BY Richard Grelling.. Translated By Alexander Gray. Introduction by Colin Heston.

Richard Grelling’s The Crime (Das Verbrechen), translated into English by Alexander Gray and published in London and New York between 1917 and 1919, is conceived as both a moral successor and completion to his earlier pacifist landmark, J’Accuse!, written between August 1915 and November 1916. In creating this extended work, Grelling sought to underscore the causes of World War I and dissect the self-justifying rhetoric that sustained the conflict long after its outbreak. Volumes I and II lay foundational groundwork, tracing the immediate antecedents of the war: imperialist tendencies within Germany and, on the part of the opposing Entente powers, ostensibly defensive motives followed by trait protectionism.

Never before in the annals of humankind has a crime of such sweeping magnitude been committed—and seldom has its perpetration been met with denial so unashamed. Within the very citadels of reason and culture, a proud civilization unleashed catastrophe under the guise of necessity—only to scramble afterward in self-exculpation. It is in this spirit of moral defiance—standing firm against voices of dissent, even from one’s own kin—that The Crime is offered to you. In the trilogy’s third volume, Grelling moves beyond the origins of war into the heart of wartime rationalization, exposing the “war-aims” that enabled aggression to persist under the cloak of purpose. May this work cast a clear light upon the structures of self-deception that allowed the world’s descent, and may it stir an unyielding clarity in us to recognize—and reject—such patterns again.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 261p.

By Andrew Scheibe, Shaun Shelly, M. J. Stowe

The illicit drug trade generates billions of dollars and sustains transnational criminal organisations. Drug markets can destabilise governance and undermine development. Data indicate increasing drug use in South Africa. However, information on the size and value of the drug market is limited. This is the first study to estimate the market value of cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine in South Africa. People who use drugs were meaningfully involved in all aspects of implementation. We used focus group discussions, ethnographic mapping, brief interviews, and the Delphi method to estimate the number of users, volumes consumed, and price for each drug in South Africa in 2020. Nationally, we estimated there to be: 400,000 people who use heroin (probability range (PR) 215,000–425,000) consuming 146.00 tonnes (PR 78.48–155.13) with a value of US$1,898.00 million (PR US$1,020.18–US$2,016.63); 350,000 people who use cocaine (PR 250,000–475,000) consuming 18.77 tonnes (PR 13.41–25.47) with a market value of US$1,219.86 million (PR 871.33–1,655.52) and 290,000 people who use methamphetamine (PR 225,000–365,000) consuming 60.19 tonnes (PR 6.58–10.68) and a market value of US$782.51 million (PR 607.12–984.88). The combined value was calculated at US$3.5 billion. Findings can be used to stimulate engagement to reform drug policy and approaches to mitigate the impact of the illicit drug trade. Additional studies that include people who use drugs in research design and implementation are needed to improve our understanding of drug markets.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 5(3): pp. 1–17

By Allison Lind , Ryan P. Larson , Susan M. Mason , Christopher Uggen

There is abundant research showing the disproportionate impacts of violence on health in disadvantaged neighborhoods, making an understanding of recent violent crime trends essential for promoting health equity. Carjackings have been of particular interest in the media, although little research has been undertaken on this violent crime. We use interrupted time series models to examine the impact of the police killing of George Floyd on the spatiotemporal patterns of carjacking in Minneapolis in relation to neighborhood disadvantage. To provide grounding, we compare our results to the well-studied patterns of homicides. Results indicate that carjackings both increased and dispersed spatially after the murder of George Floyd and subsequent social unrest, more so than homicides. Socially disadvantaged neighborhoods experienced the greatest absolute increase while more advantaged neighborhoods saw a greater relative increase. The challenge ahead is to identify policy responses that will effectively curb such violence without resorting to harsh and inequitable policing and sentencing practices.

