By Patrick Meehan and Jonathan Goodhand

This research paper advances a conceptual framework for analysing the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime in borderland and frontier regions. We challenge two dominant policy narratives around paramilitaries: first, the idea that these organisations are symptomatic of state breakdown and flourish in marginal spaces suffering from ‘governance deficits’. Second, the idea that paramilitaries can primarily be understood as apolitical, predatory and self-enriching actors, driven by economic motives, and operating outside formal political systems. In critiquing these narratives, we develop an alternative approach that studies how paramilitaries become embedded in enduring systems of rule in borderlands shaped by protracted conflict and illicit economies. At the centre of our approach is the concept of ‘coercive brokerage’ which provides a lens for exploring how paramilitaries play a crucial role in shaping power relations by mediating between different scales, jurisdictions and policy domains. Brokerage can be defined as the capacity to mediate the transmission of power across divides – or synapses – between different networks or power structures, and facilitates connections outside formal institutions. In conflict-affected frontier spaces, the use of violence – actual or threatened – enables brokers to fulfil their connective function and creates a privileged space for distinct forms of ‘coercive brokerage’. Coercive brokers have an ambiguous relationship with the state; they derive power from mediating the state’s influence, rather than acting as state proxies. By fulfilling these roles as intermediaries, coercive brokers become embedded in political and market systems in frontier regions and beyond. As we argue below, over time, coercive brokers become important political actors who deal with collective action problems by cementing alliances and political coalitions that connect political centres with frontier regions, and who pursue political interests and agendas. Not all paramilitaries become coercive brokers who end up assuming significant political roles. We aim to explore why some paramilitary figures and groups become powerful coercive brokers and others do not. We also examine why coercive brokerage seems to be a particular feature of frontier and borderland contexts. And finally, we aim to better understand variation in the dynamics of coercive brokerage – at the national and subnational levels. This paper is the first of a three-part series exploring the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime. This first paper conceptualises coercive brokerage and outlines how this concept advances the growing body of recent literature on militias and paramilitaries. The second paper then works with the concept of coercive brokerage to present comparative analysis of the paramilitary-organised crime nexus in three contexts: Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar. These case studies draw upon data and analysis generated by a four-year Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) project, Drugs & (Dis)order (https://drugs-and-disorder.org/). The third paper outlines a set of policy implications based on the key findings from across the case studies.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 26. University of Birmingham. 2023. 35p.

By Marcela Neves Bezerra and Mitja Kovac

Modern Brazil is plagued by social and economic inequalities, endemic violence, crime, and weak rule of law. Once these narratives become dependent on each other, all aspects must be worked on to change the scenario experienced in the country, of insecurity, fear and lack of opportunities. This paper argues that unprecedented increase in social injustice in Brazil is not the result of short-term measures, but the materialization of a history marked by economic and social inequalities that extend from the colonial period to the present moment and faulty criminal policies that intensified in the mid-1990's. Moreover, current massive incarceration, overcrowding of prisons combined with the lack of human living conditions is turning Brazil into a gigantic, perpetual school of crime. Investment in education that has a direct effect on the decrease of crime rate, must be aligned with the structuring of a new, less repressive and more inclusive punitive policy, to induce criminals not to recur to crime. Paper suggests that essential development in Brazil is possible only if the efficient legal institutions, rule of law, and criminal sanctioning based on principles of social justice are available to all citizens.

School of Economics and Business University of Ljubljana, 2020,

By Anina Schwarzenbach and Michael Jensen

Prior research suggests that members of terrorist groups prioritize forming network ties based on trust to improve their organizational and operational security. The homophily principle, which postulates that individuals tend to form relationships based on shared characteristics, can be a key mechanism through which people identify trustworthy associates. Next to homophily, the mechanism of establishing interconnected relationships through transitivity is also well-known to serve this purpose and shape community structures in social networks. We analyze the community structures of the Islamist co-offending network in the United States, which is highly violent, to assess whether homophily and transitivity determine which extremists form co-offending ties. We rely on a new database on the individual attributes and the co-offending relationships of 494 Islamist offenders radicalized in the United States between 1993 and 2020. Using community detection algorithms, we show that the US Islamist co-offending network is highly clustered, modular, and includes many small but only a few large communities. Furthermore, results from exponential random graph modeling show that transitive relationships as well as spatial proximity, ideological affiliation, and shared socio-cultural characteristics drive co-offending among US Islamist extremists. Overall, these findings demonstrate that the processes of homophily and transitivity shape violent social networks.

PLoS ONE 19(6): 2024, 31p.

By Parliament of Australia. Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee

This examination of right-wing extremists in Australia looks at the movements, motivations and international links of local groups, particularly in online spaces. The report makes recommendations focusing on social media platform regulation, law enforcement access to encrypted communications and the creation of a national hate crimes database.

