By Oliver Bennett MBE, Ali Shalchi

The precise scale of economic crime in the UK is unknown, but it could run to tens or hundreds of billions of pounds per year. The extent of these crimes – which include money laundering, fraud, and corruption – led the Intelligence and Security Select Committee in its July 2020 report on Russia to note that London is considered a ‘laundromat’ for corrupt money. In December 2019 the Treasury Committee found various regulatory and legislative failings in the way in which these crimes are being tackled. It urged the Government to make improvements to the supervisory system and to introduce new powers to combat economic crime. A February 2022 Treasury Committee follow-up report concluded that the Government was still not prioritizing economic crime sufficiently. In 2019 The Financial Action Task Force (the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog) praised the UK’s efforts on the issue, but also found failings and identified a lack of resources for investigating these crimes. The Economic Crime Plan The Government agrees about the need to tackle economic crime, which it says causes “much harm to individuals and communities and damage to legitimate business and the UK’s reputation.” It set out its overall approach to tackling the issue in its July 2019 Economic Crime Plan. The Plan covers the years 2019-2022 and draws together all the work being conducted by the public and private sector. A number of the 52 actions contained in the plan may involve future legislative reforms, including changes to: • the Proceeds of Crime Act to improve how the proceeds of crime can be confiscated; • corporate criminal liability, to punish and prevent economic crimes when committed on behalf of or in the name of companies; • block company stock exchange listings on national security grounds; • improve transparency over UK property ownership; • Companies House powers to enable it strike off from its register dissolved or inactive limited partnerships. Progress with the Plan In February 2022, the Royal United Services Institute said that 40% of actions in the Plan had been completed, 17% were in progress, 23% were overdue, and 19% of actions had no due date. The Government says it is “on course to deliver 49 of the 52 actions” in the Plan. The Treasury Committee has recommended that the Plan be adapted and renewed for a further three years.   

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2022. 22p.

By Gareth Mott, James Shires, Jen Ellis, James Sullivan and Jamie MacColl

Commercial cyber tools and services have many legitimate applications, from corporate penetration testing (an authorised simulated cyber attack on an IT system) to law enforcement and national security operations. But they are also subject to misuse and abuse, when they are used in ways that are contrary to national or international law, violate the human rights of their targets, or pose risks to international security. Some states are currently grappling with this policy challenge. Meanwhile, collective international initiatives for action are underway. For example, there is the US’s 2023 Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware and the UK- and France-led Pall Mall Process of 2024. Ultimately, one aim of these initiatives is to enable states to harmonise their policy interventions where possible. To inform principles and policies for intervention at national and international levels, it is necessary to understand the dynamics that encourage or facilitate offensive-cyber proliferation. This paper identifies a range of ‘non-state proliferating factors’ (NPFs) and ‘state permissive behaviours’ (SPBs), and its findings draw on desk-based research on the international commercial offensive-cyber market. These findings were supplemented by a data validation and consultative workshop with industry stakeholders held in person at Chatham House in March 2024. This half-day validation workshop drew on the expertise and insights of 44 participants predominantly based in the UK, the US and Western Europe. To facilitate candid discussion, remarks made at the workshop are not attributable, and the identities of participants are not referenced here.

In this paper, NPFs and SPBs are categorised into five areas:

1. Regulation of corporate structure and governance.

2. Legal frameworks for product development, sale and transfer.

3. Diplomatic support and engagement.

4. Development of cyber-security ecosystem and workforce.

5. Integration with defence and security industrial base.

Using these categories, this research analyses the roles of both state and non-state actors. It identifies critical inter-relationships between different SPBs and NPFs that serve to facilitate or enable potentially irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation. This is one of two papers. A second paper, authored by the researchers and published by Chatham House in October 2024, draws on the findings in this paper and identifies a range of ‘principles’ that could be used to build a code of conduct to counter irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation.

London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies - RUSI and The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2024. 39p.

By Sergio Salazar Araya

The article reconstructs and critically analyses two main contemporary discursive formations associated with migrants disappearing in transit through Mexico: the official state discourse and the social discourse of organizations searching for missing persons along the migratory route. This article discusses how the two discourses contradict each other, disputing how to represent a phenomenon occurring at the intersection of diverse, complex forms of violence. This exposes collusion between states and criminal organizations, as well as the scattered duplications and continuities between legal and illegal dynamic forces producing regional social order. Disappearance is a technique specific to actors who are battling one another in a broader field of transnational mobility and circulation. In addition, both discourses hinge on social value forms that go beyond the strictly pecuniary and situate people’s systematic disappearance as a central feature of regional power networks. The empirical data was collected during fieldwork in Mexico and Central America and collated with data published in recent reports (state and non-governmental) on migrants’ disappearance in Mexico. 