By The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

This report presents the findings of research conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) on existing child protection systems across all EU Member States. The 27 national reports, commissioned from Franet, the agency’s multidisciplinary research network, are available online on the agency’s website. These reports offer a wealth of additional data beyond what is included here. In April 2024, the European Commission adopted a Recommendation on developing and strengthening integrated child protection systems in the best interests of the child. It calls on authorities at all levels of government, civil society and other stakeholders to cooperate to protect children from violence by means of better-integrated systems. Its aim is to enforce a ‘culture of zero-tolerance for violence against children’ (recital 7) while also emphasising ‘Child protection as a global priority of the Union’ (p. 21). In developing the Recommendation, the Commission consulted children by means of the EU Children’s Participation Platform, and more than 1 000 children provided their views. Based on these data and the Commission Recommendation, this report suggests practical me

Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights ,2025. 118p.

By Thorn and Burson Insights, Data & Intelligence

Since 2019, Thorn has focused on amplifying youth voices to better understand their digital lives, with particular attention to how they encounter and navigate technologyfacilitated forms of sexual abuse and exploitation. Previous youth-centered research has explored topics such as child sexual abuse material (CSAM)1 —including that which is self-generated (“SG-CSAM”)—nonconsensual resharing, online grooming, and the barriers young people face in disclosing or reporting negative experiences. Thorn’s Emerging Threats to Young People research series aims to examine emergent online risks to better understand how current technologies create and/or exacerbate child safety vulnerabilities and identify areas where solutions are needed. This report, the first in the series, sheds light specifically on young people’s perceptions of and experiences with deepfake nudes. Future reports in this initiative will address other pressing issues, including sextortion and online solicitations. Drawing on responses from a survey of 1,200 young people aged 13-20, this report explores their awareness of deepfake nudes, lived experiences with them, and their involvement in creating such content. Three key findings emerged from this research: CSAM Any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a person less than 18 years old 1. Young people overwhelmingly recognize deepfake nudes as a form of technology-facilitated abuse that harms the person depicted. Eighty-four percent of those surveyed believe that deepfake nudes cause harm, attributing this largely to the emotional and psychological impacts on victims, the potential for reputational damage, and the increasingly photorealistic quality of the imagery, which leads viewers to perceive—and consume—it as authentic. 2. Deepfake nudes already represent real experiences that young people have to navigate. Not only are many young people familiar with the concept, but a significant number report personal connections to this harm—either knowing someone targeted or experiencing it themselves. Forty-one percent of young people surveyed indicated they had heard the term “deepfake nudes,” including 1 in 3 (31%) teens. Additionally, among teens, 1 in 10 (10%) reported personally knowing someone who had deepfake nude imagery created of them, and 1 in 17 (6%) disclosed having been a direct victim of this form of abuse. 3. Among the limited sample of young people who admit to creating deepfake nudes of others, they describe easy access to deepfake technologies. Creators described access to the technologies through their devices’ app stores and accessibility via general search engines and social media

El Segundo, CA: Thorn, 2025. 32p.

