was prepared by the Research and Trend Analysis Branch, Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs under the supervision of Angela Me, Chief, Research and Trend Analysis Branch.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022, the political economy of Ukraine has been profoundly transformed.1 The aggression affected both licit and illicit trade routes, disrupted criminal organizations, and spawned new forms of informal and illicit exchange at the frontline and in the rear of the country. It has also led to the emergence of new challenges, such as the development of new skills and technologies that could be exploited by transnational organized crime. This report aims to address the following overarching questions: how has the ongoing war against Ukraine affected organized crime and illicit markets in Ukraine, and what are the possible implications for the country, the region and the international community? These questions are addressed through research into the following six areas: • Organized crime structures and their evolution • Drug supply and demand, including production and trafficking • Online scams, and cyber and telephone fraud • Arms trafficking • Economic crime, including smuggling of cigarettes and custom fraud • Trafficking in persons • The facilitation of illegal exit and draft evasion To address the overarching research question about the effects of the war on organized crime and illicit markets, the chapters compare data for the pre-war and post-invasion periods. The report covers the period of January 2021 to June 2024, with background data for 2019-2020 and preceding periods where available and relevant, used for contextualization. It is based on desk research and in-country fieldwork, with analysis of publicly available official statistics and secondary literature, court decisions and key informant interviews. Field data collection and analysis were conducted from December 2023 to June 2024 (see Annex A for more details). The overall purpose of this research is to provide an evidence base to the government of Ukraine and national agencies involved in responding to organized crime, the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations, and other UN Member States, for countering crime-related challenges emerging out of the war against Ukraine. This research focuses on government-controlled parts of Ukraine. Consideration of alleged war crimes is outside the scope of this research.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2025. 81p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Dnipro has long played a pivotal role in Ukraine’s political and economic development. Today, the city stands at another crossroads, as a key site for understanding how organized crime has evolved under the pressures of war. This report offers a detailed account of the city’s criminal landscape, drawing on field research, interviews, and open-source analysis.

The full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 has fuelled existing trends in Dnipro, a city already familiar with conflict since 2014. Dnipro’s proximity to the front line and its importance as a logistics and military hub have intensified its role in illicit markets, particularly in arms and drug trafficking. The city has also become one of the country’s most important bases for scam call centres, with around 30 000 people employed in operations that target victims across Russia, the EU and Ukraine itself. Many of these centres reportedly operate under the protection of law enforcement and are connected to organized crime groups. Meanwhile, corruption, which initially declined after the 2022 invasion, has made a strong comeback. Major procurement scandals, shrinking transparency and barriers to civil society participation in budget oversight suggest a renewed climate of impunity.

Dnipro’s drug economy remains resilient, with dealers reportedly targeting military personnel as clients. One trafficking group dismantled in 2024 had profits exceeding UAH10 million per month. Cases also show soldiers carrying drugs to the front or being recruited into distribution networks. While not unique to Dnipro, the city’s combination of trafficking infrastructure and military presence presents specific risks.

At the same time, the saturation of illicit weapons in the region has created a volatile environment. While organized crime groups generally avoid arms dealing, the volume of illegal stockpiles, trophy weapons and “contact-free” transactions makes Dnipro a critical node for monitoring arms flows returning from the front.

The city’s control over illicit flows —from drugs and weapons to extortion and fraud— is currently in flux. Historically shaped by figures who straddled the worlds of politics, business and crime, Dnipro has seen many of its key power brokers either exiled, imprisoned or under investigation. This has created a vacuum in which no single actor dominates, leaving the city open to new contests for control. At the same time, groups from Dnipro have spread across Ukraine, looking for safer places to work, including Odesa and Kyiv, raising the risk of increasing crime in those cities and beyond.

The report concludes that the city’s trajectory will depend on shifting political allegiances, the outcome of the war, and the extent to which Kyiv can reassert control. With national-level implications, Dnipro should be a key focus for any efforts to understand or disrupt Ukraine’s evolving organized crime landscape.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2025. 31p.

