Edited by Jonathan Adams and Cordelia Hess

Is research on antisemitism even necessary in countries with a relatively small Jewish population? Absolutely, as this volume shows. Compared to other countries, research on antisemitism in the Nordic countries (Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) is marginalized at an institutional and staffing level, especially as far as antisemitism beyond German fascism, the Second World War, and the Holocaust is concerned. Furthermore, compared to scholarship on other prejudices and minority groups, issues concerning Jews and anti-Jewish stereotypes remain relatively under researched in Scandinavia – even though antisemitic stereotypes have been present and flourishing in the North ever since the arrival of Christianity, and long before the arrival of the first Jewish communities.
This volume aims to help bring the study of antisemitism to the fore, from the medieval period to the present day. Contributors from all the Nordic countries describe the status of as well as the challenges and desiderata for the study of antisemitism in their respective countries.

Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter, [2020]

Edited by Pablo Policzer

Making Sense of Haiti's State Fragility and Violence : Combining Structure and Contingency? / Andreas E. Feldmann -- Operation Condor as an International System of State Violence and Terror : A Historical-Structural Analysis / J. Patrice McSherry -- Written in Black and Red : Murder as a Communicative Act in Mexico / Pablo Piccato -- Protest and Police "Excesses" in Chile : The Limits of Social Accountability / Michelle D. Bonner --Protest and Police "Excesses" in Chile : The Limits of Social Accountability / Michelle D. Bonner -- The Police Ombudsman in Brazil as a Potential Mechanism to Reduce Violence / Anthony W. Pereira -- Democracy, Threat, and Repression : Kidnapping and Repressive Dynamics during the Colombian Conflict / Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín -- To End the War in Colombia : Conversatorios among Security Forces, Ex-Guerrillas, and Political Elites, and Ceasefire Seminars-Workshops for the Technical Sub-Commission / Jennifer Schirmer.

Calgary, Alberta, Canada : University of Calgary Press, [2019]

By Russell G Smith and Amelia Hickman

This report estimates the cost of serious and organised crime in Australia in 2020–21 to be between $24.8b and $60.1b. This is the third in a series of reports undertaken for the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission estimating the cost of serious and organised crime. It updates and improves on the methodology used in the previous report, which estimated the cost of organised crime in 2016–17. As with the previous research, this report considers the direct and consequential costs of serious and organised crime in Australia, as well as the costs to government entities, businesses and individuals associated with preventing and responding to serious and organised crime. While the current estimates were undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic and may reflect changes in criminality resulting from the pandemic, the full economic impact of serious and organised criminal offending committed during the pandemic will not be known for some time. It is clear, however, that the impact of serious and organised crime on the Australian economy is substantial.  

Statistical Report No. 38 Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 2022 73p.

By Jesuit Social Services

This paper focuses on how governments can support a greater understanding of perpetration and a strengthening and acceleration of current efforts to end men’s violence against women and children. It affirms the need to build on Australia’s current approaches to prevention and considers whether they need to be further adapted or refined. Recommendations are based on practice experience, research, and the lived experience of participants. 

Recommendations

1. Investment in the collection of more and better data on the extent of perpetration, and its dynamics and drivers.

2. Identification of emerging opportunities to intervene early to prevent violence against women and children.

3. A “stocktake” of existing prevention and early intervention work taking place across the country, including consideration of evidence where it exists, to promote more specific discussions regarding the merits of various practice approaches.

4. Development of an evidence framework for prevention and early intervention, including standards of evidence.

5. A workforce capability building approach which views a range of work as prevention, including work with people of all genders who can influence men and boys across settings.

6. An online deterrence/early intervention campaign which draws on international best practice.

7. Investment in digital tools to support parents and critical workforces to confidently foster discussions with men and boys about gender norms and use of violence, and to counter negative influences.

8. Exploring in-prison behaviour change approaches, in parallel with changes to prison conditions and culture.

Australia: Jesuit Social Services, 2024. 39p.

