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Posts tagged Crime
The Effect of Sure Start on Youth Misbehaviour, Crime and Contacts With Children’s Social Care

By Pedro Carneiro, Sarah Cattan, Gabriella Conti, Claire Crawford, Elaine Drayton, Christine Farquharson, Nick Ridpath    

Introduced in 1999, Sure Start was an ambitious, large-scale early years programme in England aimed at improving the life chances of children, particularly those growing up in poverty. The programme’s reach peaked in the late 2000s, with a network of around 3,300 centres operating as ‘one-stop shops’ for families with children under 5. Sure Start centres offered a wide range of services, from baby weighing clinics to childcare provision to employment support for parents. These services were designed primarily to target school readiness and children’s health, and recent evidence suggests the programme was successful in achieving these aims: in a series of reports, Cattan et al. (2022) and Carneiro et al. (2024a) document positive impacts of Sure Start for child health and school attainment, particularly for children from the most disadvantaged backgrounds.    Given the efficacy of the Sure Start programme for health and educational outcomes, a natural question is whether it had broader impacts on children. This report details the findings from a robust evaluation of the impact of access to Sure Start on children’s absence and suspensions at school, youth offending and contacts with the children’s social care system. Missing school, committing a crime or experiencing social services involvement can entail significant welfare costs for children. There is a case that investment in joined-up services and early intervention can prevent children from experiencing these poor outcomes. For instance, the Independent Review of Children’s Social Care (MacAlister, 2022) highlighted the potential of tailored services based in community settings to contribute to earlier identification of families in need and reduce social services intervention. It is important to understand whether an integrated early years programme delivered in local neighbourhoods, such as Sure Start, was able to influence the need for costlier interventions, such as those delivered through children’s social care and the youth justice 

Key Findings

1. Access to a nearby Sure Start centre between ages 0 and 4 significantly reduced youth crime that resulted in convictions or custodial sentences. Living within 2.5 kilometres of a Sure Start centre reduced the share of 16-year-olds who had ever received a criminal conviction by 13%. Meanwhile, custodial sentences – the most severe sanction – fell by a fifth due to access to Sure Start. Reductions in youth offending were concentrated on convictions for theft, the most common category of offence (20% reduction), and for drug offences (20% reduction).2. While access to Sure Start reduced serious youth crime, it had more mixed impacts on less severe contact with the criminal justice system. Those with access to Sure Start committed offences earlier – a 10% increase in less serious misdemeanours by age 12 – and saw rises in cautions for criminal damage and violent crime, although overall numbers of young people experiencing cautions by age 16 were unchanged.  3. Misbehaviour also increased within school settings: the proportion of children suspended from secondary school increased by 10%, and absence rates increased by 7%. Part of the increase in poor behaviour, both in schools and for younger adolescents in the criminal justice system, may reflect a diversion of children away from more severe offences towards lower-level infractions, but it also likely represents an increase in misbehaviour for some children. This could align with evidence that group-based childcare, a key component of Sure Start’s services, can adversely affect the behavioural development of some children.4. Access to Sure Start had no significant effect on referrals to children’s social services or on receiving support as a child in need (CIN) or as a child looked after (CLA) between ages 7 and 16. Children in care during late primary school (age 7 to 11) did spend around 13% less time being looked after if they had access to Sure Start during their first five years of life, potentially indicating that children’s needs were somewhat less severe or that they benefited more quickly from support from social services. 5. The youth justice system and children’s social care involve significant costs for government, as well as the individuals involved. We estimate that for every pound spent at its peak in 2010, Sure Start averted approximately 19 pence in public spending on youth justice and children’s social care, equivalent to £500 million (in today’s prices) of savings per cohort attending at the time. Savings mostly come from costs of youth custody and children looked after, reflecting the high costs of these intensive interventions (and so the large financial benefits of reducing need for these institutions). Future work will provide an overall cost–benefit analysis of the programme, incorporating the effects on educational achievement and health identified in our previous work, while taking account of how these different domains relate to one another to avoid double-counting benefits.

IFS Report R338 London: The Institute for Fiscal Studies, October 2024, 75p.

Lifting The Lid on Bluetown: A Replication Case Study, Which Investigates The Contribution of Engagement in A Local Criminal Network to Young People’s More Serious and Persistent Offending Patterns.

