Victoria Hayes

Many members of the international community fear that world sporting events, such as the Olympics and the World Cup, create surges in human trafficking for sexual exploitation, causing women and girls to be exploited for commercial sex while the rest of the world celebrates athleticism and sport. These fears have sparked heated debate about the measures hosting countries should take to prevent human trafficking at these events and the role prostitution policies play in combating human trafficking. In the lead-up to the 2010 Olympics in Canada and the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, politicians in both countries proposed legalizing prostitution as a means of combating human trafficking at the events. This Note explores the connection between prostitution laws and sex trafficking, as well as the link between world sporting events and sex trafficking, with specific reference to preparations for the recently completed 2010 Olympics and the upcoming World Cup. Drawing on research about human trafficking at the 2004 Olympics in Athens, the 2006 World Cup in Germany, and the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, this Note argues that specific anti-trafficking efforts are more effective than prostitution policy reform in combating human trafficking. Finally, this Note critiques Canada's anti-trafficking related preparations for the 2010 Olympics and provides general recommendations for strengthening South Africa's anti-trafficking efforts before the 2010 World Cup.

85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1105 (2010).

By Glenn Farley & Kamryn Brunner

CSI estimates that the costs of the epidemic in Arizona reached an all-time high last year: $58 billion. This staggering figure includes not only hospital, law enforcement, and other public service costs of dealing with this crisis, but also loss of quality of life and productivity amongst those suffering with addiction.

The costs of this crisis have continued rising due to ongoing medical and other price inflation, law enforcement strains, the severity of fentanyl relative to other opioids, and the continued crisis on Arizona’s southern border enabling the primary pathway for fentanyl into America.

While the roots of the opioid crisis go back to the mid-90’s, its severity in terms of both human and social costs didn’t really take off until after 2015. This surge is attributable to the particular severity of fentanyl abuse, its low cost, and its relatively high availability. An unfortunate fact of three independent but concurrent policy changes whose roots can be traced to the late-2010’s – the overprescribing and subsequent crackdown on prescription drugs, the relaxation of criminal enforcement of America’s drug laws, and the collapse in security along the border with Mexico – has been to enable both supply and demand for fentanyl and other illegal opioids. This experiment in hindsight was clearly a failure.

Over the last decade, fatal opioid overdoses in Arizona have more than doubled. Seizures of fentanyl and other opioids inside Arizona remain at record levels. The DEA has identified the greater Phoenix area – whose violent crime is up about 50% over the past decade – as a central distribution hub for fentanyl into the greater United States.

This update to CSI’s  2022 study of what led to this crisis, and how it has continued evolving over the past two years, continues to be about not repeating the mistakes of the past and better-informing policy going forward.

Key Findings

• CSI estimates that the cost of the fentanyl crisis to Arizona’s economy today is $58 billion – for context, the annual GDP of the state of Arizona is $521 billion. In 2017, the CDC estimated the national opioid epidemic cost nearly $1 trillion – or $22 billion in Arizona alone. But since then, the problem has only gotten worse.

• While opioid-related fatal overdoses appear to have peaked, they remain near all-time highs; declines have been modest and it is premature to assume success in dealing with this crisis. In fact, despite opioid-related deaths in Arizona falling last year, CSI estimates the cost of this epidemic reached a new high.

• Total seizures of feal to the current crisis.

• In 2015, Arizona’s Department of Health Services reported 41,400 opioid-related encounters by Arizona hospitals, resulting in $305 million in encounter costs. By 2019, though, encounters had risen to 56,600 (+372019[i] to more than 29,200 pounds today[ii] – a 320% increase. Given that as little as 2 mg of pure fentanyl can be fatal, DEA seizures in Arizona alone lntanyl in the United States by the DEA have increased from approximately 6,800 pounds in ast year were enough to kill every Arizonan 14 times over. Because it is a border state, Arizona is centr%) but encounter costs had increased a staggering 120% (to $676 million).

Phoenix: Common Sense Institute Arizona, 2024. 18p.

 By Maya Szilak

The rise in homicide rates that began in 2020 continues to be a major source of public concern. Law enforcement agencies need effective strategies to deal with this issue without unduly burdening taxpayers or asking more of already cash-strapped state and local governments. Issuing citations to non-violent offenders who commit low-level crimes and present low flight risk is one method by which law enforcement agencies can address increased homicides. For instance, officers may summon offenders to appear in court at a later date and release them at the scene, in lieu of placing them under custodial arrest or jailing offenders. The use of citations in lieu of arrest enhances law enforcement capacity to address violent crime by reducing time and energy spent on low-level arrests. Reducing low-level arrests through citations can also lessen risk of harm to officers and citizens in street encounters, improve community relations and reduce overall recidivism. While the use of citations in lieu of arrest presents potential drawbacks, largely centered around increased rates of failure to appear and net widening effects, negative impacts can be minimized through data collection by law enforcement agencies to identify problems in citation programs and facilitate the development of practices to address these issues.