  European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe December, pp. 159-178  2020.

By Mahmoud A ElSohly , Chandrani G Majumdar , Suman Chandra , Mohammed M Radwan 

The prevalence of cannabis as the most commonly used illicit substance in the United States and around the globe is well-documented. Studies have highlighted a noticeable uptrend in the potency of cannabis in the United states. This report examines the concentration of cannabinoids in illicit cannabis samples seized by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) over the last 10 years (2013–2022).

Methods

Samples received during the course of study (2013–2022) were categorized based on the geographical region where collected, as Western Region, Midwest Region, Northeast Region, South East Region, Southern Region as well as Alaska and Hawaii. These samples were processed for analysis using a validated gas chromatography with flame ionization detector method.

Results

The data showed that the cannabinoids profile of all high Δ9-THC cannabis samples, regardless of the state or region from which the samples are seized or the state from which the sample is produced under a state medical marijuana program, is basically the same with the major cannabinoid being Δ9-THC (>10% for most samples) and all other cannabinoids with less than 0.5%, with the exception of CBG (<1%) and CBN (<1%).

Conclusion

Overall, it appears the cannabinoids profile is controlled by the genetics of the plant and is not affected much by the geographical location in which the plants are cultivated.

Front Public Health. 2024 Oct 3;12:1442522.

By Magnus Lofstrom and Brandon Martin

California’s violent crime rate rose somewhat in 2023 and remains above its pre-pandemic level; the statewide property crime rate fell slightly. Both rates vary widely across crime categories and regions.

Public Policy Institute of Californiam 2024, 2p.

By Paul Jeffrey Brantingham, George E. Tita,  and George Mohler 

The onset of extreme social distancing measures is expected to have a dramatic impact on crime. Here, we examine the impact of mandated, city-wide social distancing orders aimed at limiting the spread of COVID-19 on gang-related crime in Los Angeles. We hypothesize that the unique subcultural processes surrounding gangs may supersede calls to shelter in place and allow gang-related crime to persist. If the normal guardianship of people and property is also disrupted by social distancing, then we expect gang violence to increase. Using autoregressive time series models, we show that gang-related crime remained stable and crime hot spots largely stationary following the onset of shelter-in-place. Policy Implications: In responding to disruptions to social and economic life on the scale of the present pandemic, both police and civilian organizations need to anticipate continued demand, all while managing potential reductions to the workforce. Police are faced with this challenge across a wide array of crime types. Civilian interventionists tasked with responding to gang-related crime need to be prepared for continued peacekeeping and violence interruption activities, but also an expansion of responsibilities to deal with “frontline” or “street level” management of public health needs. 

Criminology & Public Policy. 2021;20:423–436. 

By Ciarán O’Connor

This report investigates the activities of the Irish Channel, a website, and associated social media accounts that have emerged as a highly active hub of misinformation in Ireland. The website gained notoriety in June 2024 following its publication of an article containing fabricated quotes and false claims alleging election interference during the local elections.1 This ‘election interference’ narrative reflected other baseless conspiracies alleging voter fraud was a threat to election integrity in the country. The Irish Channel website is part of the Premier Content Network which is run by the Digital Publishing Company. Its primary form of content across its range of websites is embedded YouTube videos, likely with the aim of driving traffic to its site and boosting ad revenue. Yet, as this analysis details, this may violate YouTube’s terms of service. This report profiles how original content produced by the Irish Channel contains inaccuracies and falsehoods, as well as content that is supportive of far-right ideologies including hateful anti-immigrant rhetoric. Analysis by ISD also indicates some of this content appears to have been generated using AI, with basic factual errors and non-existent citations being found on more than one article on the Irish Channel website. Accounts on social media and messaging platforms linked to the Irish Channel were found to feature white supremacist conspiracy theories, antisemitic hate, and support for Adolf Hitler. Additionally, the report highlights how the Irish Channel has forged close ties with the Irish Freedom Party and has, over time, become a key media distribution and broadcasting arm for the party. Many of the most egregious instances of false, misleading, and inflammatory claims found in this analysis originated from content published in conjunction with Irish Freedom Party-linked entities and hosted and promoted by the Irish Channel. This Irish Channel case study illustrates how small, far-right political parties can use digital media platforms and social media accounts to develop alternative media networks, promote their ideology, and grow their.

