By Salla Huikuri

  Online communities of pedophiles in darknet facilitate sexual violence against children. They provide a criminogenic space for socially sidelined offenders to share and reinforce their sexual distortions. They accommodate illegal Child Sexual Abuse Material and enable its trading, sharing, and exchange. They offer advice on how to protect one’s online identity and how to physically proceed into sexual violence against children. This review deals with online child sexual offenders and their communities in darknet. It defines key terms dealing with online sexual offences against children and discusses different types of child sexual abuse offenders operating online. Moreover, it sheds light on the psychological side of offending – the justifications for sexual violence against children – and elaborates the underlying logics underpinning the respective trains of though in the online communities of pedophiles.  

Tampere: Police University College.   2022.

By  Sandra J. Ley Gutiérre

When do protests against crime and insecurity take place, regardless of the risks that such mobilization may entail? This paper argues that while violence provides an initial motivation for participating in protests, social networks play a fundamental role in incentivizing citizen mobilization against insecurity. Socialization within networks helps generate solidarity and empathy among participants, while at the same time transforming emotions associated with living in a violent context into potential for action. Also, through networks, individuals share information about opportunities for collective action and change their perceptions about the effectiveness and risks of such activism. These distinct mechanisms are valuable for the activation of protest against crime across levels of violence. Supporting evidence is derived from an original dataset on protest events in reaction to violence in Mexico between 2006 and 2012. Additionally, I rely on qualitative in-depth interviews and participant observation to illustrate the role of networks in protest against crime across several Mexican states. This paper contributes to the growing literature on criminal violence and political participation.Notre Dame, IN: The Kellogg Institute for International Studies
University of Notre Dame, 2022.

By Sally Atkinson-Sheppard

Millions of the world’s children engage in labor, often exploitative and essential to their survival. Child labor is closely related to crime; global discourse illustrates how young people are victims of forced and bonded labor and recent studies from the global South demonstrate how young people are hired as the ‘illicit laborers’ of organized crime groups. Despite this, there is a tendency to consider young people, not as laborers but as victims of trafficking or as offenders (often in relation to gangs). To address this lacuna, the article draws on data from 3 studies conducted in the global South to develop a conceptual framework suitable for understanding the intersection between labor and crime. The article develops a metaphorical ‘labor lens’, a lens which centers and prioritizes labor and instrumental drivers for crime, embedded within wider structures of illicit markets, established organized crime, state:crime collaboration and the need for children to work to survive. The article integrates economic drivers for involvement in organized crime with the moral economy, within the context of ecological frameworks of crime, embedded with wider issues of coloniality. In doing so, the article develops a new conceptual framework for considering young people’s involvement in organized crime.

  Critical Criminology (2023) 31:467–487

By Monika Sawicka

This paper aims to contribute to the debate on foreign policy strategies of state actors in the international system with a particular focus onpolicies pursued by far-right populist leaders. On the theoretical level,it builds on role theory and status-seeking strategies drawn from social identity theory (SIT) to offer an enhanced conceptual framework suit-able for scrutinising more radical forms of international activism. Thetheoretical points are then illustrated empirically by exposing the find-ings from content analysis of Brazilian policymakers’ speeches and their juxtaposition with the Bolsonaro government’s policies in the areas of environmental protection and regional cooperation. The author’s main claim is that President Jair Bolsonaro and his Foreign Affairs MinisterErnesto Araújo, through their rhetoric about cooperation in SouthAmerica and the Amazon and the actions undertaken by the adminis-tration in these fields, envisioned for Brazil the role of vandal. This had substantial consequences for the country’s international standing.

GEOPOLITICS, 2023, VOL. 28, NO. 2, 619–640

By David Spencer

A new report from Policy Exchange demonstrates how London is in the grip of a street crime epidemic and makes seventeen recommendations to show how the Metropolitan Police, City Hall and the Government can turn the tide.  

The report shows that:

• Knife crime in London increased by 58.5% in only three years between 2021 and 2024;

• Only 1 in 20 robberies and 1 in 170 “theft person” crimes in the capital were solved last year.

• 60% of the knife crimes committed in the capital were robberies – with over 81,000 mobile phones stolen in robberies and thefts last year.

• In 2024 one small geographic area of around 20 streets in London’s West End near Oxford Circus and Regent Street had more knife crime than nearly 15% of the rest capital combined; in 2023 these streets had more knife crime than 23% of the capital combined.

 The report identifies the top 20 neighbourhoods (technically known as Lower Layer Super Output Areas or LSOAs of about 15-20 streets each) in London which had the highest levels of knife crime in 2024. One in 15 of every knife crime offence in the capital in 2024 occurred in one of these 20 neighbourhoods (908 knife crimes). In 2024 only 4% of neighbourhoods accounted for nearly a quarter of all knife crime offences in the capital (3,615 knife crimes) and 15% of neighbourhoods accounted for half of all knife crime offences (7055 knife crimes).

