By Suraj Lakhani 

This paper provides an overview of the intersection between (violent) extremism and video gaming, examining the current landscape, trends, and threats. Analysing existing literature and open-source materials, this paper discussesthe types of games, platforms, and services that are vulnerable to this type of infiltration and use; particularly focussing on content, platform features, and overlaps. The paper also examines a number of recurrent themes, including: ‘radicalisation, recruitment, and reinforcing views’; ‘community building and strengthening’; and ‘extremist online ecosystems’. Thereafter, the responses to (violent) extremism from various platforms will be explored, before reflecting on current challenges and future considerations. Video gaming is considered to be one of the most consistent and fastest-growing sectors. It is estimated that there are around 2.8 billion gamers around the world (Gilbert, n.d.). As part of this, online gaming represents one of the biggest industries globally with over 900 million gamers and an estimated annual revenue of USD 18 billion (Clement, 2021). This growth is not only attributed to the development of online games and communities, but also to the game hosting and adjacent communications platformsthat have been specifically designed for gamers and gaming, including Steam, Stadia, Twitch, Discord, and DLive (ADL, 2019). There are numerous (often overlooked) positive economic, health, social, and psychological benefits of gaming (ADL, 2019; Schrier, 2019). During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, in which people have been isolated from their social groups for lengthy periods of time, online gaming has brought numerous benefits, with players reporting positive experiences such as making friends, feeling as though they are a part of various communities, finding new interests, and discovering new aspects about themselves (ADL, 2020). However, as technology develops, so do the associated harms, with new challenges constantly presented. VIDEO GAMES AND (VIOLENT) EXTREMISM A growing concern within European Union (and for that matter global) policy, security, and counter-terrorism circles is the increasing intersection between video gaming and (violent) extremism (EU, 2020; RAN, 2021). In a recent Radicalisation Awareness Network paper (RAN, 2021), it was suggested that extremists and terrorists, who are often pioneers in the digital space, are afforded new opportunities through gaming and associated platforms. These individuals ‘have introduced innovations faster than we have been able to respond, and as a result, have grown their digital advantage’ (ibid: 3). There are concerns that video games and associated (adjacent) platforms can be used to disseminate digital propaganda (Lakomy, 2019), and for purposes of radicalisation and recruitment (EU, 2020; Europol, 2021). However, as will be discussed in depth in this paper, the relationship between radicalisation, recruitment, and gaming is often complicated, with current literature challenging whether these outcomes are (violent) extremists’ primary intentions, with, instead, reinforcing beliefs, community building and strengthening, and developing more robust online ecosystems appearing to hold more prominence (Davey, 2021). It is critical to mention, however, that there is a distinct lack of (particularly empirical) research and literature in this area of study (Lakomy, 2019), with work at a nascent stage (Robinson and Whittaker, 2021), something that is particularly evident in relation to online gaming, video game hosting, and adjacent communications platforms (Davey, 2021). Although a varied and complex phenomenon (RAN, 2020), and one with numerous considerations, there have been various (often anecdotal) examples of the intersection between video gaming and (violent) extremism by jihadists, far-right violent extremists, and ethno-nationalist groups. Resultantly, ‘the search for any one narrative being used by such a varied group in such a varied array of circumstances would be an exercise in futility’ (ibid: 4). Saying that, most notably in Europe, there has been particular concern over the digital recruitment tactics of far-right (violent) extremists (RAN, 2021), where it is thought that they are ‘firmly anchored in the online gaming community, while the presence of Islamist terrorists can also be observed, albeit to a lesser extent’ (EU, 2020: 4). According to Europol’s (2021: 90) EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, ‘it can be noted that the use of video games, gaming platforms and forums, as well as gamer channels for spreading right-wing extremist propaganda has been a growing trend.’ Further, ‘(v)ideo games and video game communication applications were increasingly used in 2020 to share right-wing terrorist and extremist propaganda, in particular among young people’ (ibid: 78). This, of course, coincides with the rapid growth of far-right violent extremism and associated attacks, as documented by initiatives like the Global Terrorism Index. With this in mind, the focus of this paper predominantly lies with far-right (violent) extremism, though jihadist involvement is discussed where relevant, and arguably should not be overlooked nor underestimated.   