Policy Study No 251

Washington, DC: R Street, 2022. 8p.

By Christi Smith

Driving is a privilege, not a right, in the United States. It is also a privilege that is revoked from millions of Americans, not due to dangerous driving or criminal conduct but because of their failure to pay court-ordered fines, fees and other costs. In fact, every state in the United States imposes debt-based license suspension. While the practice was designed to incentivize people to pay their debts and have their licenses restored, lack of transportation only exacerbates an individual’s inability to maintain stable employment and fulfill financial obligations. Further, the practice of debt-based suspension disproportionately impacts low-income individuals and people of color. Without access to reliable and affordable transportation, people are forced to choose between driving on a suspended license or failing to secure or maintain the work they need to pay fines. Minor debts become major financial obligations when left unaddressed, which ensnares well-meaning people in a cycle of poverty, joblessness or legal violations due to a suspended license.

The practice is particularly burdensome for individuals who are facing legal proceedings and for those on probation or parole supervision who face the threat of punishment for driving to court-ordered appointments on a suspended license or for failing to appear in court for probation/parole check-ins or employment/rehabilitative programming due to a suspended license. This is especially common in rural areas that lack robust public transportation systems. Because criminal penalties fall disproportionately on racial and ethnic minorities, as well people in lower socioeconomic groups, the burden of debt-based license suspensions presents yet another barrier to success for individuals attempting to resolve their court-ordered responsibilities.

Debt-based license suspensions are simply another tool in the judicial system’s arsenal of policies that disproportionately punish poor people and people of color. The policy encourages rather than discourages noncompliance because of the sheer impossibility of existing in a modern world without access to dependable and affordable transportation. The inefficiency of the policy’s ability to recoup court costs and the negative impact on public safety has prompted lawmakers, advocacy organizations, law enforcement groups and researchers on both sides of the aisle to push for an end to debt-based driver’s license suspensions with S. 998, the Driving for Opportunity Act of 2021.

Given the disproportionate burden license-for-payment systems place on indigent individuals, racial minorities and justice-involved persons, it is the purpose of this policy paper to evaluate the extent to which these systems are used; the degree to which the practice unduly harms individuals, families and communities; and the impact of enforcement on incarceration and recidivism rates. This assessment will also include the identification of alternative methods of transportation and existing programs designed to overcome the challenge of transportation with a suspended license. This paper suggests improved policies for debt collection and for providing more effective methods of transportation to individuals subjected to a license suspension.

R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 254   

Washington, DC: R Street, 2022. 6p.

By Christi Smith and Jillian Snider  

After 115 years of prohibition, the legal status of cannabis in the United States is at a tipping point. Significant advances in state-level cannabis legalization have been made in the past decade, and decriminalization efforts have increased in cities across the nation. More than 90 percent of Americans—on both sides of the political aisle—support legal adult use of medical or recreational cannabis. Legalization is also increasingly supported by law enforcement, with two-thirds of police supporting medical or recreational cannabis. Yet cannabis remains illegal at the federal level, and its possession and use are subject to the most severe criminal penalties under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).

The federal government has an opportunity to end America’s longest war, the war on drugs. As evidenced by our experience with alcohol, national prohibition produces disastrous outcomes, including rising crime and violence, underground markets, unregulated products and continued demand for the substance. The general consensus among criminologists, criminal justice scholars and drug policy experts is that the war on drugs—described as a war on marijuana—has been a “resounding failure.” Further, the harms associated with marijuana prohibition far exceed the benefits in nearly all ways that can be measured.

Rather than continue the prohibition policies that have contributed to mass incarceration and the destruction of police-community relationships, we need smart federal legislation to legalize and properly regulate cannabis. This approach would significantly disrupt illegal drug markets, as marijuana is the most widely cultivated, trafficked and used illegal substance in the world. Better legislation is also critical for reducing violence and enhancing public safety, as such efforts could contribute to fewer negative police-citizen interactions, improvements in police legitimacy, the restoration of police-community partnerships, and a reallocation of resources to help stem the recent surge in homicides. Regardless of personal or moral perspectives, the federal prohibition of cannabis is bad public policy.

R Street Policy Study No. 261

Washington DC: R Street, 2022. 18p.

