By Li Li, Anke Hoeffler, and Teresa Artho

Background: Switzerland is a high-income country with low rates of fatal and nonfatal violence. Possibly due to these low prevalence rates, the costs of violence to Swiss society have received relatively little attention. Objective: This report aims to establish the prevalence rates of homicide and assaults (both physical and sexual) in Switzerland and assess their related tangible and intangible costs. Furthermore, it aims to estimate the economic cost of violence in Switzerland while specifically delving into the economic impact of domestic violence and intimate partner violence (IPV). Methods: We employ a comprehensive approach to categorize violence-related costs into three categories: (1) tangible direct costs; (2) tangible indirect costs; and (3) intangible costs. Within each category, we further classify costs based on the outcome of injuries, distinguishing between fatal and nonfatal violence. To estimate these costs, we use official crime data from the Federal Statistical Office for homicide and assaults. Recognizing the issue of underreporting in physical and sexual assault offenses, victimization surveys are employed to estimate the number of unreported cases. In the absence of Swiss data on the cost of injuries, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides estimates on medical costs, work loss costs, and the value of a statistical life (VSL)/quality of life loss costs. To ensure comparability, violence types are mapped, and costs are adjusted for purchasing power parity between the US and Switzerland. We also make adjustments to reflect the relative size of medical spending between the two countries. For comparison, we use prevalence rates of physical assault from Gallup. Using the same methodology, we also estimate the costs of domestic violence and IPV. Results: Our estimates suggest that the economic cost of violence in Switzerland is about USD 66.3 billion, equivalent to 8.3 percent of the country’s GDP, according to Swiss data. However, the costs could be as high as USD 73.4 billion, representing 9.2 percent of GDP, based on the Gallup World Poll data. Further, domestic violence alone accounts for at least 4.4 percent of Swiss GDP, while IPV accounts for at least 3.2 percent. Conclusions: Despite low Swiss prevalence rates of violence, the estimated costs of said violence are high. However, there is considerable uncertainty regarding our estimates due to missing Swiss data on medical and criminal justice costs, as well as the severity of injuries due to assault.

New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation, 2023. 36p

By Paul M Bisca, Vu Chau, Paolo Dudine, Raphael A Espinoza, Jean-Marc Fournier, Pierre Guérin, Niels-Jakob H Hansen, and Jorge Salas

Violent crime and insecurity remain major barriers to prosperity in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). With just 8 percent of the global population, LAC accounts for a third of the world’s homicides. Building on the existing literature, this paper aims to support economic policymakers and development partners by exploring the interplay between insecurity and macroeconomic outcomes, with emphasis on the relationship between violent crime and growth, the business climate, and public finances. The analysis shows that national-level crime indicators mask huge internal disparities, and that municipalities with 10 percent higher homicide rates have lower economic activity by around 4 percent. The paper develops an innovative measure of insecurity—the share of crime-related news—and shows its association with lower industrial production. Using firm-level data, it also estimates that the direct costs of crime, for firms, are around 7 percent of annual sales, and these are much higher when gangs and drug-trafficking organizations are present. Violent crime rises with macroeconomic instability, inequality, and governance problems. Using a large cross-country panel, the analysis finds that homicides increase when a country is affected by negative growth, high inflation, or a worsening of inequality. Victimization surveys indicate that where populations are concerned with the rule of law—impunity and police corruption—only one in five victims file their case with the police. Lack of trust and crime can be mutually reinforcing. Finally, the paper documents the fiscal burden of security provision and finds that spending tends to be inelastic to crime and that spending efficiency could be improved. The paper concludes with policy lessons and areas for additional collaboration between national authorities, international partners, and key stakeholders. These focus on data collection and analysis, economic policies that may address the root causes and manifestations of crime, strengthening rule of law institutions, and intensifying regional exchanges on security and public finance issues.

Washington, DC: : International Monetary Fund. 2024. 60p.