By the Little Hoover Commission

The state should prioritize data collection and collaboration with research institutions as it seeks to understand and combat retail theft in the long term, the Little Hoover Commission concluded in a new report, Retail Theft: A Data-Driven Response for California.

The report was prompted by a request from 66 members of the legislature to study issues surrounding retail theft. The report notes that since the Legislature and the voters are now considering changes to the penal code sections addressing retail theft, the Commission’s recommendations focus on long-term improvements in the way the state reports and assesses retail theft and law enforcement’s response.

In recent years, alarming videos showing brazen thefts of commercial property have circulated on social media, increasing public concern. Some businesses have cited theft as a reason for closing stores. These crimes also burden the criminal justice system, using limited resources that could be redirected toward more severe crimes.

Looking at available data, the Commission found that, despite a recent uptick, reported retail theft remains at roughly the same level as during the 2010s and lower than it was in earlier decades. Like many crimes, retail theft is undoubtedly underreported, but the report notes that by its nature, the level of underreporting is difficult to measure.

The Commission concluded that more detailed crime data is needed for policymakers to craft an evidence-based response. The Commission commended the Department of Justice for its existing data initiatives, and recommend they be expanded in consultation with experts. At a minimum, data should include information on crime statistics, demographics, law enforcement response times, prosecution and adjudication data, and rehabilitation, reentry, and recidivism data. In addition to data collection, the Commission recommended that the state partner with California universities and other nonpartisan research institutions to study preventative measures, rates of underreporting, economic impact, and drivers of public perception.

“Never was the aphorism, ‘You can’t manage what you don’t measure,’ more true than when discussing retail theft. We can’t fully comprehend the effects of retail theft, or address its causes, without detailed data. As it now stands, necessary data is missing,” said Commission Chair Pedro Nava. “There are many potential partners who can collaborate to remedy the information gap. Working with stakeholders, California can fund coordinated studies and data collection efforts to better understand the complexities of these crimes.”

“California has the opportunity to join efforts with some of the best researchers in the nation as it navigates the issue of retail theft,” said Vice Chair Anthony Cannella. “With a more complete picture of how retail theft is impacting the state, the Governor and Legislature can make evidence-based decisions on how to respond effectively.”

Sacramento: Little Hoover Commission, 2024. 35p.

Compiled by Julia Stanyard, Michael McLaggan, Aron Hyman, Julian Rademeyer, Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane, Matt Herbert, Jason Eligh, Marcena Hunter and Livia Wagner

East and Southern Africa (ESA) is a pivotal node for organized crime, connecting regional criminal markets to global networks. From the shores of Somalia to border crossings and international air and seaports in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, the region serves as a thriving source, hub and conduit for a wide variety of illegal commodities.

For example, heroin trafficked from Afghanistan via Pakistan and Iran is shipped across the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean by dhow before it is deposited in northern Mozambique and Tanzania. There, it splits into two primary supply lines: one of higher purity bound for international markets in Europe and Australia, and another that is significantly adulterated and consumed in towns and villages across ESA.

Rhino horn is smuggled by air from Johannesburg and Addis Ababa, routed through Dubai and Doha and sometimes Paris and London to throw off law enforcement. Ivory departs in shipping containers from ports in Dar es Salaam, Nampula and Durban, ending up in Singapore, Sihanoukville, Huangpu and Haiphong. Gold mined illegally in Zimbabwe’s mineral-rich Kwekwe gold fields and deep shaft mines in the towns of Krugersdorp, Carletonville, Klerksdorp and Welkom on South Africa’s Vaal Reef is processed and eventually laundered through Dubai. Gold is smuggled by the tonne into countries along the strife-torn Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’s eastern border and laundered through Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In northern Mozambique and South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province, Islamic State-aligned insurgents and supporters have been implicated in criminal economies, gold smuggling, and kidnapping and extortion schemes to raise funds.

In addition to local criminal actors, the region has attracted a coterie of international criminal players. For instance, networks from China, Pakistan and Iran are known to interface with African intermediaries for drug trafficking (drug precursor chemicals, methamphetamine and heroin) and wildlife smuggling (notably of abalone and ivory). In Southern Africa, Nigerian and Congolese syndicates, often operating from hubs such as Johannesburg, coordinate regional drug distribution and financial fraud schemes while also connecting to global diaspora networks.

