By Melanie Gower

There is a long history of cooperation between the UK and France over immigration controls at their shared borders. This has been formalised through a series of bilateral agreements, including the Sangatte Protocol (1991) and the Treaty of Le Touquet (2003). The latter allowed for France and the UK to carry out immigration controls in each other’s territories at seaports. The Sandhurst Treaty (2018) provided a legal framework for broader cooperation on border and migration issues. Early agreements addressed security around the Channel Tunnel and ferry terminals and preventing people crossing the border by hiding in vehicles. Since 2019 cooperation has focused on small boat crossings. Small boats have been the predominant recorded method of irregular arrival in the UK since 2020. The Home Office says 82 organised criminal gangs responsible for people smuggling by small boats have been “dismantled” since a Joint Intelligence Cell with France was established in July 2020. UK funding commitments Many border control agreements since 2014 have had associated funding commitments. The UK will provide €541 million (around £476 million at the time of the agreement) between 2023/24 and 2025/26, under a three-year deal made in March 2023. France is due to make an unspecified “substantial and continuing” contribution. How is the effectiveness of UK spending assessed? There is limited official information published about how the funding attached to successive agreements is spent and monitored. The government says France and the UK jointly assess the impact of cooperation and funding through regular strategic reviews. The government doesn’t publish details of review outcomes. It says doing so could undermine border security controls and the UK-France relationship.

Recent statistics The UK–France Joint Leaders’ Declaration issued in March 2023 included an agreement to increase the interception rate of boats crossing the English Channel and to “drastically reduce the number of crossings year on year”. Fewer people and boats were detected arriving in the UK in 2023 compared with 2022. The number of people intercepted and returned to France was also lower. • 36% fewer people were detected arriving by small boats in 2023 than in 2022. The Home Office says this is largely explained by a 93% reduction in Albanian nationals arriving by small boats 2023, which it attributes to recent partnership work between the UK and Albania. Arrivals of other nationalities reduced by 14% overall. • 46% fewer boats were detected arriving in the UK without permission in 2023 than in 2022, although the average number of people in each boat increased from 41 to 49. • France prevented fewer crossing attempts in 2023 than in 2022. The Home Office says this reflects the decline in the overall number of crossing attempts in 2023. Data for the first nine months of 2024 shows the number of people arriving in small boats (25,244) was slightly more than for the same period in 2023 (24,830). This is despite fewer boats (479) arriving in the first nine months of 2024 than over the same period in 2023 (506). More recent provisional data shows significantly more people and boats arrived in October and November 2024 compared to in 2023. The Home Office has cited weather conditions as a relevant factor. Topical issues Some stakeholders, including Border Force unions, some MPs, and migrants’ rights advocates, have criticised agreements between the UK and France for falling short of what they think is needed to address unauthorised border crossings. Their alternative suggestions have included powers for French law enforcement to arrest and detain intercepted migrants; powers for UK counterparts in France; and enhanced safe and legal routes for asylum seekers wishing to come to the UK. There have been reports of French police intervening more to prevent small boat departures since the 2023 UK-France funding agreement. Some commentators have linked the increased funding with an increase in migrant fatalities in 2024. Recent UK governments have wanted formal agreements with European states to return unauthorised migrants who travel to the UK. So far, the Labour government has prioritised practical cooperation with neighbouring countries over pursuing a formal returns agreement with the EU.

London: UK House of Commons Library, 2024. 31p.

By CJ McKinney, Melanie Gower

The UK has agreements with some countries for the return of people lacking legal residence. These agreements take various forms and are not usually published.

The attached briefing lists known agreements and links to the text where available. The government has confirmed the existence of some form of agreement with 24 countries since 2021, some recent and some struck up to 20 years ago:

In 2021, the government confirmed that it has formal returns agreements with Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, China, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Korea, South Sudan, Switzerland and Vietnam. That accounts for 16 countries, excluding the deal with Afghanistan because it has been inoperable in practice since regime change later in 2021.

