By Pablo Madriaza, Ghayda Hassan, Sébastien Brouillette-Alarie, Aoudou Njingouo Mounchingam, Loïc Durocher-Corfa, Eugene Borokhovski, David Pickup, Sabrina Paillé

Exposure to hate in online and traditional media: A systematic review and meta-analysis of the impact of this exposure on individuals and communities

Pablo Madriaza, Ghayda Hassan, Sébastien Brouillette-Alarie, Aoudou Njingouo Mounchingam, Loïc Durocher-Corfa, Eugene Borokhovski, David Pickup, Sabrina Paillé

The problem: People use social media platforms to chat, search, and share information, express their opinions, and connect with others. But these platforms also facilitate the posting of divisive, harmful, and hateful messages, targeting groups and individuals, based on their race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or political views. Hate content is not only a problem on the Internet, but also on traditional media, especially in places where the Internet is not widely available or in rural areas. Despite growing awareness of the harms that exposure to hate can cause, especially to victims, there is no clear consensus in the literature on what specific impacts this exposure, as bystanders, produces on individuals, groups, and the population at large. Most of the existing research has focused on analyzing the content and the extent of the problem. More research in this area is needed to develop better intervention programs that are adapted to the current reality of hate.

Objective: The objective of this review is to synthesize the empirical evidence on how media exposure to hate affects or is associated with various outcomes for individuals and groups.

Search methods: Searches covered the period up to December 2021 to assess the impact of exposure to hate. The searches were performed using search terms across 20 databases, 51 related websites, the Google search engine, as well as other systematic reviews and related papers.

Selection criteria: This review included any correlational, experimental, and quasi-experimental study that establishes an impact relationship and/or association between exposure to hate in online and traditional media and the resulting consequences on individuals or groups.

Data collection and analysis: Fifty-five studies analyzing 101 effect sizes, classified into 43 different outcomes, were identified after the screening process. Initially, effect sizes were calculated based on the type of design and the statistics used in the studies, and then transformed into standardized mean differences. Each outcome was classified following an exhaustive review of the operational constructs present in the studies. These outcomes were grouped into five major dimensions: attitudinal changes, intergroup dynamics, interpersonal behaviors, political beliefs, and psychological effects. When two or more outcomes from the studies addressed the same construct, they were synthesized together. A separate meta-analysis was conducted for each identified outcome from different samples. Additionally, experimental and quasi-experimental studies were synthesized separately from correlational studies. Twenty-four meta-analyses were performed using a random effects model, and meta-regressions and moderator analyses were conducted to explore factors influencing effect size estimates.

Results: The 55 studies included in this systematic review were published between 1996 and 2021, with most of them published since 2015. They include 25 correlational studies, and 22 randomized and 8 non-randomized experimental studies. Most of these studies provide data extracted from individuals (e.g., self-report); however, this review includes 6 studies that are based on quantitative analysis of comments or posts, or their relationship to specific geographic areas. Correlational studies encompass sample sizes ranging from 101 to 6829 participants, while experimental and quasi-experimental studies involve participant numbers between 69 and 1112. In most cases, the exposure to hate content occurred online or within social media contexts (37 studies), while only 8 studies reported such exposure in traditional media platforms. In the remaining studies, the exposure to hate content was delivered through political propaganda, primarily associated with extreme right-wing groups. No studies were removed from the systematic review due to quality assessment. In the experimental studies, participants demonstrated high adherence to the experimental conditions and thus contributed significantly to most of the results. The correlational and quasi-experimental studies used consistent, valid, and reliable instruments to measure exposure and outcomes derived from well-defined variables. As with the experimental studies, the results from the correlation and quasi-experimental studies were complete. Meta-analyses related to four dimensions were performed: Attitudinal changes, Intergroup dynamics, Interpersonal behaviors, and Psychological effects. We were unable to conduct a meta-analysis for the "Political Beliefs" dimension due to an insufficient number of studies. In terms of attitude changes, exposure to hate leads to negative attitudes (d Ex = 0.414; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.005, 0.824; p < 0.05; n = 8 and d corr = 0.322; 95% CI = 0.14, 0.504; p < 0.01; n = 2) and negative stereotypes (d Ex = 0.28; 95% CI = -0.018, 0.586; p < 0.10; n = 9) about individuals or groups with protected characteristics, while also hindering the promotion of positive attitudes toward them (d exp = -0.227; 95% CI = -0.466, 0.011; p < 0.10; n = 3). However, it does not increase support for hate content or political violence. Concerning intergroup dynamics, exposure to hate reduces intergroup trust (d exp = -0.308; 95% CI = -0.559, -0.058; p < 0.05; n = 2), especially between targeted groups and the general population, but has no significant impact on the perception of discrimination among minorities. In the context of Interpersonal behaviors, the meta-analyses confirm a strong association between exposure to hate and victimization (d corr = 0.721; 95% CI = 0.472, 0.97; p < 0.01; n = 3) and moderate effects on online hate speech perpetration (d corr = 0.36; 95% CI = -0.028, 0.754; p < 0.10; n = 2) and offline violent behavior (d corr = 0.47; 95%CI = 0.328, 0.612; p < 0.01; n = 2). Exposure to online hate also fuels more hate in online comments (d = 0.51; 95% CI = 0.034-0.984; p < 0.05; n = 2) but does not seem to affect hate crimes directly. However, there is no evidence that exposure to hate fosters resistance behaviors among individuals who are frequently subjected to it (e.g. the intention to counter-argue factually). In terms of psychological consequences, this review demonstrates that exposure to hate content negatively affects individuals' psychological well-being. Experimental studies indicate a large and significant effect size concerning the development of depressive symptoms due to exposure (d exp = 1.105; 95% CI = 0.797, 1.423; p < 0.01; n = 2). Additionally, a small effect size is observed concerning the link between exposure and reduced life satisfaction(d corr = -0.186; 95% CI = -0.279, -0.093; p < 0.01; n = 3), as well as increased social fear regarding the likelihood of a terrorist attack (d corr = -0.206; 95% CI = 0.147, 0.264; p < 0.01 n = 5). Conversely, exposure to hate speech does not seem to generate or be linked to the development of negative emotions related to its content.