Yet this chaotic mixture of different criminal commodities and networks is, in many ways, shaped by geography and coalesces around a spider’s web of regional hubs and economic centres. Environmental, social and regional dynamics in hinterlands allow warlords and smugglers to thrive, while bustling trade hubs provide cover for clandestine flows and access to key transport links. In urban slums, neglected towns and remote rural communities, criminal actors and parallel illicit economies rapidly fill the void left by an often absent state. Ancient trade and migratory routes over mountains and along rivers and coastlines that long pre-date colonial borders allow for the largely untrammelled movement of people and goods, both licit and illicit. This means many of these trafficking networks and criminal groups are found concentrated in certain illicit hubs.

The challenges in countering this are enormous. For example, Bole International Airport in Ethiopia, a key smuggling hub for extractives, wildlife products, people and drugs, handles more than 24 million passengers, 100,000 flights, 50 million pieces of luggage and around 226,000 tonnes of cargo every year. Yet it lacks sufficient screening equipment, staff and sniffer dogs. The South African port of Durban, notorious for its inefficiency, corruption and drug trafficking, handles around 60% of South Africa’s container traffic: 2.9 million 20-foot-equivalent units per year. Only a fraction can feasibly be scanned or searched.

This report aims to define where the illicit hubs of the region are and explain which factors shape the geography of organized crime in ESA across four main markets: drugs, wildlife, extractives, and human trafficking and smuggling. These illicit markets are often looked at in isolation by enforcement bodies, policymakers and analysts. While this is often justified, as it means action can be taken against a particular form of illicit trade, looking at a range of illicit markets together can better demonstrate where convergence occurs and illuminate the common factors that shape the geographical concentrations of these criminal markets.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 86p.

By Anthea McCarthy-Jones and Mark Turner

The growth of transnational organised crime has been widely perceived as a major national and international security threat. The growth has been facilitated by globalisation, in which people, money, information and goods flow more easily and rapidly across international borders. To take advantage of the illicit transnational business opportunities, crime groups have restructured from hierarchical organisations to more loosely structured configurations known as ‘dark networks.’ Crucial to the success of these networks are brokers, who enable exchanges between previously disconnected actors. In this paper, we present a new way in which to understand the role of the broker in illicit networks by distinguishing how brokers adopt different strategies that ultimately have a transactional or transformational impact on the networks they serve.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 5(1): pp. 58–69.

By Raúl Zepeda Gil

Violence rising in Latin America since the early 1990s has puzzled media, policymakers and academia. Characterising high scales of violence in non-political confrontations has been one of the main challenges. The main argument of this essay is that the hybrid criminal nature of violence in Latin America by non-state organisations has pushed the discussion to several misinterpretations and conceptual stretching that produces fog rather than clarity. Instead, this essay proposes a conceptof criminal war that can capture the complex nature of violence in Latin America by drawing convergences and divergences from diverse fields of literature and confronting usual mischaracterisations in current Latin American research.

Third World QuarTerly2023, Vol. 44, No. 4, 776–794

By Shadd Maruna

Early desistance research identified a key role for redemption scripts in the process of desisting from crime. This research emerged in an incredibly punitive environment at the turn of the century, when core beliefs about human redeemability were being challenged by popular and academic theories about incorrigible predators incapable of change. Desistance research made a profound impact, inspiring academic scholarship and changes to the policy and practice of reintegration. However, desistance research can also be accused of numerous crimes, as well, ranging from the adoption of an overly individualistic framing to the usurpation of the voices of research contributors. Fortunately, redemption is possible. A new generation of desistance theory and research now explicitly addresses the political and cultural factors impacting the desistance process and proposes that these hardened prejudices will only be changed by supporting a social movement led by and for system-impacted people. With their proven ability to inspire hope and promote action, redemption scripts may, again, be a key tool in such a movement.