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021 24p. 

By The Nato Strategi Direction-South Hub & African Centre For The Study and Research on Terrorism

Violent extremism – often intertwined with intercommunal tensions and criminality – has continued to gain ground across the Sahel. Rising instability and the deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have generated concerns among neighbouring West African states about the effects of regional spillover. Since 2016, there have been incidents tied to the presence of Terrorist and Violent Extremist Organizations (TVEOs) in some of the border communities of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo (the main focus of this report), as well as reports of preaching, recruitment and local development initiatives by violent extremists. Given the current deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and the potential spillover effects, this report aims to shed light on the potential vulnerability of West African coastal states to the spread of violent extremism from the Sahel area and to carry out an in-depth investigation into the state of governmental and regional efforts to counter the security and social challenges associated with this growing vulnerability. The report approaches the phenomenon of the contagion of violent extremism by firstly presenting background research carried out by both organizations and, secondly, highlighting the main takeaways of a Subject Matter Expert (SME) Workshop conducted as part of the report methodology. The Workshop was held with the participation of more than 30 (thirty) SMEs drawn from key institutions based in the West African sub-region, including international organizations, state institutions and non-governmental organizations. The report includes research into the current situations regarding violent extremism in the Sahel Region and those factors potentially contributing to its expansion in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, including in-depth analysis of statistical data and the available literature. The report also provides information on key institutional capacities and state security efforts put in place to prevent and counter that expansion. Analysis of the unfolding situation shows deteriorating security in the Sahel, as evident by the number of terrorist attacks between 2019 and 2021. Despite the multiplicity of both international and regional military deployments, terrorist activities are far from abating. The nature of attacks has grown more sophisticated, and become more synchronized, and the groups are growing in confidence and cohesion. The recent resurgence of coup d’etats has further threatened and worsened an already volatile situation. Multiple factors such as ideological and religion-inspired extremism, governance deficits as violent extremism catalysts, structural socio-economic conditions, and historical grievances and rivalries were identified as vulnerability factors in coastal states. In addition, lack of government presence in some local communities; herder-farmer conflicts; prolonged and unresolved conflicts; unfavourable government policies; inability of the government to provide for the basic needs of local communities; high and rising unemployment levels particularly among energetic youthful population; lack of accountability by political office holders; rampant corruption; impunity of the political elites; and marginalisation and discrimination of minority groups were identified as local-level context specific grievances that have the propensity to drive and sustain violent extremism in coastal West Africa states. Having recognised the devastating effects of violent extremism there have been efforts aimed at preventing the spread of violent extremism. International, regional and state-initiated actions towards preventing violent extremism by presenting the “hard” and “soft” security efforts are present. At the international level, the French-led Takuba forces and the European Union Training Mission in Mali, the US AFRICOM, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) are some of the efforts to contain the terrorism and violent extremism threats in the Sahel and prevent expansion. The Accra Initiative, which was launched in September 2017 to coordinate and unite interests and capabilities in stopping violent extremists, especially in the border areas was identified a key regional preventative strategy . Other regional initiatives include the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the G-5 Sahel Joint Task Force and the ECOWAS actions on preventing the finance of violent extremism. In addition to international and regional level efforts countries in coastal areas have implemented new administrative frameworks, regional and broader international cooperation, the development of security forces and other counterterrorism measures. The countries have widely accepted that the spread of violent extremist ideologies cannot be halted by purely legal and armed means. The development of society, embracing communities which have been left behind by economic and social investments have become key. In conclusion, the findings of this report have pointed out that violent extremist activities have been growing in recent years in West Africa and coastal states, radiating there from the Sahel. Although the security situations of the four countries assessed herein are not directly comparable to the very severe situation in the Sahel, the appearance of certain violent extremist groups at the northern border areas of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo is cause for concern. Equally worrisome is that the spread of violent extremism is multi-directional: TVEOs do not exclusively expand southward, but in any direction where circumstances permit.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union: 2022. 47p.   