By Jason Payne and Anthony Morgan

In this study we used criminal history data for three birth cohorts in New South Wales to estimate the prevalence of recorded family and domestic violence offending. Using an accelerated longitudinal design, we estimate that 6.3 percent of people born in New South Wales had been proceeded against by police for a family and domestic violence offence by age 37. The rate was significantly higher for men: 9.6 percent of men— one in 10—had been proceeded against for a family and domestic violence offence, compared with 3.0 percent of women (one in 33). Overall, 1.2 percent of people born in New South Wales were responsible for more than 50 percent of recorded family and domestic violence offences. Further, family and domestic violence offenders accounted for nearly half of all recorded offences by people in the birth cohort. This is the first estimate of the prevalence of recorded family and domestic violence offending in a population sample in Australia. This is an important step towards increasing the visibility of family and domestic violence perpetrators.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 701. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 18p.

By Irene María Álvarez-Rodríguez Translated by Victoria Furio

The consolidation of armed civilian collectives in the Mexican state of Michoacán arose in a setting in which the illegal regional economy no longer focused on drug smuggling but had turned to a variety of criminal activities and in which the perspective of a moral economy had been restored. This restructuring of the criminal economy was a strong factor in the emergence of the armed collectives.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 236, Vol. 48 No. 1, January 2021, 231–244

By The International Crisis Group

Launched soon after they retook power in 2021, the Taliban’s campaign against narcotics has drastically reduced opium poppy cultivation and upended Afghanistan’s drug economy. Driven by ideology, the Taliban’s anti-drug efforts include rounding up drug users, eradicating crops, and shuttering drug bazaars. The Taliban’s enforcement impacts the livelihoods of millions of people, particularly poor labourers and rural women. Wealthy traders, meanwhile, are profiting from high prices by selling existing stocks. Many farmers have switched to crops such as wheat, but struggle with the reduced income. The ban’s future is uncertain; although the Taliban are adamant about implementing it, it could collapse under the weight of economic hardship. Foreign donors, who have much to gain from reduced drug production in Afghanistan, should harness the Taliban’s zeal for counter-narcotics and encourage licit economic growth. In the meantime, the Taliban should consider the welfare of the poorest farmers and implement a phased approach to the ban. Implemented with growing seriousness, the Taliban’s anti-narcotics campaign has profoundly affected a country that ranks among the world’s largest suppliers of illegal drugs. The main focus has been opium, a central part of Afghanistan’s agricultural sector. Enforcement began slowly, but has grown stricter. Taliban forces started with easy targets, herding drug users into jails and rehabilitation centres. They then warned farmers not to cultivate the opium poppies whose resin they have harvested for centuries. When that failed, the Taliban deployed fighters to face down villagers and destroy their crops. As a result, the UN estimates, cultivation declined by 95 per cent – more than any other counter-narcotics campaign in recent history. The Taliban also started to apply pressure on traffickers, despite the fact that some of them backed their movement for decades. More recently the de facto authorities shut down drug bazaars and arrested hundreds of dealers. While underworld kingpins and big landowners have thrived under the ban, reaping the benefits of skyrocketing prices by selling stockpiles, many farmers have suffered. By UN estimates, the halt to opium farming has affected the livelihoods of almost seven million people. These individuals are unlikely to find other work in a stagnant economy burdened with sanctions. Farmers have lost an estimated $1.3 billion annually, or 8 percent of GDP in 2023. Farm work remains the biggest source of employment for Afghan women. The ban has hit them especially hard, given their lack of opportunities under a Taliban regime that severely limits their ability to work. The economic shock has been compounded by the Taliban’s limited capacity to offer farmers and rural workers alternatives. Many switched to cultivating wheat or cotton, but struggle to make ends meet. Development of licit agriculture would require more irrigation, cold storage facilities and better roads. The Taliban does not have the budget to develop such infrastructure. Meanwhile, the opium price has soared, tempting farmers to flout the ban. So far, few dare to defy the Taliban. Farmers respect the ban most faithfully in the south, where the Taliban have many supporters, and where bigger farms produced stocks of opium that could be sold after the ban. Still, pockets of disobedience remain, even in the Taliban’s home province of Kandahar. In the smaller fields of the mountainous north and east, resistance is more widespread. While the Taliban’s measures have shaken the drug sector to its very foundations, the future of the ban remains in doubt. Some experts predict that its economic impact will force the Taliban to back track on a signature policy. Of course, it is also possible that the Taliban leadership will remain stubborn and steadfast. Foreign governments have a lot to gain from Afghanistan no longer flooding global markets with drugs. After the Taliban’s severe restrictions on women’s rights made the regime odious to much of the outside world, the narcotics ban offers a rare opportunity to work with the new authorities on a pressing issue to the benefit of all sides. The Taliban’s strategy of banning drugs without providing alternative jobs risks large-scale displacement of rural Afghans and rising emigration, along with growing desperation among the poor. Donors should support a transition toward licit and equitable growth in the economy, easing the acute poverty crisis the country currently faces. Some already give aid for food security and rehabilitation of drug users, but the assistance falls far short. Effective support at a national scale would require working with the Taliban regime, which is politically difficult and, for many Western policymakers, unpalatable. It would, however, aid Afghan civilians, especially rural women. In the first instance, support could focus on rural development, agricultural support, water conservation and investments in agro-processing. But the reality is that a drug-free agricultural sector will not provide enough jobs, so the country needs a development plan focusing more broadly on non-farm employment, including for women. Regional countries should support Afghanistan’s integration into transport networks and trade arrangements, for their own interests and to stabilise their neighbourhood. All of this will require time. Until the country makes the painful transition away from dependence on narcotics as a cash crop, the Taliban should show a bit of leni ency. Although it is unlikely it will backtrack on the ban, at a minimum the regime should halt more intrusive eradication practices such as house-to-house searches. Adopting more lenient practices such as turning a blind eye to small garden plots of poppy and cannabis would give the poorest farmers a better chance of survival in the coming years. Farmers selling tiny amounts of opium for prices hundreds of times higher than what is paid for other crops would give them a lifeline without jeopardising the ban’s overall objectives. 

