By Michael T. Light, Jingying Hea, and Jason P. Robey

We make use of uniquely comprehensive arrest data from the Texas Department of Public Safety to compare the criminality of undocumented immigrants to legal immigrants and native-born US citizens between 2012 and 2018. We find that undocumented immigrants have substantially lower crime rates than native-born citizens and legal immigrants across a range of felony offenses. Relative to undocumented immigrants, US-born citizens are over 2 times more likely to be arrested for violent crimes, 2.5 times more likely to be arrested for drug crimes, and over 4 times more likely to be arrested for property crimes. In addition, the proportion of arrests involving undocumented immigrants in Texas was relatively stable or decreasing over this period. The differences between US-born citizens and undocumented immigrants are robust to using alternative estimates of the broader undocumented population, alternate classifications of those counted as “undocumented” at arrest and substituting misdemeanors or convictions as measures of crime.

 Madison, Wisconsin: 2020. 8p.

Earthsight’s year-long investigation reveals that cotton used by two of the world’s largest fast fashion companies, H&M and Zara, is linked to large-scale deforestation, land grabbing, human rights abuses and violent land conflicts in the Brazilian Cerrado, a biome known as the world’s most biodiverse savannah.

The destruction being wrought in the Cerrado – home to five per cent of the world’s species (including giant armadillos, tapirs, jaguars, rheas) – by industrial agriculture has been even worse than that seen in the Amazon. About half of the biome’s native vegetation has been lost. Nearly a fifth of its species, including the maned wolf and blue-eyed ground dove, face extinction due to habitat loss. Major Cerrado rivers could see their water levels drop by a third by 2050 due mostly to deforestation and overexploitation.

Over the last decade Brazilian cotton has gained prominence in the global fashion market. The country is now the world’s second largest exporter and expected to be the number one cotton supplier by 2030. In the decade to 2023, Brazil’s exports more than doubled. Almost all this cotton is grown in the Cerrado. 
 
Our investigators found that H&M and Zara’s clothes suppliers in Asia source cotton grown in the western portion of the Brazilian state of Bahia by two of the country’s largest producers: SLC Agrícola and the Horita Group.

Both companies are implicated in some of Brazil’s most egregious land grabbing cases. In Bahia’s municipality of Formosa do Rio Preto, Horita has been closely linked to the violent land disputes pitting a mega agribusiness estate against traditional communities, known as geraizeiros, that have inhabited the area since the 19th century. More than 10 years ago geraizeiros started experiencing harassment and violence by armed men working for the estate. In 2018, Bahia’s attorney general found the estate was one of the largest areas of public land grabbed in Brazilian history and launched a lawsuit against it to recover these lands.

In the municipality of Correntina, large agribusinesses are accused of misappropriating public lands inhabited by the traditional community of Capão do Modesto to convert them into protected areas for their farms in a process known as ‘green land grabbing’. Instead of setting aside part of their productive properties for environmental conservation, several agribusinesses have acquired land elsewhere for this purpose. Both the Horita Group and SLC Agrícola have cotton farms in Bahia that are linked to green land grabbing at Capão do Modesto. Bahia’s attorney general has referred to Capão as "one of the most serious land grabbing cases in Bahia,” and requested the cancellation of all land titles overlapping it. The local community has suffered harassment, surveillance and attacks carried out by gunmen linked to the agribusinesses.

The Horita Group and SLC Agrícola have a brazen history of environmental infractions in western Bahia, where both companies have been repeatedly fined for illegal deforestation. SLC has been named one of the top deforesters in the Cerrado. Some of its cotton farms in western Bahia have lost at least 40,000 hectares of native vegetation in the last 12 years. Earthsight conservatively estimates Horita has cleared at least 30,000ha over the last 20 years, but the true number is probably closer to 60,000ha. 