Since 2021, the government has signed formal returns agreements with Albania, Georgia, Serbia, Moldova and Pakistan. These five replaced European Union agreements with those countries in which the UK took part while an EU member.

In 2021, the UK and India agreed a migration and mobility partnership that included provisions on returns.

In 2024, the UK and Bangladesh announced an informal returns agreement described as standard operating procedures.

In 2020, the UK and Ireland set up an informal returns agreement covering asylum seekers (rather than British or Irish citizens), described as non-legally binding operational arrangements.

There may well be other informal or even formal agreements, the existence of which has not been disclosed. The arrangement with Ireland was not announced at the time and only came to public attention in 2024.

Agreements made in the form of a treaty are published and laid before Parliament, but the government is not required to publish a memorandum of understanding or operational protocol. It has refused, for example, to disclose the contents of the 2022 Pakistan agreement.

London: UK House of Commons Library, 2024. 10p.

By Jasmijn Slootjes and Ravenna Sohst

Across Europe, concerns about irregular migration have dominated media headlines and shaped recent elections. Discussions of and policymaking related to irregular migration are often a numbers game, fueled by the latest estimates of changing migration trends and migrant populations. Data on irregular migration also influence decision-making, advocacy, and strategic and operational planning of a wide range of governmental and nongovernmental actors.

But despite playing such important roles, data on irregular migration are often inadequate—either lacking altogether, uneven, or difficult to access. This has consequences for policymakers, service providers, and other stakeholders that would benefit from better access to reliable data.

This MPI Europe policy brief explores obstacles that hinder the effective collection and use of irregular migration data, how this affects policymakers and other actors, and potential avenues for strengthening the evidence base. This study, which is part of the Measuring Irregular Migration and Related Policies (MIrreM) project, draws on insights shared in workshops and interviews by policymakers, subject matter experts, NGO representatives, and other stakeholders.

Brussels: Migration Policy Institute - Europe, 2024. 18p.

By Margaret Monyani

North Africa is a focal point for global migration flows, making effective and humane management approaches vital.

North Africa’s role in global migration needs effective, humane management. This report examines Libya, Tunisia and Egypt’s migration policies, highlighting their impact on stability and migrant safety. It emphasises the need for stable governance, socio-economic development and international cooperation. The report offers recommendations for balanced approaches that address security as well as humanitarian needs.

Key findings Socio-economic instability is still a key driver of migration in North Africa. High unemployment pushes people to look for opportunities abroad, exacerbating migration flows. Regional migration dynamics are complicated by external influences. Policies in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt focus on restricting migration to Europe rather than supporting the African Union’s (AU) Free Movement Protocol, which limits opportunities for regional integration and economic development. Recommendations Libya should: Advocate for a shift in international initiatives from a focus on migration control to one that emphasises human rights, dignity and the protection of migrants, particularly within EU-funded programmes Adopt non-detention approaches for migrants, such as community-based care, regularisation pathways and access to legal support, to prioritise their rights and well-being Tunisia should: Develop a comprehensive national asylum policy that aligns with international standards to better protect asylum seekers and refugees Revisit bilateral agreements with European nations to align them with regional African migration aims, supporting the AU’s Free Movement Protocol Bolster legal and operational capacities to disrupt smuggling networks through investment in resources and law enforcement training Ongoing conflict in Libya has created a vacuum where militias and smuggling networks control migration routes, leading to severe human rights abuses in unofficial detention centres. Human rights violations against migrants are widespread in Libya, while Tunisia and Egypt face challenges in providing legal protection and basic services to migrants. Egypt should: Implement policy reforms that focus on enhancing economic opportunities to address the root causes of migration, particularly through job creation and economic stability Revise visa restrictions to reduce irregular migration and encourage safer migration pathways Strengthen legal frameworks to combat human trafficking and foster deeper regional cooperation The AU should: Accelerate the ratification of the Free Movement Protocol by addressing specific political and logistical barriers in North Africa, promoting intraregional mobility Develop a platform for real-time information exchange on migration trends, human trafficking and smuggling networks, enhancing evidencebased decision making and rapid responses Strengthen cooperation with the EU to ensure migration policies prioritise both security concerns and migrants’ rights

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 24p.

