By ALICE McINTYRE

Urban teens of color are often portrayed as welfare mothers, drop outs, drug addicts, and both victims and perpetrators of the many kinds of violence which can characterize life in urban areas. Although urban youth often live in contexts which include poverty, unemployment, and discrimination, they also live with the everydayness of school, friends, sex, television, music, and other elements of teenage lives. Inner City Kids explores how a group of African American, Jamaican, Puerto Rican, and Haitian adolescents make meaning of and respond to living in an inner-city community.

The book focuses on areas of particular concern to the youth, such as violence, educational opportunities, and a decaying and demoralizing urban environment characterized by trash, pollution, and abandoned houses. McIntyre's work with these teens draws upon participatory action research, which seeks to co-develop programs with study participants rather than for them.

New York: London: NYU Press, 2000. 255p.

By Magnus Lofstrom, Brandon Martin, and Deepak Premkumar, with research support from Andrew Skelton

California has seen increases in some crime over the last decade, including notable jumps in homicides, auto theft, and most recently retail theft, as well as a slow gradual uptick in aggravated assaults. While these recent increases have dominated headlines, longer-term trends in fact point toward significant overall decreases in crime since the 1990s that appear to be concentrated among juveniles and young adults.

In this report, we examine these long-term changes, focusing specifically on whether younger generations are less likely to be criminally active, as measured by violent crimes, than past generations—or if drops in offending have affected all age groups. One of the most robust relationships in criminology is between age and crime: criminal offending increases in adolescence, peaks in the late teens or early 20s, and then continually decreases. This relationship is the foundation for the well-known “age-crime curve,” which underlies predictions and risk assessments about future offending.

Drawing from unique, individual-level data on arrests in California between 1980 and 2020, we use arrests for violent felonies as our measure of criminal offending because these offenses have not been directly targeted by the numerous reforms implemented in the state over the past several decades and arrests for these crimes are subject to less law enforcement discretion.

Between 1990 and 2010, the age-crime curve in California generally follows historical patterns, with peaks in crime during the late teen years or early 20s; these curves follow these patterns but have gradually shifted downward, reflecting declines in violent crime during this period. However, the most recent age-crime curves differ from earlier, well-established state and national patterns in ways that are consistent with generational shifts in criminal offending. →

The violent felony arrest rate for young adults (ages 18–22) dropped by more than 50 percent over the last 25 years, from 1,712 per 100,000 residents in 1994 to 840 in 2019. The drop is even more notable as the rate for adults in their late 30s and older increased over the same period. This steep decline is the driving factor behind the most recent shift in the age-crime curve. After representing about 25 percent of violent felony arrests among adults for decades, young adults now account for 16 percent of these arrests. →

We see reductions in violent criminal offending beginning with individuals born in the early 1990s. For those born in 1993 and later, the violent felony arrest rate is 20 to 25 percent lower than in previous generations. →

The decrease in violent criminal offending among younger generations is driven by fewer individuals arrested for violent felonies. However, the number of offenses each individual is arrested for in a year has increased by about 5 percent, a notable deviation from decades-long levels. This increase has not been limited to any single generation but represents a broader increase over the last decade. →

While our study does not aim to identify the reasons behind these shifts, nor the extent to which they apply to other offenses, the decrease in criminal offending coincides with changes in some teen behavior; for example, measures of risky behavior, like alcohol consumption and drug use, have declined among more recent generations. Future work to determine specific contributing factors and whether the changes are persistent would have great value and policy relevance.

Even without knowing the root causes, several policy implications follow from our findings. The decrease in crime among younger generations suggests the possibility of lower future capacity needs for the criminal justice system. But although there has been a drop in the number of offenders arrested, the frequency of offending is up somewhat, pointing toward the potential need for new and/or alternative approaches to reduce crime among a plausibly more challenging-to-rehabilitate offender population. Lastly, but importantly, our results also suggest that risk assessment tools—which are widely used by criminal justice agencies—need to be adjusted to account for declines in offending among younger generations to reduce inaccurate predictions.

San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California 2023. 27p.

By U.K. Home Office

Country information and protection guidelines for British asylum authorities on fear of gangs (gangs' origins; main gangs; structure, size and reach; characteristics of members; activities and impact; targets of gang violence; returnees; government anti-gang policy and law; effectiveness of law enforcement agencies; freedom of movement)

London: Home Office, Independent Advisory Group on Country Information, 2021. 92p.