Author's conclusions: This systematic review confirms that exposure to hate in online and in traditional media has a significant negative impact on individuals and groups. It emphasizes the importance of taking these findings into account for policymaking, prevention, and intervention strategies. Hate speech spreads through biased commentary and perceptions, normalizing prejudice and causing harm. This not only leads to violence, victimization, and perpetration of hate speech but also contributes to a broader climate of hostility. Conversely, this research suggests that people exposed to this type of content do not show increased shock or revulsion toward it. This may explain why it is easily disseminated and often perceived as harmless, leading some to oppose its regulation. Focusing efforts solely on content control may then have a limited impact in driving substantial change. More research is needed to explore these variables, as well as the relationship between hate speech and political beliefs and the connection to violent extremism. Indeed, we know very little about how exposure to hate influences political and extremist views.

Campbell Syst Rev, 2025 Jan 16;21(1):e70018, doi: 10.1002/cl2.70018. eCollection 2025, 47.

By The New South Wales Law Reform Commission

A report on a review of the effectiveness of s93Z of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) in addressing serious racial and religious vilification in NSW. It provides two recommendations under sentencing and penalties. The report also outlines why some recommendations were not pursued. It does not make recommendations about the Anti-Discrimination Act 1997 (NSW).

The report found that communities have faced increasing levels of discrimination, vilification and other hate-based conduct, and that there has been a significant and sustained increase in vilification complaints received by Anti-Discrimination NSW. However, only a small proportion of individuals affected by vilification make a formal complaint. Concerns were raised, in particular, about an increase in online vilification.

Recommendations

The NSW Government should consider commissioning a review of the effectiveness of s 21A(2)(h) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).

The NSW Government should consider measures, such as a new Law Part Code, to improve the collection of data on hate crimes when offences other than s 93Z are charged for hate-related incidents.

Sydney: The Commission, 2024. 135p.

By The Office of the eSafety Commissioner (Australia)

Online hate is one of the most prevalent forms of digital violence. It affects many internet users in Australia and globally, especially individuals from targeted groups, including sexually diverse individuals, Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islanders, individuals with disability, and those from other culturally and racially marginalised backgrounds. It can take the form of hateful posts or comments about a person based on discrimination or bias related to characteristics such as their sexual orientation, gender, race, disability, religion or ethnicity.

This report is the first in a series of two reports exploring encounters with online hate among adults in Australia. It explores the prevalence, nature and impact of online hate among adults who belong to one or more of the targeted groups, drawing on data from eSafety’s Australian Adults Online survey, conducted in November 2022.

Key findings

Adults who identify as sexually diverse, Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander, with disability, and/or linguistically diverse are more likely to be targeted with online hate.

Adults from these targeted groups are more likely to experience online hate based on discrimination or bias related to at least one aspect of their identity.

Most targeted adults experience online hate on social media, with the hate most often perpetrated by a stranger.

Online hate has harmful effects on the wellbeing of adults from targeted groups.

A minority of targeted adults act after encountering online hate, but many refrain from acting because they don’t think anything will change.

Government of Australia, 2024. 72p.