By Abby Córdova, Jonathan Hiskey, Mary Malone, and Diana Orcés

U.S. efforts to control unauthorized crossings of its southwest border have long rested on the idea of deterrence — if migrants know that a border is dangerous to cross and the likelihood of deportation is high, they will be dissuaded from trying in the first place. Despite the seemingly intuitive logic of this strategy, and the billions of dollars invested in it, deterrence efforts largely have failed, with the number of border crossings in recent years exceeding those of 30 years ago.

To understand why this decades-old, bipartisan deterrence strategy has proven ineffective, the authors focus on individuals from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras who have previous migration experience, with a vast majority of them seeking entry into the U.S. These individuals have direct knowledge of the difficulties and dangers a border crossing poses, yet many report plans to try to cross the border again. To understand why they persist, the authors rely on survey data specifically collected to better understand the root causes of international migration.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 160-181

By George Fishman

Summary

• The Immigration Act of 1924 ushered in a four-decade-long Great Pause in mass immigration. This allowed the United States to assimilate the 20-plus million immigrants who arrived during the “Great Wave” that had begun in the 1880s. And the Act fostered a national economic climate conducive to the flowering of the American Dream, especially for Black Americans. Economists have concluded that from 1940 to 1970, largely paralleling the Great Pause, the average real earnings of white men rose by 210 percent and those of Black men rose by 406 percent.

• Not only “progressives”, “liberals”, “conservatives”, and “racists” supported restrictionist policies. So did many Black leaders. A leading Black newspaper concluded that the dramatic decrease in immigration during the First World War “gave [Blacks] the opportunity to get a foothold in the economic world”, but that “there have been many grave doubts about their ability to keep this foothold when fierce competition set in again”. Another proclaimed that the war “showed us just how keen a competitor cheap European labor had been for” Black workers.

• Roy Beck, founder of NumbersUSA, recently set forth an audacious hypothesis that the 1924 Act “was the greatest federal action in U.S. history — other than the Civil War Constitutional Amendments — in advancing the economic interests of the descendants of American slavery, and perhaps of all American workers”. The Act led to a tighter labor market, resulting in an openness and even a desire by employers both North and South to recruit Black workers. This, in turn, opened the door for the Great Migration of millions of Blacks out of the South and helped pave the way for the civil rights revolution of the 1960s. And it turned America into a middle-class society for whites and for Blacks. Beck’s hypothesis is not only plausible, it is the most compelling reading of the historical evidence.

• But not only did the 1924 Act dramatically reduce immigration, it also established country-by-country immigration quotas in reaction to the vast increase in immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe since the 1880s. Sen. David Reed argued that “[i]t was natural that the[ new immigrants] should not understand our institutions” and that they were “wholly dissimilar to the native-born Americans … untrained in self-government”. Thus, “it was best for America that our incoming immigrants should hereafter be of the same races as those of us who are already here”. The debate over the 1924 Act focused to a large extent on often ugly racial rationales for restriction.

• In 1965, Congress, in its zeal to remove the demon of national origins quotas, restarted mass immigration. Congress could have easily accomplished the former without the latter, but it did not do so. The results have been disastrous for our country, with a 19 percent drop in the average real earnings of white men (from 1970 to 2014) and a 32 percent drop for Black men.

Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies, 2024.

By American Immigration Council

In recent months, leading politicians and policymakers have renewed calls for mass deportations of immigrants from the United States. While similar promises have been made in the past without coming to fruition—during the 2016 presidential campaign, for example, Donald Trump pledged to create a “deportation force” to round up undocumented immigrants —mass deportation now occupies a standing role in the rhetoric of leading immigration hawks. To cite just one example, former U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) director Tom Homan has promised “a historic deportation operation” should a hawkish administration return to power.While some plans have envisioned a one-time, massive operation designed to round up, detain, and deport the undocumented population en masse, others have envisioned starting from a baseline of one million deportations per year.