By Mohamed Adam

Youth gangs (aged between 15 and 35 years) - known as Ciyaal Weero - emerged in Mogadishu’s periphery districts in late 2021. well as pistols (and bright torches to shine in people’s eyes) and sometimes bajaj (tuk-tuks) to rob people,mostly at night.Unemployment, the use of drugs, and weak local government are seen as the main causes of the rise of communications technology, social media, and the use of out-of-court settlements are also believed to have contributed to the rise of Ciyaal Weero in the Somali capital. Although the police forces launched the ‘Samakaab’ operation against Ciyaal Weero, the government has not yet managed to reduce the threat of the youth gangs. Since its emergence, Ciyaal Weero killed people in Mogadishu including teachers and students and limited the mobility of people in the peripheral examines the factors that contributed to the rise of Ciyaal Weero, its impact on security and mobility in Mogadishu, and puts forward some policy considerations including control of the import of drugs, development of a government strategy to tackle the youth gangs, and the creation of job opportunities.

Mogadishu - Somalia: Somali Public Agenda, 2022. 4p.

By Joanna Callen

Jamaica’s violence problem is not new. Since the mid 1970’s the island’s per capita murder rate has steadily increased, by an average of 4.4 percent per year, from 19.8 per 100,000 in 1977, to 60 per 100,000 in 2017. In 2019, Jamaica was recorded as having the second highest murder rate in the Latin America and the Caribbean. Jamaica’ extreme violence rate is often attributed to gangs. CAPRI in partnership with the UK’s Department for International Development, and with Ms. Joanna Callen as the Lead Researcher is undertaking a study with an effort to bring focused attention to Jamaica’s gang problem, with the objective of advancing knowledge towards more effective policies and programmes for gang prevention and control. The information garnered will be used to make relevant policy recommendations, with an emphasis on providing a basis to mobilize civic support for and participation in good governance in the area of crime and violence reduction, particularly as it pertains to gangs. Gangs, organized crime, and violence, and the nexus between them, are Jamaica’s biggest citizen security challenge. With the second highest murder rate in the Latin America and Caribbean region in 2019, Jamaica’s extreme violence is often attributed to gangs. Between 2008 and 2018, gang-related violence was responsible for 56 percent of murders in Jamaica, with a high of 78 percent in 2013. Jamaica is a violent country in other ways, with extraordinarily high rates of domestic violence, including intimate partner (IPV) and gender-based violence (GBV). Jamaica’s violence problem is so

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  pernicious that the country has come to be described by academics and policy makers as having a “culture of violence.

Jamaica, WI: Caribbean Policy Research Institute, 2020. 67p.

By Diana Thorburn, Joanna Callen, Herbert Gayle and Laura Koch

Murder and extreme violence are at crisis levels in Montego Bay. The city is also the birthplace and centre of the lottery scamming industry and its offshoots, an industry that generates millions of U.S. dollars a year, and is thought to be connected to the high murder and shooting rates in St. James. This study considers the purported nexus between lottery scamming, gangs, and the high murder rate in St. James by situating St. James’ violence problem in its socio-economic context, and reviews the measures that have been taken over the past decade to tackle both problems.

Jamaica, WI: Caribbean Policy Research Institute, 2017. 72p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

This policy note provides a brief background on gangs in El Salvador and the attempts of Salvadoran authorities to negotiate with them to reduce violence in the streets. It analyzes a March 2022 gang-led homicide spree with a particular focus on the government’s response, arguing how it has harmed citizens’ lives, turning fundamental human rights into bargaining chips between licit and illicit actors. Highly punitive responses to contain gang violence have been the norm in El Salvador. In addition, for the past decade, secret negotiations between state actors and imprisoned gang leaders have been conducted, but outcomes have yielded similar or worse results. Authorities must seek alternative avenues for peace, such as promoting restorative justice and community resilience, minimizing the risk of prison riots and providing reinsertion programmes. Mediation from the international community is also needed in order to prevent the situation from spinning out of control.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 14p.