By Andrés Aldana, Hernán Larralde & Maximino Aldana

Among all types of corruption, police corruption is probably the one that most directly hurts society, as those trusted with protecting the people either side with the criminals that victimize the citizens, or are themselves, criminals. However, both corruption and its effects are very difficult to measure quantitatively other than by perception surveys, but the perception that citizens have of this phenomenon may be different from reality. Using a simple agent-based model, we analyze the effect on crime rates as a result of both corruption and the perception of corruption within law-enforcement corporations. Our results show a phase transition in which crime can propagate across the population even when the majority of police officers are honest. We find that one of the parameters that strongly controls crime incidence is the probability that regular citizens become criminals. In contrast, other actions, such as arresting crime lords, or the amount of crime-associated money that is confiscated, have little impact on the long-term crime incidence. Our results suggest that in addition to combating corruption within law-enforcement institutions, to further reduce the incidence of crime, policymakers should strive to restore confidence in these institutions and the justice system.

By Charles C. Lanfear, David S. Kirk

Private short-term letting via Airbnb has exploded in the last decade, yet little is known about how this affects neighborhood crime rates. We estimate the association between Airbnb short-term letting activity and six types of police-reported crime in London, as well as an intervening mechanism, collective efficacy. We estimate these associations with maximum likelihood dynamic panel models with fixed effects (ML-SEM) using data on Airbnb lettings in 4,835 London neighborhoods observed for 13 calendar quarters. We explore mechanisms for the observed effects using multiple lag specifications and by disaggregating lettings into entire properties and spare rooms. We find that Airbnb activity is positively related to robbery, burglary, theft, and violence. These associations are attributable to lettings for entire properties rather than for rooms. Furthermore, associations are contemporaneous, as is consistent with an opportunity mechanism, rather than delayed, as would be consistent with a social control mechanism. Similarly, we find that the association between Airbnb activity and crime is not mediated by collective efficacy. Overall, these results suggest short-term letting contributes to neighborhood crime and these effects are more likely to be attributable to changes in criminal opportunity than erosion of neighborhood social control.

Criminology, Volume 62, Issue 4, 2024, pages 769-798

By Indra de Soysa

Democracy and the level of economic development correlate tightly. While some argue that egalitarian conditions inherent in democracies reduce homicide, others suggest that it is economic development that matters. This study evaluates competing theory and tests the democracy—homicide link using homicide data defined as death due to interpersonal violence and novel data on a variety of democracies. The results show that democracies associate positively with homicide, and egalitarian democracy shows the strongest effect. The level of economic development is negative on homicide and substantively large. The basic results are robust to alternative data, estimating method, and to omitted variables bias.

The British Journal of Criminology, 2024, 22 p.

By Patricio Domínguez 

This paper models crime rates as a function of the interaction between potential offenders and victims. In particular, the paper studies robbery of bus drivers, a crime that remains common in cities throughout the world. Exploiting the timing of a significant reform introduced in Chile in the public transportation sector and detailed administrative data on crime incidents, the paper shows how victims' propensity to resist an attack can alter the level and nature of criminal activity. The paper also finds a large decline in crime after the implementation of a technological innovation that eliminated cash transactions on buses. The results suggest a strong relationship between victims incentives, cash presence, and crime.

Washington DC: IDB, 2020. 70p.

By  C.M. Hoeboer*, W.M. Kitselaar, J.F. Henrich, E.J. Miedzobrodzka, B. Wohlstetter, E. Giebels, G. Meynen, E.W. Kruisbergen, M. Kempes, M. Olff, C.H. de Kogel