The inquiry, prompted by growing concern regarding right-wing extremism globally and its impact on Australian society, sought digito define, understand and limit the harm of right-wing extremist movements. Along with the historical and ideological background, it considers modern pathways to radicalisation with a focus on the significant role of online platforms. The report considers existing measures in place to counter violent extremism and makes six recommendations to curtail the spread and limit the harm of extremist groups.

Recommendations

The Australian Government should regularly assess the effectiveness of deradicalisation and countering violent extremism programs, incorporating insights from experts, practitioners, and research organisations, both domestically and internationally.

Develop a national framework to guide engagement with young people, aiming to help them identify and reject harmful ideologies while fostering positive social connections.

Research how extremist actors, particularly those targeting young people, use online platforms, including social media and gaming platforms, to spread propaganda and recruit members.

The Office of the eSafety Commissioner should collaborate with stakeholders to develop guidelines for transparent and independent measures to ensure social media platforms are effectively removing harmful extremist content.

Consider legislation allowing law enforcement and intelligence agencies, with a warrant obtained through proper judicial process, to access encrypted communications when there is a credible national security threat.

Establish a national hate crimes database to aid in the development of effective prevention and support programs.

Canberra: Parliament of Australia. The Senate, Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee 2024. 223p.

Edited by Virginia Mantouvalou and Jonathan Wolff

In developing her conception of structural injustice, Iris Marion Young made a strict distinction between large-scale collective injustice that results from the normal functions of a society, and the more familiar concepts of individual wrong and deliberate state repression. Her ideas have attracted considerable attention in political philosophy, but legal theorists have been slower to consider the relation between structural injustice and legal analysis. While some forms of vulnerability to structural injustice can be the unintended consequences of legal rules, the law also has potential instruments to alleviate some forms of structural injustice. Structural Injustice and the Law presents theoretical approaches and concrete examples to show how the concept of structural injustice can aid legal analysis, and how legal reform can, in practice, reduce or even eliminate some forms of structural injustice. A group of outstanding law and political philosophy scholars discuss a comprehensive range of interdisciplinary topics, including the notion of domination, equality and human rights law, legal status, sweatshop labour, labour law, criminal justice, domestic homicide reviews, begging, homelessness, regulatory public bodies and the films of Ken Loach. Drawn together, they build an invaluable resource for legal theorists exploring how to make use of the concept of structural injustice, and for political philosophers looking for a nuanced account of the law’s role both in creating and mitigating structural injustice.

London: UCL Press, 2024. 334p.

Edited by Matthias J. Becker, Laura Ascone, Karolina Placzynta and Chloé Vincent

The normalisation of hate speech, including antisemitic rhetoric, poses a significant threat to social cohesion and democracy. While global efforts have been made to counter contemporary antisemitism, there is an urgent need to understand its online manifestations. Hate speech spreads easily across the internet, facilitated by anonymity and reinforced by algorithms that favour engaging--even if offensive--content. It often takes coded forms, making detection challenging. Antisemitism in Online Communication addresses these issues by analysing explicit and implicit antisemitic statements in mainstream online discourse. Drawing from disciplines such as corpus linguistics, computational linguistics, semiotics, history, and philosophy, this edited collection examines over 100,000 user comments from three language communities. Contributors explore various facets of online antisemitism, including its intersectionality with misogyny and its dissemination through memes and social networks. Through case studies, they examine the reproduction, support, and rejection of antisemitic tropes, alongside quantitative assessments of comment structures in online discussions. Additionally, the volume delves into the capabilities of content moderation tools and deep-learning models for automated hate speech detection. This multidisciplinary approach provides a comprehensive understanding of contemporary antisemitism in digital spaces, recognising the importance of addressing its insidious spread from multiple angles.

Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers. 2024.262p.

By Sophie Gillfeather-Spetere, Amy Watson

Designed for use by policymakers, practitioners, and advocates, this guide synthesizes findings from 20+ reports to outline key actions for consistent and effective policy responses supporting children and young people experiencing violence. It includes four principles that outline ways of working to underpin reform and eight priority areas for action. The report finds that policies and service systems are failing to meet the needs of children and young people, particularly those with a disability, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children, those from culturally and linguistically diverse families, and LGBTQ+. The guide calls for significant policy and practice reforms that center children's and young people’s voices, acknowledge the profound and diverse impact of violence on their lives, and move away from a reactive system to one that prioritizes primary prevention.

 Four principles to underpin reform

1. There is no single experience of being a child or young person. When working to support the safety and wellbeing of children and young people we must use an intersectional approach.