London :  Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2024. 18p.

By Lucy Cooper and Kevin D. Reyes

Once considered a mere novelty app, TikTok is now a certified force in the information ecosystem.  

The short form video giant is now being used by 14% of Americans as a news platform, according to a Pew Research Centre from 2023, an amount four times more than in 2020.  The impact of the platform, once best known for dance crazes and being a tastemaker for online trends, cannot be ignored. To better understand the impact that TikTok has, in 2023 ISD analysts gathered and analyzed data on trends in hate speech and extremist content on TikTok, and how effectively they were being moderated by the platform. The results, which center on a particular moment in time, have come to inform a series of studies – the first two of which focus on white supremacist content, and anti-migrant and -refugee content. While TikTok appears to have taken measures to improve content moderation practices since ISD’s 2021 study on extremism and hate speech on the platform, this new series demonstrates that TikTok is still ineffective in removing violative content. For example, data for the white supremacy content study was collected during one week in mid-August 2023 and indicates that such content was alive and well on the platform: 70 of the 108 video samples studied were uploaded to TikTok within the most recent three months at the time of collection. Of those 108 videos, the median number of views at the time of analysis was 6,097, a significant increase from ISD’s 2021 report where the median across 1,030 videos was 503 views. The last nine months have been tumultuous for TikTok as a company. In April 2024, President Joe Biden signed a bill that could result in a nationwide ban of the app should TikTok’s parent company, the Beijing-based ByteDance, not sell the platform within 12 months. As part of an ongoing legal fight over the possible ban, the Justice Department, according to the Associated Press, this summer alleged that TikTok was gathering bulk information on users’ “views on divisive social issues like gun control, abortion, and religion,” and harvesting data in violation of children’s online privacy law. As TikTok’s future remains undecided, content moderation issues on the platform persist. In July 2024, ISD published a report detailing the millions of views garnered by a network of neo-Nazi accounts on the platform. Just a month earlier, however, TikTok had published an updated transparency report in which they claimed that in the first four months of this year, moderators proactively removed 97.7% of violative content. Of that same sample, 89.8% were removed within 24 hours, down .1% from that same period in 2023. Despite TikTok’s statements, ISD and similar organizations consistently find content in clear violation of the platform’s policies

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2024. 

By Luke Baumgartner

Tracing its origins back to the 19th century, the Black Hebrew Israelite (BHI) movement is ideologically and organizationally highly fragmented. At its core, it believes that modern African Americans are descendants of the Israelites in the Bible’s Old Testament, but some currents adopt variations of BHI ideology. While most adherents to the movement are peaceful, over the last few years, several individuals associated with BHI ideology participated in high-profile violent crimes targeting Jews in the United States, including the targeting of the JC Kosher Supermarket in Jersey City, New Jersey,[1] and a Hanukkah celebration in Monsey, New York, in December 2019.[2] While the attackers had little to no formal or institutional participation in the movement, their extremist interpretation of BHI’s core beliefs contributed to their radicalization, mobilization of violence, and, ultimately, their target selection. Moreover, violent attacks by adherents of the BHI ideology stretch back as far as 1974, when Marcus Wayne Chenault, a student of Hananiah E. Israel, shot Alberta Williams King–the mother of slain civil rights activist Martin Luther King Jr.[3] In 2022, the Program on Extremism released a report–one of the first of its kind–analyzing BHI’s ideology and relations to violence.[4] Despite its ample use of social media and track record of violence, little is known about how the broader BHI movement uses the internet to spread its message. In light of this research gap, this report examined 180 Facebook pages with large followings close to the more extreme sections of the BHI movement, further evaluating their scope, reach, longevity, activity, geographic location, typology, and major narratives. This study finds that: • Facebook pages are an especially popular way for extremist adherents of the BHI movement to reach a significant audience without being subject to content removal, takedowns, and strict service enforcement. Facebook’s record of success has several discrepancies, especially regarding enforcement against broader antisemitic narratives beyond Holocaust denial and with lesser-known hate groups and movements. • BHI extremist pages examined in this study are administrated across four continents and, on average, can maintain a presence on Facebook and avoid account removal for over five years, allowing them ample time and opportunity to accrue thousands of followers. The ability to establish a long-term presence on a major platform like Facebook increases the potential for audience engagement and opportunities to recruit and radicalize new members. • BHI pages consistently publish a range of antisemitic content and narratives, the most common of which consistently refers to white Jews as “impostors,” emphasizes the connection between Jews and Satan and adds a modern twist on traditional conspiracies of blood libel, arguing Jews are responsible for large-scale organ trafficking operations—among others. While the number of BHI pages posting antisemitic content decreased after October 7, the overall popularity of these pages continued to increase. These contradictory changes signal an improvement in Facebook’s ability to take down easily recognizable antisemitic content, such as Jews worship Satan, or recycled Nazi propaganda. Still, Facebook struggles to remove content that excludes explicit calls to violence or, alludes to conspiracies of blood libel or comparing Jews to rats, parasites, and others. • The frequency, longevity, and large follower bases of BHI extremist pages that publish antisemitic and other hateful content targeting protected classes such as the LGBTQ+ community suggest gaps in Facebook’s enforcement of its Community Standards, particularly its anti-hate speech and Dangerous Organizations and Individuals (DOI) policies. These findings suggest that antisemitic content congruent with extremist interpretations of the BHI ideology has a haven on Facebook–a social media platform with over 3 billion active monthly users.[5]  