As part of their sustainability efforts, H&M and Zara rely on a fundamentally flawed ethical supply chain certification system called Better Cotton (BC). The cotton we linked to land rights and environmental abuses in Bahia carried the Better Cotton label. This should not be surprising. The scheme suffers from several weaknesses, including in relation to requirements on compliance with local laws, respect for local communities’ rights and illegal deforestation. A new traceability system being rolled out in the coming years is woefully inadequate as it only traces cotton back to the country of origin, not to individual farms. Earthsight also identified worrying problems with BC’s accreditation and compliance systems. In Brazil, a national cotton producers’ association (ABRAPA) is in charge of the certification programme, a serious conflict of interest.

By James Lewis, Sarah Marsden, Adrian Cherney, Martine Zeuthen, Lotta Rahlf, Chloe Squires, Anne Peterscheck

Background

Increasingly, counter-radicalisation interventions are using case management approaches to structure the delivery of tailored services to those at risk of engaging in, or engaged in, violent extremism. This review sets out the evidence on case management tools and approaches and is made up of two parts with the following objectives.

Objectives

Part I: (1) Synthesise evidence on the effectiveness of case management tools and approaches in interventions seeking to counter radicalisation to violence. (2) Qualitatively synthesise research examining whether case management tools and approaches are implemented as intended, and the factors that explain how they are implemented. Part II: (3) Synthesise systematic reviews to understand whether case management tools and approaches are effective at countering non-terrorism related interpersonal or collective forms of violence. (4) Qualitatively synthesise research analysing whether case management tools and approaches are implemented as intended, and what influences how they are implemented. (5) Assess the transferability of tools and approaches used in wider violence prevention work to counter-radicalisation interventions.

Search Methods

Search terms tailored for Part I and Part II were used to search research repositories, grey literature sources and academic journals for studies published between 2000 and 2022. Searches were conducted in August and September 2022. Forward and backward citation searches and consultations with experts took place between September 2022 and February 2023. Studies in English, French, German, Russian, Swedish, Norwegian and Danish were eligible.

Selection Criteria

Part I: Studies had to report on a case management intervention, tool or approach, or on specific stages of the case management process. Only experimental and stronger quasi-experimental studies were eligible for inclusion in the analysis of effectiveness. The inclusion criteria for the analysis of implementation allowed for other quantitative designs and qualitative research. Part II: Systematic reviews examining a case management intervention, tool or approach, or stage(s) of the case management process focused on countering violence were eligible for inclusion.

Data Collection and Analysis

Part I: 47 studies were eligible for Part I. No studies met the inclusion criteria for Objective 1; all eligible studies related to Objective 2. Data from these studies was synthesised using a framework synthesis approach and presented narratively. Risk of bias was assessed using the CASP (for qualitative research) and EPHPP (for quantitative research) checklists. Part I: Eight reviews were eligible for Part II. Five reviews met the inclusion criteria for Objective 3, and seven for Objective 4. Data from the studies was synthesised using a framework synthesis approach and presented narratively. Risk of bias was assessed using the AMSTAR II tool.

Findings

Part I: No eligible studies examined effectiveness of tools and approaches. Seven studies examined the implementation of different approaches, or the assumptions underpinning interventions. Clearly defined theories of change were absent, however these interventions were assessed as being implemented in line with their own underlying logic. Forty-three studies analysed the implementation of tools during individual stages of the case management process, and forty-one examined the implementation of this process as-a-whole. Factors which influenced how individual stages and the case management process as a whole were implemented included strong multi-agency working arrangements; the inclusion of relevant knowledge and expertise, and associated training; and the availability of resources. The absence of these facilitators inhibited implementation. Additional implementation barriers included overly risk-oriented logics; public and political pressure; and broader legislation. Twenty-eight studies identified moderators that shaped how interventions were delivered, including delivery context; local context; standalone interventions; and client challenges. Part II: The effectiveness of two interventions – mentoring and multi-systemic therapy – in reducing violent outcomes were each assessed by one systematic review, whilst three reviews analysed the impact that the use of risk assessment tools (n = 2) and polygraphs (n = 1) had on outcomes. All these reviews reported mixed results. Comparable factors to those identified in Part I, such as staff training and expertise and delivery context, were found to shape implementation. On the basis of this modest sample, the research on interventions to counter non-terrorism related violence was assessed to be transferable to counter-radicalisation interventions.