By Equal Justice Initiative

In 1865, after two and a half centuries of brutal enslavement, Black Americans had great hope that emancipation would finally mean real freedom and opportunity. Most formerly enslaved people in the United States were remarkably willing to live peacefully with those who had held them in bondage despite the violence they had suffered and the degradation they had endured. Emancipated Black people put aside their enslavement and embraced education, hard work, faith, and citizenship with extraordinary enthusiasm and devotion. By 1868, over 80 percent of Black men who were eligible to vote had registered, schools for Black children became a priority, and courageous Black leaders overcame enormous obstacles to win elections to public office. The new era of Reconstruction offered great promise and could have radically changed the history of this country. However, it quickly became clear that emancipation in the United States did not mean equality for Black people. The commitment to abolish chattel slavery was not accompanied by a commitment to equal rights or equal protection for African Americans and the hope of Reconstruction quickly became a nightmare of unparalleled violence and oppression. Between 1865 and 1876, thousands of Black women, men, and children were killed, attacked, sexually assaulted, and terrorized by white mobs and individuals who were shielded from arrest and prosecution. White perpetrators of lawless, random violence against formerly enslaved people were almost never held accountable—instead, they frequently were celebrated. Emboldened Confederate veterans and former enslavers organized a reign of terror that effectively nullified constitutional amendments designed to provide Black people equal protection and the right to vote. In a series of devastating decisions, the United States Supreme Court blocked Congressional efforts to protect formerly enslaved people. In decision after decision, the Court ceded control to the same white Southerners who used terror and violence to stop Black political participation, upheld laws and practices codifying racial hierarchy, and embraced a new constitutional order defined by “states’ rights.” Within a decade after the Civil War, Congress began to abandon the promise of assistance to millions of formerly enslaved Black people. Violence, mass lynchings, and lawlessness enabled white Southerners to create a

regime of white supremacy and Black disenfranchisement alongside a new economic order that continued to exploit Black labor. White officials in the North and West similarly rejected racial equality, codified racial discrimination, and occasionally embraced the same tactics of violent racial control seen in the South.

It was during Reconstruction that a century-long era of racial hierarchy, lynching, white supremacy, and bigotry was established—an era from which this nation has yet to recover. Most Americans know very little about the Reconstruction era and its legacy. Historians have frequently overlooked this critical 12-year period that has had profound impact on life in the United States. Our collective ignorance of what happened immediately after the Civil War has contributed to misinformed stereotypes and misguided false narratives about who is honorable and who is not and has allowed bigotry and a legacy of racial injustice to persist. In 2015, the Equal Justice Initiative issued a new report that detailed over 4,400 documented racial terror lynchings of Black people in America between 1877 and 1950. We now report that during the 12- year period of Reconstruction at least 2,000 Black women, men, and children were victims of racial terror lynchings. Thousands more were assaulted, raped, or injured in racial terror attacks between 1865 and 1876. The rate of documented racial terror lynchings during Reconstruction is nearly three times greater than during the era we reported on in 2015. Dozens of mass lynchings took place during Reconstruction in communities across the country in which hundreds of Black people were killed. Tragically, the rate of unknown lynchings of Black people during Reconstruction is also almost certainly dramatically higher than the thousands of unknown lynchings that took place between 1877 and 1950 for which no documentation can be found. The retaliatory killings of Black people by white Southerners immediately following the Civil War alone likely number in the thousands. EJI presents this report to provide context and analysis of what happened during this tragic period of American history and to describe its implications for the issues we face today. We believe our nation has failed to adequately address or acknowledge our history of racial injustice and that we must commit to a new era of truth-telling followed by meaningful efforts to repair and remedy the continuing legacy of racial oppression. We hope this report sparks much needed conversation and encourages communities to join us in the important task of advancing truth and justice.

Montgomery, AL Equal Justice Initiative, 2021. 119p.

By Ece Kocabıçak

Recent decades have witnessed both a renewed energy in feminist activism and widespread attacks taking back hard-won rights. Despite powerful feminist movements, the Covid-19 pandemic has significantly undermined the progress women have struggled for decades to achieve; how can this be? What explains this paradox of a strong feminist movement coexisting with stubborn patriarchal arrangements? How can we stop the next global catastrophe initiating a similar backlash? This book suggests that the limitations of social theory prevent feminist strategies from initiating transformative changes and achieving permanent gains. It investigates the impact of theoretical shortcomings upon feminist strategies by engaging with two clusters of work: ungendered accounts of capitalist development and theories on gendered oppression and inequality. Decentring feminist theorising grounded in histories and developments of the global North, the book provides an original theory of the patriarchal system by analysing changes within its forms and degrees as well as investigating the relationship between the gender, class and race-ethnicity based inequalities. Turkey offers a case that challenges assumptions and calls for rethinking major feminist categories and theories, thereby shedding light on the dynamics of social change in the global South. The timely intervention of this book is, therefore, crucial for feminist strategies going forward. The book emerges at the intersections between Gender, International Development, Political Economy, and Sociology and its main readership will be found in, but not limited to, these disciplinary fields. The material covered in this book will be of great interest to students and researchers in these areas as well as policy makers and feminist activists. Since publication it has been nominated for the prestigious 2023 British Sociological Association's Philip Adams Memorial Prize.

Abington, Oxon, UK; New York: Routledge, 2023. 208p.