 By Susan L. Stewart a, Rose M.C. Kagawa b, Shani A.L. Buggs b, Mona A. Wright b, Garen J. Wintemute 

  Background: There is evidence linking use of controlled substances with perpetration of interpersonal violence. While the United States constitution protects the right to own a firearm, federal law prohibits firearm purchase and possession by persons believed to be at high risk for violence, including those who use controlled substances unlawfully. Methods: We report here the results of a 13-year prospective observational study on the risk of violent crime associated with a history of criminal drug charges in a cohort of 79,678 legal purchasers of handguns in Cali fornia in 2001. The main outcomes were post-purchase charges for any violent crime, violent Crime Index crimes (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault), and firearm-related violent crimes. The main exposure of interest was a history of pre-purchase charge(s) for drug-related offenses; we examined as a secondary exposure a history of marijuana-related charges. We estimated adjusted hazard ratios (aHR) with 95 % confidence intervals (CI) using Cox proportional hazards multiple events models. Results: We found that legal handgun purchasers in California with a history of drug-related charges, even those with marijuana charges only, had triple the risk of a post-purchase violent crime charge compared to purchasers with no criminal charges (drug charges only: aHR=2.9, 95 % CI 2.2–3.8; marijuana charges only: aHR=3.3, 95 % CI 1.8–6.0). In addition, a criminal history of drug charges only vs. no criminal history was associated with increased risk of one or more violent crime charges after the first post-purchase arrest event (aHR=1.6, 95 % CI 1.2–2.3). Conclusion: It is incumbent on researchers and policy makers to understand the nature and causes of this risk in order to take effective steps towards mitigation.

International Journal of Drug Policy 127 (2024) 104413 

By Kennedy Kipkoech Mutai , Jack Stone , Andrew Scheibe , Hannah Fraser , Leigh F. Johnson , Peter Vickerman 

  Background: Illicit drug use results in considerable global morbidity, but there is little data on its trends and factors associated with it in sub-Saharan Africa. We consider these questions using national data from South Africa for 2002–2017. Methods: We analysed data among individuals aged 15 years or older from five national population-based household surveys in South Africa (2002–2017; n = 89,113). Recent drug use was defined as the last three- months use of illicit drugs, i.e., any use of cannabis, cocaine, amphetamine, inhalants, sedatives, hallucinogens, opioids, and/or other illicit drugs. Time trends in recent drug use were assessed using logistic regression. Multivariable logistic regression assessed the association between recent drug use and socio-demographic factors and between drug use and sexual risk behaviours, HIV-related and other well-being variables. Results: The prevalence of recent drug use increased from 1⋅5% to 10⋅0% from 2002 to 2017, driven by increases in cannabis use (1⋅5% to 7⋅8%) and use of opioids (0⋅01% to 1⋅6%), cocaine (0⋅02% to 1⋅8%), or amphetamines (0⋅1% to 1⋅5%). In adjusted analyses, male gender, younger age, living in urban areas, mixed-ancestry or white ethnicity (compared to black-African), and unemployment were positively associated with recent drug use. Recent drug use was associated with: multiple sexual partners (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 2⋅13, 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1⋅80–2⋅51); sexual debut before 15 years old (aOR 1⋅70, 95%CI: 1⋅29–2⋅23); hazardous/harmful alcohol use (aOR 2⋅50, 95%CI: 2⋅14–2⋅93) or alcohol dependence (aOR 3⋅33, 95%CI 2⋅92–3⋅80); ever experiencing intimate partner violence (aOR 1⋅56, 95%CI 1⋅12–2⋅17); psychological distress (aOR 1⋅53, 95%CI: 1⋅28–1⋅82); and lower chance of ever testing for HIV (aOR 0⋅89, 95%CI 0⋅80–1⋅00). Recent drug use was not associated with HIV positivity, condom use or being on antiretroviral therapy. Conclusion: Illicit drug use has increased substantially in South Africa and is associated with numerous socio- demographic characteristics, higher sexual risk behaviours and other well-being variables.

www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0955395924000379  

  International Journal of Drug Policy 125 (2024) 104352

By Sarh Clifford, Cassandra J.C. Wright, Peter G. Miller, Kerri Coomberd, Kalinda E. Griffiths, James A. Smitha, Michael Livingston