Report No. 340 Kabul/Brussels,  International Crisis Group, 2024. 35p.

By Vaughn Crandall, Marina Gonzalez and Reygan Cunningham

Community violence prevention is an emerging field of public safety work focused on reducing and preventing lethal and sublethal violence.1 Yet, despite growing awareness of evidence-informed approaches, historic levels of investment and political support from the federal government, few cities have been able to sustainably reduce community violence at the city level through purposeful strategies. With support from The Pew Charitable Trusts, the California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC) worked with a diverse range of field experts to identify key capacities that may play essential roles in reducing community violence at the city level and over time. The project team began by combining findings from research across a range of disciplines and interviews with leading subject matter experts to identify key capacities that were likely to play important roles in the ability of cities to sustainably reduce community violence. The six identified capacities were: 1. Political governance and public sector leadership, 2. Data-informed problem analysis, 3. Cross-sector collaboration on a shared strategy, 4. Effective operational management, 5. Robust violence reduction infrastructure, and 6. Sustainability planning and institutionalization. To test and refine these capacities, CPSC project leads explored the role of each capacity in seven cities with long-term violence challenges as well as significant experience with violence prevention efforts: Baltimore; Boston; Cincinnati; Los Angeles; New Orleans; Oakland; and Philadelphia. This second stage of the study surfaced the following city findings: Cities with more key capacities present appeared to be more successful. These cities were able to assemble violence reduction strategies that formal evaluations found to be effective in reducing violence over multi-year time horizons.2 Higher levels of effective political governance corresponded with more robust operational management, which appeared to play a crucial role in cities' ability to reduce violence; Sustained funding, a clear theory of change, a strategic focus on a highest-risk of violence population and organizational support were associated with effective CVI ecosystems. These ecosystems appeared to help cities sustain longer-term reductions. Problem-oriented, data-driven, collaborative policing appears to play an important role, operationally and politically; The challenge of scaling programs and strategies in larger cities is significant, but can drive creative adaptation when supported by robust management structures; and Sustainability and institutionalization of violence reduction strategies appear to depend heavily on stable political governance and effective management 

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities. 18p.