Washington DC:  Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2024. 52p.

By: Jennifer Tang, Tiffany Saade, and Steve Kelly

Cutting-edge advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are taking the world by storm, driven by a massive surge of investment, countless new start-ups, and regular technological breakthroughs. AI presents key opportunities within cybersecurity, but concerns remain regarding the ways malicious actors might also use the technology. In this study, the Institute for Security and Technology (IST) seeks to paint a comprehensive picture of the state of play— cutting through vagaries and product marketing hype, providing our outlook for the near future, and most importantly, suggesting ways in which the case for optimism can be realized.

The report concludes that in the near term, AI offers a significant advantage to cyber defenders, particularly those who can capitalize on their "home field" advantage and firstmover status. However, sophisticated threat actors are also leveraging AI to enhance their capabilities, making continued investment and innovation in AI-enabled cyber defense crucial. At this time of writing, AI is not yet unlocking novel capabilities or outcomes, but instead represents a significant leap in speed, scale, and completeness.

This work is the foundation of a broader IST project to better understand which areas of cybersecurity require the greatest collective focus and alignment—for example, greater opportunities for accelerating threat intelligence collection and response, democratized tools for automating defenses, and/or developing the means for scaling security across disparate platforms—and to design a set of actionable technical and policy recommendations in pursuit of a secure, sustainable digital ecosystem.

The Institute for Security and Technology, October 2024

By: Nur Hasyim, Aditya Putra Kurniawan, and Elli Nur Hayati

This reports investigates the issue of violence against women using a different perspective, as opposed to studying women as the victims, the current study presents a perspective from the perpetrators of violence, namely men. The study explores how Indonesian men perceive themselves, and based upon the elaborations from the sources of the study, a strong value of male patriarchy is present among Indonesian males. With patriarchal values strongly embedded within most Indonesia men, it becomes plausible to assume that Indonesian men are susceptible to conduct violence against women. On the other hand, male hegemonic awareness becomes a large problem for men when they observe a situation that contradicts their assumptions, for example when women demonstrate to become more advanced in their education and career. In this context, men that are tied up in patriarchal cultures will view such events as threats or even a disaster.

Jambon IV Kompleks Jatimulyo Indah Yogyakarta 55242. 2011

By: Tracey Michelle Pyscher

As a society, we do not openly discuss domestic violence and yet its reality is front and center for children and youth whose lives are deeply shaped by it. At best, the school landscape is bleak for many, if not all, HDV youth (i.e. youth with histories of domestic violence and youth currently living with domestic violence). We know little to nothing about how HDV youth navigate school from their perspectives—how they engage with and resist educational discourses and practices and thus take up subject positions. What we do know from popular, psychological literature is that HDV youth are often objectified as troubled and deficient and this shapes their identities and experiences in school.

In this study, I discuss the challenges HDV youth face when they navigate normative and hegemonic interactions in school. I also analyze the resistive identities and performances HDV youth take up in response to interactions perceived as violating. The study is situated in a public, urban middle school and outlines how HDV youth make sense of their daily interactions with school peers and staff. The study is told through the subjective voices of three female middle school HDV youth—Jen, Mac, and Shanna. Their stories along with the voices of their caregivers offer a counter-narrative to the dominant discourses often shaping the representations of HDV youth.