By U.S. Department of Homeland Security,  he Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Executive Summary - The Homeland faces a complex set of threats to our public safety, border security, critical infrastructure, and economy from violent extremists, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), adversarial nation-states, and malicious cyber actors. These threats, while varied in scope and intended purpose, at times compound one another in unexpected ways, harming our communities and generating costly disruptions to the US economy. Meanwhile, technological advances, climate change, and natural disasters have the potential to exacerbate many of the aforementioned threats. PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY: Over the next year, the terrorism threat environment in the Homeland will remain high. We are particularly concerned about a confluence of factors this year, including violent extremist responses to domestic sociopolitical developments—especially the 2024 election cycle—and international events that domestic and foreign violent extremists likely will use to justify or encourage attacks in the Homeland. Lone offenders and small groups continue to pose the greatest threat of carrying out attacks with little to no warning. Meanwhile, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and their supporters will maintain their enduring intent to conduct or inspire attacks in the Homeland. In addition, the production, trafficking, and sale of illegal drugs by transnational and domestic criminal actors will continue to pose the most lethal threat to communities in the United States. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids remain the most lethal of drugs trafficked into the country, but small increases in overdoses linked to cocaine and methamphetamine highlight the danger from other drug types. 

We expect the Homeland also will face threats to public safety from state actors using subversive tactics in an effort to influence and divide the American public and undermine confidence in our institutions. Many of these actors—in particular, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—also target ethnic and religious minorities, political dissidents, and journalists in the United States to silence and harass critical voices, violating our sovereignty and the rule of law. The 2024 election cycle will be an attractive target for many adversaries. Some domestic violent extremists (DVEs) likely view a wide range of targets indirectly and directly associated with elections as viable targets for violence with the intent of instilling fear among voters, candidates, and election workers, as well as disrupting election processes leading up to and after the November election. Nation-state-aligned foreign malign influence actors almost certainly will continue to target democratic processes with the aims of affecting US voter preferences, exacerbating social tensions, and undermining confidence in our democratic institutions and the integrity of the electoral process. BORDER AND IMMIGRATION SECURITY: Migrant encounters at our border have declined over the last year, but migrants are still arriving in high numbers, complicating border and immigration security. As overall encounters have declined, so too have encounters with individuals in the Terrorist Screening Data Set, also known as the “terrorism watchlist,” which includes individuals associated with information indicating they may be directly engaged in or supporting terrorist activities as well as known associates of watchlisted individuals, such as family members. For several years prior to this year's decline, terrorism watchlist encounters had increased, a trend consistent with the overall increase in migrant encounters at the southwest border. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY: Domestic and foreign adversaries almost certainly will continue to threaten the integrity of our critical infrastructure with disruptive and destructive cyber and physical attacks, in part, because they perceive targeting these sectors will have cascading impacts on US industries and our standard of living. The PRC, Russia, and Iran will remain the most pressing foreign threats to our critical infrastructure. Most concerningly, we expect the PRC to continue its efforts to pre-position on US networks for potential cyber-attacks in the event of a conflict with the United States. Nation-states, criminal hacktivists, and financially motivated criminals will likely hone their techniques to disrupt US services or to conduct espionage focused on gaining access to US networks, including critical infrastructure entities. We assess that domestic and foreign violent extremists will continue to call for physical attacks on critical infrastructure in furtherance of their ideological goals and, at times, in response to international conflicts and crises. ECONOMIC SECURITY: Multifaceted and diverse economic threats—primarily from the PRC—will likely continue to harm US producers and consumers and degrade the competitiveness and future health of US companies and industries. The PRC likely will remain our greatest economic security threat because of its aggressive use of anticompetitive, coercive policies and theft of US intellectual property, technology, and trade secrets. Lastly, we expect our supply chains will remain vulnerable to foreign manipulation abroad, which could harm global productivity and consumer demand.    

Washington, DC: DHS, 2024. 46p.

