By Jesper Ryberg

The ethics of punishment constitutes an area of research that has recently been through a significant expansion, both in breadth and depth. But why is such research important? And how can it be conducted in the most fruitful way? In this article it is argued, first, that the study of penal ethics is important in order to inform penal practice. However, second, it is shown that there are both theoretical and political obstacles to the possibility of delivering genuine action guidance to practitioners. Finally, four recommendations are presented that may help to ensure that research within the ethics of punishment is carried out in a manner that is consistent with the basic justification for its very existence, namely that it is needed to provide moral guidance of penal practices in the real world.

Crim Law Forum 36, 191–204 (2025).

By Andrzej Uhl, Justin T Pickett

Are public preferences for the type or amount of punishment stable? Instability over short periods would complicate empirical desert by undercutting the value of public preferences as policy guides. Using longitudinal, cross-national survey data from Central Europe, we examined within-person stability in punishment preferences along several dimensions: type, amount, and rank order. Individual-level instability was common; respondents frequently changed their punishment preferences across waves. In the aggregate, public opinion was more stable. Our findings support the ‘qualified public input’ model of policy making—aggregate preferences should provide loose guidance for policymakers, with individual-level instability suggesting the ‘latitude of acceptance’ or ‘zone of acquiescence’. Better-educated respondents exhibited more preference stability, thus greater weight should be given to informed public opinion.

The British Journal of Criminology, 2024, XX, 1–20 pages