Given that in the modern immigration enforcement era the United States has never deported more than half a million immigrants per year—and many of those have been migrants apprehended trying to enter the U.S., not just those already living here—any mass deportation proposal raises obvious questions: how, exactly, would the United States possibly carry out the largest law enforcement operation in world history? And at what cost?

Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) along with publicly-available data about the current costs of immigration enforcement, this report aims to provide an estimation of what the fiscal and economic cost to the United States would be should the government deport a population of roughly 11 million people who as of 2022 lacked permanent legal status and faced the possibility of removal. We consider this both in terms of the direct budgetary costs—the expenses associated with arrest, detention, legal processing, and removal—that the federal government would have to pay, and in terms of the impact on the United States economy and tax base should these people be removed from the labor force and consumer market.

In terms of fiscal costs, we also include an estimate of the impact of deporting an additional 2.3 million people who have crossed the U.S. southern border without legal immigration status and were released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from January 2023 through April 2024. We consider these fiscal costs separately because we don’t have more recent ACS data necessary to estimate the total net changes in the undocumented population past 2022, or the larger impact on the economy and tax base of removing those people, an impact that is therefore not reflected in this report.

In total, we find that the cost of a one-time mass deportation operation aimed at both those populations—an estimated total of is at least $315 billion. We wish to emphasize that this figure is a highly conservative estimate. It does not take into account the long-term costs of a sustained mass deportation operation or the incalculable additional costs necessary to acquire the institutional capacity to remove over 13 million people in a short period of time—incalculable because there is simply no reality in which such a singular operation is possible. For one thing, there would be no way to accomplish this mission without mass detention as an interim step. To put the scale of detaining over 13 million undocumented immigrants into context, the entire U.S. prison and jail population in 2022, comprising every person held in local, county, state, and federal prisons and jails, was 1.9 million people.

In order to estimate the costs of a longer-term mass deportation operation, we calculated the cost of a program aiming to arrest, detain, process, and deport one million people per year—paralleling the more conservative proposals made by mass-deportation proponents. Even assuming that 20 percent of the undocumented population would “self-deport” under a yearslong mass-deportation regime, we estimate the ultimate cost of such a longer operation would average out to $88 billion annually, for a total cost of $967.9 billion over the course of more than a decade. This is a much higher sum than the one-time estimate, given the long-term costs of establishing and maintaining detention facilities and temporary camps to eventually be able to detain one million people at a time—costs that could not be modeled in a short-term analysis. This would require the United States to build and maintain 24 times more ICE detention capacity than currently exists. The government would also be required to establish and maintain over 1,000 new immigration courtrooms to process people at such a rate.

Even this estimate is likely quite conservative, as we were unable to estimate the additional hiring costs for the tens of thousands of agents needed to carry out one million arrests per year, the additional capital investments necessary to increase the ICE Air Operations fleet of charter aircraft to carry out one million annual deportations, and a myriad of other ancillary costs necessary to ramp up federal immigration enforcement operations to the scale necessary.

Some of the report’s key findings include:

• A multi-year mass deportation campaign, which would expand the infrastructure needed to arrest, detain, process, and remove one million undocumented immigrants per year, would cost $88 billion on average per year or a total of $967.9 billion.

• This operation would take over 10 years. For the same costs, the U.S. government could build 2.9 million new homes, pay full tuition and expenses for 8.9 million people to attend an in-state public college for four years or even increase annual worldwide funding for cancer research 18-fold for every year of the operation.

• Mass deportation would also deal a devastating blow to the U.S. economy, shrinking our GDP between 4.2 to 6.8%, and hit key industries already struggling with chronic labor shortages.

Washington, DC> American Immigration Council, 2024. 54p.

May Contain Markup

By Joanne Passaro

Gender and Homelessness: The book explores how gender differences contribute to the persistence of homelessness, with a focus black men in New York City.