Data analysis is grounded in the theoretical conceptions of critical sociocultural theory (Lewis, Enciso, & Moje, 2007), resistive ambivalence (Pyscher, 2015; Pyscher & Lozenski, 2014), and Scott’s (1990) conceptualization of hidden and public transcripts. I seek to better understand and theorize the intersections of actions, identities, practices, and discourses that HDV youth use in educational interactions. The methodological foundation of this study is fourfold: critical discourse studies (Gee, 2014), critical ethnography (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995), geosemiotics (Scollon & Scollon, 2003), and mediated discourse analysis (Jones & Norris, 2005). Implications include the possibility of creating more liberating educational practices for youth with histories of domestic violence and marginalized youth in general. I conclude by suggesting that we consider creating more transgressive and humane school cultures that embody carnivallike practices.

University of Minnesota, March 2016

By the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

Crime victimization has wide-reaching consequences for victims, their families and friends, their communities, and society in general. The rate of violent crime victimization has decreased dramatically since its peak in the early 1990s,1 providing the most relief to residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods who are most likely to experience violent crime.2 However, the nation recently experienced an increase in serious forms of violence. In 2020, homicide rates were 30 percent higher than the previous year.3 In the same period, aggravated assaults, including nonfatal shootings, also increased.4 While violent victimization rates started to decrease again after the first two years of the COVID-19 pandemic,5 violence remains a pressing concern for Americans.6 This trend merits closer investigation given that it follows decades of sustained progress and disproportionately affects underserved communities.7 To gain an understanding of federal efforts to evaluate racial disparities in crime victimization, the Commission voted on July 21, 2023, to examine the U.S. Department of Justice’s data collection on violent crime victimization and what that data show about disparate impacts of violent victimization on minority communities. This report uses social science methodologies to synthesize reliable research and present quantitative evidence from federal sources about racial and ethnic disparities in violent crime victimization from 2017-2021. Because crime concentrates in small geographic areas,8 the Commission also selected five jurisdictions to conduct a more in depth analysis of trends and racial disparities in violent crime victimization over the study period. In addition to relying on publicly available studies and data, the Commission held a public briefing on November 17, 2023, to receive written and oral testimony from academic and policy experts, former and current government officials, members of community advocacy groups, and violent  crime victims (see Appendix B). The Commission also sent formal requests for information to the U.S. Department of Justice. When considering all forms of violent crime, aggregated at the national level, there are no differences in the risk of victimization for White, Black, and Latino people.9 There are, however, enduring racial differences in homicide rates. Black Americans have long been the group most likely to be killed by homicide.10 Black Americans are 12 times as likely as White Americans to die by firearm homicide.11 The risk of homicide is highest for young, Black men. According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, homicide is the leading cause of death for Black males ages 1-44.12 Racial disparities in homicide are especially pronounced in large, metropolitan areas, where violent crime rates are the highest.13 The concentration of crime in large cities is a consistent pattern in crime trends over time.14 Within cities, violent crime concentrates in certain neighborhoods, street segments, or blocks.15 Ruth Abaya, Pediatric Emergency Medicine Physician and Senior Director for the Health Alliance for Violence Intervention, explains, “In many places throughout the country, community violence is concentrated, it’s cyclical, and it’s networked, creating cycles of harm and trauma that often impact multiple generations.”16 Hyperlocal crime concentration is not a new phenomenon. In their foundational study about the relationship between crime and place, influential U.S. criminologists Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay show that crime rates remain stable in neighborhoods over time even as the demographic composition of residents change.17 They argue that structural conditions, such as physical deterioration and high population turnover, create the conditions for crime.18 This finding is critical for framing racial disparities in crime victimization because it shows that the structure of high-crime neighborhoods, not factors related to the race of their residents, allows crime to flourish. Crime concentration in certain areas became associated with race because contemporary disadvantaged neighborhoods are predominately Black or Latino.19 Outdated government policies that created intentional residential racial segregation have had long-lasting consequences for where Americans still live.20 Ongoing racial segregation is associated with violent crime as the most segregated neighborhoods have elevated levels of violent crime.21 Data show that violence in these racially segregated and socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhoods drives racial disparities in one serious type of violent crime: homicide.22 During the COVID-19 pandemic, as the overall crime rate fell,23 murder rates rose because of an increase in gun homicides in disadvantaged neighborhoods.24 A recent study demonstrates that the risk of firearm-related death or injury is more acute for young Black and Latino men who live in certain zip codes than for U.S. soldiers who were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.25 Enduring racist narratives of crime26 dismiss this violence as “Black-on-Black” without acknowledging that most crimes occur within racial groups (intra-racial).27 Elliot Currie, professor of Criminology, Law and Society at the University of California Irvine, argues that America’s “peculiar indifference” to high rates of murder among young Black men “is not only socially destructive and economically wasteful but a profound moral default.”28 Homicides comprise a small share of all violent crimes; there are no racial disparities in the overall rate of violent crime victimization.29 There are, however, other social and demographic correlates of victimization. One strong predictor of being a victim of a violent crime is having previously been a victim of crime.30 Data suggest that victims of violent crime are four times as likely to experience repeat victimization.31 Additionally, both income and age predict victimization. People living in households that earn the lowest incomes (i.e., less than $25,000), are more likely to be victimized than their higher income counterparts.32 Adolescents and young adults are also disproportionately likely to be victims of violent crime, regardless of geography.33 The relationship between age and being involved in crime, as both an offender and a victim, is one of the most enduring patterns in crime.34 There are no overall gender disparities in violent victimization.35 There are, however, gender disparities in experiencing certain kinds of violence. Men are more likely than women to be homicide victims.36 When women are murdered, however, they are five times more likely than men to be killed by an intimate partner.37 Regardless of the severity of the crime, most victims of violent crime know the offender.38 Data show that an individual who commits a violent offense is statistically at a higher risk of becoming a victim of a later violent crime.39 Violent crime victims are also more likely than others to engage in violence.40 Too often, however, this victim-offender overlap is ignored41 because it complicates the false narrative of the “good victim/bad offender” dichotomy.42 This dichotomy is problematic because it risks disregarding past experiences of victimization and trauma for people who have engaged in violence.43 Studies also show that it is highly unlikely that these victims seek or receive any victim services.44 For instance, one study shows that only 16 percent of crime victims who had been involved in the justice system as offenders report accessing programs such as victim compensation, victim advocate services from the police or district attorney, or help with legal proceedings.45 The researchers argue that so few victims accessing services is a “potential harm to the short- and long-term health of offender-victims, and harm to the overall well-being of urban, minority communities.”46 The effects of violent crime extend beyond immediate physical pain and injury. There are long term physical health correlates of violent victimization, including conditions such as heart disease,47 cancer,48 high blood pressure,49 and premature mortality.50 Violent crimes also have emotional and psychological consequences for those who are injured, which can include suffering from post-traumatic stress and other manifestations of trauma that negatively impact the victim’s quality of life.51 The effects of violent crime can also extend beyond the victims to adversely affect  family members and entire communities.52 Access to justice and rehabilitative services offers a vital opportunity to break the cycle of violence in communities. A major impediment to exploring crime victimization rates is that many crimes, even violent crimes, are not known to law enforcement; therefore, official numbers collected by the FBI may underreport the prevalence of the issue.53 For instance, in 2020, less than half (40 percent) of violent victimizations were reported to police.54 Victims may choose not to report a crime to the police for a multitude of reasons, such as fear of reprisal or stigmatization, believing the police would not or could not do anything to help, or believing the crime was too personal to report.55 Not reporting a crime has serious implications beyond public safety; data show that victims are more likely to receive services and access resources if they report an incident to law enforcement.56 Compensation and assistance programs are available to crime victims, but long standing research shows that these programs are underutilized, mostly because victims are not aware of the programs and services available to them.57 For instance, 2016 data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) show that about 13 percent of violent crime survivors reported using victim services. For those who did not report the offense to police, only 5 percent reported utilizing services.58 More recent data show that the vast majority of violent crime victims continue not to receive assistance from victim service agencies; in 2021 just 9 percent of victims received services.59   (Continued) 