2. Policy and service systems need to be rights-focused to avoid causing further harm.

3. Policy and system change needs to be supported by an authorising environment with supportive leadership, adequate resourcing, child-focused and DFSV-informed policies and procedures, and education and training.

4. The strengths, resilience, and resistance of children and young people should be recognized and incorporated into trauma-informed, strengths-based system responses.

Eight priority areas for action

1. Recognize the profound and diverse impacts of domestic, family, and sexual violence on children and young people.

2. Centre the voices, strengths, and needs of children and young people.

3. Prioritise primary prevention centring children and young people’s wellbeing and safety.

4. Acknowledge and act on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ knowledge of what is best for their children.

5. Design and deliver holistic child-centred systems, policies, and supports.

6. Collaborate across systems to respond holistically to children and young people’s needs.

7. Invest in skill development in trauma- and domestic, family, and sexual violence-informed care across systems and services.

8. Share knowledge across services working with disability; domestic, family, and sexual violence; and children and young people.

Sydney: ANROWS- Australia's National Research Organisation for Women's Safety,  2024. 84p.

By New York City Racial Justice Commission

In March 2021, Mayor de Blasio announced the formation of the Racial Justice Commission and appointed 11 Commissioners, including Chair Jennifer Jones Austin and Vice Chair Henry Garrido, to focus on racial justice and reconciliation, with a mandate to identify and root out structural racism. The Racial Justice Commission (RJC) has the formal powers of a charter revision commission, including the ability to propose changes to the NYC Charter. The NYC Charter is the foundation of how our City functions and governs, and it has a direct impact on the way we live and work. The Commission set out to examine the NYC Charter to identify barriers to power, access, and opportunity for Black, Indigenous, Latinx, Asian, Pacific Islander, Middle Eastern and all People of Color (BIPOC*) in New York City and put forward ballot proposals aimed at removing those barriers and advancing racial equity. New Yorkers will vote on these proposed changes in November 2022. The Commission operates independently from the Mayor’s Office and other agencies. As a charter revision commission, the Racial Justice Commission was tasked with reviewing the entire City Charter and proposing amendments, or changes, to be considered by voters and voted upon in a general election. A charter revision commission can choose to make proposals that change the entire charter, or a specific section. Given this authority, and the unique opportunity posed by the transformative potential of this moment in history, the Racial Justice Commission decided to focus on identifying and proposing structural changes in the NYC Charter that will advance racial justice and equity and begin to dismantle structural racism for all New Yorkers. The Commission began by defining a vision for racial equity, one where the worth, talents, and contributions of all people in society are valued and recognized, and where race is not a determinant of economic, political, social, or psychological outcomes, as it neither confers privilege nor denies opportunities.

PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

Charter revision commissions can perform research, speak with experts and community leaders, conduct public meetings and public input sessions as they collect information and ideas, and make decisions about what proposed charter changes to recommend. Engaging New Yorkers in the process undertaken by the Racial Justice Commission was critical. While most charter revision commissions seek input and specific proposals from the public, the Racial Justice Commission knew it would be important to also recognize the deep pain of racial trauma and the history of injustices suffered. So, the Commission heard from New Yorkers not only on their ideas, but also on their experiences—the challenges faced, systemic barriers in place, and the personal and community impact these injustices have had. The Commission employed a wide range of engagement tools in order to reach the broadest range of New Yorkers as possible, with an emphasis on reaching Black, Indigenous, Latinx, Asian, Pacific Islander, Middle Eastern New Yorkers and all People of Color (BIPOC*) who are not as effectively reached through traditional government engagement vehicles. The Commission held public input sessions in every borough and online; received input online from over 1,250 New Yorkers; heard from thought leaders and experts from a range of fields, backgrounds, and expertise; spread the word to over 1,000 New Yorkers through presentations to community boards and civic groups; and conducted targeted interviews and focus groups with critical stakeholders working in racial equity and racial justice.

New York: NYC Racial Justice Commission, 2022. 147p.

By The Program on Extremism

Hamas has operated for decades in the US through fundraising, influence operations, and strategic adaptation, using charities and neutral rhetoric to conceal its true objectives. On college campuses, Hamas-linked networks have exploited academic freedom to further their agenda, a strategy that is the latest iteration of plans conceived as far back as the early 1990s. Groups like Samidoun and actors linked to the Iranian regime have cooperated with US-based Hamas networks, conducting similar influence and fundraising operations. 

Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2024. 23p.

