By Audrey Macklin

Enlisting states of origin or transit to prevent exit from their own territory has become a tool of extraterritorial migration control for industrialised liberal democratic states. This article first explores the practical erosion of the right to leave any country since the demise of communism, focusing on arrangements between EU member states and select African states of origin or transit. I then document the legitimating function performed by the anti-smuggling and search and rescue regimes in effacing the human right to leave. I conclude by situating exit restrictions in a wider European project of promoting, building and supporting border infrastructure in the name of development and capacity building in select African countries. This permits reflection on what the contemporary use of exit restrictions signifies for the equation of border control and sovereignty.

International Migration, June 2025

By Giulia Bruschi

While most of the immigration towards Spain come from South American countries, the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic remain the most important mixed migration routes from Africa toward Spain, and Europe more in general.

The steady increase in irregular arrivals via the Canary Islands since 2020 has catalysed the attention of EU policymaking and has continued to strain the reception system in the Canary Islands. In 2025, crackdowns on departures from Mauritania led to a reduction in irregular crossings. However, the Atlantic remains one of the deadliest sea crossings worldwide, and the land journeys to embarkation points also remain fraught with risks.

Meanwhile, the Western Mediterranean route continues to be used by migrants from West African countries, who must cross North Africa to reach the Mediterranean shores, and also poses several risks.

In this context, throughout 2024, MMC, in partnership with UNHCR, interviewed 497 migrants recently arrived in Spain via the Canary Islands, the Mediterranean, or via the land crossing in Ceuta and Melilla. The interviews aimed to explore their migration drivers, journeys, as protection risks in transit, asylum and onward movement intentions from Spain.

Mixed Migration Centre, 2025. 31p.

By The 

Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit

Over recent years, thousands of children have been wrongly treated as adults by the Home Office. These children are in the UK on their own seeking asylum. Following decisions made by UK border officials that they are “significantly over 18” they have been sent alone to adult asylum accommodation, usually hotels. This is a report about children housed in adult hotels after these decisions at the border, based on Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit’s legal and place-based expertise and experience, and on the experiences that the children we work with have shared.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY “You can’t stop feeling sad. You have to feel sad and angry when someone says you are a liar. It is in your heart.” Between January 2024 and February 2025, at least 296 children were wrongly sent to adult asylum accommodation, usually hotels, in the North West. This is a report about what children experience in asylum hotels, how theyare sentthere,andthe supportthey needtoget out. We are sounding the alarm – as others have done before us – that these children are being put at significant risk. Much harm has already been done, and must be acknowledged; and the government, local authorities andaccommodationprovidersmustact now topreventfurther harm. We are sounding the alarm – as others have done before us – that these children are being put at significant risk. Much harm has already been done, and must be acknowledged; and the government, local authorities and accommodation providers must act now to prevent further harm.

Our recommendations:

To the Home Office:

• The Home Office must admit children are wrongly treated as adults at the border and suspend all “significantly over 18” decisions until investigated.

• Repeal recent changes to age assessments introduced by the Nationality and Borders Act, and end the for-profit asylum housing model.

• Meanwhile, the Home Office should notify local authorities when children are placed in hotels and publish clearer data on age disputes.

To accommodation providers:

• Immediately refer to the local authority when staff become aware that a potential child is in adult asylum accommodation.

• Take all possible measures to safeguard potential children.

• Update training for hotel staff so they are aware of the high likelihood of children being treated as adults.

To local authorities: 

• Ensure social workers’ decisions and training include an understanding of the child’s experience in the UK, including being traumatised by Home Office age assessment practice.

• Ensure that potential children are not held to higher thresholds in assessments when local authority capacity is stretched.

• Do not refer children to the National Age Assessment Board (NAAB).

Manchester, UK: Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit, 

2025. 49p.

By Richard Ekins KC (Hon) and Sir Stephen Laws KCB, KC (Hon)

Between 2010 and 2024, successive Conservative governments made various half-baked or half-hearted attempts to reform the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights.  Reform was, and still, is very much needed – this body of human rights law distorts parliamentary democracy, disables good government, and departs from the ideal of the rule of law.  But the reform attempts largely failed.  Unless parliamentarians and others learn the lessons of these failures, no future programme of human rights law reform is likely to succeed.  This paper explains these lessons and outlines how to develop a workable programme of reform.