By Noor Huda Ismail

SYNOPSIS

The rapid spread of extremist ideologies through social media, combined with global conflicts and the manipulation of religious content, plays a significant role in online radicalisation. The emotional amplification of conflicts and the distortion of religious teachings underscore the urgent need for stronger social media regulation, enhanced digital literacy, and access to authentic religious guidance. To effectively combat radicalisation, a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach is essential to protect individuals and societies from the harmful effects of extremist ideologies in the digital age.

COMMENTARY

In November 2024, three Singaporeans, influenced by online radicalisation, were detained under the Internal Security Act for attempting to engage in armed violence overseas. Unlike the usual recruitment methods, they were self-radicalised through digital content, particularly those related to the Israel-Hamas conflict.

This incident underscores the growing role social media plays in the spread of extremist ideologies, where radicalisation occurs rapidly through videos, memes, and encrypted messages. The digital age accelerates radicalisation, often making it difficult to detect until violent actions ensue.

So, what makes the digital age uniquely dangerous in terms of radicalisation? How do global conflicts like that between Israel and Hamas contribute to this trend? And, most importantly, how is religious content being distorted to fuel extremism in this age of instant communication?

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 5p.

By Liam Duffy

Salman Rushdie finally sensed that normality was returning to his life, some 33 years after Ayatollah Khomeini’s four paragraph fatwa called for his murder. “Nowadays my life is very normal again,” he told German magazine Stern in an interview over the summer of 2022. Just two weeks later, he was knifed multiple times on stage in Chautauqua, New York. Having evaded the fatwa’s enforcers for so long, one had finally penetrated the layer of secrecy and security which had followed Rushdie for his own protection all those years. Rushdie survived, but has lost sight in one eye and the use of one of his hands. The story which led to this point is by now well known. On Valentine’s Day 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini, the Supreme Leader of Iran, called for the British-Indian author’s death in a fatwa, offering financial and spiritual reward to any Muslim willing to carry out the murder. The assassination order also extended to anyone connected to the publication and promotion of Rushdie’s novel, The Satanic Verses. There are various elements to the novel that were perceived to be insulting to Islam and the Prophet Muhammad. These will not be detailed at length here, save to say that the novel’s title refers to verses in the Quran which were relayed to Muhammad as the word of God, but later revealed to be a deceptive ploy by the devil. In English, these verses were sometimes referred to as the Satanic verses. The novel itself recounts and reimagines episodes in the life of Muhammad. Although the novel’s publication was met with protest in various parts of the world (including the United Kingdom), it was Khomeini’s fatwa that ignited the affair into a global controversy. It transformed not only Rushdie’s life but the relationship between the West and the Muslim world, as well as between Western states and their growing Muslim populations. As Kenan Malik put it in From Fatwa to Jihad: “With his four-paragraph pronouncement, the ayatollah had transcended the traditional frontiers of Islam and brought the whole world under his jurisdiction. At the same time, he helped relocate the confrontation between Islam and the West, which until then had been played out largely in the Middle East and south Asia, into the heart of western Europe. For the West, Islam was now a domestic issue.” This is not to mention the impact on the individuals concerned. There were attempts on the lives of publishers, promoters, and translators in Japan, Italy, Turkey, and Norway. The first assassin to successfully complete his task murdered Hitoshi Igarashi, Japanese translator of The Satanic Verses, in a frenzied attack outside of his office at Tsukuba University in 1991. Like so many of these incidents, the perpetrator was able to slip away and never face justice. The most tragic episode of the affair would unfold in Anatolia, Turkey, where a riled-up crowd would set the Madimak Hotel ablaze, targeting a secularist activist who had translated excerpts of The Satanic Verses in a newspaper. Their target, Aziz Nesin, would escape the inferno but 37 people would not. Owing to the fatwa, Rushdie spent much of his life in hiding, always on the move, with his public appearances tightly controlled. But just as the fatwa was fading from memory, it remained every bit as valid—and lethal—as the day it was pronounced. As The Atlantic’s Graeme Wood explains, “fatwas cannot be rescinded posthumously,” and so the bounty still “hung in the air like a putrid smell, inhaled deeply for inspiration by devout followers of Khomeini and his successors.” The fatwa also helped set the precedent for later blasphemy affairs and controversies. To Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, there was little doubt that later blasphemy affairs were connected. During the fallout from the 2005 Jyllands-Posten cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, he complained that “if any Muslim had carried out the fatwa of Imam Khomeini against the apostate Salman Rushdie, those despicable people would not have dared to insult the Prophet Muhammad.” The logic of the fatwa, and of the violence was not only punishment, but deterrence. The fatwa would also cross the sectarian divide in Islam. Part of its logic was for the Shia regime in Tehran to assert itself over their Sunni rivals in Saudi Arabia for de facto leadership of global Islam. This did not stop the Shia regime’s power play from energizing Sunni Islamist movements the world over, including the indirect empowerment of legal, non-violent Islamist groups in the West. As Western governments scrambled for interlocutors with the suddenly vocal “Muslim community,” offshoots of organizations like the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood or Jamaat-e-Islami were happy to fill that hole. As will be returned to later in the discussion, on blasphemy too, one sees the ideological distance between jihadists and other Islamist movements reduce. After the initial round of violence connected to The Satanic Verses, much of which bears the fingerprints of the regime in Tehran and its proxies, the Sunni jihadists of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) would later lead the bloodshed against blasphemers. Islamists of all stripes and from across the spectrum of non-violence to violent jihadists would, at various times, jostle to take the initiative on blasphemy disputes and position themselves as the true defenders of Islam. On some occasions and for political expediency, they would take the backseat in blasphemy affairs, waiting for the right moment to capitalize. This demonstrates that for all their professed zeal and the alleged offence taken, strategic thinking can in some cases take precedence, even when it comes to insulting Islam. Allegations of insulting Islam and the Prophet Muhammad have often carried dire and bloody consequences globally. The Jyllands-Posten cartoons affair, for instance, sparked rioting and unrest around the world in which hundreds died. Other events have reverberated similarly, such as the demonstrations, violence, and internet blackouts which greeted the uploading of a trailer for the film The Innocence of Muslims to YouTube. This report will focus on the bloody consequences of those allegations and accusations against individuals and institutions in the West, detailing both the plots and the successful attacks directed against those perceived to have insulted Islam and the Prophet. Also included are those plots where blasphemy has been cited as the motivation, but their target is not the alleged transgressor.