By Mark Shaw and Kim Thomas

Johannesburg’s western neighbourhoods of Westbury and Eldorado Park have long experienced serious problems derived from the presence of drug gangs and other forms of organized crime, resulting in a cyclical pattern of violence and criminality, followed by backlashes in the form of community protests and state responses. Law enforcement interventions have generally only temporarily quelled the violence before another cycle of gang activity, violence and protests flares up once again. Such continual cycles have been the pattern defining this urban area since the early 1990s. The costs of crime borne by the citizens of western Johannesburg are high and it is essential to reverse the cycle of violence and despair for these communities to thrive. This report focuses principally on gang-engendered violence in the city’s western suburbs of Westbury and Eldorado Park (and, to a lesser extent, Newclare), although other neighbouring urban areas that fall within the Johannesburg metropolitan area are also briefly analyzed. Broadly, in this urban area there have been three cycles of violence, and accompanying periods of protest and responses by community leaders and the state since the start of South Africa’s post-apartheid democratic era in 1994.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2019. 35p.

By Celinda Franco

Two predominantly Latino gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street gang (M-18), have raised concern among policy makers for several reasons: (1) membership in these gangs has spread from the Los Angeles area to other communities across the United States; (2) these gangs are becoming “transnational,” primarily because MS-13 and M-18 cliques are being established in Central America and Mexico; (3) evidence suggests that these gangs are engaged in criminal enterprises normally associated with better organized and more sophisticated crime syndicates; and (4) MS-13 and M-18 gang members may be involved in smuggling operations and, by extension, could potentially use their skills and criminal networks to smuggle terrorists into the United States. To date, however, no evidence exists establishing a link between MS-13 and M-18 members and terrorists. Nevertheless, some observers maintain that these two gangs may develop the capacity to become organized criminal enterprises capable of coordinating illegal activities across national borders. Yet, others find them to be no more criminally organized or sophisticated than other street gangs. At issue for Congress is whether the MS-13 and M-18 gangs constitute an emerging transnational criminal threat. The federal response to the MS-13 and M-18 gang problem has largely involved the enforcement of criminal and immigration laws, including the deportation of alien gang members. More recently, federal efforts have focused on prosecuting gang members under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. Deported alien gang members have established MS-13 and M-18 gang cliques in their home countries, and some experts suggest that U.S. deportation policies have effectively transported U.S.-styled gang culture to parts of Central America and Mexico. Moreover, evidence shows that deported alien MS-13 and M-18 gang members have established a “revolving door” migratory pattern of repeat illegal reentry into the United States, raising concerns that these “migratory” alien gang members may become involved in narco-trafficking, smuggling, and other criminal activities along the U.S.-Mexico border. Legislation has been introduced in the 110th Congress (and one such proposal has been passed by the Senate) that would strengthen the enforcement of immigration law directed at alien gang members and provide additional tools to federal prosecutors to pursue members of violent gangs. Such legislation includes H.R. 880, H.R. 1582, H.R. 1645, H.R. 2954, H.R. 3150, H.R. 3156, H.R. 3547, S. 330, S. 456, S. 990, S. 1348, and S. 1860.

Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2007. 24p.

Edited by Matthew and Shannon E. Reid

Conflict, including the threat or fear of potential violence, or being witness to or a victim of physical violence, constantly surrounds gangs and their communities and is the principal driver sustaining gang life. This Special Issue examines the diverse nature of gang-related violence with the goal of better understanding the growing complexities of gang violence over the last two decades to better inform public policy solutions. The contributions included in this Special Issue highlight the complex nature of gang-related violence in the 21st Century. As much as policy makers, the media, and even scholars like to simplify gang-related violence, all of the studies included in this Special Issue highlight the nuance and variation that exists.

Basel, SWIT: MDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute, 2021. 190p.

