Ryan Williams, and Alison Liebling

Sociological studies of prisons require expanded methodologies and interdisciplinary concepts to address challenges posed by changing prisoner demographics and transformed geopolitics. We aim to revitalize sociological inquiry on prisons and prisoner leadership by focussing on the question of whether prisons cause radicalization. Our findings support those of the most persuasive original studies: distinct prison climates generate different hierarchies, only some of which are violent. Through extensive fieldwork we explore the differences between a prison with high levels of ‘political charge’, or anger, and another with less, drawing on extremist events that unfolded over time. We contrast the dangerous dynamics of prison 1 with the more fluid, prosocial religious explorations facilitated by prison 2, considering the implications for prison radicalization studies.

The British Journal of Criminology, 2023, 63, 97–114

By The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

(U) Objective (U) The objective of this audit was to review the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) policies, procedures, and practices for monitoring terrorist inmates and the BOP’s efforts to prevent further radicalization within its inmate population. (U) Results in Brief (U) As of March 2018, the BOP had more than 500 incarcerated inmates with a known nexus to domestic or international terrorism (terrorist inmates). BOP policy requires that all social communications of high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates, are monitored. However, we found that the BOP had not identified all terrorist inmates in its custody and thus did not adequately monitor their communications. Although the BOP, in 2005, began to provide the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with a list of soon to be released inmates, we found BOP did not take appropriate steps to ensure that information about all formerly incarcerated terrorists was provided to the FBI. In addition, we found that terrorist inmates who had been placed under a Special Administrative Measure (SAM) requiring 100-percent live communication monitoring by the sponsoring law enforcement agency, which for most terrorist inmates is the FBI, were not being monitored effectively because of the technological limitations of the BOP’s monitoring capabilities. Further, between January 2015 and December 2017, we found that the BOP had not monitored or only partially monitored thousands of communications of high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates not under a SAM directive; did not review thousands of inmate emails, some of which contained potentially concerning language; and permitted terrorist inmates to communicate with unknown or un-vetted contacts. (U) Recommendations (U) We make 19 recommendations to improve the BOP’s accounting for, monitoring of, and security over terrorist inmates

Washington, DC: The Department, 2020. 67p.

By F. Cilluffo, G.B. Saathoff, et. al

The potential for radicalization of prison inmates in the United States poses a threat of unknown magnitude to the national security of the U.S. Prisons have long been places where extremist ideology and calls to violence could find a willing ear, and conditions are often conducive to radicalization. With the world’s largest prison population (over 2 million – ninety-three percent of whom are in state and local prisons and jails)1 and highest incarceration rate (701 out of every 100,000) , America faces what could be an enormous challenge – every radicalized prisoner becomes a potential terrorist recruit. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales recently stated that “[t]he threat of homegrown terrorist cells – radicalized online, in prisons and in other groups of socially isolated souls – may be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if not more so. They certainly present new challenges to detection.” The London transit bombings of 2005 and the Toronto terrorist plot of 2006, to name just two incidents, illustrate the threat posed by a state’s own radicalized citizens. By acting upon international lessons learned, the U.S. may operate from a proactive position.

Washington, DC: Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University; Charlottesville, VA: The Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG) University of Virginia School of Medicine, 2006. 39p.