Background: - During 2017-18, the Northern Territory (NT) introduced a Banned Drinker Register (BDR) and Minimum Unit Price (MUP) NT-wide; Police Auxiliary Liquor Inspectors (PALIs) in three regional towns; and restrictions on daily purchases/opening hours (DPOH) in one regional town. The BDR is an individual-level alcohol ban; MUP is a pricing policy; and PALIs enforce bans on restricted areas at takeaway outlets. This study examines the impact of these policies on adult domestic and family violence (DFV). Methods: We examined DFV assaults and breaches of violence orders from January 2014 – February 2020 using interrupted time series models for NT, Greater Darwin, Katherine, Tennant Creek, and Alice Springs. To account for increasing numbers of individuals on the BDR we tested two timepoints (Sept 2017, March 2018). Findings: Following DPOH, assaults (78 %) and alcohol-involved assaults (92 %) decreased in Tennant Creek. After PALIs, assaults (79 %) in Tennant Creek, and breaches (39 %) and alcohol-involved breaches (58 %) in Katherine decreased. After MUP, assaults (11 %), alcohol-involved assaults (21 %) and alcohol-involved breaches (21%) decreased NT wide. After MUP/PALIs in Alice Springs, alcohol-involved assaults (33 %), breaches (42 %), and alcohol-involved breaches (57 %) decreased. BDR (Sept 2017) found increases in assaults (44 %) and alcohol-involved assaults (39 %) in Katherine and assaults (10%) and alcohol-involved assaults NT-wide (17 %). There were increases of 21 %-45 % in breaches NT-wide, in Darwin, Katherine, and Alice Springs. Following March 2018 found increases in assaults (33 %) and alcohol-involved assaults (48 %) in Katherine. There were increases - from 20 % to 56 % - in breaches in NT-wide, Katherine, and Alice Springs. Conclusion: PALIs and DPOH were associated with some reductions in DFV; the BDR was associated with some increases. The upward trend commences prior to the BDR, so it is also plausible that the BDR had no effect on DFV outcomes. Although MUP was associated with reductions in the NT-wide model, there were no changes in sites without cooccurring PALIs. 

International Journal of Drug Policy

Volume 127, May 2024, 104426

By Jacopo Bellasio, Erik Silfversten, Eireann Leverett, Anna Knack, Fiona Quimbre, Emma Louise Blondes, Marina Favaro, Giacomo Persi Paoli

The government of Estonia requested support from the European Commission under Regulation (EU) 2017/825 to analyse new and emerging technological developments and identify their potential application in cybercrime. In May 2019, RAND Europe was commissioned by the European Commission Structural Reform Support Service to conduct a study (ref: SRSS/C2018/092) aimed at:Conducting an analysis of future technologies and how these could be used to commit or prevent cybercrimes.Proposing possible ways to prevent future technologies from being exploited for criminal purposes.

To meet the objectives of the study, RAND Europe (i) took stock of current knowledge of and policy on cybercrime as well as of completed and ongoing research on future trends in cybercrime; (ii) conducted horizon scanning activities to identify new and emerging technologies that may have an impact on cybercrime; (iii) engaged with stakeholders and experts to elicit their views on current and future cybercrime and technology trends; and (iv) designed and delivered a table-top exercise to help identify possible policy and legislative measures and initiatives to be adopted in order to prevent new and emerging technologies from being exploited for cybercrime purposes. This document presents an overview of results emerging from activities conducted under the study.

Key Findings

The next decade will likely see an increase in the speed and coverage of connectivity which will contribute to an overall increase in the volume and speed at which different types of cybercrime are conducted.The proliferation of Information Technology-enabled devices, systems, and services will result in an increase in the attack surface and vulnerabilities that could be leveraged by malicious actors.Developments in the fields of computing and data storage technologies, paired with a proliferation of devices, are expected to result in an increased ability to record, generate, store, access and manipulate data.Advances in computing power, accompanied by developments in the fields of artificial intelligence and machine learning, are expected to contribute to a growing ability to process and analyse data, allowing to infer from these new insights and results which are beyond the reach of current analytical capabilities.Technological advances are expected to result in increasing complexity as regards the tracking and attribution of criminal and malicious activities.The consolidation of the internet economy around a limited number of key players, and an increasing societal reliance on their products and services, may raise challenges such as contributing to the widespread emembedding of vulnerabilities with the potential to yield large-scale systemic effects when leveraged.While this study focuses on the impact that technology may have on cybercrime, a wide variety of other non-technical drivers and factors are also expected to influence this phenomenon over the coming decade.

Recommendations

Pursue broad cybercrime capacity building in light of technological development.

Strengthen the overall cybersecurity resilience of Estonia through awareness, education and capacity building.

Seek legal, regulatory and organisational agility.

Prepare the Estonian legal, regulatory and organisational environment to adequately respond to cybercrime challenges resulting from technological change.

Invest in technologies relevant to the Estonian context.

Ensure that Estonia has sufficient technological expertise, skills and research in relation to high-priority emerging technologies.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020. 13p.