By Tim Lyman, Frank R. Baumgartner, and Glenn L. Pierce

Out of 6,512 homicides from 1976 through 2014, we review the outcomes of 1,822 capitallycharged homicide cases across eight judicial districts in Louisiana. In most cases, capital charges were reduced; but in 385 cases, the state sought death to the final stage of the prosecution. In 107 cases, a death sentence was imposed. We analyze these outcomes, looking at legally relevant factors, as well as legally irrelevant ones, in determining final capital charges and death sentences. Legally relevant factors include the number of victims as well as various statutory aggravating circumstances (e.g., victims under 12 or over 64, simultaneous felony circumstances, the type of weapon, the relationship between the victim and offender). Legally irrelevant factors include the judicial district and the race and gender of the offenders and victims, respectively. Many legally relevant factors have powerful impacts: the number of victims, certain felony circumstances, child victims, elderly victims are all associated with higher rates of final capital charging or death sentencing. But we also show that factors which appear legally irrelevant in theory have have powerful effects; rates of capital prosecution and death sentencing are substantially different based on the race of victim and the combined races of the offenders and the victims, for example. We found only modest differences across the eight judicial districts we studied, but especially significant differences in rates of final capital charges and death sentences in cases that involved white victims, particularly white females. No demographic combination was as likely to see a final capital charge or a death sentence as those cases with a black male offender and a white female victim, which were more than five times as likely to lead to a final capital charge or a death sentence, compared to the much more frequent crimes involving black offenders and black victims. These findings come after a review of the bivariate relations as well as a series of multivariate logistic regressions. The Louisiana death penalty system is heavily weighted by a tendency to seek the harshest penalties in those cases with white female victims. Our powerful and consistent findings of racial and gender-based disparities hold in a multivariate analysis and are inconsistent with the equal protection of the law or any common understanding of equality or justice.

SUL Rev., 2021

By Henrice Altink

This book analyzes textual representations of Jamaican slave women in three contexts--motherhood, intimate relationships, and work--in both pro- and antislavery writings. Altink examines how British abolitionists and pro-slavery activists represented the slave women to their audiences and explains not only the purposes that these representations served, but also their effects on slave women’s lives.

London; New York: Routledge, 2005.272p.

By Maik Fielitz and Reem Ahmed,  Radicalisation Awareness Network

Humour has become a central weapon of extremist movements to subvert open societies and to lower the threshold towards violence. Especially within the context of a recent wave of far-right terrorist attacks, we witness “playful” ways in communicating racist ideologies. As far-right extremists strategically merge with online cultures, their approach changes fundamentally. This trend has been especially facilitated by the so-called alt-right and has spread globally. This predominantly online movement set new standards to rebrand extremist positions in an ironic guise, blurring the lines between mischief and potentially radicalising messaging. The result is a nihilistic form of humour that is directed against ethnic and sexual minorities and deemed to inspire violent fantasies — and eventually action. This paper scrutinises how humour functions as a potential factor in terms of influencing far-right extremist violence. In doing so, we trace the strategic dissemination of far-right narratives and discuss how extremists conceal their misanthropic messages in order to deny ill intention or purposeful harm. These recent developments pose major challenges for practitioners: As a new generation of violent extremists emerges from digital subcultures without a clear organisational centre, prevention strategies need to renew focus and cope with the intangible nature of online cultures.  

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. 18p.

By  Jacob Davey, Jakob Guhl, and Carl Miller

As Ofcom prepared for its duties as the UK’s incoming social media regulator, it commissioned ISD to produce two reports to better understand the risk of UK users encountering online terrorists, incitement to violence, and hate content across a range of digital services. This report provides an overview of public English-language messages collected from Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan across the month of August 2022 which we class as ‘plausibly hateful’. This is where at least one of the reasonable interpretations of the message is that it seeks to dehumanize, demonize, express contempt or disgust for, exclude, harass, threaten, or incite violence against an individual or community based on a protected characteristic. Protected characteristics are understood to be race, national origin, disability, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, sex, or gender identity.

Amman | Berlin | London | Paris | Washington DC: Institute for Strategic Dialogue. 2023. 34p.

By Anne Craanen, Charley Gleeson and Anna Meier

This report investigates the rise of online anti-trans activism following two prominent attacks involving LGBTQ+ communities, namely the October 2022 attack on a gay bar in Bratislava, Slovakia, and the March 2023 shooting at a school in Nashville, Tennessee perpetrated by a trans man.

We use a postcolonial approach, through which we find that the transphobia espoused online following the attacks was predominantly transmisogynistic, a consequence of the colonial logics around gender which assign the monopoly of violence to white cisgender men. The main themes identified were the erasure of trans identities, particularly transmasculinity, the overlap between transmisogyny and other forms of discrimination, and the demonization of trans people. 

