By Cynthia Fraga Rizo and Tonya Van Deinse

Intimate partner violence (IPV)—the intentional physical or nonphysical violence between current or former intimate partners—and sexual violence (SV)—non-consensual sexual activities—are pervasive, serious criminal legal system and public health problems in the United States (Centers for Disease Control [CDC], 2017; CDC, 2019; Smith et al., 2018). Survivors of IPV and SV bear the burden of numerous deleterious short- and long-term consequences. To address their myriad service needs, survivors must navigate multiple systems, organizations, and professionals. The complexity of navigating multiple service sectors means IPV/SV survivors often do not receive the help they need at the time when services are most needed. Recognizing this barrier, IPV/SV service providers, including advocates, criminal legal system professionals, and healthcare providers, have been increasingly interested in using cross-sectoral approaches (CSA) to coordinate service delivery to IPV/SV survivors (Gwinn et al., 2007). Family Justice Centers (FJC) and Multi-Agency Model Centers (MAMC) are two commonly implemented CSA models (Alliance for Hope International, 2024; Rizo et al., 2022; Shorey et al., 2014; Simmons et al., 2016). A key underlying assumption of FJCs and MAMCs is that colocation, collaboration, and coordination of services across multiple providers and disciplines will increase survivors’ access to services and ultimately lead to better outcomes. However, limited research exists regarding the implementation and effectiveness of these co-located models. To address these gaps, the research team conducted an evaluability assessment and formative evaluation of IPV/SV CSAs, with a focus on the similarities and differences across colocated models. The project was comprised of two phases: • Phase 1: Evaluability assessment of IPV/SV co-located CSAs. • Phase 2: Formative evaluation of IPV/SV co-located CSAs. The project was conducted in North Carolina, with eight co-located centers participating in the evaluability assessment and six participating in the formative evaluation.

Approach The evaluability assessment was guided by the Exploration, Preparation, Implementation, and Sustainment (EPIS) framework (Aarons et al., 2011) and followed the four steps outlined by Trevisan and Walser’s (2014) evaluability assessment model: (1) focus the assessment, (2) develop the program theory and logic, (3) gather feedback, and (4) apply the assessment findings. Prior to developing the proposal and launching the project, our team worked with a group of statewide leaders to determine the focus of the assessment (e.g., goals, objectives, research questions). The research team then engaged in three primary data collection activities— document review, affiliate interviews, and client-survivor interviews—to document the program theory and logic model of co-located service models and to identify promising strategies for evaluating co-located IPV/SV service models. In total, the team reviewed 199 documents and conducted interviews with 58 affiliates and 30 client-survivors. Following these activities, the research team sought feedback from our Expert Advisory Group (EAG) and partnering sites and used the evaluability assessment findings to develop practice and research materials. The formative evaluation comprised three components—a process evaluation focused on implementation, a client outcome evaluation, and an assessment of the evaluation’s overall feasibility. The implementation evaluation research activities consisted of gathering four different types of data: (1) aggregate annual programmatic data from six partnering sites; (2) client-level service need data (n = 764 completed service navigation logs); (3) staff collaboration survey data (n = 126); and (4) adaptive fidelity self-assessment data (n = 11). The outcome evaluation research activity involved collecting survey data from clients at three-time points (i.e., intake/baseline: n = 41; 3-month follow-up: n = 28; 6-month follow-up: n = 24). The feasibility assessment was based on focus group data with leaders and key contacts at partnering centers (n = 12) to explore their perspectives on the overall evaluation and specific research activities.       

Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, 2024.146p.

By Reed T. DeAngelis

This research note provides new evidence consistent with systemic anti-Black racism in police killings across the United States. Data come from the Mapping Police Violence Database (2013–2021). I calculate race-specific odds and probabilities that victims of police killings exhibited mental illness, were armed with a weapon, or attempted to flee the scene at the time of their killing. Multilevel, multivariable logistic regression techniques are applied to further account for the victim's age, gender, year of killing, and geographical clustering. I find that White victims are underrepresented, and Black victims overrepresented in the database. Relative to White victims, Black victims also have 60% lower odds of exhibiting signs of mental illness, 23% lower odds of being armed, and 28% higher odds of fleeing. Hispanic victims exhibit 45% lower odds of being armed relative to their White peers but are otherwise comparable. These patterns persist regardless of the victim's age, gender, year of killing, or geographical location (state, zip code, and neighborhood type). Thus, the threshold for being perceived as dangerous, and thereby falling victim to lethal police force, appears to be higher for White civilians relative to their Black or Hispanic peers. Current findings provide empirical support for political initiatives to curb lethal police force, as such efforts could help to reduce racial disparities in deaths by police nationwide.