By Barna Konkolÿ Thege, Chaz Robitaille, Lujayn Mahmoud, Eden A. Kinzel, Rameen Qamar, Jamie Hartmann-Boyce, Olivia Choy

Aggressive/antisocial behaviors in children and youth may result in impairments in family, social, or academic functioning and lead to long‐term negative consequences for both the individual and society as a whole. The potential of healthy diet and nutritional supplements to reduce aggression and antisocial behavior is an active area of study in nutritional mental health sciences. The goal of this systematic review is to (1) investigate the effectiveness/efficacy of nutritional interventions(dietary manipulation, fortification or supplementation) in reducing excessive aggression, antisocial behaviors, and criminal offending in children/youth (systematic review and meta‐analysis); and (2) provide an overview of implementation barriers and facilitators regarding nutritional interventions in children/youth (qualitative/narrative synthesis). After consulting theCampbell Collaboration's methodological guidelines, a comprehensive search for published and unpublished papers on controlled intervention studies was performed (up to February 26, 2024) using both electronic databases (MEDLINE,Embase, Cochrane Library, APA PsycInfo, Scopus, and the Allied and Complementary Medicine Database) and other resources (e.g., Google Scholar, reference list of included studies and other reviews, websites of public health agencies). This study focuses on children and youth (up to the age of 24) presenting with an above‐average level of aggression/antisocial behavior. In terms of the intervention, we considered both dietary manipulation and nutritional supplementation with aduration long enough (minimum of 1 week) that a significant change in the individual's nutritional status could be expected.We included studies with a controlled design if, for outcomes, they reported on (1) behavioral‐level violence/aggression toward others in real‐life (non‐simulated) settings, (2) antisocial behaviors, or (3) criminal offending. Initial screening,checking for eligibility criteria, data extraction from, and risk of bias assessment for each eligible study were conducted independently by two reviewers. To perform the meta‐analysis, data from each original report were standardized(transformed into Hedges' g) so that results across studies could be meaningfully combined and interpreted. Data con-versions, computation of pooled effect sizes, and estimation of publication bias were conducted using the ComprehensiveMeta‐analysis software (Version 4). Altogether, 51 reports (describing 50 individual studies) met our inclusion criteria, and72 effect sizes were extracted from these reports. Nutritional interventions with a broad target (e.g., broad‐spectrummicronutrient supplementation or general improvement in diet quality) had the most consistent and largest intervention

Campbell Systematic ReviewsVolume 21, Issue 3Sep 2025

By Marisa Ross, Susan Burtner, and Andrew Papachristos

Community violence intervention street outreach (CVI-SO) is gaining in popularity as a way to prevent gun violence. There is a growing need to better understand these interventions, which starts with documenting their full scope. Analyzing CVI outreach in Chicago from 2017–2023, the researchers find that organizations specialized in long-term mentoring and adjusted services based on participants’ risk levels, providing higher-risk individuals with more frequent and extended support.

Introduction: Community violence intervention street outreach (CVI-SO) strategies are growing in popularity as non-punitive approaches to solving the public health problem of community gun violence. Evidence on the effectiveness of CVI-SO on rates of violence is mixed and faces challenges due to concerns with documentation and data privacy, intentional selection bias in program design, and variation in participant risk and needs. Effective evaluation requires methods that accurately capture the scope and delivery of services, starting with a greater understanding of the services CVI participants receive and how they vary based on individual characteristics.Methods: This study explores the services that participants received from a coalition of Chicago CVI organizations from 2017–2023. Considering administrative and programmatic data from over 4,000 participants’ nearly 200,000 interactions with providers, the researchers examine patterns in demographics, network-based risk factors, and service provision and dosage. They then use descriptive and latent profile analyses to characterize the “typical” participant in Chicago.Results: Results show that CVI work relies heavily on long-term mentoring relationships. Service patterns show that latent groups exist with varying dosage: higher dosage participants with higher risk for gun violence receive more frequent contacts over longer periods, demonstrating how organizations adjust their approach based on participant needs. Profiles that primarily receive behavioral or social supports-related services also emerge.Conclusions: Findings underscore the need for evaluation frameworks that capture both the strategic variation in service delivery and the multiple pathways through which CVI programs influence participant outcomes.Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Institute for Policy Research, 2025. 36p.