The report identifies that within the Metropolitan Police there are least 850 police officers currently in non-frontline posts which could be redeployed to the policing frontline to tackle knife crime, robbery and theft in the areas where criminals are most prolific. This includes police officers currently posted to the following departments: Transformation (142 officers), Human Resources (24 officers), Culture, Diversity and Inclusion (20 officers) and Digital, Data & Technology (34 officers).  

Policy Exchange rejects the suggestion that stop and search is being deployed in a “racist” way. While only 39.5% of those stopped and searched by the police are black, 43.6% of those charged with murder are black, 45.6% of non-domestic knife-crime murder victims are black and 48.6% of robbery suspects are black. 13.5% of London’s population are black. Policy Exchange asserts that it is not “racist” when the police are merely responding to the demographic breakdown of serious and violent offending in the capital.  

Policy Exchange analysis shows that the courts are taking a dangerously lax approach to the most prolific criminals. Despite already having 46 or more previous convictions, “Hyper-Prolific Offenders” are sent to prison on less than half of all occasions (44.5%) on conviction for a further indictable or either-way offence – 4,555 such criminals walked free from court in 2024. For “Super-Prolific Offenders” (those with 26 to 45 previous offences) this falls to 42.1% with 9,483 such criminals walking free from court in 2024. Despite there being mandatory sentencing provisions for repeat knife-carriers to be sent to prison over a third are not sentenced to a term of immediate custody

By Tinenenji Banda and Marja Hinfelaar

Zambia is a significant source of critical minerals including copper, cobalt, lithium, nickel and graphite. Interest in Zambia’s minerals is growing, particularly from Western countries and China. Unfortunately, due to governance weaknesses, there is ample corruption and illicit financial flows at several transaction levels in the value chain. This U4 Issue therefore identifies government interventions Zambia can use to curtail corruption considering existing political pressures.

Main points

• Intense competition for critical mineral value chains results in an increased risk of revenue leakage due to corruption and tax evasion. Illicit financial flows (IFF) threaten Zambia’s economic development and undermine its fiscal systems.

• Zambia has formal commitments in place, such as laws, regulatory institutions and international commitments, to battle corruption and IFFs, but the institutional architecture is fragmented and inadequately enforced. Inter-agency collaboration is required to address these challenges.

• Through a literature review, including a law and policy review, and a stakeholder mapping exercise with 21 key informant interviews with government, civil society, academic and industry representatives, we constructed a qualitative understanding of the key risk factors for corruption and IFFs.

• Significant factors are the lack of a transparent, coherent and disciplined mining licensing system; a non-transparent bidding process; public-private collusion across value chains; abuse of intermediaries and agents; and weak regulation in the sector.

• Opportunities for interventions are enhanced systems for disclosure and due diligence, reform of the Mining Cadastre, support for evidence-based policymaking, support for the organisation of the artisanal mining sector, enhanced quality of civil society organisation public discourse, and enhanced collaboration in anti-corruption agencies, while keeping political pressures in mind.

By Naomi Roht-Arriaza

Courts in several jurisdictions have recognised corruption as a direct human rights violation, enabling broader legal standing, integrating international law and focusing on victims. Case studies, predominantly from Latin America, illustrate different legal theories used to hold officials accountable and expand access to justice in anti-corruption proceedings. Consequently, the formulation of a stand-alone right has merit despite limitations.

By Jiao Yu Thomas, K.M. Cudjoe , Walter S. Mathis, Xi Chenao 

This study examined the link between neighborhood disorder trajectories and metabolic and inflammatory biomarkers in U.S. older adults. We analyzed data from community-dwelling Medicare beneficiaries in the National Health and Aging Trends Study. Neighborhood physical disorder was assessed annually through interviewer observations over six years. Latent class analysis was used to identify exposure trajectory subgroups. Machine learning based inverse probability weighted (IPW) regression models were conducted to estimate associations with five biomarkers, including body mass index (BMI), waist circumference, hemoglobin A1C (HbA1c), high-sensitivity C-reactive protein (hsCRP), and interleukin-6 (IL-6). Compared to the stable low exposure group, older adults with increased exposure, decreased exposure, and stable high exposure exhibited higher levels of HbA1c. Only stable high exposure was associated with increased hsCRP. No significant associations were found for other biomarke rs. Residential environments play an important role in shaping the biological risk of aging. Incorporating routine screening for neighborhood environmental risks and implementing community-level interventions are pivotal in promoting healthy aging in place.

