state or local law enforcement agency maintain custody of an individual for up to 48 hours beyond the time the individual otherwise would have been released so that ICE can arrange to take over custody.  

Washington DC: American Immigration Council, 2025. 9p.

By Felipe Gon ̧calves Elisa and J ́acome Emily Weisburst

We study the role of victim reporting in the production of public safety. We examine the Secure Communities program, a crime-reduction policy that involved police in
detecting unauthorized immigrants and increased deportation fears in immigrant communities. We find that the policy reduced the likelihood that Hispanic victims report crimes to police and increased offending against Hispanics. The number of reported crimes is unchanged, masking these opposing effects. We show that reduced reporting drives the offending increase and provide the first elasticity of offending to victim reporting in the literature, calculating that a 10% decline in reporting increases offending by 7.9%.

Unpublished paper 2025. 95p.

By Focus on Labour Exploitation (FLEX)

2025 marks the 10 year anniversary of the Modern Slavery Act. Since that time the gaps in the UK’s systems to prevent, identify and address exploitation, including trafficking and modern slavery, have been well evidenced.

The Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill misses a crucial opportunity to drive meaningful change to ensure that all victims of exploitation are protected, whatever their immigration status.

By failing to repeal key elements of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and the Illegal Migration Act 2023, this Bill does not address key drivers of exploitation. Instead, this Immigration Enforcement centred approach fails to provide meaningful opportunities for survivors to recover through security and decent work. This only plays into the hands of exploiters.

London: T (FLEX) , 2025. 6p

By Anita Orav

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In recent years, the European Union has faced a significant number of asylum applications, with over 513 000 applications received in the first half of 2024 alone. Women and girls make up a substantial proportion of asylum seekers, with one in three asylum-seekers being female. In international law, the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention is the main instrument regulating asylum. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Istanbul Convention provide a framework for protecting the rights of women who seek protection. The EU has developed a common European asylum system that has gradually incorporated gender-sensitive elements in legal texts such as the Qualification Directive, the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive. These directives offer special protection to vulnerable individuals, including women and children. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has played a crucial role in advancing a gender-sensitive approach in EU asylum law, acknowledging the specific experiences and circumstances of women and other vulnerable individuals seeking protection in the EU. The CJEU has recognised gender-based violence as a form of persecution and grounds for asylum or subsidiary protection. It has also acknowledged the importance of considering the individual circumstances and experiences of asylum seekers, particularly women and girls, who may face persecution or harm owing to their adherence to certain values or lifestyles. This aligns with a more gender-sensitive approach in EU asylum law and policy in recent years. Nevertheless continued progress is needed to address the human rights challenges faced by women and girls in asylum procedures.

Bruxelles/Brussels - Belgium : EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2025. 8p.

By Stephen Webb

As immigration rises to the top of voters’ concerns, a major new Policy Exchange report examines why governments of both parties have found it so hard to get the numbers down, and what policies would be needed to achieve this. 

The report, written by Stephen Webb, a former Home Office director and with foreword by The Honourable Alexander Downer AC, former Foreign Minister of Australia, sets out the incentives in the system that have led to consistently high migration. These include the power of the pro-immigration lobby, mixed incentives within Government, and a human rights case law that has consistently moved in a more liberal direction over the past 30 years. It notes that the problems we are facing in the UK are increasingly shared by other European countries.   

The report exposes that at least £11m is being spent by NGOs with a focus on migration issues on research, analysis and lobbying – with a further £30m in taxpayer funded grants to universities, most of which have a clear tilt towards liberal immigration policies. 

The report argues that the policy response needs to change the incentives, whether they be on migrants themselves, employers and renters, other government departments and third countries who do not cooperate on returning their nationals. The report recommends: 

An auction system to allocate a limited number of work visas to ensure they go to the highest quality candidates, with the proceeds used to increase wages in the care sector,A system of ‘sureties’ which impose a penalty on visa holders if they do not leave on timeIllegal migrants to know they will not be allowed to settle in the UK, but will be transferred to safe accommodation on Ascension IslandTougher laws to block visas and overseas aid going to countries that do not cooperate in returns of their nationalsMuch tougher penalties for those employing and renting accommodation to people without the right to be in the UK.A cross European coalition to reform the ECHR, with a willingness to leave if this is not delivered 

In a foreword to the report, former Australian Foreign Minister, The Honourable Alexander Downer AC, said: 

“The issue of immigration has become one of the most contentious on the Western world…so far few countries have managed the issue well…but the British immigration system is a particular shambles… 

A British government will have sooner or later to get control of the immigration program.  If they fail to do so, we can be sure populists and extremists will get elected who promise to do it.”