By Elizabeth Hacker, Kriti Bhattarai, Ranjana Sharma, Jody Aked, Bhujel, S. , Danny Burns, Mariah Cannon, Deshar, L. , Anita K.C., Pragya Lamsal, Barsha Luitel, Sudhir Malla, Mishra, N. , Rayamajhi, D. , Shakya, A. , Sherpa, P. , Kapil Shrestha & Amit Timilsina

Spanning five years, the focus of the CLARISSA programme in Nepal was on identifying the system dynamics of WFCL in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector, with particular attention given to the informal economy where the worst forms of child labour are prevalent. In addition to extensive participatory and qualitative research inquiry, in Nepal, 12 Participatory Action Research Groups of children and business owners spent between 12 and 18 months learning from action to reduce WFCL and its impact. The Action Research component makes the CLARISSA programme unique in the child labour space because it has learned about the dynamics of WFCL from action as well as inquiry. This paper synthesises what the CLARISSA programme learned about WFCL in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector. It looks at children’s pathways into child labour, their lived experience of it, and the businesses in which they work. With a focus on both the supply and demand dynamics of child labour, this paper aims to further understanding of the reasons why children have to work and why businesses employ children. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports and the Hard Labour website, which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in and the neighbourhoods where they live. This paper synthesises the detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why worst forms of child labour occur in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector, and what can be done about it.

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 18,  Brighton: Institute of Development Studies,  2024. 74p.

By Jody Aked, Danny Burns and A.K.M. Maksud  

CLARISSA (Child Labour: Action-Research-Innovation in South and South‑Eastern Asia), a research programme on worst forms of child labour (WFCL), aims to identify, evidence, and promote effective multi-stakeholder action to tackle the drivers of WFCL in selected supply chains in Bangladesh and Nepal. Spanning five years, the programme’s focus in Bangladesh was on identifying the system dynamics of WFCL in Dhaka’s leather industry, and particularly the informal economy, where WFCL is prevalent. In addition to extensive participatory and qualitative research inquiry, 13 participatory action research groups of children and business owners spent 12–18 months learning about actions to reduce WFCL and its impact. The Action Research component makes the CLARISSA programme unique in the child labour space because it has learned about the dynamics of WFCL from action as well as inquiry. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports, and the Hard Labour website, which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in, and the neighbourhoods they live in. This paper synthesises this detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why WFCL happens in Dhaka’s leather industry and what can be done about it. This paper synthesises what the CLARISSA programme learned about child labour in the leather industry in and around Dhaka, Bangladesh. It looks at children’s pathways into child labour and their lived experience of it, alongside the small leather businesses they work in. The aim was to understand why children have to work and why the businesses employ children, looking at both the supply and demand dynamics of child labour. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports and the Hard Labour website,2 which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in, and the neighbourhoods they live in. This paper looks across this rich and detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why WFCL happens and what can be done about it.   

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 11, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2024. 70p.  

By Patricia C. Lewis , Nadine J. Kaslow, Yuk Fai Cheong, Dabney P. Evans and Kathryn M. Yount

Femicide Refers to the intentional gender-related killing of women and girls (1). Despite the high prevalence of female murder victimization in the United States (U.S.) (2, 3), the U.S. lags behind other nations in defining and documenting gender-related female homicides (4). While efforts are underway within the criminal justice and public health sectors to better track violent deaths, deficient surveillance systems limit efforts to estimate the annual incidence of femicide in the U.S. Here, we position femicide as a preventable death that should be treated as a social and public health problem and a distinct form of homicide in the legal code. This approach is especially salient, given the documented increase of non-lethal intimate partner violence (IPV) in major cities (5) and nationally (6) during the COVID-19pandemic, demonstrating the collateral impacts of public-health crises on violence against women (VAW). 

Front. Public Health, 27 February 2024 Sec. Injury Prevention and Control Volume 12 - 2024 |