By Mark Shaw, Tuesday Reitano, Simone Haysom, Peter Tinti

  I llicit trade is an umbrella term that covers multiple crimes and commodities, including the theft, diversion, adulteration, counterfeiting, and production of substandard goods, all acts which can occur at multiple points along a supply chain. It is initiated, enabled, and protected by a wide range of actors, from unethical corporations and corrupt officials at all levels of government to armed violent groups in conflict zones and organized crime networks operating locally and transnationally. As global trade routes increasingly encompass developing economies—as a source, transit, and market for consumer goods—they present unique challenges to creating effective national and, by implication, regional and global regimes against illicit trade. For many states around the world, and especially in the Global South, these challenges threaten to destabilize social, economic, and political structures. These states are the world’s “states on the cusp.” The term illicit trade, for the purpose of this report, refers to illegal production, movement, or sale of normally legal goods. Such illegal movement is often carried out to derive profit by avoiding costs such as those imposed by taxes or customs duties. There is a particularly strong incentive for illicit trade in cases where goods are subject to high duties, or where goods are subsidized to be cheaper in one jurisdiction (food, sugar, and flour are examples) but not in another, providing incentives for illegal cross-border trade. The phrase “licit goods traded illicitly” captures this phenomenon neatly. Importantly, however, this definition also includes some goods that are counterfeited to pass off as being licit, and then traded either illicitly (avoiding scrutiny) or, on occasion, in legal markets. The trade in counterfeit goods alone has been estimated to be worth between 3 and 7 percent of global GDP. Many forms of illicit trade, including counterfeit medicines, substandard goods, and the falsification or adulteration of food and agricultural commodities, medical equipment, and consumer and industrial goods have serious public health and safety implications. Other forms of illicit trade have huge environmental, social, and economic impacts, not least of which is reduced revenue collection which weakens state institutions, creating a downward spiral of higher illicit trade intertwined with weaker state capacity. Reversing this trend, therefore, must be a global public good. This complex mix of products and commodities being traded illegally raises the important question of whether advances in technology can assist in more effective regulation. At the core of these efforts is ensuring that commodities are both produced and traded legally to protect consumers from harm. Here, “harm” refers to harms to the public (arising from poor quality or counterfeit products) and to the state (such products harms the state’s ability to collect essential revenues and to control markets in accordance with democratic processes). Global economic trends in international trade and ever more complex supply chains are, however, reducing the role that governments can play in monitoring and regulating trade, creating both greater vulnerabilities and increasing the importance of the private sector as a critical actor. This poses significant new challenges. With an estimated 80 percent of global trade travelling by sea, the trend toward the privatization of ports and other critical infrastructure and the proliferation of free trade zones have created a growing blind spot for governments seeking to understand and regulate supply chains and illicit trade. For some forms of illicit trade, the role of small air shipments through private carriers has had a similar effect, eroding law enforcement’s ability to monitor, predict, and interdict where and how illicitly traded goods will reach the hands of their consumers. Online marketplaces and small package shipping are replacing the physical spaces where illicit transactions used to take place; their market size and reach are expanding while at the same time reducing the stigma of illegality. In short, the scope for illegality is growing, just as the capacity for states to respond is weakening. Can advances in technology fill the gap? Sophisticated and rapidly evolving technologies are bringing new ways to track, trace, monitor, and maintain records with integrity. They are steadily reinforcing law enforcement’s capacity to identify criminality in the vastness of the surface and dark web. Despite the promise that technology has to offer, some longstanding stumbling blocks need to be overcome. Some of these are particularly acute in developing economies. At the most basic level, for example, no system can provide quality control over data entry when those responsible for entering the primary data are either willfully or through lack of capacity corrupting that content. More generally, the lack of global standards and effective and consistent legal frameworks, and, increasingly, questions about jurisdiction caused by cyber-enabled trade and global supply chains, may limit the impact of purely national regimes of oversight and enforcement regimes. Lack of capacity, insecurity, and multiple forms and levels of corruption are pertinent features of developing economies that  compound the inherent challenges of responding to illicit trade. Evidence from case studies around the world, as well as two commissioned for this report—examining the political economy of illicit tobacco in Southern Africa and of counterfeit medicines in Central America—reveal that political actors and state institutions are complicit in enabling, promoting, and protecting illicit trade at the very highest levels of the state. They also show that it is often the most vulnerable and underserved in society who rely on illicit markets to meet basic needs. While there are clear distinctions by commodity and context, the perpetuation of illicit markets and trade within developing economies often can be exacerbated by systematic and serious failures in governance and political will, rather than technical shortcomings that can easily be overcome. Technical solutions also may have unintended consequences for governance and the poor. That does not mean that they should not be used, rather that a better understanding of the economic, political, and social context in which they are implemented is desirable. Implemented effectively, they hold great promise in taking forward steps to undercut illicit markets and improve citizens’ well-being. However, the changing landscape for infrastructure, investment, and development assistance also has reduced the leverage of more traditional multilateral institutions to insist upon the governance and policy reforms that would address these issues. These changes have had contradictory outcomes: increasing trade on the one hand but weakening regulatory systems and conditionalities (that had been a growing part of traditional multilateral development bank practices) on the other. Requirements for transparency, broad-based development benefits for the citizenry, or democratic governance have been weakened, although not removed, in the new financing landscape. Against this backdrop, private sector innovation for providing technology-based tools to enhance regulatory capacity combined with citizen empowerment is key. Such innovations, however, should be grounded in an understanding of the context into which they are introduced and be governed by effective oversight systems, including effective and transparent public-private partnerships. How to address illicit trade in developing economies, therefore, remains unsurprisingly complex. Wins often will be incremental and setbacks frequent. The overall goal simply may be to constrain the enabling environment for illicit trade rather than allowing it to endlessly expand, to target efforts where they have the greatest chance of sustained success, and to prioritize those commodities where the harmful implications are the greatest. This is a volatile time in global history, marked by rapid technological and political changes plus a global COVID-19 pandemic. We must develop a better understanding of the political economy of illicit trade and craft an active monitoring capacity for intervenening. In this report, we put forward a commodity- and context-specific political economy approach to achieve this and conclude with some guidance for policy makers from any sector, public or private, to assess when and how to respond to i o illicit trade, and to work in and with developing economies.  