By Rene Reyes

Free speech is under siege. This is not to say that all speakers and viewpoints are at equal risk—some voices receive support and protection, while others are subject to threats and suppression.  Pro-Palestinian speech falls into the latter category.  Critics argue that there has long been a “Palestine Exception” to free speech, but efforts to silence pro-Palestinian advocacy on university campuses and elsewhere have dramatically increased since Israel began its assault on Gaza in October of 2023 in response to incursions by Hamas militants.  Many supporters of Israel contend that such restrictions on pro-Palestinian advocacy are justified, and have suggested that there is a double standard between racism and antisemitism at play when universities fail to condemn at least some forms of pro-Palestinian speech. The implication seems to be that anti-Black and Brown speech would never be tolerated on campuses, and that racialized minorities have been a special favorite of legal and institutional protections against hateful expression. The problem with this argument is that it is demonstrably false.  Indeed, this Essay argues that free speech doctrines have consistently functioned to give white people the liberty to engage in hateful speech and to deny Black, Brown, and other racialized individuals the kinds of protections from fear and harm that supporters of Israel are now demanding.  In other words, the Palestine Exception to free speech is real—and it is part of a deeper legal tradition that has enshrined free speech as an element of white privilege.

Virginia Law Review ,Vol 111, June 2025.

By New South Wales. Legislative Assembly Committee on Law and Safety

Following the December 2025 Bondi terror attack, the NSW government is strengthening laws against hate speech, specifically targeting slogans like "globalize the intifada" and prohibited terrorist symbols in public. A January 2026 Parliamentary inquiry recommended legislation to ban this specific slogan and similar hate speech to combat violence, with proposals including amending the Crimes Act 1900.

NSW ParliamentNSW Parliament +3

Key Measures and Developments:

Targeted Slogans: The chant "globalize the intifada" is explicitly identified as inciting violence, with moves to prohibit it and similar hateful statements.

Legislative Action: The inquiry recommends amending the Crimes Act 1900 (specifically section 93ZAA) to further prohibit public acts that incite hatred on grounds including religion, race, and sexual orientation.

School Crackdown: Immediate, stricter conduct rules are in place across NSW schools (government, independent, and Catholic), with potential for dismissal for staff engaging in hate speech.

Symbol Prohibition: Legislation is being developed to outlaw the public display of symbols associated with proscribed terrorist organizations.

Inquiry Recommendations: The Parliamentary committee advised monitoring UK hate speech laws, ensuring new legislation is robust against constitutional challenges, and reviewing any new laws within 12 months.

Context: These actions follow the 2025 Bondi incident and focus on balancing anti-racism with existing legal frameworks.

Justice and Equity CentreJustice and Equity Centre +7

Parliament of NSW. 2026. 56p.

By  Rosamund SHREEVES 

The International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) on 6 February is an occasion to raise awareness and call for further action to end this practice that puts an estimated four million girls at risk of severe harm every year. The available data shows that there are also survivors of FGM or potential victims in at least 16 EU Member States. The EU supports international efforts to end FGM and has made preventing and combating it a key part of its strategies on women's and children's rights. The European Parliament, which has been raising awareness and pushing for firm action on FGM since 2001, spearheaded provisions on criminalising FGM as a standalone offence and providing specialist support for victims in new EU legislation on combating violence against women, which Member States must transpose into national law by June 2027. Looking ahead, while the number of countries with legislation prohibiting FGM has increased and there has been some success in changing social norms, progress is not a given. The United Nations and civil society organisations are flagging an urgent need to step up collective action and sustain investment if the internationally agreed target of eliminating FGM by 2030 is to be reached. At EU level, the preparation of the next long-term EU budget, action plan for gender equality, and implementation of the EU gender equality strategy for 2026-2030 will provide openings to build and expand on the action taken to date.