Criminology, Volume63, Issue1

February 2025

Pages 5-25

By Edelyn Verona and Bryanna Fox

The United States has one of the highest rates of correctional supervision among all nations in the world, reflecting the disproportionate incarceration of racial minorities and economically disadvantaged groups. Scholars have emphasized the role of structural factors and governmental policies in longterm shifts in crime and incarceration. However, much of the psychological research on crime and antisocial behaviors has not deeply considered this broader context, focusing mostly on individual and proximal environmental risk factors. This article presents a novel synthesis of large cross-disciplinary literatures that have not been previously integrated. After a brief summary of dominant themes in psychological research on the topic, we review the strong evidence, primarily from fields outside of psychology, for structural forces that explain pathways into criminal justice involvement, independent of individual-level explanations. A broader ecological framework is outlined to help unconfound individual and structural influences, with the hope of motivating policy change that is evidence-based and equitable.

Annu. Rev. Clin. Psychol. 2025. 21:439–64

By Omar García-Ponce

The study of criminal violence has received increasing attention in political science over the past 15 years, as organized criminal groups have grown and diversified worldwide, unleashing unprecedented waves of violence. This article presents a critical assessment of the current state of political science scholarship on criminal violence. It discusses the sources and dynamics of organized criminal violence, emphasizing the reconceptualization of state–criminal group relationships in the literature, shifts in illegal markets, and the political incentives fueling criminal wars. It also examines how states and societies respond to criminal violence. State responses include punitive approaches, institutional reform, and community-based interventions, while societal responses can be examined through the lenses of exit (e.g., migration, disengagement), voice (e.g., political participation, collective resistance), and loyalty (i.e., compliance with state authorities or criminal groups). The article also addresses conceptual and methodological challenges, policy implications, and ethical considerations inherent in this field of study and identifies promising pathways for future research. 

Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 2025. 28:435–56 

By Katalin Parti

In an attempt to understand how differently fraud works depending on a victim’s age, we have examined the effects of situational (lifestyle-routine activities), self-control, and sociodemographic variables on scam victimization across age groups. The analysis was carried out on a national sample of 2,558 Americans, representative by age, sex, and race, and includes additional factors such as their education, living arrangement, employment, and propensity for reporting a crime or asking for help. The results substantiate research findings of the contribution of self-control and LRAT in predicting victimization in general but could not identify major situational and individual differences between older and younger Americans’ scam victimization. However, employment can function as a protective factor for older individuals in some online fraud scenarios. Furthermore, older adults show significantly more reluctance in asking for help or reporting than do younger ones. Future research must address these differences. The author also suggests developing specific variables for measuring how lifestyle-routine activity theory works in scam victimization.

International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence & Cybercrime: 5(3), 20-40

By Valentín Figueroa and Guadalupe Tuñón

We show that the emancipation of enslaved Black people led to their subsequent incarceration in a context of urban slavery —a context that lacked the economic incentives for incarceration present in plantation economies such as the U.S. South. To establish causality, we study a lottery of certificates of freedom in nineteenth-century Buenos Aires that randomly freed a small group of enslaved persons. Through archival research and digitization of the full count of the handwritten 1810 census, we link lottery winners and sets of eligible nonwinners to police records until 1830. We find that emancipation increased the probability of incarceration, on average, by 11.8 percentage points. Exploring mechanisms, we find no evidence that the e↵ect was driven by rural labor shortages, bur rather by the criminalization of petty offenses..

Peinxwron, NJ: Princeton University,

Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination.

2023. 49p.

By Tomas Salem

This book offers a unique look into the world of policing and the frontline of Brazil’s war on drugs. It analyzes the tensions produced by attempts to modernize Rio de Janeiro’s public security policies. Since the return of democracy in 1985, Rio's police forces have waged war against armed drug gangs based in the city’s favelas, casting the people who live in these communities as internal enemies. In preparation for the Olympics in 2016, the police sought to ‘pacify’ the favelas and their populations through the establishment of Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) in many of the city’s favela communities. Drawing on eight months of ethnographic fieldwork with the police, this book follows officers across the institutional hierarchy in their daily activities, on patrol, and during training. Tracing the genealogies of contemporary forms of policing-as-warfare through the notion of ‘colonial war’ and ‘cultural war’, it highlights the material and ideational dimensions of war as a cosmological force that shapes Brazilian social relations, subjectivities, landscapes, economies, and politics. It draws on the Deleuzian notion of ‘war machine and state dynamics’ to show how practices of elimination co-exist with attempts to transform favela territories and their people and analyzes the link between the moral universe of policing and right-wing populism in Brazil. Through rich and nuanced ethnography, it offers a critical perspective on militarized policing and 21st century forms of authoritarianism.

Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 330p.

By David Taylor

Creating a Policed Society? Provides an analysis of the evolution of policing and its impact on society in the West Riding of Yorkshire during the Victorian era. Unlike many previous police histories, which have focussed on specific (mainly urban) forces, it looks at developments across a region and brings out the complex and ongoing debates about policing, the diversity of police provision and the varied impact and responses that took place. As well as drawing on earlier works devoted to specific towns, the book offers a wide-ranging approach that utilises a range of hitherto underused sources that provide important insights into the details of police experience, both individual and collective. The book is structured around three major problem areas that have a relevance beyond the bounds of the West Riding. They are: (1) the extent to which the various police forces can be seen to be efficient; (2) the extent to which the Victorian West Riding can be seen as a policed society; and (3) the extent to which the policing in the county can be described as consensual. The author argues, firstly, that, despite ongoing problems retention, discipline and ill-health, most late-Victorian forces in the West Riding satisfied their local and national masters of their efficiency and were significantly less inefficient than their mid-century counterparts. Secondly, it is argued that notwithstanding the limitations to police powers, the Victorian West Riding was recognisably a policed society (or more accurately, a collection of policed societies), not least in the eyes of the majority of the local community. Finally, despite clear demonstrations of popular hostility to the police, in towns and country, in the third quarter of the nineteenth century and the persistence of anti-police sentiments, particularly in certain districts and among certain social groups, it is argued that, by a realistic and dynamic (rather than absolutist) definition of policing by consent, the Victorian West Riding was policed more by consensus than coercion.

Huddersfield, UK: University of Huddersfield Press, 2024. 429p.

By Anton Borg

Law enforcement agencies regularly collect crime scene information. There exists, however, no detailed, systematic procedure for this. The data collected is affected by the experience or current condition of law enforcement officers. Consequently, the data collected might differ vastly between crime scenes. This is especially problematic when investigating volume crimes. Law enforcement officers regularly do manual comparison on crimes based on the collected data. This is a time-consuming process; especially as the collected crime scene information might not always be comparable. The structuring of data and introduction of automatic comparison systems could benefit the investigation process. This thesis investigates descriptive and predictive models for automatic comparison of crime scene data with the purpose of aiding law enforcement investigations. The thesis first investigates predictive and descriptive methods, with a focus on data structuring, comparison, and evaluation of methods. The knowledge is then applied to the domain of crime scene analysis, with a focus on detecting serial residential burglaries. This thesis introduces a procedure for systematic collection of crime scene information. The thesis also investigates impact and relationship between crime scene characteristics and how to evaluate the descriptive model results. The results suggest that the use of descriptive and predictive models can provide feedback for crime scene analysis that allows a more effective use of law enforcement resources. Using descriptive models based on crime characteristics, including Modus Operandi, allows law enforcement agents to filter cases intelligently. Further, by estimating the link probability between cases, law enforcement agents can focus on cases with higher link likelihood. This would allow a more effective use of law enforcement resources, potentially allowing an increase in clear-up rates.

Department of Computer Science and Engineering Publisher: Blekinge Institute of Technology, SE-371 79 Karlskrona, Sweden Blekinge Institute of Technology Doctoral Dissertation Series No. 2014:12 Department of Computer Science and Engineering 221p.