By the UK Ministry of Justice and HM Courts & Tribunals Service

  1 The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is headed by the Lord Chancellor and is accountable to Parliament for the efficient and effective functioning of the courts. Its three priorities are: to protect the public from serious offenders and improve the safety and security of our prisons; reduce reoffending; and deliver swift access to justice. HM Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS), an executive agency of the MoJ, reports jointly to the Lord Chancellor, Lord Chief Justice and to the Senior President of Tribunals. It is responsible for supporting the independent judiciary in the administration of criminal courts, civil courts, family courts and tribunals in England and Wales, and non-devolved tribunals in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The judiciary, headed by the Lady Chief Justice, is constitutionally independent from the government. 2 Criminal cases are heard in magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court. Cases enter the criminal justice system when a defendant is charged with an offence. The case is allocated a court date through the judicial process of listing. Cases generally go to magistrates’ courts first, where over 90% of criminal cases are dealt with. The remaining cases, usually more serious and complex offences, transfer to the Crown Court. 3 The MoJ and HMCTS measure and report on the outstanding caseload in the Crown Court, including the number of cases awaiting trial and being tried, and those awaiting sentencing. The caseload is determined by the respective rates of cases coming to the Crown Court (receipts) and completed cases (disposals). When the rate of receipts exceeds the rate of disposals, the outstanding caseload increases. The MoJ and HMCTS do not specify a minimum or optimal caseload at which the Crown Court functions most efficiently – below which there is a risk that judges and courtrooms are available but do not have enough cases to try, and above which cases on average take longer from listing to completion – because the optimal level is dependent on the nature of cases and the capacity available to hear them, both of which vary. Therefore, the MoJ does not distinguish between cases that form part of the expected caseload and additional cases that constitute a backlog. Because the MoJ has not quantified its expected caseload, we cannot quantify the backlog separately. When we are presenting data, we refer to the total number of cases as the ‘outstanding caseload’. Otherwise, we refer to it as the ‘backlog’.

4 In April 2021, the MoJ produced the Criminal Justice Action Plan that recognised a need for a whole-system approach to responding to systemic issues within the criminal justice system. It brought together work already underway across the system, focusing on three priority areas: improving timeliness, improving victim engagement and reducing backlogs. In the October 2021 Spending Review, the MoJ was provided with £477 million over 2022-23 to 2024-25 for the criminal justice system’s recovery from COVID-19, including reducing court backlogs, and a total budget settlement of £34.5 billion over the same period. 5 In October 2021, we published Reducing the backlog in criminal courts, which examined the reasons for the growth in the backlog in magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court, both before and during the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic.1 We reported that HMCTS had responded quickly to the impact of the pandemic, launching a recovery programme in May 2020, and successfully increasing court capacity. We concluded that, while the backlog in magistrates’ courts was expected to return to pre-pandemic levels swiftly, significant risks to reducing the backlog in the Crown Court remained, which were likely to persist beyond 2024. Scope of this work 6 We undertook this investigation in response to the Crown Court backlog reaching its highest ever level. This report describes what action the MoJ, HMCTS and other parts of the criminal justice system have taken to address the backlog of cases in the Crown Court. It examines: • the scale, nature and impact of the Crown Court backlog; • the MoJ’s and HMCTS’s understanding of the impact of actions to reduce the Crown Court backlog; and • how the MoJ and HMCTS are attempting to manage the Crown Court backlog. 7 We refer to, but did not examine in detail, the work of other parts of the criminal justice system, such as the judiciary, police, magistrates’ courts and HM Prison and Probation Service, that are relevant to managing the Crown Court backlog. We do not comment on the wider reform programmes in the system such as the court reform programme, which is the focus of our 2023 report Progress on the courts and tribunals reform programme. 2 We do not comment on other major projects unless directly relevant to the Crown Court backlog. We do not seek to examine and report on value for money of the MoJ’s and HMCTS’s work to date to reduce the backlog.   

London: The National Audit Office (NAO) , 2024. 54p.

By Virginia Comolli | Martin Thorley

  Pacific island countries (PICs) and territories increasingly play host to transnational criminal activities, with direct and indirect implications for Pacific communities and beyond. Ignoring these issues in favour of other diplomatic priorities or economic agendas risks exacerbating local fragility and creating safe havens from which foreign criminals can operate unhindered. The cocaine, synthetic drugs and heroin trades are what draws organized criminals to the Pacific (for the most part). Traditionally, the Pacific islands have been used as transit points for narcotics originating in Asia and Latin America and destined for high-value consumer markets in Australia and New Zealand. PICs, however, are now also developing their own domestic markets. In terms of provenance, three groups stand out: Triads and Asian syndicates: Compared to the other organized crime groups active in the Pacific, Asian syndicates have a wider portfolio of activities, which straddle the licit and illicit. In fact, alongside their engagement in drugs and human trafficking, cyber scams and various financial crimes, some Asian groups, and Chinese triads such as 14K in particular, enjoy connections with senior establishment figures, which they may be able to leverage for political influence. Central and South American cartels: Mexican and Colombian groups are key actors in the drug trade, especially cocaine and methamphetamines. The Sinaloa cartel in Mexico appears to be the most prominent in the arena, even though it lacks any permanent bases in the Pacific islands. Trafficking methods include the use of planes, yachts, bodily concealment and dropping drugs in the ocean for later retrieval. These groups are also able to rely on North American connections to facilitate illicit flows. Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs): OMCGs from Australia and New Zealand are involved in several criminal activities in the region, especially drug trafficking. They have established chapters in the Pacific islands and are able to exploit the presence of criminal deportees there to facilitate the trafficking of narcotics, as well as money laundering, extortion and other illicit activities. Minor actors: The Pacific has also attracted a diverse range of criminal actors from eastern and south-eastern Europe, the Middle East and other regions. They have been involved in various criminal activities, such as ATM scams and drug shipments. Opportunists from different countries have also collaborated with established criminal groups in the region.  