By Dan Anderberg. Line Hjorth Andersen,  N.Meltem Daysal, Mette Ejrnæs

We examine the impact of a 2002 Danish parental leave reform on intimate partner violence (IPV) using administrative data on assault-related hospital contacts. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that extending fully paid leave increased mothers’ leave-taking and substantially reduced IPV, with effects concentrated among less-educated women. The reform also lengthened birth spacing, while separations remained unchanged and earnings effects were modest. The timing and heterogeneity of impacts point to fertility adjustments—rather than exit options or financial relief—as the key mechanism. Parental leave policy thus emerges as an underexplored lever for reducing IPV.

By The Anti-Defamation League

The State of Antisemitism in Professional Academic Associations, reveals a problem that extends far beyond faculty meetings or disciplinary debates. When bias takes hold in professional academic associations, it shapes the ideas, frameworks, and standards that guide entire fields and seeps into curricula, research, and public discourse, quietly shaping how students, future professionals and the wider public interpret the world. Simply put, the consequences of this reach everyone.

By assessing where antisemitism persists – and how associations are responding – RAI’s 2025 report provides both a warning and a path forward: to ensure that academic spaces remain not only intellectually rigorous, but also ethically sound, inclusive and accountable to the public they ultimately serve – and to the scholars who call these associations their academic homes.

By Hsiang-Chin Hsu & Tzu-Ching Sung 

This study investigates the impact of a service-learning activity on the personal and professional development of 28 international medical students at I-Shou University, focusing on their participation in a service-learning project at a juvenile correctional school in Taiwan. Through the collection and thematic analysis of written reflections, four key themes were identified: cultural competence, empathy development, medical professionalism, and personal and professional growth. The service-learning experience significantly enhanced students’ cultural competence by exposing them to cross-cultural challenges, deepening their understanding of the social determinants of health, and reinforcing the importance of communication skills in overcoming language and cultural barriers. This is particularly relevant in diverse healthcare settings where effective communication is essential for patient-centered care. A notable outcome of the activity was the development of empathy, as students reflected on the emotional needs of the juveniles they encountered, highlighting the critical role of non-judgmental, compassionate care in healthcare practice. Furthermore, the experience fostered medical professionalism by confronting students with ethical dilemmas, such as equitable access to healthcare for marginalized populations, thus emphasizing the responsibility of future physicians to advocate for social justice and address healthcare disparities. Personal and professional growth emerged as another significant outcome, with students reporting increased self-awareness and emotional intelligence. The service-learning activity challenged their preconceived notions about marginalized populations, enabling them to recognize and mitigate personal biases, ultimately contributing to more compassionate and ethical patient care. Overall, the study underscores the transformative role of service-learning in medical education, fostering cultural competence, empathy, ethical awareness, and social responsibility—qualities essential for preparing socially responsible physicians to navigate healthcare. These findings collectively bridge theory and practice, illustrating how transformative learning and professional identity formation manifest through experiential service-learning. Accordingly, this study emphasizes integrating service-learning into medical education curricula to bridge theory and practice and equip students for ethical, cultural, and professional challenges. Future research should explore its long-term impact on professional development and broader curricular integration.

Nobody ever spoke to me like that before.” Improving Interactions Within the Justice System. Recommended practices from national clinical experts convened by the NYC Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice & Center for Justice Innovation

By The New York City Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice

Most people who are arrested in New York City are not rearrested while they wait for a decision about the outcome of their case. However, a small group are rearrested at substantially elevated rates. And despite their clear need for supportive services, most of this group never receive intensive mental health, emotional health, or behavioral health interventions at any point during their time in the justice system. Instead, most interactions people experience as they journey through the justice system are limited to a series of brief mandated encounters—check-ins, needs assessments, reminders, hearings. Despite their brevity, these encounters represent key intervention points1 with the potential to change individuals’ future well-being and behavior, either negatively or positively, through inevitable influences on their emotional and psychological well-being. As New York City grapples with how to adequately serve people at highest need and highest risk of justice involvement, the New York City Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice and the Center for Justice Innovation convened a national roundtable of clinical experts in Manhattan on October 12, 2023. Participants were asked to distill their expertise and apply it to the range of processes that practitioners most frequently navigate within the criminal court system context. The goal was to identify key opportunities for making these processes as therapeutic and impactful as possible under the constraints of system-based practice—in New York City and across the country. This roundtable focused on the interactions most system-involved people actually have on a daily basis. Specifically, intake screenings, routine monitoring appointments, and other brief mandated interventions are critical opportunities for providing trauma-informed care, which recognizes and responds to the high rates of trauma that people involved in the justice system experience.2 Often, this trauma is experienced both prior to3 and as a result of their involvement in the system.4 Making use of these opportunities could go a long way toward increasing court appearances, reducing rearrests, and increasing engagement in longer-term supportive and therapeutic services. As the city continues to wrestle with the twin challenges of reducing crime and incarceration and improving behavioral health care in the city, this roundtable could not come at a more critical moment. The roundtable sought to connect overall principles to concrete practices. While practitioners often refer to principles such as being trauma-informed, meeting people where they’re at, strengths based, and non-judgmental, what does that actually look like in practice? And how can staff reconcile these most effectively with accountability? What specific words or actions generate increased engagement and connection with people who do not trust systems of any kind, much less the justice system? This brief provides a list of concrete recommendations for providers, distilled from the roundtable discussion. It should be noted that none of these recommendations should be taken as conclusive or unequivocally endorsed by the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice. Instead, MOCJ is providing a summary of the recommendations provided by experts based on their experiences in the field.