Edited by Mihails Potapovs and Kate E. Kanasta

Drawing on expertise from professionals, government officials, and academics, this book uncovers the proactive measures taken by Latvia to build resilient cybersecurity capabilities. The work offers a comprehensive exploration of Latvia’s cyber domain, structured around three overarching themes: the ecosystem, its processes, and future perspectives. In doing so, it takes readers through the intricacies of Latvia’s cybersecurity landscape and provides a nuanced understanding of its strengths, challenges, strategic considerations, and broader implications. One of the key contributions of the work lies in its exploration of Latvia’s cybersecurity strategies and resilience. By delving into the nation’s policies, collaborations, and technological advancements, this book uncovers how Latvia has proactively addressed cyber threats, emphasising the importance of tailored approaches for smaller countries in building robust cybersecurity defences. Highlighting the importance of studying cybersecurity in smaller nations, this book stresses Latvia’s contributions to global cybersecurity efforts as an EU and NATO member. The volume advocates for innovation and collaboration, emphasising their crucial role in securing a digital future for nations worldwide. This book will be of much interest to student of cybersecurity, Baltic politics, EU politics, global governance, and International Relations. The Open Access version of this book, available at http://www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-Share Alike (CC-BY-NC-SA) 4.0 license.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 305p.

By Hai V. Nguyen, Shweta Mital, Shawn Bugden, Pharm; et al

Importance British Columbia, Canada, was the first and only jurisdiction globally to implement a province-wide safer supply policy, which offered pharmaceutical grade opioids to individuals at risk of opioid overdose, followed by the decriminalization of drug possession. Supporters of the safer supply policy argue that this policy could save lives by offering pharmaceutical-grade opioids to people who use toxic street drugs. Similarly, proponents of decriminalization suggest that decriminalizing drug possession could reduce drug overdoses by reducing stigma associated with drug use and enabling persons who use drugs to seek addictions treatment. However, critics of both policies believe that providing safer opioids and removing penalties for drug possession may worsen the crisis. Currently, there is limited evidence on the health impacts of these policies.

Objective To assess the association of British Columbia’s adoption of the safer supply policy and subsequent decriminalization of drug possession with opioid overdose hospitalizations and deaths.

Design, Setting, and Participants This observational cohort study used synthetic difference-in-differences analysis with quarterly province-level data to compare prepolicy and postpolicy changes in British Columbia with those in other Canadian provinces that did not implement these policies. The study period spanned from quarter 1 of 2016 to quarter 4 of 2023.

Exposure Safer opioid supply policy implemented in March 2020 and decriminalization of drug possession implemented in January 2023.

Main Outcomes and Measures Opioid-poisoning hospitalizations and apparent opioid-related toxicity deaths, measured as number per 100 000 population.

Results The safer supply policy alone was associated with an increase of 1.66 opioid hospitalizations per 100 000 population (95% CI, 0.41-2.92; P = .009) or 33%. The addition of drug possession decriminalization was associated with a further increase of 1.27 opioid hospitalizations per 100 000 population (95% CI, 0.05-2.50; P = .046) for an overall 58% increase compared with the period before the safer supply policy was in effect. There was insufficient evidence to conclusively attribute an increase in opioid overdose deaths to these policy changes.

Conclusions and Relevance This cohort study found that neither the safer supply policy nor the subsequent decriminalization of drug possession appeared to alleviate the opioid crisis. Instead, both were associated with an increase in opioid overdose hospitalizations. The observed increase in opioid hospitalizations, without a corresponding increase in opioid deaths, may reflect greater willingness to seek medical assistance because decriminalization could reduce the stigma associated with drug use. However, it is also possible that reduced stigma and removal of criminal penalties facilitated the diversion of safer opioids, contributing to increased hospitalizations.