Race and Justice Volume 14, Issue 3, July 2024, Pages 413-422

By Mason Youngblood

Increasing levels of far-right extremist violence have generated public concern about the spread of radicalization in the United States. Previous research suggests that radicalized individuals are destabilized by various environmental (or endemic) factors, exposed to extremist ideology, and subsequently reinforced by members of their community. As such, the spread of radicalization may proceed through a social contagion process, in which extremist ideologies behave like complex contagions that require multiple exposures for adoption. In this study, I applied an epidemiological method called two-component spatiotemporal intensity modeling to data from 416 far-right extremists exposed in the United States between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that patterns of far-right radicalization in the United States are consistent with a complex contagion process, in which reinforcement is required for transmission. Both social media usage and group membership enhance the spread of extremist ideology, suggesting that online and physical organizing remain primary recruitment tools of the far-right movement. In addition, I identified several endemic factors, such as poverty, that increase the probability of radicalization in particular regions. Future research should investigate how specific interventions, such as online counter-narratives to battle propaganda, may be effectively implemented to mitigate the spread of far-right extremism in the United States.

HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:49 |

By The Nato Strategi Direction-South Hub & African Centre For The Study and Research on Terrorism

Violent extremism – often intertwined with intercommunal tensions and criminality – has continued to gain ground across the Sahel. Rising instability and the deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have generated concerns among neighbouring West African states about the effects of regional spillover. Since 2016, there have been incidents tied to the presence of Terrorist and Violent Extremist Organizations (TVEOs) in some of the border communities of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo (the main focus of this report), as well as reports of preaching, recruitment and local development initiatives by violent extremists. Given the current deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and the potential spillover effects, this report aims to shed light on the potential vulnerability of West African coastal states to the spread of violent extremism from the Sahel area and to carry out an in-depth investigation into the state of governmental and regional efforts to counter the security and social challenges associated with this growing vulnerability. The report approaches the phenomenon of the contagion of violent extremism by firstly presenting background research carried out by both organizations and, secondly, highlighting the main takeaways of a Subject Matter Expert (SME) Workshop conducted as part of the report methodology. The Workshop was held with the participation of more than 30 (thirty) SMEs drawn from key institutions based in the West African sub-region, including international organizations, state institutions and non-governmental organizations. The report includes research into the current situations regarding violent extremism in the Sahel Region and those factors potentially contributing to its expansion in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, including in-depth analysis of statistical data and the available literature. The report also provides information on key institutional capacities and state security efforts put in place to prevent and counter that expansion. Analysis of the unfolding situation shows deteriorating security in the Sahel, as evident by the number of terrorist attacks between 2019 and 2021. Despite the multiplicity of both international and regional military deployments, terrorist activities are far from abating. The nature of attacks has grown more sophisticated, and become more synchronized, and the groups are growing in confidence and cohesion. The recent resurgence of coup d’etats has further threatened and worsened an already volatile situation. Multiple factors such as ideological and religion-inspired extremism, governance deficits as violent extremism catalysts, structural socio-economic conditions, and historical grievances and rivalries were identified as vulnerability factors in coastal states. In addition, lack of government presence in some local communities; herder-farmer conflicts; prolonged and unresolved conflicts; unfavourable government policies; inability of the government to provide for the basic needs of local communities; high and rising unemployment levels particularly among energetic youthful population; lack of accountability by political office holders; rampant corruption; impunity of the political elites; and marginalisation and discrimination of minority groups were identified as local-level context specific grievances that have the propensity to drive and sustain violent extremism in coastal West Africa states. Having recognised the devastating effects of violent extremism there have been efforts aimed at preventing the spread of violent extremism. International, regional and state-initiated actions towards preventing violent extremism by presenting the “hard” and “soft” security efforts are present. At the international level, the French-led Takuba forces and the European Union Training Mission in Mali, the US AFRICOM, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) are some of the efforts to contain the terrorism and violent extremism threats in the Sahel and prevent expansion. The Accra Initiative, which was launched in September 2017 to coordinate and unite interests and capabilities in stopping violent extremists, especially in the border areas was identified a key regional preventative strategy . Other regional initiatives include the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the G-5 Sahel Joint Task Force and the ECOWAS actions on preventing the finance of violent extremism. In addition to international and regional level efforts countries in coastal areas have implemented new administrative frameworks, regional and broader international cooperation, the development of security forces and other counterterrorism measures. The countries have widely accepted that the spread of violent extremist ideologies cannot be halted by purely legal and armed means. The development of society, embracing communities which have been left behind by economic and social investments have become key. In conclusion, the findings of this report have pointed out that violent extremist activities have been growing in recent years in West Africa and coastal states, radiating there from the Sahel. Although the security situations of the four countries assessed herein are not directly comparable to the very severe situation in the Sahel, the appearance of certain violent extremist groups at the northern border areas of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo is cause for concern. Equally worrisome is that the spread of violent extremism is multi-directional: TVEOs do not exclusively expand southward, but in any direction where circumstances permit.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union: 2022. 47p.   