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2026. 4p.

By The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have worked together to provide an overview of the common food fraud cases in the aquatic sector and the associated health risks. The report resulting from this collaboration provides information on tools that can be used to fight food fraud for aquatic products, and international case studies illustrate the scope and impact of fraud. The report reviews regulatory frameworks as well as standards such as those set by Codex Alimentarius, FAO guidelines, and GFSI‑benchmarked schemes, advocating for harmonized labelling, mandatory scientific names, and improved traceability. It emphasizes the role of consumer awareness and industry transparency in combating fraud.

Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper, No. 742. Rome.

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)2026. 179p.

By Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Bobby Boxerman and Celeste Barry
Prior criminal records account for a large share of already lengthy prison sentences, often adding years or even decades to sentences, without evidence of community safety benefits.

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What’s new? Recruitment of children to fight in armed and criminal groups has boomed across Colombia over the last decade, with hundreds of minors lured into joining violent groups on false promises of wealth, status and protection. This war crime disproportionately affects Colombia’s ethnic communities and those who live in conflict zones.

Why does it matter? Armed groups rely on minors to maintain territorial control. Children carry out high-risk tasks, suffer abuse, and are punished with death if caught escaping. Recruitment shatters communities’ ability to resist armed groups because locals fear their own family members will be the targets of reprisals if they speak out.

What should be done? Colombia should act promptly to identify children at risk, boost protection at schools (where recruitment often happens) and strengthen its criminal investigations into the perpetrators. Foreign donors should support police efforts to track recruiters and help strengthen communities’ ability to prevent the crime from taking place.

International Crisis Group, 2026, 28p.

By JOY OLSON and ERIC L. OLSON

This paper analyzes the drivers of migration hypothesizing that persistent government failure driven in large part by corruption produces a sense of hopelessness among Central Americans that contributes to and propels their decision to migrate. Traditionally, corruption and its contribution to hopelessness have not been studied as drivers of migration. The authors conclude that addressing weak governance and corruption helps create a national context in which individuals can see a future in their own country. Central Americans from the Northern Triangle countries have a complex set of motivations for migration. Traditionally studied push factors include poverty, violence and natural disasters. Pull factors include economic opportunity/upward mobility, protection, and family reunification. The weight given to each factor is as varied as the number of people migrating. The intention to migrate is often based on one’s calculation of personal challenges and opportunities. Decisions are also influenced bylarger social, political, and economic factors. While it is an individual that migrates, it is their experience within their community and nation that informs their decision. Contextual factors contributing to migration include respect for human rights, governance and corruption. The State Department’s human rights reports paint a clear picture of the deplorable human rights situation in each Northern Triangle country and highlights the high level of impunity and, conversely, low expectations for justice that the majority can expect from their governments and justice systems. According to surveys of both experts and individuals, government corruption and/or the perception of corruption is widespread and endemic across the Northern Triangle. Weak governance can be the result of poor planning, lack of resources, and limited workforce capacity, but in many instances, it is also the result of corruption. While more research is needed, the thrust of the studies cited suggest that corruption can be both a direct and indirect driver of migration. The authors identify hopelessness as contributing to migration from the Northern Triangle. Since little research has been done in this area, proxies like Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) are considered. Hope, optimism, and SWB are concepts based not only on personal experience, but on one’s interaction with and perceptions of broader society. One’s experience with endemic corruption can contribute to a sense hopelessness. The authors argue that endemic corruption in Central America, and the destruction of mechanisms to control corruption, undermine peoples’ confidence in government and contribute to a lack of hope that their lives will improve. While the work done to date is insufficient to establish direct correlations. If the citizens of Central America believe that good governance and anti-corruption measures can be successful and see the results of such efforts reflected in improved healthcare, education, access to education, and justice, it could improve theirlives will improve. While the work done to date is insufficient to establish direct correlations. If the citizens of Central America believe that good governance and anti-corruption measures can be successful and see the results of such efforts reflected in improved healthcare, education, access to education, and justice, it could improve their sense of hope for the future and improve feelings of SWB thus lessening an underlying push factor from Central America. More must be done to address government corruption in the region and to learn about the relationship of hopelessness to migration.