New York: The Counter Extremism Project (CEP) , 2023. 46p.

By Elena B. Stavrevska, Nattecia Nerene Bohardsingh, María Dolores Hernández Montoya, Tania Cecilia Martínez, Briana Mawby and Aliza Carns

Violence has traditionally been viewed through the lens of armed conflict or specific, concrete violent incidents. However, it is necessary to understand that violence may be a chronic phenomenon— a persistent, deeply ingrained aggression affecting daily lives. Chronic violence, as conceptualized in the work of authors including Tani Adams and Jenny Pearce, is embedded in societal structures, often perpetuated by socio-economic disparities, political instability and cultural norms. This report contributes to the study of chronic violence in three distinct ways: this

research centers gendered experiences and perspectives on chronic violence; the findings are based on the insights and research of authors living in contexts experiencing chronic violence; and the report focuses primarily on the connection between national- and international-level policies and frameworks to address chronic violence. Women and marginalized gender groups experience a particular type of chronic violence, stemming from deeply rooted patriarchal structures. These experiences, while diverse, share a common thread: they are manifestations of systemic oppression and inequality, from domestic violence to broader societal discrimination. The report makes the case for reconceptualizing violence in the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and gender equality fields, building upon feminist conceptions of the continuum of violence to recognize that societal structures, systemic discrimination and even pervasive cultural norms can be sources of violence. This comprehensive view has significant implications for policy, demanding multisectoral strategies that address not just symptoms but the root causes. This report illuminates the pervasive issue of chronic violence, especially its gendered dimensions, and advocates for comprehensive approaches to understanding and addressing it. Multidimensional strategies, inclusive policies and a global commitment are needed to elevate women’s roles across sectors, from community development to high-level peace negotiations. Understanding the deep intricacies of violence can serve as the bedrock for constructing sustainable, equitable peace. The analysis presented here reveals the following key findings: iv Chronic violence is pervasive and endemic, not episodic. Chronic violence affects women and LGBTQ+ people in distinct ways. A nuanced understanding of violence is necessary. Women are key actors in addressing chronic violence. Holistic, people-centered approaches at the international, national and local levels are imperative.

San Diego:

Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, University of San Diego,

2023, 74p.

By Brandon Cheng, Carmen C.W. Lim, Juliane Pariz Teixeira , Matthew J. Gullo , Gary C.K. Chan , Jason P. Connor

Background and aims: Social media use is now a significant part of modern daily life. Little is known about how social media impacts young peoples’ drinking behaviours and drinking-related consequences. This cohort study aims to explore the prospective relationship between social media use and future drinking. Methods: 1473 alcohol naïve young people, who at Wave 5 (aged 12–13 years) reported no lifetime alcohol use, were included (social media use, peer alcohol use, and covariates were also reported at Wave 5). At Wave 8 (aged 17–18 years), participants reported alcohol use outcomes, including age of drinking initiation, past month and past week risky consumption (>10 drinks/week), and problem drinking (alcohol-related troubles, injuries, and fights). Results: After controlling for factors known to be associated with alcohol use in young people and applying a conservative significance level (α =.01), results revealed that children who engaged in almost daily social media use at ages 12–13 later reported a younger age of drinking onset (β = − 0.56, 95 % CI = − 0.74, − 0.39, p <.001) and greater problem drinking (β = 0.48, 95 % CI = 0.13, 0.83, p =.008) at ages 17–18, compared to those who never used social media at ages 12–13. Early social media use was not associated with odds of subsequent pastmonth alcohol use or risky alcohol consumption. Conclusion: Young peoples’ social media use was associated with future drinking behaviours, prompting the need for preventative measures to acknowledge the salient impacts of social media.