Washington, DC: Atlantic Council,  Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security , 2020. 57p.

By Linda Jepkoech Kimaru ,Cheng Cheng Hu, Sudha Nagalingam, Priscilla Magrath, Elizabeth Connick, Kacey Ernst, and John Ehir

Adherence to antiretroviral therapy (ART) is crucial for achieving and maintaining viral suppression in people living with HIV (PLWH). While individual factors affecting HIV viral suppression have been extensively studied, there is less attention on community-level factors, specifically perceived neighborhood disorder. This study aims to assess the relationship between perceived neighborhood disorder and achieving virologic suppression among people living with HIV. One hundred and eighty-eight PLWH 18 years of age and older from two HIV clinics completed a cross-sectional study. We assessed perceptions of neighborhood disorder, ART self-efficacy, social support, alcohol and drug use, depression, HIV stigma, provider-patient relationship, demographics, and length at the zip code. HIV viral loads were obtained from the clinical record. The analysis involved the use of Fisher’s Exact test, Spearman’s Rank test, Wilcoxon rank sum test, and Firth logistic regression. All analyses were conducted using STATA 17. Most participants were male (79%), white (62%), and identified as non-Hispanic (66%). Individuals with no perceived neighborhood disorder had median scores of 10 for integration and perseverance in ART self-efficacy. Those with high perceived disorder displayed decreased scores of 8.4 and 8.3 for integration and perseverance respectively. Both integration and perseverance showed statistically significant negative correlations with perceived neighborhood disorder, (Spearman’s rho -0.2966; p<0.000 and -0.2387; p = 0.0010 respectively). Individuals with virologic suppression (n = 167) reported significantly lower perceived neighborhood disorder scores (median = 0.9 [IQR: 0.2–2.0]) compared to those without virologic suppression (n = 10, median = 3.2 [IQR: 2.4–4], p = 0.0012). The study highlights a notable correlation between perceived neighborhood disorder, ART adherence self-efficacy, and virologic suppression. This indicates that improving HIV treatment outcomes needs to extend beyond individual-level factors and include strategies to address neighborhood-level conditions. Public health policies and programs should consider the broader social and environmental contexts in which people living with HIV reside.

PLOS Glob Public Health, 2024, 13p.

By Nicole Kravitz-Wirtz,  Angela Bruns , Amanda J Aubel , Xiaoya Zhang , Shani A Buggs

Understanding the burden of gun violence among youth is a public health imperative. While most estimates are based on direct and witnessed victimization, living nearby gun violence incidents may be consequential too. Yet detailed information about these broader experiences of violence is lacking. We use data on a population-based cohort of youth merged with incident-level data on deadly gun violence to assess the prevalence and intensity of community exposure to gun homicides across cross-classified categories of exposure distance and recency, overall and by race/ethnicity, household poverty, and neighborhood disadvantage. In total, 2–18% of youth resided within 600 m of a gun homicide occurring in the past 14–365 days. These percentages were 3–25% for incidents within 800 m and 5–37% for those within a 1300-m radius. Black and Latinx youth were 3–7 times more likely, depending on the exposure radius, to experience a past-year gun homicide than white youth and on average experienced incidents more recently and closer to home. Household poverty contributed to exposure inequities, but disproportionate residence in disadvantaged neighborhoods was especially consequential: for all racial/ethnic groups, the difference in the probability of exposure between youth in low vs high poverty households was approximately 5–10 percentage points, while the difference between youth residing in low vs high disadvantage neighborhoods was approximately 50 percentage points. Given well-documented consequences of gun violence exposure on health, these more comprehensive estimates underscore the importance of supportive strategies not only for individual victims but entire communities in the aftermath of gun violence.