Edited by Eveline G. Bouwers and David Nash

This book investigates the relationship between blasphemy and violence in modern history, with a focus on cases from the European world, including its (post-) colonial ties. Spanning from the late-eighteenth century to today, it shows how cultures of blasphemy, and related acts of heresy, apostasy and sacrilege, have interacted with different forms of violence, committed against both the sacred and the secular.

Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2022. 

Edited By David Ehrhardt, David Oladimeji Alao, M. Sani Umar

Exploring the contentious landscape of Nigeria’s escalating violence, this book describes the changing roles of traditional authorities in combatting contemporary security challenges. Set against a backdrop of widespread security threats – including insurgency, land disputes, communal violence, regional independence movements, and widespread criminal activities – perhaps more than ever before, Nigeria’s conventional security infrastructure seems ill-equipped for the job. This book offers a fresh, empirical analysis of the roles of traditional authorities – including kings, Ezes, Obas, and Emirs – who are often hailed as potent alternatives to the state in security governance. It complicates the assumption that these traditional leaders, by virtue of their customary legitimacy and popular roots, are singularly effective in preventing and managing violence. Instead, in exploring their creative adaptation to governance roles after a dramatic postcolonial downturn, this book argues that traditional leaders can augment, but not substitute, the state in addressing insecurity. This book’s in-depth analysis will be of interest to researchers and policy makers across African and security studies, political science, anthropology, and development.

London; New York: Routledge, 2024. 313p.

By Nicole Gelinas 

During Mayor Eric Adams’s first seven weeks in office, soaring violent crime in New York City’s subway system dominated the local news. Public fear and frustration peaked in mid-January, with the murder of 40-year-old Michelle Go, who was shoved from a Times Square subway platform onto the tracks in the middle of the day. Go’s alleged killer, an apparently mentally ill and homeless man who had repeatedly violated parole for a 2017 violent felony conviction, was yet another example of the city and state’s failure to treat and supervise violent mentally ill people, or to incarcerate violent offenders. Go’s death was a tragic instance of a now nearly two-year-old phenomenon. When subway ridership fell precipitously in March 2020, to as low as 6.5% of the pre-Covid normal level of 5.6 million riders each weekday, violent felonies did not fall with passenger numbers. Violent felonies rose sharply, not only on a per-rider basis but in absolute numbers. A beneficial “safety in numbers” effect, supplemented by the legacy of decades of proactive policing, had disappeared. Now the full data for 2021 are in, and a new, longer-term trend persistent through the second year of Covid has become clear. As ridership has gradually returned, to an average of 59% of normal from early November until Christmas Eve 2021, violent crime has not gradually declined in tandem. Violent crime, both per passenger and, in some categories, in raw numbers, has remained persistently higher than it was in 2019. Where there was safety in numbers before Covid and grave peril in desolation beginning in March 2020, there now exists an unhappy medium. Modest-size crowds—though larger than those in 2020—are not by themselves helping to deter violent crime. This stagnation of both crowd size and public safety is unlikely to fix itself: as people fear taking trains because of violent crime, they keep crowd levels low, thus enabling violent crime to persist at elevated levels. At the same time, the NYPD and prosecutors have not stepped in to fill the vacuum. Preventive policing, in terms of arrests and civil summonses for alleged low-level law violations, remains far below pre-Covid levels. In January 2022, before Go’s murder, new Mayor Eric Adams and Governor Kathy Hochul announced a joint state-city plan to secure the subways. (The city-run NYPD is generally responsible for public safety in the subways, not the state-run Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which runs the trains.) As of mid-March 2022, however, the plan has not yet achieved results: for the year through March 13, transit crime was up 80.3% compared with the same period in 2021. To restore order on the subways, the city must go beyond the improved mental-health treatment that the plan promises. Rather, police have to return to proactive and preventive policing and deterrence—and prosecutors need to follow through on these cases. In 2019, New York City and tristate residents depended on mass transit for three-fourths of their daily commutes into Manhattan. Without safe transit, Manhattan and the city cannot recover economically from Covid.4 