The most important conclusion from our research is for everyone – technology companies, policymakers and other stakeholders – to take transphobia and transmisogyny seriously. Too often transmisogyny is seen as a side problem, or as a complement to another set of more radical ideas, including but not limited to white nationalism or anti-government sentiment. It can often be the case that transphobia, alongside misogyny, hate speech, or other forms of discrimination, is seen as “harmful but lawful” or described as “borderline content”, thereby not in need of online moderation. While simply removing such material from platforms may be neither appropriate nor advisable in all cases, there are other forms of content moderation that platforms can consider, depending on how online transphobia manifests itself. 

In the conclusion of our work, we provide practical recommendations to technology companies of all sizes for tackling transphobia more effectively. Key among these are the importance of knowledge-sharing between platforms and subject matter experts, defining transphobia and transmisogyny in platforms’ terms of service, and employing content moderation practices such as disinformation tags and algorithmic deprioritization. 

Recommendations for technology companies:

1. Increase online monitoring following attacks that are directly relevant to the LGBTQ+  community as transphobic content is likely to increase, including material that violates terms of service, incites violence or is otherwise illegal. 

2. Collaborate with experts to comprehend and classify transphobic rhetoric, and produce a taxonomy alongside subject-matter specialists, technology representatives, civil society, and government partners.

3. Consider diverse moderation methods, removing illegal content and also using alternatives to removal such as fact-checking and algorithmic adjustments to mitigate exposure to transphobic channels and content.

4. Define transphobia in terms of service to guide users as to what is allowed on platforms and enable user reporting. 

5. Design clear reporting and appeal mechanisms for moderated content, including online transphobia, to protect digital and human rights.

” London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), May 2024.2024. 26p.

By Emily Thompson and Galen Lamphere-Englund

Violent extremist, terrorist, and targeted hate actors have been actively exploiting video games to propagandize, recruit, and fundraise for more than 30 years. This report presents an analysis of that history using a unique dataset, the Extremist and Terrorist Games Database (ETGD), developed by the authors. It contains 155 reviewed entries of standalone games, modifications for existing games (mods), and browser‑based games dating from 1982 to 2024. The titles analyzed appear across the ideological spectrum: far right (101 titles), jihadist (24), far left (1), and other forms of extremism and targeted hate (29), including school‑massacre ideation (12). They span platforms ranging from simple standalone games for Atari in the 1980s to sophisticated mods for some of today’s most popular games. The number of titles has increased year on year – in line with global conflict and extremist ideological trends, and revealing a continued push by malicious actors to exploit gaming. Meanwhile, the means of distribution have shifted from violent extremist organizations and marketplaces – such as white supremacist, neo‑Nazi, and jihadist organizations – to distributed repositories of extremist games hosted on internet archives, Ethereum‑hosted file‑sharing, Telegram and with subtly coded titles on mainstream platforms like Steam. While most of the titles in the ETGD are available for free, several that have been sold (often at symbolic prices like $14.88 or $17.76) appear to have generated revenue for groups ranging from Hezbollah to the National Alliance, an American neo‑Nazi group. Through new analysis of Steam data, we also show that a small number of extremist and targeted hate titles have generated almost an estimated $600,000 in revenue for small publishers on the platform. Far from being a comprehensive analysis of the ETGD, we intend this preliminary launch report to form a basis for future research of the dataset and a framework for continued contributions to the ETGD from Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN) members. Above all, we seek to contribute to sensible policymaking to prevent violent extremism that situates games as part of a wider contested and exploited information space, which deserves far more attention from those working towards peaceful ends. Complete recommendations are provided in the conclusion section of this report but include the following: 1. Prohibit and prevent violent extremist exploitation: Gaming platforms should explicitly prohibit violent extremist and terrorist behaviors and content. Leadership exists here from Twitch, Discord, Microsoft/Xbox, and the affiliated Activision‑Blizzard.  a. Audio and video platforms, such as Spotify, Apple Music, and YouTube should seek to identify extremist gaming content currently available under misleading titles and tags. b. Flag and remove extremist titles across platforms: Hashing and preventing outlinking to ETGD games and links should be a priority across platforms. 2. Improve reporting mechanisms: Platforms must improve reporting mechanisms to make it easier for players to report violative content found in games and in‑game conduct. 3. Understand and take down distributed repositories: Larger repositories of extremist gaming content readily available on the surface web accelerate user exposure. 4. Collaborate across sectors: Addressing the spread of extremist games requires a collaborative effort between tech companies, government agencies, and civil society organizations. 5. Educate across sectors: Programmes supporting educators and frontline community moderators should be developed. 6. Support research and innovation: Including cross‑sector initiatives like the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) and EGRN, which produced this database. 7. Enhance regulatory frameworks: Governments should update regulatory frameworks applying to digital platforms, recognizing the nuances of gaming platforms and complying with human rights. 8. Encourage positive community engagement: Thoughtful, well-designed community guidelines, moderation policies, and reporting mechanisms can support community‑building.  