By Pamela B. Teaster, Erica Wood,  Sally B. Hurme,  Carlisle Shealy

In the United States, 10.6% of adults ages 18-64 and 35.2% of people age 65 and older live with a disability (Kraus et al., 2018). Four and a half percent of adults ages 18-64 and 8.9% of people age 65 and older have a cognitive disability (Kraus et al., 2018). Certain cognitive disabilities make adults vulnerable to abuse and require the help of a surrogate decision-maker, such as a guardian or an agent under a power of attorney (Gunther, 2011). A wide spectrum of adults may need the assistance of a guardian, including individuals with serious mental illness, intellectual disability, and traumatic brain injury. The number of adults with serious mental illness increased from 8.3 million in 2008 to 13.1 million in 2019; the greatest increase occurred in young adults ages 18-25 (Lipari, 2020). More than 7 million people in the United States have an intellectual disability, with many requiring assistance (Population Specific Fact Sheet–Intellectual Disability | National Disability Navigator Resource Collaborative, n.d.). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that each year there are more than 2.87 million visits to emergency departments, hospitalizations, and deaths due to traumatic brain injury; some of these result in long-term disability (TBI Data | Concussion | Traumatic Brain Injury | CDC Injury Center, 2021). The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs reports that more than 400,000 U.S. service members experienced a traumatic brain injury between 2000 and 2019 (VA Research on Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), n.d.). Individuals with serious mental illness, intellectual disability, and traumatic brain injury may require short- or long-term guardianship depending on the progression and treatment of their disability. Advancements in medical care not only expand the lifespan of older individuals but also enhance the life expectancies of younger individuals with brain injuries, serious mental illness, or intellectual disabilities, who may outlive their family caregivers (Patja et al., 2000). Terminology for guardianship differs by state. In many but not all states, court-appointed surrogates who make decisions concerning an individual’s finances are referred to as “conservators,” and those who make decisions concerning an individual’s health or personal matters are called “guardians.” For this report, we use the term guardian to refer to both, unless specifically indicated. Guardians are bound by statutory requirements and case law — as well as ethical principles — to act in the best interests of a vulnerable adult. Guardians are fiduciaries, which means that they must act according to the highest standards of care, accountability, trust, honesty, confidentiality, and avoidance of conflict of interest (Managing Someone Else’s Money: Help for Court Appointed Guardian of Property and Conservators, 2019). Powers given to guardians are often immense — for example, the authority to sell a person’s home and personal property, make contracts on their behalf, and consent to all medical treatments. In addition, guardians may be authorized to charge fees for their services that are payable from an adult’s estate — a situation that, left unmonitored, opens the potential for abuse. Moreover, adults with cognitive impairments may be unable to recognize when guardians are not serving as they should. Although guardians should provide protection, there is also the risk that a guardian may take advantage of an adult whom they were named to protect. Despite this situation, we currently lack reliable data both on how many guardianships or guardians exist and on the outcomes of these  arrangements. A number of high-profile media exposés (e.g., Aviv, 2017; Day, Stark, & Coscarelli, 2021; Garland, 2017) have highlighted how, in some egregious cases, guardian actions have harmed adults who are at risk. 

Washington DC: National Institute of Justice , 2022. 64p.

By Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson and Magnus Öberg

This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non-state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.

Journal of Peace ResearchVolume 61, Issue 4, July 2024, Pages 673-693

By Sherry, Suzanna

Last October, progressive Jews were shocked by the raw antisemitism displayed by their erstwhile allies on the political left. After Hamas terrorists tortured, raped, or murdered more than 1200 Israeli civilians and took some 200 civilians hostage, some progressives – especially on college campuses – celebrated. They chanted the Palestinian mantra “from the river to the sea,” seeking to erase Israel (and Jews) from the face of the earth. The number of antisemitic incidents on campus soared, coming from both students and faculty. A Stanford lecturer forced Jewish students to the back of the classroom and labeled them “colonizers.” Jewish students had to barricade themselves inside a library at Cooper Union, and Jewish students at MIT were told by faculty to avoid the university’s main lobby for their own safety. Many university presidents who had previously sent out campus-wide emails condemning the murder of George Floyd, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the overruling of Roe v. Wade, and countless other world events suddenly discovered the Kalven Principles and claimed it would be inappropriate for them to take sides, or issued weak statements about how the situation in the Middle East was complicated. This double standard continued as some universities responded to student calls for genocide of Jews by invoking principles of free speech, principles that had been notably ignored when the speech in question was directed at other groups. Most campus DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) offices, especially at the most elite universities, had nothing to say about the surging antisemitism. This essay explains why no one should have been shocked, or even mildly surprised, by the progressive response to the massacre. Progressive or “woke” culture –as exemplified by critical race theory, anti-racism of the Ibram X. Kendi variety, and, especially on college campuses, the DEI juggernaut – is necessarily and inevitably antisemitic at its core. That these related movements have now exposed their antisemitism publicly is no surprise: antisemitism is bred in their bones.