By Yasmine Wong
The UK Home Office recently announced that it is considering treating extreme misogyny (i.e., hatred of or prejudice against women) as a form of extremism following an ongoing review of the government’s counter-extremism strategy. The government believes that misogyny is an ideological trend that is gaining traction and fuelling extremism in the country.At the centre of this phenomenon is the “manosphere” – a networked group of online communities promoting “anti-feminism, misogyny, and hateful ideas” about women and sexual minorities. Groups like “Incels” (involuntary celibates) and “Men’s Rights Activists” famously make up the manosphere. They have a violent and extremist edge and portray men as victims in a world that they perceive to be benefitting women and other minorities.The manosphere has, unfortunately, crept into the mainstream through the popularisation and dissemination of misogynistic narratives by social media personalities like Andrew Tate. That misogyny appears to be driving extremism and has the potential to cause societal polarisation suggests that it is no longer an ideological problem but has become a national security one.

Misogyny as a “Gateway Drug” to Violent Extremism

Far-right extremist attacks motivated by misogyny have surfaced in the last five years. In 2023, the perpetrator of the mall shooting in Allen, Texas, where eight people were killed, was found to have misogynistic, white supremacist and racist tendencies. In 2021, the gunman who killed eight people (of which six were Asian women) in Atlanta was believed to have been motivated by misogynistic and racist inclinations. In 2020, a man in Hanau, Germany, went on a shooting rampage, killing nine people. He was thought to have also been motivated by similar tendencies.Researchers hypothesise that misogyny has become a “gateway drug” to far-right violent extremism. This happens when the ideological frame that blames women for individual and societal ills is expanded to include ethnic or religious “others”, opening the cognitive door to wider forms of hate-based and exclusionary extremism against different identity groups.For instance, the perceived existential threat posed by feminism and gender equality on men has been likened to the perceived existential threat that migrants pose to the white male identity as initially outlined in “great replacement” or “white genocide” conspiracies. In other words, far-right actors employ misogyny in intersection with racism and xenophobia, blaming women, migrants, and other minorities for the decline of traditional notions of nationhood, family, and masculinity.

Misogyny Has Crept Into the Mainstream

Misogyny is no longer confined to the fringes of subcultures and communities; it has crept into the mainstream. The rise of online personalities like Andrew Tate, Jordan Peterson, Myron Gaines, and Walter Weekes, who peddle toxic masculinity, and misogynistic views, is a worrying trend. Tate, for example, exploits male fears about their economic futures and the threat to hegemonic masculinity. His social media content, often seen as “humorous” and “authentic”, serve as social currency among young men and boys.Social media algorithms are also complicit in the amplification of misogynistic content, pushing “toxic, hateful or misogynistic material” to young people (particularly boys suffering from anxiety and poor mental health) under the guise of entertainment. Researchers found a four-fold increase in misogynistic content recommended by TikTok’s algorithm over a five-day period of study, amping up to more extreme videos which focus on “anger and blame directed at women”.The results from a separate Australian study conducted in 2022 corroborate this, finding that algorithms used in YouTube and YouTube Shorts contributed to the promotion of “misogynistic, anti-feminist and other extremist content” to Australian boys and young men. A 2024 Irish study produced similar results – TikTok and YouTube recommended misogynist content to boys and young men regardless of whether they actively searched for it, with the intensity increasing according to the level of engagement.

Misogyny In Asia

In Asia, “male anger” allows misogynistic narratives and the broader extremist ideologies that they harbour to take root among a susceptible audience. In South Korea and Japan, there is an observed increase in misogynistic attacks inspired by elements of Incel ideology.In China, misogynistic terms and narratives similar to those used in Incel communities of the West are to be found in most social media platforms, with high-profile anti-feminist influencers like Zhu Zhou encouraging attacks against women who do not fulfil “reproductive duties”.In India, the flourishing Indian Incel community feeds off and exacerbates the misogyny already prevalent in Indian society, with violence meted out to women by men “who feel slighted or rejected by them”. Known as Currycels, Indian Incels believe that they are disadvantaged because of their race (as Indian women are thought to prefer White men) and that they are the victims of feminism.These examples appear to underscore the view that feminist progress and greater gender equality begets misogynistic backlash. It also raises the question of whether such misogyny will give rise to far-right extremism and violence in the future.