COVID-19 caused a great burden on the healthcare system and led to lockdown measures across the globe. These measures are likely to influence crime rates, but a comprehensive overview on the impact of COVID-19 on crime rates is lacking. The aim of the current study was to systematically review evidence on the impact of COVID-19 measures on crime rates across the globe. We conducted a systematic search in several databases to identify eligible studies up until 6–12-2021. A total of 46 studies were identifed, reporting on 99 crime rates about robberies (n=12), property crime (n=15), drug crime (n=5), fraud (n=5), physical violence (n=15), sexual violence (n=11), homicides (n=12), cybercrime (n=3), domestic violence (n=3), intimate partner violence (n=14), and other crimes (n=4). Overall, studies showed that most types of crime temporarily declined during COVID-19 measures. Homicides and cybercrime were an exception to this rule and did not show significant changes following COVID-19 restrictions. Studies on domestic violence often found increased crime rates, and this was particularly true for studies based on call data rather than crime records. Studies on intimate partner violence reported mixed results. We found an immediate impact of COVID-19 restrictions on almost all crime rates except for homicides, cybercrimes and intimate partner violence.  

Published in American Journal of Criminal, Sociology, Political Science, Medicine November 2023

By John H. Boman IV & Owen Gallupe 

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, state-level governments across the United States issued mandatory stay-at-home orders around the end of March 2020. Though intended to stop the spread of the COVID-19 virus, the lockdowns have had sweeping impacts on life in ways which were not originally planned. This study’s purpose is to investigate the extent to which governmental responses to COVID-19 have impacted crime rates in the U.S. Compared to the pre-pandemic year of 2019, crime – as measured by calls for service to law enforcement – has decreased markedly. However, there are multiple indications that the crime drop is being driven by decreases in minor offenses which are typically committed in peer groups. At the same time, serious crimes which are generally not committed with co-offenders (namely homicide and intimate partner violence) have either remained constant or increased. As such, the crime drop appears to be hiding a very disturbing trend where homicides remain unchanged and intimate partner batteries are increasing. Since many offenders would presumably be committing less serious crimes in a non-pandemic world, we raise attention to the possibility that mandatory lockdown orders may have taken minor offenders and placed them into situations where there is rampant opportunity for intimate partner violence, serious batteries, and homicides. While crime in the U.S. appears to be down overall, this good news should not blind us to a troubling co-occurring reality – a reality that paints a dim picture of unintended consequences to public health and criminal justice finances as a result of COVID-19 lockdowns.

American Journal of Criminal Justice, 2020. 9p.

By Steven James Lee and  Daniel Augusto

  In the latter half of 2020, Los Angeles was dubbed by the media and academicians as the latest epicenter of COVID-19 in the United States. Using time-series analysis on Los Angeles Police Department crime data from 2017 through 2020, this paper tests the economic theory of crime, routine activities theory, social isolation theory, and structural vulnerability theory to determine whether they accurately predicted specifc crime rate movements in the wake of COVID-19 in the city of Los Angeles. Economic theory of crime was supported by the data, and social isolation theory and structural vulnerability theory were partially supported. Routine activities theory was not supported. Implications for policymakers and academics are also discussed.  

Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 2022. 21p.

By J. Andrew Hansen, Gabrielle L Lory 

Rural criminal justice organizations have been overlooked by researchers and underfunded in the United States, exacerbating problems caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Access to victims' services has been a longstanding issue in rural communities, but has become more difficult due to stay-at-home orders and changes in daily activities. Requirements such as social distancing, necessitated by COVID-19, have increased the risk of domestic violence and rural service providers are less prepared than those in more populated areas. Rural law enforcement agencies, on the other hand, have traditionally operated with smaller budgets and staffs-conditions that have complicated the response to the unprecedented event. Many of the recommended practices for policing during a pandemic have been more applicable to larger urban and suburban departments with more resources and officers extended across many units. The strain on rural victims' services and law enforcement has been felt only a few months into the coronavirus pandemic, while the long-term effects are not yet known.

Southern Criminal Justice Association, 2020. 12p.