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) , 2024. 40p.'

By Cynthia Fraga Rizo and Tonya Van Deinse

Intimate partner violence (IPV)—the intentional physical or nonphysical violence between current or former intimate partners—and sexual violence (SV)—non-consensual sexual activities—are pervasive, serious criminal legal system and public health problems in the United States (Centers for Disease Control [CDC], 2017; CDC, 2019; Smith et al., 2018). Survivors of IPV and SV bear the burden of numerous deleterious short- and long-term consequences. To address their myriad service needs, survivors must navigate multiple systems, organizations, and professionals. The complexity of navigating multiple service sectors means IPV/SV survivors often do not receive the help they need at the time when services are most needed. Recognizing this barrier, IPV/SV service providers, including advocates, criminal legal system professionals, and healthcare providers, have been increasingly interested in using cross-sectoral approaches (CSA) to coordinate service delivery to IPV/SV survivors (Gwinn et al., 2007). Family Justice Centers (FJC) and Multi-Agency Model Centers (MAMC) are two commonly implemented CSA models (Alliance for Hope International, 2024; Rizo et al., 2022; Shorey et al., 2014; Simmons et al., 2016). A key underlying assumption of FJCs and MAMCs is that colocation, collaboration, and coordination of services across multiple providers and disciplines will increase survivors’ access to services and ultimately lead to better outcomes. However, limited research exists regarding the implementation and effectiveness of these co-located models. To address these gaps, the research team conducted an evaluability assessment and formative evaluation of IPV/SV CSAs, with a focus on the similarities and differences across colocated models. The project was comprised of two phases: • Phase 1: Evaluability assessment of IPV/SV co-located CSAs. • Phase 2: Formative evaluation of IPV/SV co-located CSAs. The project was conducted in North Carolina, with eight co-located centers participating in the evaluability assessment and six participating in the formative evaluation.

Approach The evaluability assessment was guided by the Exploration, Preparation, Implementation, and Sustainment (EPIS) framework (Aarons et al., 2011) and followed the four steps outlined by Trevisan and Walser’s (2014) evaluability assessment model: (1) focus the assessment, (2) develop the program theory and logic, (3) gather feedback, and (4) apply the assessment findings. Prior to developing the proposal and launching the project, our team worked with a group of statewide leaders to determine the focus of the assessment (e.g., goals, objectives, research questions). The research team then engaged in three primary data collection activities— document review, affiliate interviews, and client-survivor interviews—to document the program theory and logic model of co-located service models and to identify promising strategies for evaluating co-located IPV/SV service models. In total, the team reviewed 199 documents and conducted interviews with 58 affiliates and 30 client-survivors. Following these activities, the research team sought feedback from our Expert Advisory Group (EAG) and partnering sites and used the evaluability assessment findings to develop practice and research materials. The formative evaluation comprised three components—a process evaluation focused on implementation, a client outcome evaluation, and an assessment of the evaluation’s overall feasibility. The implementation evaluation research activities consisted of gathering four different types of data: (1) aggregate annual programmatic data from six partnering sites; (2) client-level service need data (n = 764 completed service navigation logs); (3) staff collaboration survey data (n = 126); and (4) adaptive fidelity self-assessment data (n = 11). The outcome evaluation research activity involved collecting survey data from clients at three-time points (i.e., intake/baseline: n = 41; 3-month follow-up: n = 28; 6-month follow-up: n = 24). The feasibility assessment was based on focus group data with leaders and key contacts at partnering centers (n = 12) to explore their perspectives on the overall evaluation and specific research activities.       

Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, 2024.146p.

By Reed T. DeAngelis

This research note provides new evidence consistent with systemic anti-Black racism in police killings across the United States. Data come from the Mapping Police Violence Database (2013–2021). I calculate race-specific odds and probabilities that victims of police killings exhibited mental illness, were armed with a weapon, or attempted to flee the scene at the time of their killing. Multilevel, multivariable logistic regression techniques are applied to further account for the victim's age, gender, year of killing, and geographical clustering. I find that White victims are underrepresented, and Black victims overrepresented in the database. Relative to White victims, Black victims also have 60% lower odds of exhibiting signs of mental illness, 23% lower odds of being armed, and 28% higher odds of fleeing. Hispanic victims exhibit 45% lower odds of being armed relative to their White peers but are otherwise comparable. These patterns persist regardless of the victim's age, gender, year of killing, or geographical location (state, zip code, and neighborhood type). Thus, the threshold for being perceived as dangerous, and thereby falling victim to lethal police force, appears to be higher for White civilians relative to their Black or Hispanic peers. Current findings provide empirical support for political initiatives to curb lethal police force, as such efforts could help to reduce racial disparities in deaths by police nationwide.