Drug and Alcohol Dependence
Volume 265, 1 December 2024, 112478

By Susan Olzak

This study examines the effect of violent and nonviolent tactics in gaining support for social movements using information on protests by the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. The theoretical dispute over whether violence benefits or harms a movement remains unsettled, and the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Violence increases media attention and generates recognition of a movement and its goals, but violence also raises fears of instability and risks disapproval. This article aims to bring coherence to this debate by arguing that while violence can benefit a movement by emphasizing the contrast between peaceful and violent protesters, the costs associated with the use of violence ought to diminish support for a movement. The analysis that uses a hybrid model to analyze panel data from two national surveys finds evidence that both peaceful and violent BLM protests are associated with higher support for BLM, but they do not change individuals’ support over time.

Mobilization: An International Quarterly (2024) 29 (3): 287–307.

By Maureen A. Eger https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9023-7316 and Susan Olzak 

While radical right parties championing anti-immigrant platforms have made electoral gains throughout Europe, anti-immigrant sentiment—a key indicator of radical right support—has not dramatically increased during this same period. In this article, we seek to help make sense of this paradox by incorporating a contextual factor missing from previous studies: levels of anti-immigrant violence. Our key argument is that higher levels of collective violence targeting immigrants raise the salience of the immigrant/native boundary, which activates both positive and negative views of immigrants and makes these attitudes more cognitively accessible and politically relevant. This argument implies that exposure to violence against immigrants should strengthen existing prejudice (or empathy) toward immigrants and engender feelings of affinity (or antipathy) for radical right parties. Analyses of the German portion of the European Social Survey (ESS 2014 − 2019) and the Anti-Refugee Violence in Germany (ARVIG 2014 − 2017) datasets reveal a powerful interaction effect: exposure to higher levels of collective violence increased the probability of feeling closest to radical right parties among those who held neutral, negative, and extremely negative views of immigrants. However, these events were not associated with radical right sympathies among those holding pro-immigrant attitudes. We conclude that when violence against immigrants resonates with public opinion on immigrants, it opens new political opportunities for radical right parties. These findings should inform future research on the politicization of international migration, especially studies investigating how anti-immigrant attitudes translate into political outcomes.

International Migration ReviewVolume 57, Issue 2, June 2023, Pages 746-777

By Susan Olzak

Influential studies of right-wing extremist violence offer evidence that such violence is motivated by grievances intensified by a perceived loss in status or by economic dislocations. This article moves away from an emphasis on grievances by turning to theories of ethno-nationalism and group conflict. Ethno-nationalism is in part driven by attitudes of dominant groups favoring ethnic exclusion, whereas group threat theories explain that ethnic diversity increases the salience of ethnic boundaries and fuels a collective response to group threat. Such threats encourage violence to contain this threat and restore dominance. Exclusionary attitudes and support for expanded gun rights in America further legitimize a culture of ethno-nationalism that encourages violent acts. I test these arguments with data from the Pew Research Center, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Extremist Crime Database on right-wing violence. The state-level and county-level results support the claim that rising ethnic diversity raises the rate and volume of right-wing violence significantly. State-level results also find that rising memberships in the National Rifle Association increase the rate of right-wing violence significantly.

Sociological Science 10(2):197-226, March 20, 2023

By C. Jarrett Dieterle

When it comes to having alcoholic beverages delivered to our doors, America is in a very different place today than it was 24 months ago. As COVID-19 spread across the world, markets were forced to adapt to the delivery economy model that has dominated throughout the pandemic. Although the sale of most goods could readily be converted from brick-and-mortar purchases to doorstep shipping, alcohol was a notable exception. Many states still prohibited liquor stores, grocery stores and alcohol producers from delivering alcohol locally to consumers’ homes, and nearly every state prohibited restaurants and bars from selling alcohol “to-go” or via delivery. And while wineries were able to ship their bottles to customers in most states, distilleries and breweries were largely barred from the direct-to-consumer (DtC) shipping market. The COVID-19 effect on alcohol delivery and shipping has been both broad and deep. As of last fall, the vast majority of states had passed at least some type of alcohol delivery reform, if not multiple reforms. In fact, many states are still actively considering alcohol delivery legislation or planning to do so in the years ahead. As alcohol delivery has taken off, pushback has emerged. Although much of the pushback can be attributed to protectionist impulses by industry stakeholders, some of the concern stems from health and safety concerns like underage drinking as well as driving under the influence. As more lawmakers across the country consider the future of alcohol delivery in their states, it is important to understand these concerns and engage in data-driven investigations of their legitimacy.

R STREET SHORTS NO. 113 April 2022, 5p.