By David Powell; Mireille Jacobson

IMPORTANCE Illicit opioids, particularly illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF), are major contributors to overdose deaths in the US. Understanding the prevalence and characteristics of illicit opioid use is crucial for addressing the opioid crisis. OBJECTIVE To estimate the prevalence of illicit opioid use, including IMF, and initial opioid exposure among those reporting illicit opioid use. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This cross-sectional study was conducted using an online survey with targeted demographic quotas from June 10, 2024, to June 17, 2024. A total of 1515 participants aged 18 years and older from the US completed the survey. The analysis was conducted between June 30, 2024, and February 13, 2025. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES The primary outcome was self-reported illicit opioid use within the past 12 months. Secondary outcomes included initial exposure to opioids and perceived likelihood of overdose. Logistic regression was used to analyze associations with demographic and geographic factors. RESULTS A total of 1515 respondents completed the survey, including 770 female individuals (50.8%), 20 American Indian or Alaska Native (1.3%), 101 Asian or Pacific Islander (6.7%), 215 Black (14.2%), 1087 White (81.7%), and 24 multiracial (1.6%); 186 (12.3%) were aged 18 to 24, 242 (16.0%) 25 to 34, 327 (21.6%) 35 to 44, 280 (18.5%) 45 to 54, 281 (18.5%) 55 to 64, 139 (9.2%) 65 to 74, and 60 (4.0%) 75 to 84 years. Among this sample, 166 (10.96%; 95% CI, 9.38%-12.52%) reported nonprescription opioid use within the past 12 months, including 114 (7.52%; 95% CI, 6.20%-8.85%) of the 1515 respondents reporting IMF use. Among those reporting nonprescription opioid use within the past 12 months, 65 (39.16%; 95% CI, 31.73%-46.58%) reported that their first opioid use involved opioids prescribed to them, whereas 60 (36.14%; 95% CI, 28.84%-43.45%) reported that their first use involved prescription opioids not prescribed to them. Only 41 (24.70%; 95% CI, 18.14%-31.26%) answered that their first exposure involved illicit opioids. Seventy-one (4.69%; 95% CI, 3.62%-5.75%) of all respondents reported that it was very likely they would have an overdose due to opioid use. This rate increased to 33.33% (95% CI, 24.68%-41.99%) among those who had used IMF within the past 12 months. Illicit opioid use was higher among men, Black respondents, and younger age groups. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The findings of this cross-sectional study indicate a higher prevalence of illicit opioid use than previously reported, highlighting the need for more timely and accurate data to inform policy and intervention strategies.

JAMA Health Forum; 2025

By Jonathan P. Caulkins, Bishu Giri

Illegally manufactured fentanyl (IMF) kills enormous numbers of people in the U.S. and Canada. Since the emergence of modern heroin markets in the late 1960s, supply control has been associated with meaningful reductions in opioid use and harms in at least six cases worldwide. However, countering supply effectively depends on understanding what the dominant drug-trafficking routes are. New data on fentanyl seizures presented here largely reinforce previous understanding that most IMF enters the U.S. from the south. These data call into question tariffs and other policies and policy justifications that treat the threat from the northern border as comparably severe.

U.S. counties bordering Mexico and Canada show significantly higher rates of large fentanyl seizures, compared with counties that do not border our foreign neighbors—where “large” is defined as over a kilogram of powder or more than 1,000 pills, quantities indicative of wholesale trafficking. The 80 counties along the land borders recorded 2,461 large seizures between 2013 and 2024, averaging about 31 per county, while the other 3,064 counties documented 12,358 seizures, averaging only 4 per county. By weight, of all the fentanyl in those big land-border seizures in 2013–24, about 99% of the pills and 97% of the powder were found along the border with Mexico; by comparison, large seizures along the Canadian border are relatively rare. If we look at the recent years—2023 and 2024—distributions remain the same. San Diego County, California, leads in powder-form large fentanyl seizures; and Pima County, Arizona, records the highest volume of pill-form large fentanyl seizures.Drugs seized could be in transit to other places, or they might be intended for local consumption. Therefore, it is useful to contrast a county’s share of large seizures with its share of the population, which serves as a proxy for the size of the local market. Counties along the Mexican border account for only 2.35% of the U.S. population; but in 2023–24, they hosted about 40% of the nationwide quantity of fentanyl appearing in large seizures, for both powder and pills. By contrast, counties in the lower 48 states that border Canada account for 3.1% of the U.S. population but only 1.2% of the powder and just 0.5% of the pills obtained in large seizures.

To determine which counties look like import or transit centers, we developed a Disproportionality Index (DI), which compares a county’s proportion of large seizures against its proportion of the national population. On that scale, 1.0 means that seizures are proportionate to local population; below 1.0 indicates less than expected; and over 1.0 indicates more seizures than expected. Because of random fluctuations, a county can be a bit above or below 1.0, but we consider DIs above 2.5 noteworthy.