J Urban Health, 2022 Jun 7, 16p.

By Jamie MacColl, Jason R C Nurse and James Sullivan 

  GOVERNMENTS AND BUSINESSES are struggling to cope with the scale and complexity of managing cyber risk. Over the last year, remote working, rapid digitalisation and the need for increased connectivity have emphasised the cyber security challenge. As the pursuit of approaches to prevent, mitigate and recover from malicious cyber activity has progressed, one tool that has gained traction is cyber insurance. If it can follow the path of other insurance classes, it could play a significant role in managing digital risk. This paper explores whether cyber insurance can incentivise better cyber security practices among policyholders. It finds that the shortcomings of cyber insurance mean that its contribution to improving cyber security practices is more limited than policymakers and businesses might hope. Although several means by which cyber insurance can incentivise better cyber security practices are identified, they have significant limitations. Interviewees from across government, industry and business consistently stated that the positive effects of cyber insurance on cyber security have yet to fully materialise. While some mature insurers are moving in the right direction, cyber insurance as a whole is still struggling to move from theory into practice when it comes to incentivising cyber security. If this is to change, the insurance industry must overcome significant challenges. One is the competitiveness of the nascent cyber insurance market over the last two decades. Most of the market has used neither carrots (financial incentives) nor sticks (security obligations) to improve the cyber security practices of policyholders. The industry is also struggling to collect and share reliable cyber risk data that can inform underwriting and risk modelling. The difficulties inherent in understanding cyber risk, which is anthropogenic and systemic, mean insurers and reinsurers are unable to accurately quantify its causes and effects. This limits insurers’ ability to accurately assess an organisation’s risk profile or security practices and price policy premiums accordingly. The spectre of systemic incidents such as NotPetya1 and SolarWinds2 has also limited the availability of capital for cyber insurance markets. However, the most pressing challenge currently facing the industry is ransomware. Although it is a societal problem, cyber insurers have received considerable criticism for facilitating ransom payments to cybercriminals. These add fuel to the fire by incentivising cybercriminals’ engagement in ransomware operations and enabling existing operators to invest in and expand their capabilities. Growing losses from ransomware attacks have also emphasised that the current reality is not sustainable for insurers either.

To overcome these challenges and champion the positive effects of cyber insurance, this paper calls for a series of interventions from government and industry. Some in the industry favour allowing the market to mature on its own, but it will not be possible to rely on changing market forces alone. To date, the UK government has taken a light-touch approach to the cyber insurance industry. With the market undergoing changes amid growing losses, more coordinated action by government and regulators is necessary to help the industry reach its full potential. The interventions recommended here are still relatively light, and reflect the fact that cyber insurance is only a potential incentive for managing societal cyber risk. They include: developing guidance for minimum security standards for underwriting; expanding data collection and data sharing; mandating cyber insurance for government suppliers; and creating a new collaborative approach between insurers and intelligence and law enforcement agencies around ransomware. Finally, although a well-functioning cyber insurance industry could improve cyber security practices on a societal scale, it is not a silver bullet for the cyber security challenge. It is important to remember that the primary purpose of cyber insurance is not to improve cyber security, but to transfer residual risk. As such, it should be one of many tools that governments and businesses can draw on to manage cyber risk more effectively.   

RUSI Occasional Paper, June 2021, London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies , 2021. 68p.

By Anne Summers, Thomas Shortridge, Kristen Sobeck

Whichever way you look at it, many women are paying a huge economic price in addition to the physical, emotional and psychological damage done to them by domestic violence. It is no accident that employment and education – the pathway to better employment – are targeted by perpetrators as a prime means of depleting or even destroying women’s ability to be financially self-sufficient.

The data used in this report enables the authors, for the first time, to quantify the economic impact of domestic violence on Australian women. The report sets out in detail how large numbers of women have not attained a degree, have left the labour force, have reduced their working hours, or have taken time off work– all because of domestic violence.

The authors identify changes that need to be made across the following areas: paid domestic violence leave policie tthe operation of paid domestic violence leave multiple avenues of support are needed support to (re-)enter employment the Leaving Violence Program.