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 85p.

By Cecilia Menjívar

Stumpf and Manning’s Article, Liminal Immigration Law, explains the origin, mechanisms, and persistence of liminal laws in three cases they analyze: DACA, immigration detainers, and administrative closure. Their analysis unearths key similarities across these cases: the “stickiness” and robustness of liminal rules, their transitory nature, and their flexibility in contrast to the inflexibility of traditional law. This Essay expands Stumpf and Manning’s analysis by considering social science scholarship on the legal production of legal statuses. It examines the liminal case of Temporary Protected Status to capture the effects of liminality on the ground for individuals and families, the power of liminal rules as an instrument of immigration control and governance, and the key role of racialization practices in the creation, interpretation, and implementation of liminal rules. The conceptual extension in this Essay exemplifies how the analytic lens that Stumpf and Manning propose will prove generative for legal, socio-legal, and social science scholarship more generally.  

  IOWA LAW REVIEW ONLINE,  Vol. 110:51 2024, 16 p.

By William A. Kandel

Four major principles underlie current U.S. legal permanent immigration policy: allowing families to reunify, admitting needed skilled workers, providing humanitarian protection, and fostering geographic diversity among lawful permanent residents (LPRs; also referred to as immigrants). These principles are embodied in provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for family-sponsored immigration, employment-based immigration, the U.S. refugee and asylee programs, and the diversity immigrant visa, respectively. Additional INA provisions provide LPR status but account for relatively few immigrants. Among these are special immigrant visas for certain Iraqis and Afghans employed by U.S. Government and their spouses and children; cancellation of removal for foreign nationals in removal proceedings; U nonimmigrant visas for crime victims who assist law enforcement agencies; and T status for human trafficking victims. As defined in the INA, the term “immigrants” is synonymous with LPRs, also known more informally as green card holders, and refers to foreign nationals who come to live lawfully and permanently in the United States. Foreign nationals can either apply to adjust from a temporary, typically nonimmigrant status to LPR status from within the United States, or apply for an immigrant visa from a U.S. embassy or consulate and request admission as an LPR upon arrival to the United States from abroad. The INA imposes an annual worldwide permanent immigration level of 675,000 persons: 480,000 family-sponsored immigrants, made up of family-sponsored “immediate relatives” and “preference immigrants”; 140,000 employment-based immigrants; and 55,000 diversity immigrants. However, the INA worldwide limit is a permeable cap that is regularly breached because immediate relatives and asylees are not numerically limited. In addition, the number of refugees admitted each year is determined by the President in consultation with Congress. As a result, the number of individuals approved for LPR status each year typically exceeds the INA numerical limits that are intended to process this demand fairly and in accordance with the national interest. In FY2023, the United States granted LPR status to 1,172,910 foreign nationals. The INA further imposes, for family-sponsored preference and employment-based immigrants, a per-country limit of 7% of their annual worldwide levels. The 7% limit is intended to prevent nationals of one or a few countries from dominating immigrant flows. For countries that send many prospective immigrants to the United States, the 7% limit often results in years-long waits for LPR status. From FY2014 to FY2023, the United States granted LPR status to an average of about 1 million foreign nationals each year. Of these, 65% acquired LPR status as family-based immigrants, 16% as employment-based immigrants, 11% as refugees and asylees adjusting to LPR status, 4% as diversity immigrants, and 4% as other immigrants. On average, 54% of all immigrants adjusted to LPR status from within the United States during this time. Top immigrant source countries over the period included Mexico (14%), China (7%), India (6%), the Philippines (5%), and the Dominican Republic (5%). In FY2024, an estimated 4 million prospective family-sponsored preference immigrants possessed approved immigrant petitions and were waiting overseas to apply for a statutorily numerically limited immigrant visa. In addition, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has approved a sizeable number of petitions for family-sponsored preference and employment-based immigrants based in the United States and overseas who represent an indeterminate number of prospective immigrants in a corresponding and sometimes overlapping queue. USCIS also has about 230,000 pending petitions for U nonimmigrant status pertaining to crime victims which, if approved, would make these petitioners eligible for LPR status. Proponents of reducing permanent immigration often contend that family-sponsored immigration allows relatively large numbers of foreign nationals to settle permanently in the United States without regard to their skills, education levels, potential contributions to the U.S. economy or potential fiscal impacts on U.S. taxpayers. Others argue that family-sponsored immigration should be limited to immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and LPRs. Still others support limiting employmentbased LPRs to only very highly skilled workers, admitting employment-based immigrants using merit-based point systems instead of or in addition to employer sponsorship, and eliminating the diversity immigrant program. Proponents of increasing permanent immigration typically emphasize the positive impacts of skilled and other migration generally to the U.S. economy, the need for more workers in labor-short occupations and industries, or concerns over demographic trends that portend future U.S. population decline.  