By International Crisis Group

Born in the aftermath of civil war and boosted by mass deportations from the U.S., Central American gangs are responsible for brutal acts of violence, chronic abuse of women, and more recently, the forced displacement of children and families. Estimated to number 54,000 in the three Northern Triangle countries – El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – the gangs’ archetypal tattooed young men stand out among the region’s greatest sources of public anxiety. Although they are not the only groups dedicated to violent crime, the maras have helped drive Central American murder rates to highs unmatched in the world: when the gangs called a truce in El Salvador, homicides halved overnight. But it is extortion that forms the maras’ criminal lifeblood and their most widespread racket. By plaguing local businesses for protection payments, they reaffirm control over poor urban enclaves to fund misery wages for members. Reducing the impact of these schemes, replacing them with formal employment and restoring free movement across the Northern Triangle’s urban zones would greatly reduce the harm of gang activity. Charting this route, however, requires a sharp switch in current policies. Ever since mara-related insecurity became visible in the early 2000s, the region’s governments have responded through punitive measures that reproduce the popular stigmas and prejudices of internal armed conflict. In programs such as Iron Fist in El Salvador, the Sweep-Up Plan in Guatemala or Zero Tolerance in Honduras, mass incarceration, harsher prison conditions and recourse to extrajudicial executions provided varieties of punishment. The cumulative effects, however, have fallen far short of expectations. Assorted crackdowns have not taken account of the deep social roots of the gangs, which provide identity, purpose and status for youths who are unaccommodated in their home societies and “born dead”. The responses have also failed to recognise the counterproductive effects of security measures that have given maras prisons in which to organise and confirmation of their identity as social outcasts. The succession of unsuccessful punitive measures is now coming under closer scrutiny across the Northern Triangle. All three countries are experimenting with new forms of regional collaboration in law enforcement. Guatemala has introduced vanguard measures to combat extortion rackets, many of them run from within jails, and has proposed a range of alternatives to prison terms. Although the collapse of the truce with the maras in 2014 spurred unprecedented violence in El Salvador, murder rates appear to have fallen again, while parts of the maras have proposed fresh talks with an eye to their eventual dissolution – an offer shunned by the government. Mass deportation from the U.S. back to these countries risks a repeated upsurge in gang crime. However, U.S. concern with reducing the migrant flow from Central America has generated significant new funds for development in the region via the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity. At the core of a new approach should stand an acknowledgement of the social and economic roots of gang culture, ineradicable in the short term, alongside a concerted state effort to minimise the violence of illicit gang activity. Focused and sophisticated criminal investigations should target the gangs responsible for the most egregious..

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 41p.

By InSight Crime and Center for Latin American & Latino Studies (CLALS)

Mara Salvatrucha, or MS13, is one of the world’s largest and most violent street gangs. It is also one of the least understood, making it difficult for policymakers and law enforcement to confront. A new report by InSight Crime and American University’s Center for Latin American & Latino Studies (CLALS) reveals new details about the gang’s operations and provides policy prescriptions for eradicating MS13. Entitled “MS13 in the Americas: How the World’s Most Notorious Street Gang Defies Logic, Resists Destruction,” the report is based on hundreds of interviews with, and surveys of gang members and law enforcement officials in El Salvador, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and Long Island. It contains insights into the gang’s hierarchy, politics, structure, and recruitment methods.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime and Center for Latin American & Latino Studies, 2018. 90p.

By Saša Milojević, Branislav Simonović, Bojan Janković, Božidar Otašević, and Veljko Turanjanin

Violence and supporters’ behaviour at sports events in the region have been subject to innumerable newspaper articles, TV reports, including several sociological studies. Despite this, public hunger for information about extreme supporters and their behaviour (considered provocative by the public) and numerous explanations of the phenomenon are certainly not definitive. Each new fan incident only further amplifies the interest in this matter and replicates attempts to finally answer numerous intriguing questions raised in this regard. Over the past years, the Republic of Serbia has doubtless faced hooliganism at sports events. This phenomenon is developing both in qualitative and quantitative terms, and will persist in future as well. In addition to poor quality of the game and the visibly lower standard of living, the fact that fan incidents have become much more frequent and serious has also affected the diminished interest in sports and dissuaded many fans from visiting sports arenas. In contrast, it seems at first sight that the crisis of the sports public has affected the least the grandstands reserved for extreme fans. Some young people, who otherwise would not be directly interested in watching matches, consider the behaviour of extreme fan groups attractive and exciting. It is exactly such behaviour that attracts them to sports premises. All this has brought about the formation of an aggressive subculture of violent fan groups and constant provocation of incidents as the arrival at a sports event is not motivated by club support, but by the desire to manifest violence and vent negative emotions. Solving the problem of hooliganism at sports events is not an easy and simple task. Hooliganism at sports events may be reduced to a socially acceptable degree with the implementation of quality security assessments of the risk of incidents, by monitoring extreme fans and pre-empting their intentions, isolating them, performing efficient intervention, and by ensuring coordinated cooperation among government authorities, sports organisations and clubs, educational institutions and the media. In tackling violence at sports events, repressive measures should not be entirely disregarded, on the contrary. However, a proactive police approach and preventive measures should be given priority. Such an approach enables mingling of different, opposing fan groups, and need not result in conflicts and violence. Namely, fans may together support their favourite club and establish good, or at least satisfactory mutual relations.