Sydney: University of Technology Sydney 2025. 52p.

By Dan Werb, dwerb@health.u HaeSeung Sung ∙ Yingbo Naa ∙ Indhu Rammohana ∙ Jolene Eeuwesa ∙ Ashly Smoke∙  Akwasi Owusu-Bempah, Thomas Kerr,g, and Mohammad Karamouzian

  Background Supervised consumption services (SCS) are effective at preventing overdose mortality. However, their effect on public safety remains contested. We investigated homicide rates in areas near SCS in Toronto. Methods We classified coroner-reported fatal shootings and stabbings (January 1st, 2010 to September 30th 2023) by geographic zone: within 500 m (‘near’), between 500 m and 3 km (‘far’), and beyond 3 km of an SCS (‘out’). We then used Poisson regression to calculate the rate ratio (RR) across zones 18, 36, 48, and 60 months pre vs. post SCS implementation. Finally, we compared spatial homicide incidence prior to and after the date of the implementation of each SCS using interrupted time series (ITS). Findings Overall, 956 homicides occurred, and 590 (62%) were fatal shootings and stabbings. There was no meaningful change in the rate of fatal shootings and stabbings within 3 kms of SCS (near and far zones) after their implementation. However, between 48 and 60 months pos-implementation, we detected an increase in out zones. In an ITS analysis, we observed a reduction in the monthly incidence in near zones and an increase in out zones. Interpretation SCS implementation was not associated with increased homicide rates; instead, we observed a reduction in monthly incidence near SCS. These results may inform drug market activity responses that optimize community health and safety.

The Lancet Regional Health – Americas, Volume 43, 2025. 101022

By Joseph E. Schumacher, Abdullah Ahsan, Amber H. Simpler, Adam P. Natoli & Bradley J. Cain

Conducting research within a carceral health care context offers a unique view into the nature of drug use among arrestees with potential to identify and prevent drug use consequences. The purpose of this study was to characterize the nature and extent of drug use among first-time jail arrestees to inform detection and treatment.

Methods

This study utilized a naturalistic research design to collect de-identified urine drug screens (UDS), jail characteristics, and arrestee demographic variables among arrestees indicating drug use from 25 jails across the United States in 2023 through a confidential data sharing agreement with NaphCare, Inc. using its proprietary electronic health record operating system. Descriptive statistics were used to detail the features of the dataset, Pearson’s chi-square tests of independence were performed to statistically analyze associations between UDS results and jail characteristics and arrestee demographics, and significant chi-square test results were further investigated by examining standardized residuals to clarify the nature and significance of within-group differences in proportions.

Results

Of the 43,553 UDS cases comprising the final sample (28.8% of total arrestees), 74.8% (32,561) were positive for one or more drugs, and 25.2% of UDS cases were negative for all drugs. Among those who tested positive, 69.0% were positive for cannabis, 54.8% for stimulants, 29.6% for opioids, and 12.4% for sedatives. Arrestees were positive for multiple drugs half the time, with combinations of cannabis, stimulants, and opioids most common. Significant associations between drug use and both jail characteristics and arrestee demographics were found.

Conclusions

Though drug use is not a recent phenomenon, the lethality potential of the drugs being used today is relatively new. Arrestees with positive urine drug screens are at heightened risk of adverse outcome due to sudden cessation of substance use. Findings highlight the need for objective clinical data to guide acute treatment of individuals at risk of withdrawing while detained. A

ddiction Science & Clinical Practice (2025), 15p.

By Dean J. Connolly, Santino Coduri-Fulford c, Katherine Macdonald , Gail GilchristLuke Muschialli