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service 2024.   27p.

By Cecilia Menjívar & Krista M. Perreir

Thousands of minors are migrating unaccompanied to high-income countries. This special issue focuses on unaccompanied migrant minors from the Global South to Europe and the U.S. In this introduction, we seek to complement the contributions to this special issue by shedding light on what resources and experiences unaccompanied migrants arrive with, stressing these young migrants’

challenges at each stage prior to arrival and the challenges they face navigating the receiving context. We first clarify how the international community defines ‘unaccompanied minors’ or ‘unaccompanied children’. We then provide brief histories of unaccompanied minors in immigration flows to the U.S. and the EU. Next, we review the literature on the experiences of

unaccompanied minors before, during, and after migration. Finally, we discuss key themes and insights from the articles provided in this special issue.

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 22p.

By Felipe Gonçalves, Elisa Jácome and Emily Weisburst

How does immigration enforcement affect public safety? Heightened enforcement could reduce crime by deterring and incapacitating immigrant offenders or, alternatively, increase crime by discouraging victims from reporting offenses. The researchers study the U.S. Secure Communities program, which expanded interior enforcement against unauthorized immigrants. Using national survey data, they find that the program reduced the likelihood that Hispanic victims reported crimes to police and increased the victimization of Hispanics. Total reported crimes are unchanged, masking these opposing effects. The researchers provide evidence that reduced Hispanic reporting is the key driver of increased victimization. Their findings underscore the importance of trust in institutions as a central determinant of public safety.

Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 2024. 95p.

By Christopher L. Foote

The US unemployment rate has drifted higher since early 2023, even though growth in payroll employment has been strong over this period. Some commentators have noted that the puzzle of rising unemployment amid rapid hiring can be explained by a large increase in immigration, which would raise population growth and allow firms to hire large numbers of new (immigrant) workers without dipping into the unemployment pool. This paper uses a source of administrative data that is directly related to the labor market—immigrant applications for work permits—to estimate the immigrant labor inflow in 2023 and 2024. The surge in new work permit applications in these two years supports the large immigration estimates based on other administrative data from the Department of Homeland Security, including the significant immigration increase recently estimated by the Congressional Budget Office.

Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 2024. 27p.

By CJ McKinney, Melanie Gower

The UK has agreements with some countries for the return of people lacking legal residence. These agreements take various forms and are not usually published.

The attached briefing lists known agreements and links to the text where available. The government has confirmed the existence of some form of agreement with 24 countries since 2021, some recent and some struck up to 20 years ago:

In 2021, the government confirmed that it has formal returns agreements with Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, China, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Korea, South Sudan, Switzerland and Vietnam. That accounts for 16 countries, excluding the deal with Afghanistan because it has been inoperable in practice since regime change later in 2021.

Since 2021, the government has signed formal returns agreements with Albania, Georgia, Serbia, Moldova and Pakistan. These five replaced European Union agreements with those countries in which the UK took part while an EU member.

In 2021, the UK and India agreed a migration and mobility partnership that included provisions on returns.

In 2024, the UK and Bangladesh announced an informal returns agreement described as standard operating procedures.

In 2020, the UK and Ireland set up an informal returns agreement covering asylum seekers (rather than British or Irish citizens), described as non-legally binding operational arrangements.

There may well be other informal or even formal agreements, the existence of which has not been disclosed. The arrangement with Ireland was not announced at the time and only came to public attention in 2024.

Agreements made in the form of a treaty are published and laid before Parliament, but the government is not required to publish a memorandum of understanding or operational protocol. It has refused, for example, to disclose the contents of the 2022 Pakistan agreement.

London: UK House of Commons Library, 2024. 10p.