Authors' Conclusions

The effectiveness of existing case management tools and approaches is poorly understood, and research examining the factors that influence how different approaches are implemented is limited. However, there is a growing body of research on the factors which facilitate or generate barriers to the implementation of case management interventions. Many of the factors and moderators relevant to countering radicalisation to violence also impact how case management tools and approaches used to counter other forms of violence are implemented. Research in this wider field seems to have transferable insights for efforts to counter radicalisation to violence. This review provides a platform for further research to test the impact of different tools, and the mechanisms by which they inform outcomes. This work will benefit from using the case management framework as a way of rationalising and analysing the range of tools, approaches and processes that make up case managed interventions to counter radicalisation to violence.
Campbell Systematic Reviews
Volume 20, Issue 2

June 2024

By Ashley N. Muchow

Amid punitive shifts in crime and immigration control during the 1980s and 1990s, Hispanic individuals com-prised a growing share of the population confined in U.S.prisons and jails. Although it is widely acknowledged that the nation’s wars on crime and drugs contribute to higher rates of minority arrest, limited empirical research has examined whether the merging of immi-gration control with criminal justice practice during this period intensified these disparities. This article uses county-level arrest data from California between 1980and 2004 to investigate whether intergovernmental ser-vice agreements (IGSAs) leasing jail space for immigrant detention increased rates of Hispanic arrest. Employing A quasi-experimental design that leverages the staggered adoption of IGSAs across counties, this study finds that these agreements increased rates of Hispanic arrest but had no discernible impact on arrest rates for White Or Black residents. Supplemental analyses reveal that these increases were driven by misdemeanor arrests and were particularly pronounced in counties where the His-panic population comprised between 11 and 22 percent.These findings suggest that IGSAs may trigger minority threat concerns that increase arrests, shedding additional light on Hispanic representation in the criminal justice system.

Criminology, early view, May 2024.

By Charles Fain Lehman

Drug policing faces two simultaneous crises. One is the drug crisis itself, which the public and policymakers expect police to play a role in suppressing. The other is a crisis of public confidence, in policing in general but especially in the efficacy of the enforcement-driven “War on Drugs.” This report frames an approach to policing drugs meant to address both crises—a 21st-century approach to drug policing.

Routine drug policing is widely perceived to be an ineffective approach to controlling drug problems. This is because it is relatively hard for policing to cut off the supply of drugs altogether. Routine enforcement can increase the price of drugs, making the drugs scarcer, but these effects are likely small, and the effects of price on demand are, in turn, quite small in addicted subpopulations. These concerns are particularly relevant in the current crisis, in which novel methods of drug production have driven prices to rock bottom.

Faced with this evidence, some argue that policing and drug problems should be totally disconnected, through a policy of decriminalization. This, advocates argue, would reduce both the health harms of drug use and the harms of the criminal-justice system. However, the evidence indicates that the former claim is probably wrong—the expected average effect of decriminalization on figures like the overdose death rate is probably close to zero. Moreover, policymakers are capable of addressing the fact that the criminal-justice system can harm drug users, and it would be foolhardy to drop the good aspects of drug enforcement as a method to avoid these “bads.”

What are the “goods” of drug policing, and how can they be bolstered? This report culminates in three strategies for a modern, evidence-based approach to drug policing:

• Drug-Market Crackdowns: Rather than do routine, haphazard enforcement, police can focus all their resources on particular drug markets or drug problems and enforce against them simultaneously. This has the effect of crippling the market, circumventing the limited effects that policing has on price by substantially reducing supply altogether.

• Responding to Emerging Threats: Emerging drug markets—especially novel synthetic substances—represent a particular opportunity for police effectiveness. By differentially targeting small markets, police can keep them small, having an outsize impact relative to targeting large but hard-to-control markets.

• Policing as Public Health: Police officers are not just enforcers; they are also first responders, and they should see themselves as frontline actors in getting people the treatment they need. Equipping police with naloxone is a widely taken first step. But treatment referral following overdose, or diversion to treatment in lieu of arrest or prosecution, is a promising way for police to take the lead on controlling drug problems.