Washington, DC: USSC, 2024. 

By Hannah E. Meyers, Ilya Shapiro, Tim Rosenberger

Just as Ku Klux Klan members used white hoods to conceal their identities and terrorize their targets, modern activists are using keffiyehs, Guy Fawkes masks, balaclavas, and other inherently intimidating face coverings. Indeed, face-masking is pervasive among participants in demonstrations that are growing in frequency and disruptiveness. Most recently, the pro-Hamas “protests” that have proliferated across college campuses and city streets involve activists who cover their faces explicitly to make it impossible to determine who is engaged in violence, intimidation, and property destruction. Just as masks emboldened KKK activity a century ago, they are a central feature in the 360% surge in antisemitic incidents since Hamas’s attack on Israel last year.1 New York City experienced about 2,000 protests in the half-year following October 7—including incidents involving more than 10,000 participants illegally blocking bridges and major infrastructure.2 Cities across the country seem to be struggling to maintain order and check the growing number of attacks associated with these events on Jewish owned businesses and other institutions.  There is an obvious and simple answer to protesters’ growing aggressiveness, an answer that proved effective against their forebears in the KKK: denying intimidating and violent protesters the right to conceal their identities via face coverings. Hamas supporters, Antifa, Patriot Front, and others act boldly so long as they can remain anonymous. Stripped of this anonymity and the intimidating power of the keffiyeh and black bandanna, they will be far less likely to engage in criminal behavior.