Miami: jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy. Florida International University,  2021.

By Patrick Butchard, Philip Loft

Genocide is a crime under international law, according to the United Nations General Assembly. The 1948 Genocide Convention, which has 153 parties requires party states to punish those responsible for genocide. The convention also requires states to prevent genocide from occurring. While it does not set out how they must do this, judgments on cases before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have clarified some details of the obligation. What are a state’s obligations in international law? Judicial decisions from the International Court of Justice suggest that: • States are required to try to prevent genocide, but they do not breach their obligation if they fail. – They must still try even if they think their actions will not succeed

– What counts as a reasonable attempt at preventing genocide will depend on a state’s circumstances. • States must take action to prevent genocide as soon as they become aware there is a serious risk of it. • Genocide must actually occur for a state to be in breach of its obligation to prevent it. • Measures to prevent genocide might include engaging with bodies of the UN, such as the Security Council, or directly with other states. • States are unlikely to be allowed under international law to use military force against another state in an attempt to prevent genocide.

London: UK Parliament House of Commons Library, 2026. 25p.

By John D. Bessler

The modern international human rights movement began with the U.N. Charter and the U.N. General Assembly’s adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although the movement to abolish the death penalty is rooted in the Enlightenment, global advocacy to halt executions and to abolish capital punishment has accelerated exponentially in recent decades. This Article discusses the origins of global networks to advance human rights and highlights the growing international advocacy, including by nation-states and nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), for a worldwide moratorium on executions and to abolish capital punishment altogether. The total number of countries conducting executions in the past few decades has declined dramatically, putting retentionist states, such as China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, North Korea, and the United States, in an increasingly isolated position in the international community. Many nations now even refuse to extradite criminal suspects without assurances that the death penalty will not be sought. With more than 90 countries having already ratified or  Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), aiming at theabolition of the death penalty, and with scores of domestic and international NGOs now actively promoting abolition, the global movement to abolish capital punishment has made significant strides and holds tremendous promise, though much more work remains to be done. This Article highlights the path forward for advocates seeking the death penalty’s abolition in law—and de facto—across the globe, with a focus on international law and classifying the use of capital prosecutions, death sentences, and executions as acts of torture and clear violations of fundamental human rights. In particular, the Article discusses advocacy efforts before the United Nations, highlights the role of NGOs in leading that effort, and advocates for the recognition of a peremptory.

 34 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2025).

By Alice Fereday

Chad’s role as a departure and transit country for northbound migration to North Africa and Europe is often overlooked, particularly in comparison to neighbouring Niger and Sudan. However, the country’s position at the crossroads of routes connecting central and eastern Africa to Libya and Niger makes it a significant transit corridor for regional migration, and its role as a bastion of relative stability in an increasingly volatile region has further increased its importance in recent years. Since 2023, the conflict in Sudan and a major influx of refugees into Chad have further shaped these mobility dynamics, making the country a major destination and transit point for Sudanese refugee displacement in the region. At the same time, Chad is navigating a fractious and contested political transition. Political violence escalated in 2024 and remains an important source of tension and political instability. The combination of these complex internal and regional dynamics, and their impact on human smuggling dynamics, make Chad a key country to monitor. A major component of human smuggling dynamics in Chad is internal movements to the country’s northern goldfields. These mobility patterns have typically been shaped by internal factors, including political instability, rebel activity and gold mining.1 This changed in 2023 with the outbreak of the conflict in Sudan and the massive influx of refugees and returnees into eastern Chad. Though northbound movements were temporarily hindered by this shift, which resulted in a relative decrease in demand for northbound travel from eastern Chad in the early months of the conflict, by the end of 2023 human smuggling had picked up again as many Sudanese began leaving refugee camps with the intention of travelling to northern Chad, Libya, Niger and Tunisia, often with the help of smugglers.2 In 2024, these movements escalated further and human smuggling between eastern and northern Chad saw significant growth, due in large part to increasing demand among Sudanese refugees for travel to northern Chad and Libya. However, the movement of Sudanese refugees through Chad also involved travel to Niger via N’Djamena or northern Chad. Northbound movements in Chad were also driven by increasing demand for travel to the Kouri Bougoudi goldfield. The flow of prospective gold miners, which began after the goldfield reopened at the end of 2022, was also facilitated by decreased restrictions on northbound travel as risks of rebel incursions in northern Chad remained contained in 2024. This encouraged the activities of passeurs, who catered to increasing demand for northbound travel, particularly from eastern Chad.Overall, Chad recorded progressively increasing movement levels in 2024 compared to previous years, presaging its emergence as an important space to watch for migrant and refugee movement, and associated protection risks. This is the latest GI-TOC monitoring report on human smuggling in Chad. It builds on a series of annual reports – issued since 2019 – which track the evolution of human smuggling in Chad and the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it