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2022. 17p.

By  Debbie Scott, Cherie Heilbronn, Kerri Coomber, Ashlee Curtis, Foruhar Moayeri, James Wilson, Sharon Matthews, Rose Crossin, Alex Wilson, Karen Smith, Peter Miller and Dan Lubman

The acute association between interpersonal violence, alcohol and drug use, self-harm, and mental health issues is relatively unexplored. Violence-related ambulance attendances were analysed, differentiated by type of violence and by victim or aggressor of violence, as well as the co-occurrence of alcohol and drug use, self-harm, and mental health issues. Ambulance attendances related to victims of violence had few co-occurring issues beyond alcohol and drug misuse. In contrast, attendances related to aggressors were more complex, with high proportions of co-occurring mental health, self-harm, and alcohol and drug issues. These findings demonstrate the utility of ambulance data for surveillance of interpersonal violence  

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 595. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 17p.

By Thomas Abt and  Richard Hahn

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Community violence happens between unrelated individuals, who may or may not know each other, generally outside the home” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2022, para. 1). The Department of Justice describes community violence as “generally happening outside the home in public spaces” (Department of Justice, 2022, para. 1). So defined, community violence accounts for the large majority of homicides in the United States each year (Crifasi et al., 2018). The costs of this violence to impacted individuals, families, communities, and the country as a whole are staggering. Frequently cited studies estimate the average total social cost of a single homicide to be 10 million dollars or more (Cohen et al., 2004; DeLisi et al., 2010). The human costs of such violence are unquantifiable. A massive body of social scientific research demonstrates that community violence clusters around small groups of people, places, and behaviors (Abt, 2019). In the United States and elsewhere, fatal and nonfatal shootings concentrate in and among small networks of individuals and groups, leading to cascading effects of retaliatory violence (Papachristos et al., 2015). Crime and violence also converge in and around small numbers of locations (Herold, 2023). Finally, certain risky behaviors such as illegal gun carrying are closely associated with gun violence (Hureau and Wilson, 2021). Strategies identifying and addressing these clusters of community violence have demonstrated success in stopping such violence and saving lives. The effectiveness of people-based strategies like focused deterrence, place-based approaches such as hot spots policing, and behavioral interventions such as cognitive behavioral therapy are all supported by dozens of studies employing multiple methods, many of which are summarized in systematic reviews (Braga et al., 2019; Braga et al., 2019; Lipsey et al., 2007). An emerging body of evidence also supports non-punitive, community‐led strategies known collectively as community violence intervention (CVI) (John Jay Advisory Group on Preventing Community Violence, 2020). CVI programs use a wide range of methodologies, but most seek to engage those at the highest risk for violence and provide some form of treatment, support, or services to interrupt ongoing cycles of violence. Identifying the key people, places, and behaviors most likely to be involved in violence in a certain jurisdiction is an essential first step for implementing many of these anti-violence approaches. Identifying them also helps local leaders better understand how community violence operates in their jurisdictions and improves their ability to decide strategy, allocate resources, coordinate efforts, manage performance, facilitate evaluation, and other important functions. Unfortunately, there are numerous obstacles to gathering such information. While community violence is concentrated, knowledge about such violence is diffuse, spread among many. Technological limitations often impair law enforcement’s ability to gather crucial data. Political agendas, mistrust, and administrative regulations can limit the sharing of information once collected. Community stakeholders often possess a wealth of knowledge concerning violence but may be unwilling to share such information due to gaps in the perceived legitimacy of governmental officials. In any city suffering from high levels of community violence, a critically needed capacity is the ability to overcome these obstacles and “identify people and networks involved in recent violence and at the highest risk of future violence, the context and motives behind those incidents, and the micro-places where violence is most likely to occur” (CPSC, 2024). For decades, local governments have engaged researchers and technical assistance organizations to help them better understand their crime and violence challenges. Expertise has come largely from the fields of criminal justice and public health. Since the 1980s, problem-oriented policing strategies have utilized the SARA (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) framework to better identify, understand, and address crime problems. (Goldstein, 1990; Eck and Spelman, 1987). At approximately the same time, violence emerged as a legitimate issue in public health, ultimately resulting in a similar 4-step “public health approach” to violence (monitor the problem, identify risk and protective factors, test strategies, and promote effective ones) (Dalhberg & Mercy, 2009). In the field of community violence reduction, these efforts have evolved to include shooting reviews, homicide reviews, group audits, social network analysis, and various forms of crime mapping, among others. Sometimes called “problem analyses,” these efforts are instrumental in directing local attention, energy, and resources towards the anti-violence strategies with the strongest likelihood of success. Importantly, they can assist law enforcement agencies in narrowing their focus to the individuals most likely to become involved in violence, thereby reducing reliance on aggressive, unfocused enforcement tactics that generate little public safety benefit but cause significant community harm (Bitran et al., 2024). Here, we refer to these efforts as “community violence problem analyses” (CVPAs) to distinguish them from analyses of other crime and violence challenges. Examples of such analyses can be found in Appendix A. Despite their value, only a relatively small number of jurisdictions have used CVPAs to inform their anti-violence efforts. CVPAs and other forms of problem analyses are the “weakest and most overlooked phase of the action research cycle” (Ross & Arsenault, 2017).  (continued)  