These strategies collectively imply a more strategic approach to drug policing than the historical norm. Routine buy-busts are likely no longer effective strategies for fighting the drug crisis—if they ever were. But police can still play a substantial role in combating the drug crisis. And if they do so intelligently, they can regain the public’s trust.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2024. 26p.

By Scott R. Kegler, et al.

Introduction: The majority of homicides (79%) and suicides (53%) in the United States involved a firearm in 2020. High firearm homicide and suicide rates and corresponding inequities by race and ethnicity and poverty level represent important public health concerns. This study examined changes in firearm homicide and firearm suicide rates coinciding with the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

Methods: National vital statistics and population data were integrated with urbanization and poverty measures at the county level. Population-based firearm homicide and suicide rates were examined by age, sex, race and ethnicity, geographic area, level of urbanization, and level of poverty.

Results: From 2019 to 2020, the overall firearm homicide rate increased 34.6%, from 4.6 to 6.1 per 100,000 persons. The largest increases occurred among non-Hispanic Black or African American males aged 10–44 years and non-Hispanic American Indian or Alaska Native (AI/AN) males aged 25–44 years. Rates of firearm homicide were lowest and increased least at the lowest poverty level and were higher and showed larger increases at higher poverty levels. The overall firearm suicide rate remained relatively unchanged from 2019 to 2020 (7.9 to 8.1); however, in some populations, including AI/AN males aged 10–44 years, rates did increase.

Conclusions and Implications for Public Health Practice: During the COVID-19 pandemic, the firearm homicide rate in the United States reached its highest level since 1994, with substantial increases among several population subgroups. These increases have widened disparities in rates by race and ethnicity and poverty level. Several increases in firearm suicide rates were also observed. Implementation of comprehensive strategies employing proven approaches that address underlying economic, physical, and social conditions contributing to the risks for violence and suicide is urgently needed to reduce these rates and disparities.

 MMWR Morb Motal Wkly Rep. 2022; 71(19):656-663. doi:10.15585/mmwr.mm7119e1Google ScholarCrossref

By Alex R. Piquero,  John K. Roman

This cross-sectional study evaluates changes in firearm homicide demographics before and after the COVID-19 pandemic.

Go to:

Introduction

In 2020, the US experienced the largest 1-year increase in homicide since 1960. The spike began in the first few months of the year, accelerating during the COVID-19 pandemic, emergency measures, the murder of George Floyd, and social protests.1

Three additional observations are relevant. First, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that the homicide increase in 2020 was due to firearm injuries. While the overall homicide rate increased 28.4%, the firearm homicide rate increased 34.6%.2 Second, the spike in violence was concentrated within certain demographic groups. CDC researchers found 19 384 victims of firearms homicide in 2020.3 Of those victims, 61% were Black individuals, and they experienced firearm homicide at 14 times the rate of White indviduals in 2020. This racial disparity does not exist for other types of violence.4 Third, the largest increases in death by firearm homicide were for Black men aged between 10 and 44 years old.5

Go to:

Methods

This cross-sectional study queried mortality data from the CDC WONDER online database to examine race and ethnicity disparities in death by firearm homicide by 5-year age-band categories for the period 2018 through 2022 (2022 includes provisional data), before, during, and subsequent to the pandemic.6 The CDC WONDER database provides information on race and ethnicity as reported on death certificates. Population-adjusted rates were returned by the database using data from the US Census Bureau. Exemption of institutional review board review was granted by The University of Miami. Informed consent was not required because the study used publicly available data without personal identifying information. All analyses were completed in Excel version 16.0 (Microsoft).