Belgrade: ОSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2013. 264p.

By Caitriona Dowd.

This paper explores the evidence available on the role of work in youth participation in violence, through a study of recent research and evidence in this field. The evidence review considers the role of ‘work’ broadly, seeking to go beyond restricted definitions of waged and formal sector employment or underemployment. It considers the role of formal and informal work, different forms of work, and the various potential roles – both positive and negative – that work may play in youth participation in violence. The study will also employ a broad definition of ‘violence’ – considering youth participation in organised, mass-mobilised conflicts; ‘radicalised’ or ‘extremist’ violent groups; less formal, criminal violence; and, where relevant, interpersonal violence. The deliberately broad definition of violence facilitates a focused analysis of the evidence and research surrounding the role of work in youth engagement in all forms of violence that constitute a disengagement from a peaceful social order, recognising the interlinkages between multiple and varied outward manifestations of violence (for example, criminal, economic, political and interpersonal violence). The study explores the evidence for the role of work in youth violence participation at the intersection of multiple forms of work, multiple forms of violence, and multiple forms of participation, mapping gaps in existing research and evidence, and opportunities for further research and analysis. Attention will be concentrated on research and evidence produced after 2010, building on the work of Cramer (2010) on unemployment and violence.

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2017. 30p.

Edited by Matthew Valasik and Shannon E. Reid.

Conflict, including the threat or fear of potential violence, or being witness to or a victim of physical violence, constantly surrounds gangs and their communities and is the principal driver sustaining gang life. This Special Issue examines the diverse nature of gang-related violence with the goal of better understanding the growing complexities of gang violence over the last two decades to better inform public policy solutions. The contributions included in this Special Issue highlight the complex nature of gang-related violence in the 21st Century. As much as policy makers, the media, and even scholars like to simplify gang-related violence, all of the studies included in this Special Issue highlight the nuance and variation that exist.

Basel, SWIT: MDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute, 2021. 188p.

By Claudia Wallner.

This paper examines the key limitations of youth empowerment interventions in preventing and countering violent extremism, and identifies potential solutions to overcome these. Age is frequently identified as a risk factor or a predictor for engagement in violent extremism. Indeed, certain factors associated with youth – such as changes in social identity, weakened social control and the intensified influence of peer groups – can make individuals more susceptible to violent extremist influences. Yet, using age as a predictor for engagement in such behaviour does not account for the vast majority of young people who do not engage in violent extremism. It also does little for identifying the minority who do engage in it. Youth programmes are often based on a simplistic understanding of the reasons why some young people engage in violent extremism. Consequently, they struggle with targeting their activities and fail to address the complex factors that drive young people to violent extremism. The programmatic focus on youth as a potential extremist threat and the lack of clear criteria to decide which young people to focus the attention of P/CVE work on can lead to the securitisation of everyday, youth-related activities and the framing of youth as a ‘suspect community’.

Key findings and recommendations. Narrow, age-based definitions of youth are not applicable in areas where achieving adulthood does not depend on reaching a certain age. In order to be relevant to the contexts in which they are implemented, interventions should work with regional and national definitions of youth that typically take locally relevant factors into account. Better targeting strategies that are based on evidence about risk and resilience factors and their cumulative impacts are needed to allocate resources efficiently and avoid the marginalisation of already vulnerable groups. This underscores the need for a better understanding of youth motivations and a move away from viewing the entire ‘youth’ segment of the population as a potential terror threat. Youth agendas tend to adopt a highly securitised view of young people, particularly young males, that perceives them as a threat to peace and stability. An improved and context-specific understanding of gender with regard to youth could help tailor interventions to the intended target audiences.

London: Royal United Services Institute, 2021. 73p.