Cultural and Moral Location: Homelessness is not just an economic issue but also a cultural and moral one, where homeless men are seen as both hypermasculinized and emasculated.

Survival Strategies: Homeless women often strategize to appear"worthy" to move through the system, while homeless men lack similar strategies and face greater stigmatization.

Impact of Family Structures: The book argues that nuclear family ideologies play a significant role in who remains homeless versus who becomes houseless.

Psychology Press, 1996, 128 pages

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By Osmond K. Praenkel

Importance of Civil Liberties: The document emphasizes that civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, assembly, and protection from arbitrary arrests, are fundamental to a free society.

Historical Context: It discusses the origins and development of civil liberties in the United States, particularly through the Bill of Rights and subsequent amendments.

Challenges and Limitations: The text highlights the challenges in fully realizing civil liberties, including during wartime and in the face of discrimination.

Role of the Judiciary: The document underscores the critical role of courts in interpreting and enforcing civil liberties, ensuring that government actions do not infringe on individual rights.

The Viking Press, 1944, 277 pages

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By Jeff Karabanow, Sean Kidd, Tyler Frederick, and Jean Hughes

Study Focus: The book explores the lived experiences of homeless in Canada, focusing on their transition from homelessness stability.

Methodology: The study used a longitudinal mixed-method approach, involving in-depth qualitative interviews and questionnaires with 51 participants over a year.

Key Findings: Factors influencing the transition include consistent support,feelings of belonging,life and social skills, and housing stability.

Challenges: Youth face significant challenges such as instability,scheduling issues, and engagement difficulties during their transition.

Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press, May 30, 2018, 147 pages

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Edited by Debra J. Rog

Complexity of Homelessness: Homelessness is a multifaceted issue involving various subgroups such as mentally ill individuals, families with children, and those with substance abuse problems. Understanding These complexities is crucial for effective interventions.

Mixed-Method Approaches: Estimating the number of homeless individuals requires mixed methods to produce reasonable estimates, as highlighted by David S. Cordray.

Evaluation Challenges: Evaluating programs for the homeless, such as those targeting substance abuse or mental health, involves significant methodological and practical challenges, including diverse evaluation designs and data collection issues.

Program Evaluations: The document reviews several large-scale national demonstration programs, emphasizing the importance of both individual and system-level evaluations to improve service delivery and policy implications.

Jossey-Bass, 1991, 94 pages

By Lisa Klee Mihaly

Homelessness Impact: Homelessness severely affects children's health,emotional well-being, and development, often leading to long-term consequences.

Causes of Homelessness: Major causes include inadequate income,lack of affordable housing, and insufficient family support systems.

Policy Failures: Current policies and emergency shelters are insufficient to address the needs of homeless families.

Recommendations: The document suggests increasing affordable housing, improving income support, and providing comprehensive services to prevent and address homelessness.

Children’s Defense Fund, 1991, 25 pages

May Contain Markup

Edited by Matthew A. Kraljic

Homelessness Statistics: The document discusses the challenges inaccurately quantifying the homeless population, highlighting discrepancies in data sources and the implications of these numbers.

Causes of Homelessness: It identifies multiple causes, including urban renewal, lack of affordable housing, insufficient mental health care, and economic disparities.

Impact on Different Demographics: The document emphasizes that homelessness affects various groups, including former middle-class individuals, children, and rural populations.

Potential Solutions: It explores potential solutions, such as combining volunteerism, private sector aid, and public policy initiatives to address homelessness more effectively.

The H.W Wilson Company, 1992, 162 pages

By Peter Nagle and Richard Summerrell

On 10 August 1987 the then Prime Minister, the Honourable R J L Hawke, announced the formation of a Royal Commission to investigate the causes of deaths of Aboriginals while held in State and Territory jails. The Royal Commission was established in response to a growing public concern that deaths in custody of Aboriginal people were too common and poorly explained. This Commonwealth Royal Commission was the 108th since Federation. The establishment of the Commission and the appointment of the Honourable Mr Justice Muirhead as Royal Commissioner had the support of all State and Territory governments….Access to records collected or created by government has always been subject to opposing pressures. Access to records is seen as providing a check on arbitrary government power, but privacy considerations and other sensitivities also need to be protected….”