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 5p.

By Cristina Cretu-Adatte, Renaud Zbinden, Luca Brunoni, Hazel Bunning, Josselin Wilfred Azi & Olivier Beaudet-Labrecque

This article delves into the intricacies of managing illicit financial gains among Ivorian cyber fraudsters, shedding light on the findings of a field study conducted in Côte d’Ivoire by Swiss and Ivorian research teams. The study involved interviews with cyber criminals, law enforcement officials, and subject matter experts, to answer a specific question: What strategies do Ivorian cyber fraudsters use to manage and launder the criminal proceeds originating from romance scams and sextortion? The results explore the tactics employed by cyber fraudsters to obfuscate illicit financial flows, their organizational structures, and the strategies they employ in managing and using their gains. It confirms certain elements from the scientific literature, in addition to introducing new insights for a better understanding of the processes of money laundering and the use of illicit funds. The article also unravels the multifaceted challenges encountered within the anti-money laundering framework in the context of cybercrime and raises avenues for further reflection and future work to enhance the fight against this scourge.

Eur J Crim Policy Res 30, 359–378 (2024).

By Saurabh Thakur, Monika Roszkowska

General Findings. Organized Criminal Networks (OCNs) operating in the Eastern Indian Ocean are predominantly hierarchical in their organizational structure with individuals or a network of individuals at the helm of operations. The geographical location, proximity to two major drug-producing regions in Asia, and the vast shoreline have aided the transit of illicit drugs in the Maldives and Sri Lanka through the Southern Route. The transnational drug smuggling in the region is mostly transactional, carried out through a series of patron-client networks. Other modes include freelancing and family and community-based networks. . The involvement of the local population is driven by both push and pull factors, including profit motive, patronage, protection, poverty, addiction, street masculinity, involvement of family members, peer influence, and social media influence. Corruption within law enforcement and legal institutions was listed as a key problem in both countries. The broken chain of custody and complicity of government officials in illicit activities have affected the prosecution rates in both countries. The socio-cultural factors (i.e. ethnic, national, or family ties) form the basis for building trust and loyalty within the organized drug trafficking networks, establishing working relationships and promotions within networks. Emerging routes in Maldives and Sri Lanka seem to deviate towards the lesser-patrolled areas in the southern part of the Indian Ocean as the criminal networks continue to adapt to the enhanced maritime enforcement measures in the region. 8 The ability of new elements to enter the market can depend on various factors, including existing power dynamics between various local gangs, local political connections, law enforcement efforts, the adaptability of new entrants, and institutional corruption. However, an increase in the trafficking of synthetic drugs and a rise in local consumption were reported as factors that are likely to impact these existing market dynamics. The maritime route holds the largest share in illicit drug trafficking in the Maldives and Sri Lanka, especially larger consignments, but there has been a noticeable rise in the share of the air routes and postal methods post-COVID-19 restrictions.  

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; 2024 44p.

By Nicholas R. Magliocca , Diana S. Summers , Kevin M. Curtin , Kendra McSweeney, Ashleigh N. Price

Cocaine traffickers, or ‘narco-traffickers’, successfully exploit the heterogeneous landscapes of Central America for transnational smuggling. Narco-traffickers successfully adapt to disruptions from counterdrug interdiction efforts by spatially adjusting smuggling routes to evade detection, and by doing so bring collateral damages, such as deforestation, corruption, and violence, to new areas. This study is novel for its integration of landscape suitability analysis with criminological theory to understand the locations of these spatial adaptations by narco-traffickers as intentional, logical, and predictable choices based on the socio-environmental characteristics of Central America’s landscapes. Multi-level, mixed effects negative binomial regression models predict the suitability of landscapes for cocaine trafficking across 17 departments (the unit of analysis) in Costa Rica, El Sal vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama from 2007 to 2018. Informed by long-term research in the region, independent variables included proximity to roads, country borders, international ports, indigenous territories, population density, and protected areas. The year of peak interdiction (measured by kg of cocaine seized) in each department was used to analyze spatial shifts in landscape suitability before and after maximum counterdrug interdiction pressure. We find that areas with lower population density and closer proximity to international borders became more suitable following peak interdiction—i.e, they are more likely to be sought out by traffickers seeking to avoid further disruptions from counter-narcotic efforts. Additionally, indigenous territories were disproportionately exploited as cocaine trafficking routes following significant interdiction activities by law enforcement. While interdiction may reduce the suitability of targeted locations, it can also unintentionally increase the attractiveness of other locations. Our study pushes criminological theory through its application to a unique space/time context, and it advances land system science by considering landscape suitability for logistical rather than productive uses. Policy implications are clear. Since interdiction resources are limited relative to the overall amount of trafficking activity, knowing which landscape features are viewed as  suitable by traffickers can in the short term guide interdiction deployment strategies, and in the longer term build strategies to mitigate associated harms from trafficking where they are most likely  