Go to:

Results

Figure 1 displays the crude rate of death by firearm homicide per 100 000 for all individuals, White individuals only, Black individuals only, and Hispanic or Latino individuals of any race. Four results are evident. First, among all groups, 2 age bands (20-24 and 25-29 years) show the highest peaks. Second, the year 2021 has the highest rate for the majority of age bands. Third, firearm homicides for White individuals also peaked in 2021, with persons aged 20 to 34 years having the highest risk. Fourth, rates for White individuals never top 4.3 per 100 000. Among Black individuals, for those persons aged 20 to 24 years, the rate is over 80 per 100 000. Finally, Figure 2 displays the ratio of Black to White homicide victimization by age group, by year. For those aged 15 to 19 years, the rate for Black individuals in 2021 is 27 times the rate for White individuals.

JAMA Netw Open. 2024 May; 7(5): e2412946.

By Rebecca Shea and Jared B. Smith
  All federal programs and operations are at risk of fraud. Therefore, agencies need robust processes in place to prevent, detect, and respond to fraud. While the government obligated almost $40 trillion from fiscal years 2018 through 2022, no reliable estimates of fraud losses affecting the federal government previously existed. As part of GAO’s work on managing fraud risks, this report (1) estimates the range of total direct annual financial losses from fraud based on 2018-2022 data and (2) identifies opportunities and challenges in fraud estimation to support fraud risk management. GAO estimated the range of total direct annual financial losses from fraud based on 2018-2022 data using a Monte Carlo simulation model. GAO identified opportunities and challenges through interviews and data collection focused on 12 agencies representing about 90 percent of federal obligations. What GAO Recommends GAO is making two recommendations to OMB—one in collaboration with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and the other with agency input to improve the availability of fraud-related data. GAO is also making a recommendation to the Department of the Treasury to expand government-wide fraud estimation, in consultation with OMB. OMB generally agreed with the recommendations but disagreed with the estimate. GAO believes the estimate is sound, as discussed in the report. CIGIE stated it would work with OMB to consider how OIGs might improve fraud-related data. Treasury agreed with the recommendation.   

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2024. 80p.

By David Blake Johnson and Joshua J. Robinson

We explore the relationship between gun prevalence and homicides in the United States from 2003–2019. Unlike previous research, which typically uses an indirect, state-level measure of gun prevalence, we use a direct measure of guns in a narrow geographic area: gun dealers. We find an increase in gun dealer density is significantly and positively associated with increased homicides in subsequent years. We compare estimates from our preferred measure, the number of dealers per 100 square miles in a local area, to those found using other gun prevalence measures. We find our preferred measure to be more consistent in magnitude across three different estimation methods and two different data sources. We additionally show the effect of gun dealer density is limited mostly to counties that have a high percent of Black residents. We propose that the so-called “Ferguson Effect”—a sharp increase in violent crime in urban and Black communities after 2014—might be partially explained by an influx of gun dealers in and near Black communities, rather than just a change in the propensity of Black residents to call the police or changes in police behavior.

Unpublished paper 2021. 48p.

Johnson, David Blake and Robinson, Joshua J., Gun Dealer Density and its Effect on Homicide (November 17, 2021).