Sexualised drug use (SDU) is a highly prevalent phenomenon of increasing public health significance in communities of men who have sex with men (MSM). This prospectively registered PRISMA-ScR-adherent systematic scoping review examines the current state of knowledge surrounding violence amongst MSM in the context of SDU. A broad search was conducted across four databases, with no restrictions. Studies citing or cited by all database-identified records retained for full-text review were retrieved and screened. Three journals were hand searched across the past five years, and three searches were conducted on Google Scholar. In addition, 13 key opinion leaders were contacted via email to request any additional published or unpublished data. The twentyeight studies included in the final synthesis reported mostly qualitative data from geographically diverse nonrepresentative samples, predominantly relating to sexual violence with other typologies seldom investigated or reported. Although quantitative data were limited, sexual violence appeared common in this context and was directly associated with impaired mental health and suicidality. Some participants reported first- or second-hand accounts of non-consensual administration of incapacitating doses of GHB/GBL to men who were subsequently raped. This was frequently perpetrated by men whose age, status, or financial privilege afforded them power over their victims. While reports from some participants suggested context-specific blurring of the lines of consent, a few quotes demonstrated a dearth of knowledge surrounding the centrality of consent in lawful sex. Given the historical denigration of MSM, any efforts to further investigate or address this issue must be community-led.

International Journal of Drug Policy

Volume 136, February 2025, 104706

By Daniel Birks, Elizabeth R. Groff, and Nick Malleson

An agent-based model is a form of complex systems model that is capable of simulating how the micro-level behavior of individual system entities contributes to macro-level system outcomes. Researchers draw on theory and evidence to identify the key elements of a given system and specify behaviors of agents that simulate the individual entities of that system—be they cells, animals, or people. The model is then used to run simulations in which agents interact with one another and the resulting outcomes are observed. These models enable researchers to explore proposed causal explanations of real-world outcomes, experiment with the impacts that potential interventions might have on system behavior, or generate counterfactual scenarios against which real-world events can be compared. In this review, we discuss the application of agent-based modeling within the field of criminology as well as key challenges and future directions for research.

Annual Review of Criminology, Vol. 8:75-95 January 2025)

By Jack Katz and Nahuel Roldán

Criminology is haunted by state-structured biases. We discuss five. (a) With the spatial boundaries and the binary deontology they use to count crime, governments draw researchers into ecological fog and sometimes fallacy. (b) All legal systems encourage criminologists to promote untenable implications of socially stratified criminality. (c) To degrees that vary by time and place, the scope of criminological research is compromised by methodological nationalism. (d) State agencies use chronologies that repeatedly draw researchers away from examining the nonlinear temporalities that shape variations in criminal behavior. (e) State agencies produce data that facilitate explaining the why of crime, but scientific naturalism would first work out what is to be explained. We recommend a criminology that begins by describing causal contingencies in social life independent of governments’ labeling of crime.

Annual Review of Criminology, Vol. 8:53-73 , January 2025

By John Hagan

My interest in criminology grew as the Vietnam War escalated. I applied to two Canadian graduate schools and flipped a coin. The coin recommended the University of Toronto, but I chose the University of Alberta, which had a stronger criminology program. I wrote a dissertation about criminal sentencing, which led to an Assistant Professorship at the University of Toronto. Dean Robert Pritchard of Toronto’s Law School encouraged my work and later successfully nominated me for a Distinguished University Professorship. My interests continued to grow in international criminal law. A MacArthur Distinguished Professorship at Chicago’s Northwestern University and the American Bar Foundation facilitated my research at the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. I followed this by studying the crime of genocide in Sudan and later the trial of Chicago’s Detective Jon Burge. Burge oversaw the torture of more than 100 Black men on Chicago’s South Side. US Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald prosecuted Burge when Illinois prosecutors would not. Despite many good things about Chicago, the periodic corruption of the government and police was not among them.

Annual Review of Criminology, Vol. 8:1-23 . January 2025

By Ingrid Diane Johnson

Purpose: How victims of violence against women (VAW) label their experiences and selves can be important for help-seeking, but descriptive research on the prevalence of experience- and self-labels among VAW victims is limited. This study sought to fll some of the gaps in this quantitative literature using new measurement tools. Method: The current study used quantitative survey data from a weighted sample of 1694 community-based women in Alaska who had experienced VAW (determined using behaviorally specific items) to measure the prevalence of a variety of labels these victims could apply to their experiences and selves. Results Generally, victims of specific forms of violence had minimal agreement on the terms they used to label their experiences. The most commonly endorsed label was 28.5% of those who had experienced alcohol or drug involved sexual assault applying the label rape to their experiences. Across all victims, the most commonly endorsed self-label was survivor, with one-quarter to one-third endorsing this label, depending on the subsample. Roughly one-tenth used the self-label victim across all subsamples. Conclusion: VAW service providers should consider labels used to promote services and how to increase awareness about which behaviors constitute VAW; policymakers should improve the accessibility of healthcare so that labeling oneself or one’s experiences in a certain way is not a prerequisite of help-seeking; and researchers should continue exploring how to measure experience- and self-labels with minimal priming of participants and greater specificity to the actual experiences with violence.