The counties with the highest DIs for 2023–24 were along the U.S.–Mexican border. For example, Imperial County, California, had a DI of 111 for fentanyl pills and 100 for powder. In contrast, in the county along the Canadian border with the greatest number of large seizures (Wayne County, Michigan, home of Detroit), the DIs were 0.5 for pills and 1.9 for powder, yielding an average DI of less than 2.0.

Only three other counties or collections of counties along the Canadian border had an average DI greater than 1. One (Okanagan County, Washington) stemmed from drugs seized from a Mexican-led organized-crime group that was supplying populations near the Canadian border. Another cluster (Juneau and Ketchikan) was suggestive of Alaska markets possibly being supplied from Canada. The third (Whatcom County, Washington) was locally significant (DI of 2.2 for powder) but small overall (Whatcom County accounted for just 0.15% of total powder seized).

Efforts to counter drug flows need to be grounded in data. The analysis here contradicts views—such as those used to justify certain tariffs—that treat the flows across the southern and northern borders as being comparably important.[1]

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2025. 15p.

BY Richard Grelling.. Translated By Alexander Gray. Introduction by Colin Heston.

Richard Grelling’s The Crime (Das Verbrechen), translated into English by Alexander Gray and published in London and New York between 1917 and 1919, is conceived as both a moral successor and completion to his earlier pacifist landmark, J’Accuse!, written between August 1915 and November 1916. In creating this extended work, Grelling sought to underscore the causes of World War I and dissect the self-justifying rhetoric that sustained the conflict long after its outbreak. Volumes I and II lay foundational groundwork, tracing the immediate antecedents of the war: imperialist tendencies within Germany and, on the part of the opposing Entente powers, ostensibly defensive motives followed by trait protectionism.

Never before in the annals of humankind has a crime of such sweeping magnitude been committed—and seldom has its perpetration been met with denial so unashamed. Within the very citadels of reason and culture, a proud civilization unleashed catastrophe under the guise of necessity—only to scramble afterward in self-exculpation. It is in this spirit of moral defiance—standing firm against voices of dissent, even from one’s own kin—that The Crime is offered to you. In the trilogy’s third volume, Grelling moves beyond the origins of war into the heart of wartime rationalization, exposing the “war-aims” that enabled aggression to persist under the cloak of purpose. May this work cast a clear light upon the structures of self-deception that allowed the world’s descent, and may it stir an unyielding clarity in us to recognize—and reject—such patterns again.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 261p.

By Andrew Scheibe, Shaun Shelly, M. J. Stowe

The illicit drug trade generates billions of dollars and sustains transnational criminal organisations. Drug markets can destabilise governance and undermine development. Data indicate increasing drug use in South Africa. However, information on the size and value of the drug market is limited. This is the first study to estimate the market value of cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine in South Africa. People who use drugs were meaningfully involved in all aspects of implementation. We used focus group discussions, ethnographic mapping, brief interviews, and the Delphi method to estimate the number of users, volumes consumed, and price for each drug in South Africa in 2020. Nationally, we estimated there to be: 400,000 people who use heroin (probability range (PR) 215,000–425,000) consuming 146.00 tonnes (PR 78.48–155.13) with a value of US$1,898.00 million (PR US$1,020.18–US$2,016.63); 350,000 people who use cocaine (PR 250,000–475,000) consuming 18.77 tonnes (PR 13.41–25.47) with a market value of US$1,219.86 million (PR 871.33–1,655.52) and 290,000 people who use methamphetamine (PR 225,000–365,000) consuming 60.19 tonnes (PR 6.58–10.68) and a market value of US$782.51 million (PR 607.12–984.88). The combined value was calculated at US$3.5 billion. Findings can be used to stimulate engagement to reform drug policy and approaches to mitigate the impact of the illicit drug trade. Additional studies that include people who use drugs in research design and implementation are needed to improve our understanding of drug markets.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 5(3): pp. 1–17