College Park, MD: Center for the Study and Practice of Violence Reduction. University of Maryland, 2024. 25p.

By Anton Blok

Main Themes: The book explores the relationship between honor and violence, particularly in contexts where central control over violence is weak or absent

Case Studies: It includes studies on Sicilian mafia, rural banditry in theDutch Republic, and various cultural practices related to honor and violence.

Anthropological Approach: The author emphasizes the importance of understanding social action as paradoxical and influenced by unintended consequences.

References: The document contains numerous references to other works and studies, highlighting its academic rigor.

Wiley, Feb 8, 2001, 358 pages

HO, BIANCA; DOYLE, KIERAN

From the document: "Pro-Palestine demonstrations involving students in the United States have nearly tripled from 1 to 26 April compared with all of March, ACLED [ [Armed Conflict Location and Event Data]] data show [...]. New York has been one of the main student protest battlegrounds since the Israel-Palestine conflict flared up in and around Gaza last October, and the arrest of more than 100 students at Columbia University in New York around 18 April heralded a new wave of campus demonstrations."

ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT. 2 MAY, 2024. 5p.

By Carl Gutierrez-Jones

The beating of Rodney King, the killing of Amadou Diallo, and the LAPD Rampart Scandal: these events have been interpreted by the courts, the media and the public in dramatically conflicting ways. Critical Race Narratives examines what is at stake in these conflicts and, in so doing, rethinks racial strife in the United States as a highly-charged struggle over different methods of reading and writing. Focusing in particular on the practice and theorization of narrative strategies, Gutiérrez-Jones engages many of the most influential texts in the recent race debates including The Bell Curve, America in Black and White, The Alchemy of Race and Rights, and The Mismeasure of Man. In the process, Critical Race Narratives pursues key questions posed by the texts as they work within, or against, disciplinary expectations: can critical engagements with narrative enable a more democratic dialogue regarding race? what promise does such experimentation hold for working through the traumatic legacy of racism in the United States? Throughout, Critical Race Narratives initiates a timely dialogue between race-focused narrative experiment in scholarly writing and similar work in literary texts and popular culture.

New York; London: NYU Press, 2001.

By Ghaffar Hussain

Each society needs to clearly define what it considers unacceptable if it wishes to stay functional. 

• We must tackle extremism in a way that preserves civil liberties.

• A definition must be technical and workable and term ‘extremism’ must not become a mere adjective. 

• A definition of extremism must focus on themes that undermine its core ethos of a society, which in the anglosphere context are intolerance, violence and hatred.

  Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism. 2024, 10pg