By David Bruce

The South African per-capita murder rate has steadily escalated since 2011/12, when it was at its lowest since 1994. The 2022/23 rate of 45 per 100 000 is the highest in 20 years. But focusing on national murder trends is misleading as trends vary greatly across the nine provinces. The current high per-capita murder rate is driven by high rates in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng. Key findings: South African murder trends vary considerably across provinces. The Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng have the highest per-capita murder rates. In 2022/23, the Eastern Cape had the highest murder rate (71 per 100 000), followed by KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, both with annual murder rates of 56. The four provinces with the most murders have also recorded the highest per-capita murder rate increases in the last 10 years. Since 2011/12, rates have increased most dramatically in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. The increase has been greatest from 2017/18 to 2022/23. The per-capita murder rate in the Western Cape decreased over the last five years. Recommendations The government and society must prioritise reducing murder rates, which are high and increasing. The collection of data about murder, and the analysis thereof, must be improved. ‘One-size-fits-all’ approaches to addressing murder are unlikely to be effective. Responses should be adapted to respond to the drivers of murder focusing on high-murder localities. Priority should be given to understanding and addressing murder in the four provinces with the highest per-capita murder rates. KwaZulu-Natal and, to a lesser degree, Gauteng experienced major surges in murder in 2021/22, with increases continuing in 2022/23. These have taken them well above their rates in the year before the COVID-19 pandemic and national lockdown. Deaths during the July 2021 unrest were not a major contributor to the increases in murder in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in 2021/22. Many experts believe that the entrenchment and growth of organised crime has played a major role in the increasing number of murders. More in-depth provincially focused research and analysis is required to better understand the factors and circumstances driving murder trends. 

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 12p.

By Göran Adamson

In 2005, the Swedish Crime Prevention Agency published a report about the link between immigration and crime. Since then, no comprehensive study has been conducted even though Sweden has experienced a large influx of migrants in combination with a rising crime rate. This study conducted by Göran Adamson and Tino Sanandaji is the first purely descriptive scientific investigation on the matter in fifteen years. The investigation (from 2002 to 2017) covers seven distinct categories of crime, and distinguishes between seven regions of origin. Based on 33 percent of the population (2017), 58 percent of those suspect for total crime on reasonable grounds are migrants. Regarding murder, manslaughter and attempted murder, the figures are 73 per cent, while the proportion of robbery is 70 percent. Non-registered migrants are linked to about 13 percent of total crime. Given the fact that this group is small, crime propensity among non-registered migrants is significant.

Sweden; Society, 2020. 13p.

By Michael T. Light, Jingying Hea, and Jason P. Robey

We make use of uniquely comprehensive arrest data from the Texas Department of Public Safety to compare the criminality of undocumented immigrants to legal immigrants and native-born US citizens between 2012 and 2018. We find that undocumented immigrants have substantially lower crime rates than native-born citizens and legal immigrants across a range of felony offenses. Relative to undocumented immigrants, US-born citizens are over 2 times more likely to be arrested for violent crimes, 2.5 times more likely to be arrested for drug crimes, and over 4 times more likely to be arrested for property crimes. In addition, the proportion of arrests involving undocumented immigrants in Texas was relatively stable or decreasing over this period. The differences between US-born citizens and undocumented immigrants are robust to using alternative estimates of the broader undocumented population, alternate classifications of those counted as “undocumented” at arrest and substituting misdemeanors or convictions as measures of crime.

 Madison, Wisconsin: 2020. 8p.

By DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NEW ZEALAND

“…The study includes statistical information to the extent that it is available. The law and administrative procedures are described and where appropriate psychological and sociological factors are discussed. This factual background is essential for informed consideration of the criminal scene. Inevitably interpretations are made and a variety of opinion is offered. It was not the purpose of the Department to produce a colourless official document devoid of all contentious matter. Although there has been a measure of co-ordination, diversity of opinion and spontaneity remain. It would therefore be difficult to agree with everything that is said or suggested.”