National Archives of Australia. 1996. 85p.

By Maren Machles

“This is one of 16 deaths in custody detailed in a report the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) commissioned in 2021. The details of what took place and who this individual was are vague because the report was heavily redacted. The agency hired an outside contractor to review the investigations of 16 deaths that took place in a handful of the more than 90 detention centers the BIA operates and/or funds on tribal lands. The BIA has yet to publish the report. However, POGO’s analysis of a redacted version of the report, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), raises troubling questions about the BIA’s compliance with federal requirements around reporting deaths in custody, whether those deaths are being adequately counted and investigated by the agency, and whether proposed reforms would address why these deaths occur in the first place.”

Program on Government Oversight. POGO. June 27. 2023. 9p.

By Richard Wright

Historical Context: The book discusses the psychological and social impacts of Western colonization on Asian and African societies, highlighting the long-term effects of oppression and cultural disruption.

Psychological Reactions: It explores the psychological responses of oppressed people, including feelings of inferiority, resistance, and the complex dynamics of loyalty and identity.

Cultural Critique: The author critiques both Western and non-Western societies, emphasizing the need for mutual understanding and the dangers of cultural arrogance and ignorance.

References: The document includes numerous references to works by other authors and poets, illustrating the interconnectedness of cultural and literary expressions.

Doubleday, 1957, 190 pages

By John Stone

Historical Context: The study of race relations became central insociology post-World War II, influenced by decolonization and civilrights movements.

Power Dynamics: Minority groups' power and influence are crucial in understanding racial conflicts and social changes.

Global Perspective: Racial and ethnic conflicts are not limited to the West but are a global phenomenon, affecting socialist and capitalist societies alike.

Social Institutions: Race relations impact various social institutions, including education, employment, and legal systems, highlighting the complexity of achieving racial justice.

Fontana Press / Collins, 1985, 191 pages

By Herbert Adolphus Miller, PH.D.

Group Dynamics: The book explores the psychology of domination and freedom within groups, emphasizing the importance of mutual understanding and the development of sentiments for resolving conflicts.

Americanization: It discusses the challenges and paradoxes of Americanization, highlighting the need for a rational and empathetic approach to integrating immigrants.

Pseudo-Science Critique: The author criticizes the misuse of pseudo-science in justifying social hierarchies and emphasizes the need for genuine scientific methods.

Historical Context: The book provides a historical analysis of various social and political conflicts, drawing lessons from past mistakes to suggest better approaches for the future.

Read-Me.Org, 2024, 196 pages

By James B. McKee

Historical Context: The book explores the development of the sociology of race relations in the United States, highlighting its evolution from the early 20th century to the 1960s.

Sociological Failure: It critically examines the failure of sociologists to predict and understand the civil rights movement and the subsequent racial struggles in the 1960s.

Perspective Critique: The author argues that the failure was due to the sociologists' perspective, which was shaped by their own social context and often ignored the realities of racial change.

Black Sociologists' Struggle: The book also discusses the challenges faced by black sociologists in expressing their perspectives within a predominantly white academic field.

University of Illinois Press, 1993, 376 pages

By Philip Mason

Purpose and Scope: The book aims to introduce the subject of race relations, drawing on various academic disciplines like biology, psychology, and social anthropology.

Race and Behavior: The author argues that race itself does not determine intelligence or behavior, but beliefs about race significantly impact human behavior and societal structures.

Historical Context: The book discusses historical examples of race relations, including colonialism, slavery, and apartheid, highlighting their long-term effects on societies.

Intelligence: The text explores the concept of intelligence,distinguishing between innate and acquired intelligence, and emphasizes the role of environment and societal expectations in shaping intellectual capacities.

Oxford University Press, 1970, 181 pages