By Georgina Sturge 

  Asylum is protection given by a country to someone fleeing from persecution in their own country. An asylum seeker is someone who has applied for asylum and is awaiting a decision on whether they will be granted refugee status. An asylum applicant who does not qualify for refugee status may still be granted leave to remain in the UK for humanitarian or other reasons. An asylum seeker whose application is refused at initial decision may appeal the decision through an appeal process and, if successful, may be granted leave to remain. • In 2023, 67,337 applications for asylum were made in the UK, which related to 84,425 individuals (more than one applicant can be included in a single application). • The annual number of asylum applications to the UK peaked in 2002 at 84,132. After that the number fell sharply to reach a twenty-year low point of 17,916 in 2010. It rose steadily throughout the 2010s, then rapidly from 2021 onwards to reach 81,130 applications in 2022, the highest annual number since 2002. • Not all asylum applications are successful. In 2023, 33% were refused at initial decision (not counting withdrawals). The annual refusal rate was highest in 2004 (88%) and lowest in recent times in 2022 (24%). • When an application is refused at initial decision, it may be appealed. Between 2004 to 2021, around three-quarters of applicants refused asylum at initial decision lodged an appeal and almost one third of those appeals were allowed. • In 2023, the most common origin region of asylum seekers was Asia and the most common single nationality was Afghan. In previous recent years, the Middle East was the most common origin region, with Syrian and Iranian the most common nationalities. • As of June 2023, the total ‘work in progress’ asylum caseload consisted of 215,500 cases. Of these, 138,000 cases were awaiting an initial decision, 5,100 were awaiting the outcome of an appeal, and approximately 41,200 cases were subject to removal action. • The total asylum caseload has more than doubled in size since 2014, driven both by applicants waiting longer for an initial decision and a  growth in the number of people subject to removal action following a negative decision. • The Covid-19 pandemic reduced the number of asylum seekers arriving by air routes in 2020 and 2021. However, during this time the number of people arriving in small boats across the Channel (most of whom applied for asylum) rose substantially. The number of small boat arrivals rose again in 2022 despite the re-opening of other travel routes. • In 2022, there were around 13 asylum applications for every 10,000 people living in the UK. Across the EU27 there were 22 asylum applications for every 10,000 people. The UK was therefore below the average among EU countries for asylum applications per head of population, ranking 19th among EU27 countries plus the UK on this measure. In addition to the asylum process, the UK operates various routes for people seeking humanitarian protection to be granted status outside of the UK and then, in some cases, assisted in travelling to the UK. • Between 2014 and March 2024, 57,000 people were resettled or relocated to the UK through various schemes. Around 20,000 of these were Syrians resettled between 2014 and 2020. Since 2021, 25,000 people from Afghanistan have been resettled or relocated to the UK through various schemes. • In 2022, two new routes were introduced for Ukrainians. As of May 2024, around 207,000 people have arrived under these routes. This flow was much larger in scale than any other single forced migration flow to the UK in recent history. The number of Ukrainian refugees who arrived in the UK in 2022 was equivalent to the number of people granted refuge in the UK from all origins, in total, between 2014 and 2021. • In 2023, asylum seekers and refugees made up around 11% of immigrants to the UK. If including the British National (Overseas) scheme in the category of humanitarian routes, up to 14% of immigration in that year would fall into that category.    

London: UK House of Commons Library, 2024. 36p.

By Rebecca S. Gambler, et al., U.S. Government Accountability Office

  With more than 60,000 employees, CBP is the nation’s largest federal law enforcement agency and is responsible for securing U.S. borders while facilitating legitimate travel and trade. When conducting their duties, CBP law enforcement personnel may be involved in critical incidents. For example, in 2023, critical incidents occurred when a vehicle struck and injured Border Patrol agents and when a child died in CBP custody. CBP personnel may also be involved in noncritical incidents. GAO was asked to review CBP’s approach in responding to incidents. This report assesses how Border Patrol CITs operated before they were disbanded in 2022, Border Patrol’s response to noncritical incidents since that time, and how OPR has developed capacity and implemented investigative standards for critical incident response. GAO analyzed Border Patrol documents on CIT operations from fiscal years 2010 through 2022. GAO interviewed Border Patrol officials from headquarters and the nine southwest border sectors. GAO also analyzed OPR documents and data and interviewed OPR officials. GAO conducted site visits to three southwest border locations. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that Border Patrol implement guidance that standardizes sector approaches to noncritical incident response and monitor adherence to the guidance, and that OPR develop guidance for investigators on identifying potential impairments to their independence and train investigators on how to apply the guidance. CBP concurred.

GAO-24-106148

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2024. 91p.

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

This report analyses publicly available statistical data and factual observations collected about the functioning of the Kosovo justice system institutions in the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region before and after the mass resignation of Kosovo Serb judges, prosecutors, and administrative staff in November 2022. It identifies the impact of the resignations on the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica justice system, with a focus on rule of law and fair trial standards, particularly the right to trial within a reasonable time and access to justice.

Vienna: OSCE, 2024. 32p.

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

This report provides an analysis of data collected by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo trial monitoring programme from January to December 2022 and identifies trends in prosecution, defence and court practices in relation to the imposition of detention measures on defendants with mental health needs in Kosovo. It analyses judicial practice for compliance with fair trial and international human rights standards.