By Alice Fereday ̵and Alexandre Bish

Human smuggling in Chad mostly involves northbound movements linking southern and eastern areas of the country to the north, in particular the gold mining areas in the Tibesti mountains, and to Libya. As a result, these dynamics are often connected to and impacted by the situation in northern Chad, where decades of political unrest, successive rebellions, intercommunity conflict, and deeply entrenched illicit economies and transnational organized crime dynamics are key factors of instability. Chadian authorities have long responded to these risks through securitization, including, in recent years, tight control over key routes and hubs, and a ban on travel to the north, further increasing demand for smuggling services among Chadians travelling to the goldfields or further afield to Libya, and in some cases, Europe. In 2022, human smuggling activity in Chad continued to be heavily affected by the political and security developments that followed the incursion led by the Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (Front for change and concord in Chad – FACT) and ensuing death of President Idriss Déby, the country’s long-time leader, in April 2021. This upheaval interrupted what had been a broader rise of human smuggling from and through Chad, which, despite being illegal, had increased since 2016. This rise was in part due to the displacement of smuggling routes from Niger and Sudan, following anti-smuggling interventions in those two countries, which led to the use of Chad as a transit hub for human smuggling networks. Despite the displacement of routes, the number of migrants transiting the country still paled in comparison to the numbers that continued transiting Sudan and Niger. The most significant human smuggling itinerary in Chad remains the transport of migrants, both Chadian and foreign, to the gold mining economy along the country’s northern border with Libya. Since their discovery in 2012 and 2013, goldfields in the north have developed into major economic hubs attracting mostly poor migrants from across the region. The COVID-19 pandemic and linked travel restrictions in 2020 had little impact on movement to the goldfields. Rather, following the October 2020 ceasefire in Libya, the arrival of former mercenaries previously engaged in Libya to Kouri Bougoudi resulted in an uptick in gold mining, which in turn fuelled demand for workers. This development caused a surge in the movement of Sudanese and Chadian miners towards the goldfield since mid-2020.

By the United Nations.  High Commissioner for Human Rights

UN Human Rights is calling urgent attention to the continuing and critical need for a human rights solution to a particularly “wicked problem” - the complex crisis of trafficking in persons, slavery and other serious human rights violations and abuses that are taking place in South-East Asia in the context of extensive criminal operations set up to perpetrate cyber-enabled fraud. This report centers the lived experience of victims subjected to abuses within these scam operations and who in many cases continue to suffer human rights harms after their release. Through a behavioural science and systems analysis lens, the report also seeks to understand the barriers and enablers that lead victims into these operations through fraudulent recruitment pathways. The report concludes with key messages which call on States, and where relevant other stakeholders, to ensure a human rights-based response to this multidimensional issue, placing the rights, dignity, safety, and well-being of victims of trafficking at its core including through ensuring full respect of the non-punishment principle.

by Lord Hugh Charles Clifford. (Author), Graeme R. Newman (Introduction)