By O'Meara Daly, Eoin and Redmond, Sean and Naughton, Catherine 

The Bluetown study aimed to replicate the Greentown study. The Greentown study was innovative in methodology and purpose. It examined the context of the minority of young people in Ireland who engaged in ‘atypical’ crimes (burglary and drugs for sale and supply), where criminal activity tended to be more serious and prolific. It identified the presence of a local criminal network and found that engagement in the network was plausibly associated with repeat offending. Two replication case studies, Bluetown and Redtown, aimed to examine if the Greentown findings resonated in other locations in Ireland. The current study aimed to identify if the Greentown findings could be generalised to another anonymised Garda sub-district, Bluetown. The Twinsight methodology Redmond (2016) specifically designed the Twinsight methodology for the Greentown study. In Greentown, local criminal network maps constructed from PULSE crime data illustrated crime transactions (focusing on burglary and drugs for sale or supply) including transactions between adults and young people. Similarly, criminal network maps were constructed for Bluetown during the period of 2014–2015. The network map provided a framework to harness the expert knowledge of members of An Garda Síochána in Bluetown and facilitated confidential discussions around key incidents, young people’s contexts and relationships. Key findings Garda narratives centred on four area-based criminal networks that existed in Bluetown. These were distinct from each other and spread over a large geographical area. Network 1 was family based and hierarchical in nature, with Networks 2 and 3 grounded in peer relationships and their locality. Garda respondents described Network 4 as a drugs network with a loose organisational structure. According to Gardaí, all four networks in Bluetown contained relationships with different levels of trust between members and this affected network strength and stability. Criminal network strength and stability was also influenced by fear and intimidation. Similar to Greentown, each network contained members with family connections to crime and involved young people with a combination of risk factors. In Bluetown, proximity to offending peers and the normalisation of criminal behaviour were additional factors with networks developing in localities for sustained periods.

Conclusion There was sufficient consistency between the original Greentown findings and the replication study in Bluetown: notably regarding Network 1 and its family orientation, in addition to the chaotic backgrounds of young people in problematic peer groups. One difference between Greentown and Bluetown was that the latter represented a large urban sub-district with four distinct criminal networks identified by Garda respondents on the criminal network map. As a result, some Garda respondents were limited in their knowledge of all areas on the PULSE informed map. In Greentown we identified that engagement in local criminal networks contributed to young people developing more serious and prolific crime trajectories. Likewise, in Bluetown the findings suggest that engagement in networks contributed to a significant number of young people developing more serious and prolific offending patterns. The combination of Bluetown and Greentown findings indicates that the structure and dynamics of networks may be context-specific. Both sets of findings suggest that engagement in a local criminal network may have contributed to the young people’s ‘atypical’ criminal activity    

 Limerick: School of Law, University of Limerick. 2020. 64p.

Trends in Juvenile Offending: What You Need to Know

By  Brendan Lantz, and Kyle G. Knapp

The analysis, entitled, Trends in Juvenile Offending: What You Need to Know, focuses on trends in offending from 2016 through 2022 by examining changes in the frequency of juvenile offending by crime type, demographics, and several other characteristics. This study uses incident information from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) from 2016 to 2022. The study period begins in 2016 because of notable increases in agency participation in reporting crime statistics to NIBRS following 2015; it ends in 2022 because that was the most recent year of data available at the time the report was prepared. To produce these data, offense, victim, and offender segment-level information was aggregated to the incident level for each year. The year files were then appended into a master incident-level file, in which incidents were restricted to those (a) involving at least one juvenile offender; and (b) from agencies that reported to NIBRS each month during the study period. From this file, totals were created for each month in every year. Some totals represent the total number of offender participations, while other totals represent the total number of incidents with one or more characteristics of interest. The outline below walks through each segment of NIBRS, how information was aggregated, how cases were dropped, and how totals were generated. 

2024. 20p.

Does Welfare Prevent Crime? The Criminal Justice Outcomes of Youth Removed From SSI

By Manasi Deshpande & Michael G. Mueller-Smith

We estimate the effect of losing Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits at age 18 on criminal justice and employment outcomes over the next two decades. To estimate this effect, we use a regression discontinuity design in the likelihood of being reviewed for SSI eligibility at age 18 created by the 1996 welfare reform law. We evaluate this natural experiment with Social Security Administration data linked to records from the Criminal Justice Administrative Records System. We find that SSI removal increases the number of criminal charges by a statistically significant 20% over the next two decades. The increase in charges is concentrated in offenses for which income generation is a primary motivation (60% increase), especially theft, burglary, fraud/forgery, and prostitution. The effect of SSI removal on criminal justice involvement persists more than two decades later, even as the effect of removal on contemporaneous SSI receipt diminishes. In response to SSI removal, youth are twice as likely to be charged with an illicit income-generating offense than they are to maintain steady employment at $15,000/year in the labor market. As a result of these charges, the annual likelihood of incarceration increases by a statistically significant 60% in the two decades following SSI removal. The costs to taxpayers of enforcement and incarceration from SSI removal are so high that they nearly eliminate the savings to taxpayers from reduced SSI benefits

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2022. 38p.