Vienna: OSCE, 2024. 18p.

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,

This report provides an analysis of data from cases of illegal possession of weapons collected by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo trial monitoring programme from December 2020 to August 2023 and assesses court sentencing practices for compliance with fair trial and international human rights standards, with a particular focus on fair and consistent sentencing. 

Vienna: OSCE, 2024.  21p.

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,

Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings

This paper provides an overview of the existing links between disability and trafficking in human beings, how persons living with disability are affected by trafficking, and to what extent legal standards, policy frameworks, and anti-trafficking measures integrate concerns associated with disabilities. This analysis is approached from four distinct perspectives: disability as an enhanced vulnerability factor that traffickers target; disability as a feature of exploitation; disability as a result of trafficking and exploitation; and disability of trafficking survivors as a factor in accessing justice, protection, employment, health, and rehabilitation services. Finally, the paper presents a series of recommendations and potential strategies aimed at elevating awareness and prioritizing the disability dimension within efforts to combat human trafficking.

Vienna: OSCE, 2024. 46p,

By Christopher Lau

Against the backdrop of declining crime rates, gun violence and gun-related homicides have only risen over the last three years. Just as it historically has, the brunt of that violence has been borne by poor Black and brown communities. These communities are especially impacted: they are not only far more likely to be the victims of gun violence, but are also the primary targets of police surveillance and harassment. People of color are disproportionately prosecuted for gun crimes, which, in part, prompted the Black Public Defenders Amicus Brief in support of expanding gun rights in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen. Recognizing that the carceral approach of policing and prosecution has failed to prevent gun violence and has harmed Black and brown communities, this Article sets forth community violence interruption groups as a promising decarceral alternative. Violence interruption groups address violence by working with the people who are most impacted by cyclical gun violence and intervene by mediating conflicts, defusing imminent violence, and encouraging people to give up their firearms. Building on the work of abolitionist scholars and organizers, this Article centers the role of Violence Interrupters as an important alternative to policing and punitive prosecution. It explores legal changes that might minimize the legal barriers to violence interruption, including statutory reform, mens rea reform, expansion of the Second Amendment, and recognition of an innocent possession defense.

104 Boston University Law Review 769 (2024), Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1805

By Ingrid V. Eagly and Steven Shafer

This Article traces the modern development and institutional design of detained immigration courts—that is, the courts that tie detention to deportation. Since the early 1980s, judges in detained immigration courts have presided over more than 3.6 million court cases of persons held in immigration custody, almost all men from Latin America, most of whom are charged with only civil violations of the immigration law.

Primary sources indicate that detained immigration courts are concentrated outside major urban areas, most commonly in the South, and often housed in structures not traditionally associated with courts, including inside prisons, jails, detention processing centers, makeshift tents, shipping containers, and border patrol stations. Other defining features of these detained courts include case completion goals prioritizing speed, minimal representation by counsel, heavy reliance on video adjudication, constrained public access, and arrest and venue rules that give the government unfettered control over the court that hears the case. Accompanying these developments, judges working inside detained courts have become increasingly separated from the rest of the immigration judge corps and, when compared to their counterparts in the nondetained courts, are more likely to be male, to have served in the military, and to have worked as prosecutors.

This Article argues that the largely unregulated design elements of detained immigration courts threaten due process and fundamental fairness by fostering a segregated court system that assigns systematic disadvantage to those who are detained during their case. Recognizing the structure and function of the detained immigration court system has a number of important implications for organizing efforts to reduce reliance on detention, policy proposals for restructuring the immigration courts, and future research on judicial decision-making.

Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110 Issue 3, 691 (2024)

UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 24-15

By Elizabeth Wrigley-Field

Field Reparations proposals typically target wealth. Yet slavery’s and Jim Crow’s long echoes also steal time, such as by producing shorter Black lifespans even today. I argue that lost time should be considered an indepen dent target for redress; identify challenges to doing so; and provide examples of what reparations redressing lost lifespan could look like. To identify quantitative targets for redress, I analyze area- level relationships between Black lifespans and six measures of intensity of slavery, Jim Crow, and racial terror. Results reveal inconsistent relationships across measures, suggesting difficulties in grounding a target for redress in such variation. Instead, I propose that policies aim to redress the national lifespan gap between White and Black Americans. The article concludes with a typology of potential strategies for such redress.  

RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences June 2024, 10 (2) 88-112; DOI: https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2024.10.2.04

By Cas Mudde 

The rise of Donald Trump has weakened the dominance of the “American exceptionalism” paradigm in analyses of U.S. politics, but the pivot to views of the United States as part of a global trend toward democratic backsliding ignores important, uniquely “American” cultural, historical, and institutional attributes that make the country more at risk for democratic erosion than most other established democracies. This short article puts Trump, and his Republican Party, into the broader comparative perspective of (European) far-right studies. I argue that Trump in many ways fits the “fourth wave” of postwar far-right politics, lay out the unique challenge that the United States is facing in terms of democratic erosion, and draw on the case of Viktor Orbán in Hungary to learn lessons for the United States. The article ends with some suggestions of how democrats (not just Democrats) should address the far-right Republican challenge to U.S. democracy.

It is rare for political scientists to write a New York Times bestseller, but Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt did just that, with their insightful book How Democracies Die (2018). It is the best contribution to what has quickly become a new and popular genre of political doomsday books, declaring the end of democracy, liberalism, or both. What makes the success of How Democracies Die even more remarkable is that the authors look to other countries to help explain what is happening in the United States. Based on the authors’ extensive research on early-twentieth-century Europe and late-twentieth-century Latin America, Levitsky and Ziblatt provide an original and thought-provoking understanding of contemporary U.S. politics. With this comparative approach, the authors went against the “American exceptionalism” paradigm, claiming that U.S. politics is unique in the world, which has long dominated academic and political debates in the United States.

Ironically, for a politician who championed an isolationalist “America First” policy, Donald Trump has done more to open the country up to comparisons with the rest of the world than possibly any U.S. politician before him. Few analyses of his ascendence failed to note similar developments in other countries, from Brazil (Jair Bolsonaro) to Italy (Silvio Berlusconi) and France (Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen). The most ahistorical accounts declare Trump the trendsetter of a global “far right” surge that, in fact, started at least 25 years prior in Europe. The pivot from “American exceptionalism” to views of the United States as part of a global trend toward democratic backsliding might be therapeutic to those who oppose Trump, but it ignores important, uniquely “American” cultural, historical, and institutional attributes that make the United States more at risk for democratic erosion than most other established democracies.

In this short article, I put Trump, and his Republican Party, into the broader comparative perspective of (European) far-right studies. In the first section, I argue that Trump in many ways fits what I have called the “fourth wave” of postwar far-right politics. In the second section, I lay out the unique challenge that the United States is facing in terms of democratic erosion; and in the third section, I draw on the case of Viktor Orbán in Hungary to learn lessons for the United States. The article ends with some suggestions of how democrats (not just Democrats) should address the far-right Republican challenge to U.S. democracy.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 699(1), 101-115. 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162211070060

By Dennis Rodgers

Gangs are widely considered major contributors to the high levels of violence afflicting Latin America, including in particular Central America. At the same time, however, the vast majority of individuals who join a gang will also leave it and, it is assumed, become less violent. Having said this, the mechanisms underlying this ‘desistance’ process are not well understood, and nor are the determinants of individuals’ post-gang trajectories, partly because gang desistance tends to be seen as an event rather than a process. Drawing on long term ethnographic research carried out in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, a poor neighbourhood in Nicaragua’s capital city Managua, and more specifically a set of ‘archetypal’ gang member life histories that illustrate the occupational options open to former gang members, this article offers a longitudinal perspective on desistance and its consequences, with specific reference to the determinants of individuals’ continued engagement with violence (or not) 

Journal of Latin American Studies (2023), 55, 679–704 doi:10.1017/S0022216X23000718