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024. 23p.  

By Steven Broad

  Trade in wild animals and plants occurs in most countries of the world and involves a wide range of species and commodities. Over the past 50 years in particular, a considerable array of policy and legislative measures have been introduced to both address trade-related conservation harms and enhance wildlife resource use sustainability, largely by exerting conditionality on access and commerce. Nevertheless, wildlife trade remains a major element of the overexploitation of wild species, the second most significant driver of global biodiversity loss after land-use change. A 2019 World Bank review of the costs of this trade concluded that when financial and economic values are combined, illegal logging, fishing and other forms of wildlife trade have an estimated full global economic value of between US$1 trillion and US$2 trillion per year. One of the key reasons that efforts to counter wildlife overexploitation struggle to succeed, is the emergence of criminal activities that circumvent regulatory measures and drive significant levels of illegal wildlife trade. Such wildlife trafficking varies greatly in scale and impact from country to country and between different wildlife commodity sectors. In some cases, criminal activity runs through the whole trade chain: from poaching or illegal harvest, through wildlife smuggling, to black market sale of prohibited goods to consumers. In other cases, crime is focused on a particular step along the trade chain, such as illegal timber harvest, with resulting products later being infiltrated into ostensibly legal markets.  

  Wildlife trafficking has profoundly negative environmental and human impacts, threatening wild species and undermining their ecological roles, their value to human livelihoods and potentially contributing to the climate crisis through harm to ecosystem functionality.4 The criminality driving poaching, smuggling and sale of wildlife in contravention of local, national and international laws and treaties is a significant global security challenge, often converging with other sectors of the illicit economy. Five decades of increasing international cooperation between governments, the private sector and civil society to address the challenge of wildlife trafficking has to some extent moderated its potential impact, but overall, the environmental, economic and social harms arising from such crime persist. Significant investment by national governments, multilateral institutions and other funding agencies is being made to tackle this challenge. A 2016 World Bank analysis (currently being updated) documented US$1.3 billion of international donor funding between 2010 and 2016 to tackle illegal wildlife trade, in addition to substantial national investments domestically.5 Key questions for those making such investment decisions include: knowing where the most significant problems are; whether interventions implemented at national, regional and global levels are effective in reducing criminal and environmental harm; and whether, overall, the problem is getting better or worse. This paper aims to address the question of how the significance of such wildlife crime can be measured at a national level within the context of a global index of organized crime.6 It begins by considering issues of definition, i.e. what activities fall within the scope of wildlife crime, across both flora and fauna markets highlighted in the crime index. This is followed by a review of past and present efforts to measure these crime areas. Finally, the paper looks ahead to consider how methods of measuring wildlife crime might be enhanced in future and how such efforts may need to evolve as the market itself changes over time  

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024.  31p.

By Earth League International

The report highlights 5 case studies covering 10 transnational criminal networks operating from Latin America to Asia, 33 Persons of Interest, including some of the most important shark fin international traffickers, and dozens of smuggling routes identified by ELI that illustrate the convergence of environmental and wildlife crime, specifically shark fin trafficking, with other serious crimes and expose the severity of the issue at a global scale. This report utilizes ELI’s revolutionary 4-Type Environmental Crime Convergence paradigm in our 2023 Environmental Convergence Report with John Jay College of Criminal Justice to comprehensively understand and combat the intricate web of transnational organized crime operations behind shark fin trafficking and the criminal exploitation of nature.

“The extensive field and analytical work invested in Operation STELLA MARIS underscores our commitment to unmasking the complexities of shark fin trafficking and environmental crime convergence. We hope that the findings will serve as a valuable resource to support the efforts of diverse stakeholders, from government agencies and policymakers to international bodies, the media, and other NGOs, in their ongoing fight against environmental crime“, says Andrea Crosta, Executive Director of Earth League International.