Race and Justice Volume 14, Issue 3, July 2024, Pages 413-422

By Suraj Lakhani 

This paper provides an overview of the intersection between (violent) extremism and video gaming, examining the current landscape, trends, and threats. Analysing existing literature and open-source materials, this paper discussesthe types of games, platforms, and services that are vulnerable to this type of infiltration and use; particularly focussing on content, platform features, and overlaps. The paper also examines a number of recurrent themes, including: ‘radicalisation, recruitment, and reinforcing views’; ‘community building and strengthening’; and ‘extremist online ecosystems’. Thereafter, the responses to (violent) extremism from various platforms will be explored, before reflecting on current challenges and future considerations. Video gaming is considered to be one of the most consistent and fastest-growing sectors. It is estimated that there are around 2.8 billion gamers around the world (Gilbert, n.d.). As part of this, online gaming represents one of the biggest industries globally with over 900 million gamers and an estimated annual revenue of USD 18 billion (Clement, 2021). This growth is not only attributed to the development of online games and communities, but also to the game hosting and adjacent communications platformsthat have been specifically designed for gamers and gaming, including Steam, Stadia, Twitch, Discord, and DLive (ADL, 2019). There are numerous (often overlooked) positive economic, health, social, and psychological benefits of gaming (ADL, 2019; Schrier, 2019). During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, in which people have been isolated from their social groups for lengthy periods of time, online gaming has brought numerous benefits, with players reporting positive experiences such as making friends, feeling as though they are a part of various communities, finding new interests, and discovering new aspects about themselves (ADL, 2020). However, as technology develops, so do the associated harms, with new challenges constantly presented. VIDEO GAMES AND (VIOLENT) EXTREMISM A growing concern within European Union (and for that matter global) policy, security, and counter-terrorism circles is the increasing intersection between video gaming and (violent) extremism (EU, 2020; RAN, 2021). In a recent Radicalisation Awareness Network paper (RAN, 2021), it was suggested that extremists and terrorists, who are often pioneers in the digital space, are afforded new opportunities through gaming and associated platforms. These individuals ‘have introduced innovations faster than we have been able to respond, and as a result, have grown their digital advantage’ (ibid: 3). There are concerns that video games and associated (adjacent) platforms can be used to disseminate digital propaganda (Lakomy, 2019), and for purposes of radicalisation and recruitment (EU, 2020; Europol, 2021). However, as will be discussed in depth in this paper, the relationship between radicalisation, recruitment, and gaming is often complicated, with current literature challenging whether these outcomes are (violent) extremists’ primary intentions, with, instead, reinforcing beliefs, community building and strengthening, and developing more robust online ecosystems appearing to hold more prominence (Davey, 2021). It is critical to mention, however, that there is a distinct lack of (particularly empirical) research and literature in this area of study (Lakomy, 2019), with work at a nascent stage (Robinson and Whittaker, 2021), something that is particularly evident in relation to online gaming, video game hosting, and adjacent communications platforms (Davey, 2021). Although a varied and complex phenomenon (RAN, 2020), and one with numerous considerations, there have been various (often anecdotal) examples of the intersection between video gaming and (violent) extremism by jihadists, far-right violent extremists, and ethno-nationalist groups. Resultantly, ‘the search for any one narrative being used by such a varied group in such a varied array of circumstances would be an exercise in futility’ (ibid: 4). Saying that, most notably in Europe, there has been particular concern over the digital recruitment tactics of far-right (violent) extremists (RAN, 2021), where it is thought that they are ‘firmly anchored in the online gaming community, while the presence of Islamist terrorists can also be observed, albeit to a lesser extent’ (EU, 2020: 4). According to Europol’s (2021: 90) EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, ‘it can be noted that the use of video games, gaming platforms and forums, as well as gamer channels for spreading right-wing extremist propaganda has been a growing trend.’ Further, ‘(v)ideo games and video game communication applications were increasingly used in 2020 to share right-wing terrorist and extremist propaganda, in particular among young people’ (ibid: 78). This, of course, coincides with the rapid growth of far-right violent extremism and associated attacks, as documented by initiatives like the Global Terrorism Index. With this in mind, the focus of this paper predominantly lies with far-right (violent) extremism, though jihadist involvement is discussed where relevant, and arguably should not be overlooked nor underestimated.   

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021 24p. 