Ministry of Justice. New Zealand. 1968. 410p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

Edited by Ted Robert Gurr

VIOLENCE IN AMERICA Vol. 1 explores the intricate tapestry of crime throughout the nation's history, shedding light on the various facets of violence that have shaped American society. From notorious outlaws of the Wild West to the rise of organized crime during Prohibition, this volume delves into the darker chapters of the past, offering a compelling narrative that examines the root causes and consequences of criminal activities. Through meticulous research and insightful analysis, this book provides a comprehensive overview of the history of crime in America, inviting readers to reflect on the enduring legacy of violence in a nation built on conflicting ideals.

Newbury Park. Sage. 1989. 281p.

By Adam Teperski and Stewart Boiteux

AIM To examine whether longer apprehended domestic violence orders (ADVO) are associated with changes in domestic violence (DV) offending and ADVO breaches. METHOD A dataset of 13,717 defendants who were placed on an ADVO after a DV incident between January 2016 and April 2018 was extracted from the NSW Bureau of Crime and Statistics and Research’s ADVO database. This included 10,820 defendants subject to a final 12-month order, and 2,897 defendants subject to a final 24-month order. We utilised an entropy balancing matching approach to ensure groups of defendants subjected to differing ADVO lengths were comparable and implemented an event study analysis to examine quarterly differences in offending outcomes in the three years after the start of the order. In doing so, we were able to examine relative differences in offending in the first 12 months (where both groups were subject to an ADVO), the second 12 months (where only the 24-month ADVO group were subject to an ADVO), and the third 12 months (where neither group were subject to an ADVO). RESULTS In the 12 to 24 month period, where ADVOs with a longer duration were active and shorter ADVOs were not, longer ADVOs were associated with increased breach offending and decreased DV offending. Specifically, in the 5th, 6th and 7th quarters after the beginning of a final order we observed 3.4 percentage points (p.p.), 4.1 p.p., and 2.3 p.p. increases in defendants breaching their ADVO, respectively. When considering baseline rates of breaching, this represents relative increases of 79% to 161%. In the 5th, 6th, and 7th quarters after the beginning of a finalised order, longer ADVOs were associated with respective 1.8 p.p., 2.0 p.p., and 3.1 p.p. decreases in DV offending, reflecting relative decreases in DV offending by 41% to 59%. We find no group differences in DV offending or breaches in the subsequent 12 months, when ADVOs for both groups had expired. While the study examined multiple factors related to both longer ADVO length and offending, we cannot exclude the possibility that unobserved factors may be influencing our results. CONCLUSION Relative to 12-month ADVOs, 24-month ADVOs were associated with an increase in the probability that an offender breaches the conditions of their ADVO, and a decrease in the probability that an offender commits a proven DV offence.

(Crime and Justice Bulletin No. 261). 

Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research., 2023. 34p.

By Mélanie S.S. Seabrook, Alex Luscombe, Nicole Balian, Aisha Lofters, Flora I. Matheson, Braden G. O’neill, Akwasi Owusu-Bempah, Navindra Persaud, Andrew D. Pinto

This longitudinal study found no consistent correlations between increased police spending and municipal crime rates.

The analysis found that police services are a top budget priority in most municipalities, with up to 26 percent of total expenditures allocated to police. However, the findings revealed net increases in per capita spending are not associated with larger reductions in crime rates.

The authors examined budgets of 20 urban municipalities in Canada: Toronto, Montreal, Peel Region, Calgary, York Region, Edmonton, Ottawa, Winnipeg, Vancouver, Waterloo Region, Surrey, Quebec City, Hamilton, Halifax, Laval, London, Gatineau, Saskatoon, Burnaby, and Longueuil.

The study looked at police funding and how it varies across Canadian municipalities over a long period of time. The data from 2010 to 2020 showed wide differences in spending. For example, Vancouver spent more than double per capita on policing in 2019 than Quebec City, highlighting the complexity of the interactions between crime rates and police funding.