By Lisel Petis

Law enforcement agencies across the country, regardless of state or jurisdiction population size, are facing challenges on a daily basis, including exhaustion and frustration from dealing with “frequent flyers” and “repeat callers;” continued stress and pressure caused by agency staffing shortages and negative public sentiment; and increased rates of community mental health and substance abuse issues leading to potentially dangerous outcomes. In response, some conservative areas have found a way to better support their local law enforcement and the communities they serve through pre-arrest diversion programs. Pre-arrest diversion models—such as Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD), co-responder and community responder—have become some of the most successful trends in criminal justice. These programs already exist across the nation and have proven efficient and effective in diverting low-level offenders from the criminal justice system. By looking at the execution of LEAD in Laramie County, Wyo., Behavioral Health Connect (BHCON) in El Paso County, Colo. and Community Assistance and Life Liaison (CALL) in St. Petersburg, Fla., other jurisdictions can understand how pre-arrest diversion reduces calls for service, saves police officers’ time and decreases jail populations. Furthermore, these districts serve as an example that allows us to explore how to successfully implement a diversion program and navigate potential challenges.

Key Points: 1. Conservative jurisdictions are turning to novel prearrest diversion models to help with staffing shortages, court backlogs and “frequent flyers” who are often suffering from mental health or addiction issues. 2. Pre-arrest diversion models—such as LEAD, corresponder or community responder—prioritizes police time, court resources and jail space for serious offenses and violent crimes while also repairing law enforcement’s relationship with the community, connecting individuals with services and reducing recidivism. 3. Communities can better support their local law enforcement and overcome concerns of logistics, safety and funding when implementing their own diversion programs.

R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 252 March 2022, 12p

By Patrick Meehan and Jonathan Goodhand

This research paper advances a conceptual framework for analysing the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime in borderland and frontier regions. We challenge two dominant policy narratives around paramilitaries: first, the idea that these organisations are symptomatic of state breakdown and flourish in marginal spaces suffering from ‘governance deficits’. Second, the idea that paramilitaries can primarily be understood as apolitical, predatory and self-enriching actors, driven by economic motives, and operating outside formal political systems. In critiquing these narratives, we develop an alternative approach that studies how paramilitaries become embedded in enduring systems of rule in borderlands shaped by protracted conflict and illicit economies. At the centre of our approach is the concept of ‘coercive brokerage’ which provides a lens for exploring how paramilitaries play a crucial role in shaping power relations by mediating between different scales, jurisdictions and policy domains. Brokerage can be defined as the capacity to mediate the transmission of power across divides – or synapses – between different networks or power structures, and facilitates connections outside formal institutions. In conflict-affected frontier spaces, the use of violence – actual or threatened – enables brokers to fulfil their connective function and creates a privileged space for distinct forms of ‘coercive brokerage’. Coercive brokers have an ambiguous relationship with the state; they derive power from mediating the state’s influence, rather than acting as state proxies. By fulfilling these roles as intermediaries, coercive brokers become embedded in political and market systems in frontier regions and beyond. As we argue below, over time, coercive brokers become important political actors who deal with collective action problems by cementing alliances and political coalitions that connect political centres with frontier regions, and who pursue political interests and agendas. Not all paramilitaries become coercive brokers who end up assuming significant political roles. We aim to explore why some paramilitary figures and groups become powerful coercive brokers and others do not. We also examine why coercive brokerage seems to be a particular feature of frontier and borderland contexts. And finally, we aim to better understand variation in the dynamics of coercive brokerage – at the national and subnational levels. This paper is the first of a three-part series exploring the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime. This first paper conceptualises coercive brokerage and outlines how this concept advances the growing body of recent literature on militias and paramilitaries. The second paper then works with the concept of coercive brokerage to present comparative analysis of the paramilitary-organised crime nexus in three contexts: Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar. These case studies draw upon data and analysis generated by a four-year Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) project, Drugs & (Dis)order (https://drugs-and-disorder.org/). The third paper outlines a set of policy implications based on the key findings from across the case studies.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 26. University of Birmingham. 2023. 35p.

By Marcela Neves Bezerra and Mitja Kovac

Modern Brazil is plagued by social and economic inequalities, endemic violence, crime, and weak rule of law. Once these narratives become dependent on each other, all aspects must be worked on to change the scenario experienced in the country, of insecurity, fear and lack of opportunities. This paper argues that unprecedented increase in social injustice in Brazil is not the result of short-term measures, but the materialization of a history marked by economic and social inequalities that extend from the colonial period to the present moment and faulty criminal policies that intensified in the mid-1990's. Moreover, current massive incarceration, overcrowding of prisons combined with the lack of human living conditions is turning Brazil into a gigantic, perpetual school of crime. Investment in education that has a direct effect on the decrease of crime rate, must be aligned with the structuring of a new, less repressive and more inclusive punitive policy, to induce criminals not to recur to crime. Paper suggests that essential development in Brazil is possible only if the efficient legal institutions, rule of law, and criminal sanctioning based on principles of social justice are available to all citizens.