The Cost of Juvenile Crime and its Economic Impact on Colorado 

By Paul Pazen and Steven L. Byers

People in Colorado have not directly experienced crime. From property offenses to violent crimes, every crime leaves a traumatized victim. Whether the wounds are physical, psychological, or financial, it is important to acknowledge the profound effects that a crime can have on its victims. At Common Sense Institute, our goal is to address the economic impact of crime while remaining conscious of the suffering that it causes. This report analyzes the cost of juvenile crime in Colorado and its economic impact. This study encompasses the period of 2010 to 2023 and the data comes from Colorado Crime Statistics (2023). Colorado’s juvenile crime trends tell a mixed story. On the one hand, youth crime rates have fallen in the last 15 years as property crime rates fall, follow. On the other hand, violent youth crime has risen. Meanwhile, the number of juveniles arrested and detained has fallen from a combination of alternative sentencing, diversion programs, and increased parole. It is violent crime that costs more. Juvenile crime results in direct or tangible costs including unrecovered stolen property, damaged property, victims’ out-of-pocket medical expenses, the cost of police, courts and correctional institutions, and lost earnings by both victims and juvenile perpetrators who are arrested and convicted. Juvenile crime also inflicts indirect or intangible costs like the pain and suffering of victims, reduced quality of life for everyone, and lower levels of investment and lower property values.i Intangible costs are difficult to measure with precision but, among those who have estimated them, there is a consensus that the intangible cost of juvenile crime far exceeds the tangible cost. Reducing current rates of murder, rape, assault, theft, and robbery by juveniles would produce a wide range of savings and other benefits to families, individuals, property owners and taxpayers. All estimates of the cost of crime in this report are adjusted for inflation and are reported in 2020 dollars so that costs can be compared across years. In 2021, after an extraordinary rise in crime, CSI estimated a total cost of crime of $3.3 billion. 

Greenwood Village, CO: Common Sense Institute, 2024. 30p.

Disrupting the Pathways to Gang Violence for Youth of Color

By Jennifer Roark


This study, informed by a life course perspective, used a mixed methodological approach to identify the differences in events, motivations, and experiences related to gang affiliation and the differences across (a) system-documented, gang-involved individuals, (b) system-documented gang-involved individuals who have gang-involved family members, and (c) other high-risk youth who are suspected of involvement. The results of this study produced a nuanced understanding of these youth’s lives, especially as it relates to their fathers. As expected, when fathers were identified as having involvement in gangs themselves, youths were significantly more likely to also become members. The overall goal of this research was to identify distinct pathways to gang activity that could inform practitioners and policymakers about useful intervention strategies. This research fills a literature gap about the relationships between and amongst fathers and sons, and how those relationships transmit both criminogenic and protective factors that would encourage or discourage gang affiliation and gang activity. Father gang involvement continued to be a strong predictor of youth gang involvement even when controlling for other social relationships (e.g., peers, siblings, cousins), but not as much as same generation and peer influence. Importantly, fathers were not the sole social influence on a youth’s decision to join a gang. Peer and same generation family (siblings and cousins) gang involvement were as strong or stronger predictors of a youth’s involvement in crime and gangs as were the variables associated with fathers. The findings unexpectedly revealed that an increase in the most logged life events during a three-month timeframe reduced risk of escalation as a youth.

Portland, OR:  Research and Planning, Department of Community Justice Multnomah County Oregon. 2023, 113pg

Parental Legal Culpability in Youth Offending

By Colleen Sbeglia, Imani Randolph, Caitlin Cavanagh, and Elizabeth Cauffman

When youth commit crimes, their parents may be held legally responsible for their actions. Parental legal culpability laws were developed to ensure justice for victims of crime but also deter juvenile delinquency. However, it is unclear if parental culpability has these desired effects or if it instead contributes to disparities that already exist in the justice system. This review provides a psychological perspective on parental legal culpability, highlighting the different types of offenses that parents may be held responsible for, including vicarious tort liability, status offenses, and criminal responsibility. Given the significant public discourse around certain types of crime, we also include focused discussions about parental culpability for youth violence and cybercrimes. We then consider the unintended consequences that may arise as a result of parental sanctions, from exacerbating racial and ethnic inequalities to imposing financial burdens that may put families at risk for further justice involvement. Finally, we discuss challenges to the efficacy of parental culpability laws, with recommendations for areas of continued research.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 403 - 416

The Rise of Youth Gangs (Ciyaal Weero) in Mogadishu

By Mohamed Adam

Youth gangs (aged between 15 and 35 years) - known as Ciyaal Weero - emerged in Mogadishu’s periphery districts in late 2021. well as pistols (and bright torches to shine in people’s eyes) and sometimes bajaj (tuk-tuks) to rob people,mostly at night.Unemployment, the use of drugs, and weak local government are seen as the main causes of the rise of communications technology, social media, and the use of out-of-court settlements are also believed to have contributed to the rise of Ciyaal Weero in the Somali capital. Although the police forces launched the ‘Samakaab’ operation against Ciyaal Weero, the government has not yet managed to reduce the threat of the youth gangs. Since its emergence, Ciyaal Weero killed people in Mogadishu including teachers and students and limited the mobility of people in the peripheral examines the factors that contributed to the rise of Ciyaal Weero, its impact on security and mobility in Mogadishu, and puts forward some policy considerations including control of the import of drugs, development of a government strategy to tackle the youth gangs, and the creation of job opportunities.

Mogadishu - Somalia: Somali Public Agenda, 2022. 4p.