Implications for Singapore

While the popularity of manosphere content has not been ascertained in Singapore, local online spaces, particularly local Reddit communities and forums like HardwareZone and Sammyboy, do play host to misogynistic narratives. The narratives, particularly those that feature the privileges of women at the expense of men, have been observed to mirror narratives found in the manosphere.In r/Singapore (a community where Reddit users discuss topics relating to Singapore), users lament about institutions such as the Singapore legal system and national service favouring women and disadvantaging men. They argue that Singaporean women are not oppressed, which justifies ire against feminism and gender equality.A study conducted by the Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) found a host of misogyny in Singapore’s social media space, with content ranging from outright expressions of violence against women to narratives that reinforce gender stereotypes, with the most common being comments that belittled and objectified women. Misogynistic content was also found to have higher levels of engagement.The 2024 Ipsos survey found that almost half of Singaporeans think efforts toward women’s equality have gone so far that they now occur at the expense of men. Notably, men echo these statements at a far higher rate than women. Similarly, the results of a 2022 Ipsos survey conducted in Singapore mirror those of the 2024 study, where one in three Singaporean men believed that feminism does more harm than good, and that “traditional masculinity is under threat”, with a quarter denying the existence of gender inequality.While there may not be reported cases of misogyny directly leading to instances of far-right extremism in Singapore, this idea of “traditional masculinity being under threat” evokes concerning parallels with misogynistic narratives that serve as rallying calls in far-right spaces.Furthermore, Singapore remains highly connected to the Internet, and a survey revealed that online misogyny is commonplace. It also reported that six in ten young people spoke of being exposed to sensitive content (including gender-based hate) without searching for it. The proliferation of misogynistic (and incel-adjacent) narratives online may be an indication that conditions exist that are conducive for such extremist ideologies to take root here.

Conclusion

Regardless of how misogyny and the gender divide present themselves, the resultant impact is the same – the exacerbation of polarisation along intersecting identity lines and the rise of extremism. Rather than normalising the gender divide and misogynistic attitudes, it is imperative to understand the risks associated with the global growth of misogyny, not just in its insidious role in violent extremism, but also its potential to damage the social fabric.

Singapore,  S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),   2024. 4p.

By Pamela G. Faber, Megan K. McBride, Julia McQuaid, Emily Mushen, Alexander Powell, William G. Rosenau and Elizabeth Yang With contributions by Megan Katt and Annaleah Westerhaug

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict – Stability and Humanitarian Affairs (OASD (SO/LIC-SHA)) asked  CNA to study the role of women and gender in both violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and US counterterrorism (CT) and counter violent extremism (CVE)  operations (hereafter CT/CVE). This request emerged from the recognition that greater understanding of the role of gender and women in CT/CVE operations is necessary as mandated in section 1047 of the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and in accordance with the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act of 2017. This study addresses the following research questions: 

• What roles do women play in VEOs organizationally and operationally? 

• How have these roles shifted over time, and how might they evolve in the short and long terms?

• What are the existing Department of Defense (DOD) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) approaches and policies regarding gender and CT/CVE? 

• What opportunities are presented to DOD, and SOF in particular, through increased consideration of gender in CT/CVE? What are the risks of failing to do so? 

• How should the US factor the role of gender into future CT/CVE operations, training, and education?

To carry this out, we developed a three-part approach: 

• Identified the roles of women and gender in VEOs through nine case studies: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Al-Shabaab, National Socialist Underground and National Action (two white supremacist groups in Europe), Boko Haram, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Lord’s Resistance Army, and Abu Sayyaf Group.

• Assessed whether current US DOD CT/CVE strategy, policy, and activities incorporate gender considerations.

• Identified gaps, risks, and opportunities according to four thematic categories: strategy, policy and doctrine, internal activities,1 external activities, and conceptual understanding.

Our findings demonstrate that women play supporting, enabling, and operational roles in VEOs, and that there is no deliberate or coordinated effort to integrate these roles into CT/CVE strategy, policy, or activities.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2021. 232p.