School of Economics and Business University of Ljubljana, 2020,

By Anina Schwarzenbach and Michael Jensen

Prior research suggests that members of terrorist groups prioritize forming network ties based on trust to improve their organizational and operational security. The homophily principle, which postulates that individuals tend to form relationships based on shared characteristics, can be a key mechanism through which people identify trustworthy associates. Next to homophily, the mechanism of establishing interconnected relationships through transitivity is also well-known to serve this purpose and shape community structures in social networks. We analyze the community structures of the Islamist co-offending network in the United States, which is highly violent, to assess whether homophily and transitivity determine which extremists form co-offending ties. We rely on a new database on the individual attributes and the co-offending relationships of 494 Islamist offenders radicalized in the United States between 1993 and 2020. Using community detection algorithms, we show that the US Islamist co-offending network is highly clustered, modular, and includes many small but only a few large communities. Furthermore, results from exponential random graph modeling show that transitive relationships as well as spatial proximity, ideological affiliation, and shared socio-cultural characteristics drive co-offending among US Islamist extremists. Overall, these findings demonstrate that the processes of homophily and transitivity shape violent social networks.

PLoS ONE 19(6): 2024, 31p.

By Parliament of Australia. Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee

This examination of right-wing extremists in Australia looks at the movements, motivations and international links of local groups, particularly in online spaces. The report makes recommendations focusing on social media platform regulation, law enforcement access to encrypted communications and the creation of a national hate crimes database.

The inquiry, prompted by growing concern regarding right-wing extremism globally and its impact on Australian society, sought digito define, understand and limit the harm of right-wing extremist movements. Along with the historical and ideological background, it considers modern pathways to radicalisation with a focus on the significant role of online platforms. The report considers existing measures in place to counter violent extremism and makes six recommendations to curtail the spread and limit the harm of extremist groups.

Recommendations

The Australian Government should regularly assess the effectiveness of deradicalisation and countering violent extremism programs, incorporating insights from experts, practitioners, and research organisations, both domestically and internationally.

Develop a national framework to guide engagement with young people, aiming to help them identify and reject harmful ideologies while fostering positive social connections.

Research how extremist actors, particularly those targeting young people, use online platforms, including social media and gaming platforms, to spread propaganda and recruit members.

The Office of the eSafety Commissioner should collaborate with stakeholders to develop guidelines for transparent and independent measures to ensure social media platforms are effectively removing harmful extremist content.

Consider legislation allowing law enforcement and intelligence agencies, with a warrant obtained through proper judicial process, to access encrypted communications when there is a credible national security threat.

Establish a national hate crimes database to aid in the development of effective prevention and support programs.

Canberra: Parliament of Australia. The Senate, Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee 2024. 223p.

Edited by Virginia Mantouvalou and Jonathan Wolff

In developing her conception of structural injustice, Iris Marion Young made a strict distinction between large-scale collective injustice that results from the normal functions of a society, and the more familiar concepts of individual wrong and deliberate state repression. Her ideas have attracted considerable attention in political philosophy, but legal theorists have been slower to consider the relation between structural injustice and legal analysis. While some forms of vulnerability to structural injustice can be the unintended consequences of legal rules, the law also has potential instruments to alleviate some forms of structural injustice. Structural Injustice and the Law presents theoretical approaches and concrete examples to show how the concept of structural injustice can aid legal analysis, and how legal reform can, in practice, reduce or even eliminate some forms of structural injustice. A group of outstanding law and political philosophy scholars discuss a comprehensive range of interdisciplinary topics, including the notion of domination, equality and human rights law, legal status, sweatshop labour, labour law, criminal justice, domestic homicide reviews, begging, homelessness, regulatory public bodies and the films of Ken Loach. Drawn together, they build an invaluable resource for legal theorists exploring how to make use of the concept of structural injustice, and for political philosophers looking for a nuanced account of the law’s role both in creating and mitigating structural injustice.

London: UCL Press, 2024. 334p.

Edited by Matthias J. Becker, Laura Ascone, Karolina Placzynta and Chloé Vincent

The normalisation of hate speech, including antisemitic rhetoric, poses a significant threat to social cohesion and democracy. While global efforts have been made to counter contemporary antisemitism, there is an urgent need to understand its online manifestations. Hate speech spreads easily across the internet, facilitated by anonymity and reinforced by algorithms that favour engaging--even if offensive--content. It often takes coded forms, making detection challenging. Antisemitism in Online Communication addresses these issues by analysing explicit and implicit antisemitic statements in mainstream online discourse. Drawing from disciplines such as corpus linguistics, computational linguistics, semiotics, history, and philosophy, this edited collection examines over 100,000 user comments from three language communities. Contributors explore various facets of online antisemitism, including its intersectionality with misogyny and its dissemination through memes and social networks. Through case studies, they examine the reproduction, support, and rejection of antisemitic tropes, alongside quantitative assessments of comment structures in online discussions. Additionally, the volume delves into the capabilities of content moderation tools and deep-learning models for automated hate speech detection. This multidisciplinary approach provides a comprehensive understanding of contemporary antisemitism in digital spaces, recognising the importance of addressing its insidious spread from multiple angles.

Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers. 2024.262p.