Journal of Family Violence (2024) 39:421–433

By Reanna Sanchez

The goal of this process evaluation was to determine how closely the RRC was following evidence-based practices for reentry and to determine how successful the RRC has been transitioning individuals from the jail to the community. To evaluate the effectiveness of the RRC, we (1) conducted a survey of county staff involved in the reentry process (n = 25) to better understand how staff perceive the reentry planning process and the RRC, (2) conducted observations of the intake and screening process at the MDC, and (3) reviewed client records for all inmates who passed through the RRC between 2018 and 2022. We found that there were challenges associated with how the RRC screened, assessed, and targeted individuals for intervention related to a lack of standardization across process components. Surveys collected from staff members provided insight into challenges related to reentry, such as the need for a single case plan to follow the individual through jail and into the community. Finally, analysis of the client-level data illustrated the services and needs of clients. While many individuals (n = 9,985) completed risk needs assessments (RNAs), the number of individuals that completed transition plans (TPs) is far less (n = 2,785). Due to the nature of the different challenges of the current process in place, determining the impact of the RRC on recidivism reduction remains complicated.

Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, Center for Applied Research & Analysis, 2023. 40p.

By Alex Severson,  Elise Ferguson

This study evaluates the predictive validity of the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, using data from 22,387 felony cases between July 2017 and June 2023. The PSA, which generates scores predicting defendants' likelihood of failure to appear (FTA), new criminal activity (NCA), and new violent criminal activity (NVCA) during pretrial release, demonstrated "fair" to "good" predictive validity with AUC scores ranging from 0.58-0.69, aligning with results from our initial validation study from June 2021. While the PSA showed similar predictive performance across racial groups for FTA and NCA outcomes, the NVCA flag performed poorly for Black defendants, with predictive validity no better than chance. We also found that age-related risk factors embedded in the NCA and NVCA scales had limited predictive value. We documented significant increases in FTA rates during and after COVID-19, likely due to policy changes that increased court appearances through mandatory status hearings. Despite higher base rates of NCA and NVCA for male defendants, the PSA demonstrated similar predictive validity across genders. Analysis of NCA by charge severity revealed that even high-risk defendants rarely committed serious felonies while on pretrial release. Our findings suggest opportunities to optimize the PSA locally by adjusting how age-related factors are weighted and reconsidering the use of the NVCA flag for Black defendants.

Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH CENTER FOR APPLIED RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS , 2024. 48p.

By Aaron Lenihan,  Amanda Hauke,  Francisco Sanchez and Paul Guerin,

The Department of Health, Housing, and Homelessness (HHH) launched the Albuquerque Peer to Peer: Opioid Coordination and Outreach Project in September 2017. The project aims to reduce opioid misuse, overdose, and death in the Albuquerque area by using peer support workers to connect individuals suffering from opioid use disorder with appropriate treatment and recovery support services. This report presents the results of CARA’s evaluation of the Peer to Peer project. We review the scientific literature on similar programs to establish a baseline for expected client outcomes and best practices, and then compare the Peer to Peer project to this baseline through an analysis of program documents and service data. The results of our analysis reveal that Albuquerque Peer to Peer is broadly designed and implemented according to best practices. However, we recommend clarifying the procedures for assessing client needs and facilitating client engagement in referred-to services. In terms of the short-term outcome -- proportion of clients who engaged in the treatment services to which they were referred – we found that Albuquerque Peer to Peer is performing as well as comparable, state-of-the-art peer outreach programs. We recommend the project track middle to long-term client outcomes, like rates of EMS involvement and overdose death, moving forward.

Albuquerque: New Mexico Statistical Analysis Center, Institute for Social Research, Center for Applied Research & Analysis, 2023. 40p.