FIU Law Review from Vol. 25 to Vol. 19, Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 24-4, 2024. 

By Rupert Horsley

This report details the key trends and developments in human smuggling in Libya in 2023. In large degree, the year was one of continuity with the patterns seen in 2022. Over the course of the year, for example, 77 470 migrants departed the Libyan coast, only marginally higher than 2022’s figure of 75 500.1 Furthermore, hybrid migration, in which migrants travel to Libya regularly or semi-regularly before attempting the sea crossing to Europe, accounted for an estimated 75% of these departures, also roughly similar to the proportion recorded in 2022. Many of the migrants involved in hybrid journeys first arrived in Libya at Benina airport in the east of the country. This indicates the increasing importance of eastern Libya to human smuggling writ large. In addition to the migrant arrivals at Benina airport, eastern Libya also saw a dramatic rise in departures from the coastal areas in and around Tobruk in 2023, with some 40% of sea crossings in the first half of the year taking place from there. Some, though not all, of the migrants leaving from the east coast had arrived in Benina. While heightened enforcement by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) suppressed departures from the Tobruk hub in the second half of 2023, the body reportedly continued to allow Benina to be used as the main air travel arrival point for hybrid migration for the rest of the year. Thus, the LAAF clearly emerged as one of the main actors influencing hybrid migration in Libya in 2023. Following the shutdown of the Tobruk system, hybrid migration sea crossings were displaced to the west coast. By August, departures from this area had increased significantly and there were reports of migrants accumulating in warehouses in several hubs. In October, a notably large series of departures from Zuwara occurred at a remarkable rate. Increased departures from the west coast indicate that entrenched smuggling networks remain ready to seize opportunities. Given the political and security fragmentation of the region, these networks are likely to underpin the resilience of human smuggling in Libya for the foreseeable future. A notable element that remained marginal in 2023 was trans-Saharan smuggling through Libya. This was once a major route for migrants departing from Libya, but has declined significantly since 2017/18 due to insecurity and migrant abuse in Libya and law enforcement action in downstream countries. One of the few significant developments was the relatively moderate but growing number of Sudanese refugees fleeing the civil war in that country. However, this was not substantial enough to drive systematic changes in the dynamics of overland human smuggling. Similarly, Sudanese nationals did not leave the Libyan coast in large numbers. This is the latest GI-TOC monitoring report on human smuggling in Libya. It builds on the series of annual reports that has been issued since 2017, tracking the evolution of human smuggling in Libya, as well as the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it.2   

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 36p.

By Ingri Bøe Buer

This article reconsiders peace and security from the perspectives of community leaders, educators and activists in favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 2019–2020. Through a critical lens, it argues that the urban violence in Rio de Janeiro resembles a form of new wars where the state is a major producer of insecurity. It questions the meaning of peace and top-down pacification processes in a city where the favelas, since their origin, have been considered dangerous areas needing to be pacified and controlled. The article introduces favela peace formation as a concept to describe alternative processes working to reduce the inter-sectional forms of violence in these communities: non-violent, locally legitimate peace processes working to slowly construct a positive, sustainable peace. To conclude, it discusses how favela peace formation presents a way of imagining peace as ‘care’ instead of ‘order’ in response to the state’s violent peace as ‘control’

Peacebuilding, DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2024.2354083

By Sarah Projansky

Looking at popular culture from 1980 to the present, feminism appears to be "over": that is, according to popular critics we are in an era of "postfeminism" in which feminism has supposedly already achieved equality for women. Not so, says Sarah Projansky. In Watching Rape, Projansky undermines this complacent view in her fascinating and thorough analysis of depictions of rape in U.S. film, television, and independent video. Through a cultural studies analysis of such films as Thelma and Louise, Daughters of the Dust, and She's Gotta Have It, and television shows like ER, Ally McBeal, Beverly Hills 90210, and various made-for-tv movies, Projansky challenges us to see popular culture as a part of our everyday lives and practices, and to view that culture critically. How have media defined rape and feminism differently over time? How do popular narratives about rape also communicate ideas about gender, race, class, nationality, and sexuality? And, what is the future of feminist politics, theory, and criticism with regard to issues of sexual violence, postfeminism, and popular media? The first study to address the relationship between rape and postfeminism, and one of the most detailed and thorough analyses of rape in 25 years, Watching Rape is a crucial contribution to contemporary feminism.

