By Daniela Ronco, Alvise Sbraccia, Giovanni Torrente

This project’s goal is to assess strategies and programmes which prevent, deter and counter radicalization in prison and identify and analyse good practices regarding new or existing deradicalization, disengagement and rehabilitation programmes and risk assessment tools. The analysis has been carried out having in mind the international and European standards for the the protection of detainees' rights. Research incorporates qualitative and quantitative data analysis on official government documents and interviews with stakeholders from prison administration and management, prison staff, Imams, chaplains and other religious representatives. The relevance of results is to develop practices across Europe to effectively manage individuals considered radicalized, at risk of being or to prevent others. Ensuring common knowledge by disseminating to national and European networks will improve de-radicalization measures across prisons.

European Prison Observatory 2019. 47p.

By The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

(U) Objective (U) The objective of this audit was to review the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) policies, procedures, and practices for monitoring terrorist inmates and the BOP’s efforts to prevent further radicalization within its inmate population. (U) Results in Brief (U) As of March 2018, the BOP had more than 500 incarcerated inmates with a known nexus to domestic or international terrorism (terrorist inmates). BOP policy requires that all social communications of high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates, are monitored. However, we found that the BOP had not identified all terrorist inmates in its custody and thus did not adequately monitor their communications. Although the BOP, in 2005, began to provide the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with a list of soon to be released inmates, we found BOP did not take appropriate steps to ensure that information about all formerly incarcerated terrorists was provided to the FBI. In addition, we found that terrorist inmates who had been placed under a Special Administrative Measure (SAM) requiring 100-percent live communication monitoring by the sponsoring law enforcement agency, which for most terrorist inmates is the FBI, were not being monitored effectively because of the technological limitations of the BOP’s monitoring capabilities. Further, between January 2015 and December 2017, we found that the BOP had not monitored or only partially monitored thousands of communications of high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates not under a SAM directive; did not review thousands of inmate emails, some of which contained potentially concerning language; and permitted terrorist inmates to communicate with unknown or un-vetted contacts. (U) Recommendations (U) We make 19 recommendations to improve the BOP’s accounting for, monitoring of, and security over terrorist inmates

Washington, DC: The Department, 2020. 67p.

By International Crisis Group

Indonesia, like many countries where Islamic jihadi cells have been uncovered, has been experimenting over the last three years with “deradicalisation” programs. While the term is poorly defined and means different things to different people, at its most basic it involves the process of persuading extremists to abandon the use of violence. It can also refer to the process of creating an environment that discourages the growth of radical movements by addressing the basic issues fuelling them, but in general, the broader the definition, the less focused the program created around it. Experience suggests that deradicalisation efforts in Indonesia, however creative, cannot be evaluated in isolation and they are likely to founder unless incorporated into a broader program of prison reform. One Indonesian initiative, focused on prisoners involved in terrorism, has won praise for its success in persuading about two dozen members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and a few members of other jihadi organisations to cooperate with the police. Key elements are getting to know individual prisoners and responding to their specific concerns, often relating to economic needs of their families, as well as constant communication and attention. One premise is that if through kindness, police can change the jihadi assumption that government officials are by definition thoghut (antiIslamic), the prisoners may begin to question other deeplyheld tenets.

Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2007. 29p.

By Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck and Jennifer Rubin

This study is the result of internally funded RAND Corporation research. It seeks to provide a preliminary overview of the challenges posed by radicalized and extremist prisoners, and to explore the potential for the radicalization of young European Muslims in the prison environment. The study draws on the body of existing prison theory literature, historical case examples and contemporary open sources. It draws a number of conclusions about the potential in prison for extremist activity, including radicalization, and highlights a number of areas where further research and action may be desirable.

Cambridge, UK: RAND Europe, 2008. 86p.

By F. Cilluffo, G.B. Saathoff, et. al

The potential for radicalization of prison inmates in the United States poses a threat of unknown magnitude to the national security of the U.S. Prisons have long been places where extremist ideology and calls to violence could find a willing ear, and conditions are often conducive to radicalization. With the world’s largest prison population (over 2 million – ninety-three percent of whom are in state and local prisons and jails)1 and highest incarceration rate (701 out of every 100,000) , America faces what could be an enormous challenge – every radicalized prisoner becomes a potential terrorist recruit. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales recently stated that “[t]he threat of homegrown terrorist cells – radicalized online, in prisons and in other groups of socially isolated souls – may be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if not more so. They certainly present new challenges to detection.” The London transit bombings of 2005 and the Toronto terrorist plot of 2006, to name just two incidents, illustrate the threat posed by a state’s own radicalized citizens. By acting upon international lessons learned, the U.S. may operate from a proactive position.

Washington, DC: Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University; Charlottesville, VA: The Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG) University of Virginia School of Medicine, 2006. 39p.