Environmental crime is breaking down critical ecosystems and accelerating climate change, fueling Earth’s extinction crisis and there’s a great need for high-quality detailed intelligence about the transnational trafficking networks and organized crime behind this criminal exploitation. 

Shark populations, especially those targeted by the international fin trade, are crashing, and over one-third of shark species are listed by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as Vulnerable or Endangered. Not only is the practice of shark finning cruel, but a lack of sharks in marine ecosystems can lead to imbalances in species below them in the food chain that damage populations of coral reefs. 

Operation STELLA MARIS uncovers how the shark fin trade in Latin America extends far beyond shark fin trafficking, encompassing multiple types of wildlife and environmental crime, different forms of trafficking, human smuggling, fraud, and related financial and corruption-related crimes. Our intelligence-led field operations are essential to information gaps and provide evidence-based knowledge to various stakeholders, from government agencies to policymakers, the media, and the public. Our intelligence-led field operations are essential to information gaps and provide evidence-based knowledge to various stakeholders, from government agencies to policymakers, the media, and the public.  

Los Angeles: Earth League International, 2024. 107p.

By The Asian Development Bank

This report highlights how sexual and gender minorities in countries across Asia and the Pacific face discrimination and violence, assesses the legal barriers impacting their lives, and shows how policy reforms can increase inclusion and economic opportunities.

It exposes regional disparities, outlines how laws and regulations reduce access to education, jobs, and public services, and shows how they restrict people expressing their identity and getting legal gender recognition. The report recommends a range of measures including taking legal and policy action to target hate crimes, improving law enforcement training, and preventing so-called “conversion therapies” to help reduce damaging exclusion and inequity.

Mandaluyong City, 1550 Metro Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2024. 66p.

By Randolph Roth

The recent rise in American homicide rates did not start in 2020 with a spike during COVID. Homicide actually began to increase in 2015, reversing more than 20 years of declining or stable rates.

In this report, Randolph Roth, professor of history and sociology at The Ohio State University, examines this trend in the context of homicide patterns throughout the history of the United States.  

The factors that correlate most consistently with national and regional homicide rates, he finds, are aspects of nation building, arguing that shifts in citizens’ beliefs about the legitimacy of their government, character of leadership, feelings of affinity for or alienation from fellow citizens, and acceptance or resentment of the social hierarchy affect the frequency with which Americans kill each other.

This report is the first offering in HFG’s Violence, Politics & Democracy initiative, a multi-year project examining how these phenomena interact in mature democracies to better understand and counter political violence and other forces that damage democratic norms and institutions, imperiling the safety of citizens.

New York: HARRY FRANK GUGGENHEIM FOUNDATION, 2024. 39p.

By Australia Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement

Australian consumers are willing to pay some of the highest prices globally for illicit drugs, and data sources such as the National Wastewater Drug Analysis Program, the National Drug Strategy Household Survey and the Illicit Drug Data Report reveal that consumption within Australia continues to grow, returning to pre-COVID-19 levels.

While the Committee understands that this is a multi-faceted issue requiring an integrated response from multiple sectors, this report pays particular attention to the role of police and its partner agencies in dealing with illicit drugs. Broader issues are considered with reference to their impact on law enforcement.

Strategies under the demand and harm reduction pillars target the behaviours and factors leading to, and the risks arising from, drug use. The regulation and policing of drug consumption is largely a matter for the states and territories, and demand and harm reduction strategies have been introduced to varying degrees around the country. A number of specific strategies were discussed, including decriminalization of personal use, as well as the establishment of drug checking and safe injecting facilities. The focus of the Committee, however, has been on outlining the challenges for law enforcement arising from the various policy settings.

This report consists of 6 chapters:

• Chapter 2 provides the context for the inquiry, outlines current trends in supply, seizures and consumption of illicit drugs and summarises some of the major harms arising from illicit drug use;

• Chapter 3 establishes the current policy settings in relation to illicit drugs and canvasses some of the major policy debates raised in evidence;

• Chapter 4 considers supply reduction strategies and investigates current law enforcement approaches, including responses to the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals, as well as the impact of seizures on supply;

• Chapter 5 canvasses demand and harm reduction strategies, including decriminalisation, and discusses the interaction of these strategies with, and their impacts on, law enforcement; and

• Chapter 6 details the committee’s conclusions and recommendations.

Key recommendations:

• The Australian government should re-establish a governance structure under the National Cabinet architecture, bringing together representatives with responsibility for law enforcement and health across the Commonwealth, states and territories, to oversee the implementation of the National Drug Strategy.

• The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission should undertake research to clarify what proportion of people arrested for possession of illicit drugs are concurrently charged with another criminal offence and would not have come to law enforcement attention but for the concurrent (non-drug related) offence.