In a world still grappling with the echoes of systemic inequality, Christianity Versus Slavery (1841) emerges not merely as a historical relic, but as a prescient manifesto on human dignity and the moral imperatives of justice. This collection—comprising the fiery oratory of George Thompson, the strategic appeals of Lord Clifford to the Catholics of Ireland, and the authoritative weight of centuries of Papal Briefs—challenges the modern reader to confront the persistent "complicated interests" and "rotten politics" that continue to shape global structures of exploitation. At its heart, the work champions the "Scriptural doctrine of equality," asserting that the "innate dignity of man" is an immutable truth that transcends "complexion" or state borders. This 19th-century insistence that "God has made of one blood the varied tribes of man" serves as a foundational precursor to our modern concept of universal human rights.
The book’s relevance to the modern era is perhaps most striking in its sophisticated analysis of the intersection between global exploitation and domestic economic health. Lord Clifford’s address highlights how the "ruinous, than unchristian and inhuman traffic" of slavery in the colonies was inextricably linked to the "general distress" and "awful distress" of the manufacturing interests and the "starving workman" at home. This early critique of an "equally wicked and foolish policy" that prioritized "sordid lucre" over justice prefigures modern debates regarding ethical supply chains, globalized labor rights, and the hidden human costs of consumer goods. By linking the oppression of India and Ireland to the struggle for abolition, the text invites a contemporary audience to view justice as an indivisible, global pursuit.
Furthermore, the work offers a timeless strategy for social change through the "regeneration of public sentiment". In an age often dominated by digital echo chambers and a "venal press," the book’s emphasis on the "power of truth" and "moral power" as weapons "mightier than armies" remains a potent call to action. It warns that the struggle for justice is "slow and progressive," requiring a "struggle continued through a series of years" against "deep-seated prejudices" and "long-cherished pride". Ultimately, Christianity Versus Slavery serves as a rigorous moral compass, reminding the modern era that the "spiritual nature and affinity of the races" is the only legitimate basis for a sane and just civilization.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. 101p.

By Karen Muller,  Astrid Gonzaga Dionisio, Sanghyun Park

The “Online Knowledge and Practice of Children and Parents in Indonesia: Baseline Study 2023” highlights that most children in Indonesia use the internet daily, primarily for socializing and entertainment. However, they face significant risks, including exposure to inappropriate content, cyberbullying, and online sexual exploitation and abuse. The study reveals that many children and parents lack adequate online safety education, with only 37.5% of children having received information on how to stay safe online. Additionally, 42% of children have felt uncomfortable or scared due to online experiences, and 50.3% have seen sexual images on social media.UNICEF Indonesia is actively addressing these issues by supporting the government in strengthening the legal framework for child online protection and enhancing integrated services for victim support. UNICEF empowers children, parents, and teachers to promote safe online behavior and strengthen law enforcement capabilities to detect, investigate, and prosecute cases of online child exploitation. UNICEF also focuses on generating evidence to inform policies and practices, aiming to create a safer online environment for children in Indonesia. Their efforts include co-creating campaigns with children and youth to raise awareness about online risks and engaging with businesses to promote responsible conduct for the rights and well-being of children, 202

By The Youth Endowment Fund

The Youth Endowment Fund asked nearly 11,000 children aged 13–17 across England and Wales to share their experiences of violence. The findings are set out in separate reports, each exploring a different theme. This one focuses on teenage children’s experiences of exploitation and ‘gangs’. When we asked teenage children whether they had been in a ‘gang’, we defined a ‘gang’ as: “A group of young people who think of themselves as a ‘gang’, probably with a name, who are involved in violence or other crime.” We used the word ‘gang’ because it is one that many young people recognise and use themselves, more than phrases such as group-based criminality. But we also recognise its limitations: the term oversimplifies a complex issue and can reinforce harmful stereotypes. To reflect these sensitivities, we use inverted commas when referring to ‘gangs’. At several points in this report, we share the words of James (whose name has been changed to protect his identity), who, from ages 12 to 18, was criminally exploited. His story lays bare the reality