Other studies have also had mixed results regarding the relationship between police funding and crime. A A 2014 found no clear relationship between crime rates and per capita police expenditures in Canadian provinces, and a 2015 studyof 50 Canadian municipalities found that higher spending on police was associated with higher rates of violent crime, but the direction of the relationship was not established.

Research on police funding is limited in Canada, partly due to the lack of publicly available data on police spending. The study calls for improved publishing of police expenditure data, and for future research to examine whether funding decisions may be based on past crime rates and explore whether investments in police impact future crime rates.

Although the authors do not make specific policy recommendations regarding police budgets, the findings raise questions about the reasoning for such vast differences in police funding across the country despite overall downward crime rates.

Canadian Public Policy, Volume 49 Issue 4, December 2023, pp. pp. 383-398

By Philip J. Cook and Ashley Mancik

In 1962, the FBI reported a national homicide clearance rate of 93%. That rate dropped 29 points by 1994. This Great Decline has been studied and accepted as a real phenomenon but remains mysterious, as does the period of relative stability that followed. The decline was shared across regions and all city sizes but differed greatly among categories defined by victim race and weapon type. Gun homicides with Black victims accounted for most of the decline. We review the evidence on several possible explanations for the national decline, including those pertaining to case mix, investigation resources, and citizen cooperation. Our preferred explanation includes an upward trend in the standard for arrest, with strong evidence that although clearance-by-arrest rates declined, the likelihood of conviction and prison sentence actually increased. That result has obvious implications for the history of policing practice and for the validity of the usual clearance rate as a police performance measure.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 59 - 83

UNITED STATES. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM (U.S.)

From the document: "The FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program provides a nationwide view of crime based on data submissions voluntarily reported by non-federal law enforcement agencies throughout the country. The data submitted to the distinct collections detail criminal incidents and law enforcement workforce and operations. For decades, several of these compilations have been published annually. Though each collection presents details of crime data based on numbers provided by participating agencies, the reports vary in context, participation, and publication criteria. 'Crime in the Nation, 2022,' includes data received from 15,724 law enforcement agencies that provided either the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) or the Summary Reporting System (SRS) data. These agencies represent 83.3 percent of agencies actively enrolled in the UCR Program and covering a combined population of 311,628,976 (93.5 percent) inhabitants. Notably, every city agency covering a population of 1,000,000 or more inhabitants contributed a full 12 months of data to the UCR Program in 2022. In addition to the 'UCR Summary of Crime in the Nation, 2022,' which contains a synopsis of the data, 'Crime in the Nation, 2022' is comprised of the following components: [1] 'Crime in the United States (CIUS), 2022'; [2] 'NIBRS [National Incident-Based Reporting System], 2022'; [3] 'NIBRS Estimates, 2022'; [4] 'Hate Crime Statistics, 2022'; [and 5] 'Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA), 2022: Officers Assaulted'[.]"

United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform Crime Reporting Program (U.S.). 2023. 37p.

By Gian Maria Campedelli, Serena Favarin, Alberto Aziani and Alex R. Piquero

Recent studies exploiting city-level time series have shown that, around the world, several crimes declined after COVID-19 containment policies have been put in place. Using data at the community-level in Chicago, this work aims to advance our understanding on how public interventions affected criminal activities at a finer spatial scale. The analysis relies on a two-step methodology. First, it estimates the community-wise causal impact of social distancing and shelter-in-place policies adopted in Chicago via Structural Bayesian Time-Series across four crime categories (i.e., burglary, assault, narcotics-related offenses, and robbery). Once the models detected the direction, magnitude and significance of the trend changes, Firth’s Logistic Regression is used to investigate the factors associated with the statistically significant crime reduction found in the first step of the analyses. Statistical results first show that changes in crime trends differ across communities and crime types. This suggests that beyond the results of aggregate models lies a complex picture characterized by diverging patterns. Second, regression models provide mixed findings regarding the correlates associated with significant crime reduction: several relations have opposite directions across crimes with population being the only factor that is stably and positively associated with significant crime reduction.

Crime Science 2020 9:21