Landscape and Urban Planning Volume 221, May 2022, 104359

By Robert Zeithammer, James Macinko, Diana Silver

Introduction

Ignition interlock devices installed after conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) have been shown to reduce subsequent DUI arrests (specific deterrence). However, there is little evidence on how interlock-device penalties might affect general deterrence, that is, deterring people from driving after consuming alcohol before a DUI conviction.

Methods

A discrete choice experiment was conducted and data were analyzed in 2023 with 583 U.S.-based adults who consumed alcohol at least once in the past week to assess the deterrent effects of five different penalties (fine, jail time, interlock device, license suspension, alcohol treatment) for alcohol-impaired driving under randomized sequential scenarios of high (20% chance of being caught) and low (1%) police enforcement. Participants resided in 46 states.

Results

Deterrent effects of an interlock penalty, operationalized as having to install an interlock device for 1 year, are large and on par with a 20-fold increase in police enforcement activity (from 1% chance of being caught to 20%), or a $2,000 increase in the DUI fine under the status quo enforcement regime. On average, a 1-year interlock penalty had the same deterrent effect as a 10-day increase in jail time.

Conclusions

Wider use of interlock devices as a DUI penalty could have large deterrent effects, independent of their ability to physically prevent the motor vehicle of an intoxicated driver from starting. The deterrent effect documented here adds to evidence of interlock devices’ overall effectiveness as well as their potential to shift DUI penalties away from criminalization (jail time) and toward immobilization and rehabilitation.

American Journal of Preventive Medicine; 2024 Articles in Press

By Leke de Vries, Toby Davies

The role of street networks in shaping the spatial distribution of crime has become a foundational component within environmental criminology. Most studies, however, have focused on opportunistic crime types, such as property offenses. In this study, we instead research a theoretically distinct phenomenon by examining the placement of venues that host criminal activity. In particular, we study the relationship between network structure and the placement of illicit massage businesses, which operate at the intersections of illicit and legitimate activity by hosting illicit commercial sex under the guise of legitimate massage. We model their placement as a function of two network metrics: betweenness, which measures a street's usage potential, and a variant called “local betweenness,” which measures the potential of nearby streets. Multilevel models are used to examine the importance of these street-level metrics while accounting for tract-level covariates. Our findings demonstrate that, unlike property crimes, illicit massage businesses tend to be located on streets that are quiet but that are close to areas of high activity. Such locations seem to combine accessibility and discretion, and therefore, represent ideal conditions for such businesses to thrive. Our findings can inform problem-oriented approaches to prevent the harms associated with illegitimately operating businesses.

 Criminology Volume 62, Issue 3 Aug 2024 Pages 377-618

By: InSul Kim

The purpose of this dissertation study is to conduct an art-based, community action research study as a means (1) to support the recovery process of domestic violence survivors; (2) to produce social capital among members of the community to initiate civic discussions on the consequences of domestic violence; and (3) to investigate its implications for cultural policy as the outcomes of this study highlight the unique role of the arts in making a difference in people’s lives and communities. The artworks produced by the workshop participants of this study (i.e., domestic violence survivors) were exhibited in a professional gallery as a form of visual narrative that speaks for their wounded past and difficult journeys. The collected data strongly indicates that art can be an exceptionally powerful tool for communication and healing, when words and discussions fall short. Overall, this research investigates the instrumental functions of the arts as a means to produce social capital for personal well-being, social support, and social justice. The study was framed within action research methodology and the triangulation model in data sources, research methods, and theoretical lenses, while both quantitative and qualitative techniques were employed. The collected data were analyzed at three different levels: (1) Personal level (i.e., the art workshop participants: n=16), (2) Organizational level (i.e., the staff of the transitional housing facility and the gallery: n=6), and (3) Community level (i.e., the general audience who came to the exhibit: n=74).

Ohio State University 2011