• The Australian government should commission research to understand the impacts of decriminalisation in Australian and international jurisdictions where reforms have been implemented. Such research should, where possible, evaluate the longitudinal impacts on individuals, communities and law enforcement agencies to provide an evidence base to inform future policy decisions.

Commonwealth of Australia, 2024. 

By Stefania Chiappini

The article presents a systematic literature review on the use and the psychiatric implications of over-the-counter drugs (OTC), prescription-only-medications (POM), and new psychoactive substances (NPS) within custodial settings. The searches wer carried out on 2 November 2022 on PubMed, Scopus, and Web of Science in line with PRISMA guidelines. A total of 538 records were identified, of which 37 met the inclusion criteria. Findings showed the most prevalent NPS and OTC and POM classes reported in prisons were synthetic cannabinoids receptor agonists (SCRAs) and opioids, respectively. NPS markets were shown to be in constant evolution following the pace of legislations aimed to reduce their spread. The use of such substances heavily impacts the conditions and rehabilitation of persons in custody, with consequent physical and mental health risks. It is important to raise awareness of the use and misuse of such substances in prisons (i) from an early warning perspective for law enforcement and policy makers (ii) to prompt doctors to cautiously prescribe substances that may be misused (iii) to improve and increase access to treatment provided (iv) to add such substances to routine toxicological screening procedures (v) to improve harm reduction programmes. 

Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews

Volume 162, July 2024, 105691

By April Miin Miin Chai, Kylie S. Reale

This study explores the offender, victim, and environmental characteristics that significantly influence the number of days a sexual homicide victim remains undiscovered. Utilizing a sample of 269 cases from the Homicide Investigation Tracking System database an in-depth analysis was conducted to unveil the factors contributing to the delay in the discovery of victims' bodies. The methodological approach involves applying a negative binomial regression analysis, which allows for the examination of count data, specifically addressing the over-dispersion and excess zeros in the dependent variable - the number of days until the victim is found. The findings reveal that certain offender characteristics, victim traits, and spatio-temporal factors play a pivotal role in the time lag experienced in locating the bodies of homicide victims. These findings have crucial implications for investigative efforts in homicide cases, offering valuable insights that can inform and enhance the efficacy and efficiency of future investigative procedures and strategies.

Behavioral Sciences & the Law; May 2024

By The European Parliament,  Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs,   Directorate-General for Internal Policies 

  Cross-border parental child abductions in the EU are governed by The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and (except for Denmark) the Brussels II-ter Regulation. Countries outside of the EU may or may not be Contracting States to ‘the Convention’, but will not be bound by Brussels II-ter. Research has found that the often negative, long lasting impact of abduction may continue throughout the lifecycle of those who have been abducted. It may also affect future generations of society. This means that every effort to deter abduction should be made. Where that is not possible, the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention should be nurtured to support its application in contemporary society. Specialist mediation should be encouraged in relation to international child abduction generally, and specifically in relation to Third Countries which are not Contracting States to ‘the Convention’.   

Brussels:  European Parliament, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs,   Directorate-General for Internal Policies , 2024. 57p.

By Alistair Henry and Shane Horgan

This project sought to begin a process of scoping out and developing criminological perspectives on videogames and the social worlds of videogames and gamers through two interactive workshops. Its starting orientation was social interactionism and the understanding of video games as meaningful and affective places and spaces of interaction, presence, and ‘being’. This orientation sees videogames as potential spaces of cultural expression, symbolic representation, meaning-making, and identification; as interactive spaces of (real and imagined) participation and collaboration; and as ‘social worlds’ which participants inhabit and in which they exercise (some) agency in negotiating their deviance and compliance.

These digital social worlds are part of the fabric of everyday experience for many people who already
drift continuously between presence across different facets of the digital technoscape (including internet, social media and gaming) and the analogue world, potentially finding meaning, connection and identification across them all. This project was thus, from the outset, situated in the study of video games and video gaming within traditions of social interactionism and the sociology of deviance, but it also sought to contribute directly to more recent developments in the field exploring the importance and effects (and affects) of representational forms, symbols, and cultural narratives, such as within visual, cultural and narrative criminologies.

In relation to videogames themselves, the project aimed to be open minded and not restrictive about what could be included. For example, although ‘crime’ features within many video games as a dimension of the narrative, action, or game world, many games do not feature ‘crime’ but feature, or can be played in ways, that signify deviance or compliance. Therefore, the project did not restrict itself to the study of ‘crime games’, or any particular category of games, but remained open to the diverse forms that videogames take (in terms of subject matter, genre, platform etc.).

Glasgow: 

Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research, University of Glasgow

2024. 17p.