By Mason Youngblood

Increasing levels of far-right extremist violence have generated public concern about the spread of radicalization in the United States. Previous research suggests that radicalized individuals are destabilized by various environmental (or endemic) factors, exposed to extremist ideology, and subsequently reinforced by members of their community. As such, the spread of radicalization may proceed through a social contagion process, in which extremist ideologies behave like complex contagions that require multiple exposures for adoption. In this study, I applied an epidemiological method called two-component spatiotemporal intensity modeling to data from 416 far-right extremists exposed in the United States between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that patterns of far-right radicalization in the United States are consistent with a complex contagion process, in which reinforcement is required for transmission. Both social media usage and group membership enhance the spread of extremist ideology, suggesting that online and physical organizing remain primary recruitment tools of the far-right movement. In addition, I identified several endemic factors, such as poverty, that increase the probability of radicalization in particular regions. Future research should investigate how specific interventions, such as online counter-narratives to battle propaganda, may be effectively implemented to mitigate the spread of far-right extremism in the United States.

HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:49 |

By The Nato Strategi Direction-South Hub & African Centre For The Study and Research on Terrorism

Violent extremism – often intertwined with intercommunal tensions and criminality – has continued to gain ground across the Sahel. Rising instability and the deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have generated concerns among neighbouring West African states about the effects of regional spillover. Since 2016, there have been incidents tied to the presence of Terrorist and Violent Extremist Organizations (TVEOs) in some of the border communities of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo (the main focus of this report), as well as reports of preaching, recruitment and local development initiatives by violent extremists. Given the current deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and the potential spillover effects, this report aims to shed light on the potential vulnerability of West African coastal states to the spread of violent extremism from the Sahel area and to carry out an in-depth investigation into the state of governmental and regional efforts to counter the security and social challenges associated with this growing vulnerability. The report approaches the phenomenon of the contagion of violent extremism by firstly presenting background research carried out by both organizations and, secondly, highlighting the main takeaways of a Subject Matter Expert (SME) Workshop conducted as part of the report methodology. The Workshop was held with the participation of more than 30 (thirty) SMEs drawn from key institutions based in the West African sub-region, including international organizations, state institutions and non-governmental organizations. The report includes research into the current situations regarding violent extremism in the Sahel Region and those factors potentially contributing to its expansion in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, including in-depth analysis of statistical data and the available literature. The report also provides information on key institutional capacities and state security efforts put in place to prevent and counter that expansion. Analysis of the unfolding situation shows deteriorating security in the Sahel, as evident by the number of terrorist attacks between 2019 and 2021. Despite the multiplicity of both international and regional military deployments, terrorist activities are far from abating. The nature of attacks has grown more sophisticated, and become more synchronized, and the groups are growing in confidence and cohesion. The recent resurgence of coup d’etats has further threatened and worsened an already volatile situation. Multiple factors such as ideological and religion-inspired extremism, governance deficits as violent extremism catalysts, structural socio-economic conditions, and historical grievances and rivalries were identified as vulnerability factors in coastal states. In addition, lack of government presence in some local communities; herder-farmer conflicts; prolonged and unresolved conflicts; unfavourable government policies; inability of the government to provide for the basic needs of local communities; high and rising unemployment levels particularly among energetic youthful population; lack of accountability by political office holders; rampant corruption; impunity of the political elites; and marginalisation and discrimination of minority groups were identified as local-level context specific grievances that have the propensity to drive and sustain violent extremism in coastal West Africa states. Having recognised the devastating effects of violent extremism there have been efforts aimed at preventing the spread of violent extremism. International, regional and state-initiated actions towards preventing violent extremism by presenting the “hard” and “soft” security efforts are present. At the international level, the French-led Takuba forces and the European Union Training Mission in Mali, the US AFRICOM, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) are some of the efforts to contain the terrorism and violent extremism threats in the Sahel and prevent expansion. The Accra Initiative, which was launched in September 2017 to coordinate and unite interests and capabilities in stopping violent extremists, especially in the border areas was identified a key regional preventative strategy . Other regional initiatives include the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the G-5 Sahel Joint Task Force and the ECOWAS actions on preventing the finance of violent extremism. In addition to international and regional level efforts countries in coastal areas have implemented new administrative frameworks, regional and broader international cooperation, the development of security forces and other counterterrorism measures. The countries have widely accepted that the spread of violent extremist ideologies cannot be halted by purely legal and armed means. The development of society, embracing communities which have been left behind by economic and social investments have become key. In conclusion, the findings of this report have pointed out that violent extremist activities have been growing in recent years in West Africa and coastal states, radiating there from the Sahel. Although the security situations of the four countries assessed herein are not directly comparable to the very severe situation in the Sahel, the appearance of certain violent extremist groups at the northern border areas of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo is cause for concern. Equally worrisome is that the spread of violent extremism is multi-directional: TVEOs do not exclusively expand southward, but in any direction where circumstances permit.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union: 2022. 47p.