New York: NYU Press, 2001.

By Tara Wheeler, Julia Bergeron-Smith, George Shaler, Lisa Sampson

Sex offender recidivism data can be difficult to comprehend, especially when conducting research across states. For example, sex offenders can be categorized in numerous ways: by the type of crime committed (e.g., rape, assault, exhibitionism), by offense severity, by victim age (adult or child). Likewise, recidivism definitions (e.g., rearrest, reconviction, or reincarceration) and timeframes (e.g., one-year, two-year, or three-years following release) can vary across local, state, and federal agencies. Thus, there is no single measure systemically used across jurisdictions. Recognizing the public’s concerns about sex offender recidivism, the Maine and Massachusetts Statistical Analysis Centers (SACs), proposed and received funding for a retrospective sex offender recidivism study through the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Department of Justice. This collaboration marks the first time either state has undertaken this type of study. This project studied the recidivism rates of Maine sex offenders who were released from prison between 2005 and 2019 and Massachusetts sex offenders released between 2009 and 2018. In total, the Massachusetts cohort was composed of 1,210 offenders and the Maine study of 905 offenders. Criminal history records were obtained for each offender from their respective states to determine whether the offender recidivated (i.e., committed post-release offenses that resulted in a conviction). To be included in the recidivism portion of this study, there must have been at least a five-year window between the time of release and the time the criminal history data was pulled. Overall, 880 offenders were included in the Massachusetts recidivism analysis and 661 in the Maine recidivism analysis. A primary interest area was to determine whether recidivism rates differed by offense severity (i.e., rape or non-rape) and victim age (i.e., child or adult), however, these two groupings are not entirely separate from one another— while rape is considered more severe than other types of sex offenses, crimes against children are also deemed to be more egregious than crimes against adults. Therefore, an offender typology—based on the original sex offenses associated with the commitment and subsequent release—was created that incorporates both victim type and offense severity. The first, and most severe, category is child rapist, which includes all offenders who committed a child rape offense, followed by the rapist category, which includes all other offenders who committed a rape offense. Next is child predator and is used for those who committed a sex offense against a child but did not commit a rape offense. Last, is the other category and captures those who did not fall within one of the prior three categories. To gain a better understanding of recidivism among the sex offender population, survival analysis (specifically, the Cox Proportional Hazards regression method) was conducted to determine which offender characteristics, if any, influenced recidivism rates. Using this approach, researchers were able to control for other known attributes. The attributes tested in this study were: • offender type • severity of sex offense(s) (Maine only) • number of sex offense(s) • commitment length (Maine only) • release type (supervision or discharge) • security level of facility offender was released from (Massachusetts only) • release age Key Findings • Age at earliest sex offense associated with commitment varied by offender type for both Maine and Massachusetts. Interestingly, child predators had a mean age that was statistically higher than that of rapists and child rapists. o In Massachusetts, the average offense age of child predators was 36.6 years old, which was significantly higher than the offense age of rapists (31.1 years old) and child rapists (33.9 years old). o For Maine, child predators were, on average, 35.0 years old at the time of their earliest sex offense associated with commitment, compared to 30.4 years old for child rapists and 31.1 years old for rapists. • Maine’s five-year recidivism rate (43%) was much higher than the Massachusetts five year recidivism rate (25%). While there are numerous potential scenarios that could explain the differences in recidivism rates, it is important to note that each state has its own criminal laws and procedures that, in turn, impacts the underlying study population and their recidivism rates. For instance, an offense that resulted in commitment to state prison in Maine might result in a county jail commitment for Massachusetts. Therefore, caution should be taken when making comparisons between the two states. • Offender type, severity of sex offense, and release age were found to be associated with Maine recidivism rates. When coupled with release age, release type was also found to have an influence on recidivism rates. Holding all other attributes constant: o Individuals whose most severe sex offense was a misdemeanor are expected to recidivate at a rate 45% higher than those with a felony level offense. o ‘Other’ type offenders (those whose offenses fell short of rape and did not target children) have an expected recidivism rate 45% higher than offenders who committed sex offenses against children (child predators and child rapists) o Age at release, both by itself and as an interaction with release type, is associated with recidivism rates. For every 10-year increase in age at release, the predicted recidivism rate decreased by 21%. However, for offenders who were released to supervision, the hazard rate decreases even further, with supervised offenders having a 38% decrease in risk for every 10-year increase of age at release. • Of the attributes tested, offender type, release type, release level, and release age were found to be associated with Massachusetts recidivism rates. Holding all other attributes constant: o Offenders released from a maximum-security level facility are predicted to recidivate at a rate 2.4 times higher than that of offenders released from a medium security level facility or lower. o ‘Other’ type sex offenders are predicted to recidivate at a rate 115% higher than those who committed child-based sex offenses (child predators and child rapists). Meanwhile, non-child rape offenders are expected to recidivate at a rate 58% higher than child offenders. o Discharged offenders released without supervision have an expected recidivism rate 61% higher than offenders who were supervised following release. o For every 10-year increase in age, the recidivism rate is expected to decrease by 37%.    

 Portland:  Maine Statistical Analysis Center;   Massachusetts Statistical Analysis Center, 2023. 50p.

By Kara Miller

The Oklahoma Statistical Analysis Center (SAC), a unit located within the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI), is tasked with analyzing and reporting crime data. In 2019, Oklahoma House Bill 2597 was passed by the legislature and signed by the Governor. Effective November 1, 2019, the bill modified Oklahoma law to permit anyone over 21 years or military services members and/or veterans over 18 to carry a firearm without first obtaining a self-defense act (SDA) license provided they are not disqualified based on their criminal history. In order to evaluate whether the change in law impacted crime in Oklahoma, the SAC chose to study violent, gun-related crimes in Oklahoma using State Incident-Based Reporting System (SIBRS) data for the offenses of “murder and non-negligent manslaughter” and aggravated assault. This initial report evaluates 2018 data to establish a baseline. Future reports will analyze data from 2019 and beyond comparing the results to this benchmark report. Key Findings:  For the 37 victims of murder where the sex was known: o Male victims (27) were killed by offenders whose sex was reported as male (17, 56.7%), female (8, 26.7%), or unknown (5, 16.7%). o Female victims (10) were killed by offenders whose sex was reported as male (9, 90.0%) or female (1, 10.0%).  The majority (540, 79.3%) of victims of aggravated assault with a gun were reported with no injury. Victim-to-offender relationship: o For 73.7% of victim-to-offender relationships for victims of murder/non-negligent manslaughter, the victim was within the family of the offender (42.1%), or the victim was outside of the family but known to the offender (31.6%). o For 64.8% of victim-to-offender relationships for victims of aggravated assault, the victim was within the family of the offender (17.8%), or the victim was outside of the family but known to the offender (47.0%).  Victims of Aggravated Assault and Injuries of Aggravated Assault is defined as the presence of a weapon that could cause serious injury or presence of severe injuries.  Nearly 80.0% of victims were reported with no injury. 

Oklahoma City: Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation. Office of Criminal Justice Statistics, 2020. 81p. 

May Contain Markup

By Eliza Earle Ferguson

Crimes of Passion: The book explores how crimes of passion,particularly those involving intimate violence, were understood and treated in fin-de-siècle Paris. These acts were often seen as love stories gone wrong and were frequently acquitted.

Gender Dynamics: It highlights the gendered nature of intimate violence, showing how men and women experienced and justified violence differently, often influenced by societal norms and economic conditions.

Community and Legal Interactions: The document discusses the role of community networks and the legal system in addressing intimate violence, revealing tensions between local knowledge and state power.

Historical Context: The book situates these issues within the broader social and cultural context of 19th-century Paris, providing a detailed analysis of how intimate violence intersected with gender, class, and urban life.

JHU Press, Mar 19, 2010, 268 pages