By Joshua Rovner

Youth arrests and incarceration increased dramatically in the closing decades of the 20th century but have fallen sharply since. Public opinion often wrongly assumes that crime (and incarceration) is perpetually increasing. In fact, the 21st century has seen significant declines in both youth arrests and incarceration. Despite positive movement on important indicators, far too many youth—disproportionately youth of color—are incarcerated. Nevertheless, between 2000 and 2023, the number of youth held in juvenile justice facilities, adult prisons, and adult jails fell from 120,200 to 31,800—a 74% decline.

By John M. MacDonald, Aaron Chalfin, Maya Moritz, Brian Wade, Alyssa K. Mendlein, Anthony A. Braga, Eugenia South

Street crimes are thought to be inBy John M. MacDonald, Aaron Chalfin, Maya Moritz, Brian Wade, Alyssa K. Mendlein, Anthony A. Braga, Eugenia South

Street crimes are thought to be influenced by changes in ambient lighting; yet, most studies have focused on small-scale interventions in limited areas. It remains unclear whether enhanced lighting can improve safety on a larger, jurisdiction-wide scale. This study examined the first 10 months of Philadelphia's citywide rollout of enhanced street lighting. Between August 2023 and May 2024, 34,374 streetlights were upgraded across 13,275 street segments, converting roughly one third of the city's street segments to new LED (light-emitting diode) fixtures that provide clearer and more even lighting. We assessed the impact of these upgrades on total crimes, violent crimes, property crimes, and nuisance crimes. Our findings reveal a 15% decline in outdoor nighttime street crimes and a 21% reduction in outdoor nighttime gun violence following the streetlight upgrades. The streetlight upgrades may have contributed to 5% of the citywide decline in Philadelphia gun violence during the study period. Qualitative data also suggest that resident perceptions of safety and neighborhood vitality improved after new streetlights were installed.

Policy Implications

Although prior research has mostly focused on small-scale implementations, our study demonstrates that improvements in street lighting can significantly reduce crime rates across large urban areas. These results support the adoption of energy-efficient LED street lighting as a crime reduction strategy for cities. Further research is needed to explore the impact of enhanced streetlight interventions on other types of crime and to determine whether the crime reduction benefits are sustained when these upgrades are implemented across the entire City of Philadelphia for an extended period

fluenced by changes in ambient lighting; yet, most studies have focused on small-scale interventions in limited areas. It remains unclear whether enhanced lighting can improve safety on a larger, jurisdiction-wide scale. This study examined the first 10 months of Philadelphia's citywide rollout of enhanced street lighting. Between August 2023 and May 2024, 34,374 streetlights were upgraded across 13,275 street segments, converting roughly one third of the city's street segments to new LED (light-emitting diode) fixtures that provide clearer and more even lighting. We assessed the impact of these upgrades on total crimes, violent crimes, property crimes, and nuisance crimes. Our findings reveal a 15% decline in outdoor nighttime street crimes and a 21% reduction in outdoor nighttime gun violence following the streetlight upgrades. The streetlight upgrades may have contributed to 5% of the citywide decline in Philadelphia gun violence during the study period. Qualitative data also suggest that resident perceptions of safety and neighborhood vitality improved after new streetlights were installed.

Policy Implications

Although prior research has mostly focused on small-scale implementations, our study demonstrates that improvements in street lighting can significantly reduce crime rates across large urban areas. These results support the adoption of energy-efficient LED street lighting as a crime reduction strategy for cities. Further research is needed to explore the impact of enhanced streetlight interventions on other types of crime and to determine whether the crime reduction benefits are sustained when these upgrades are implemented across the entire City of Philadelphia for an extended period

By Cynthia Lum, Christopher S. Koper, Hyunji Lee, Daniel S. Nagin, Lawrence Sherman

Research Question Can research discover the true cost-effectiveness of new technologies in policing, such as automatic license plate readers (ALPR)? Data We review the findings of many impact tests of introducing ALPR readers in predominantly US police agencies. Methods We place the data in the context of the two key police mandates: public safety and public confidence. We then apply the logic of linking findings specific to the new technology with the two broad mandates. Findings The effect of any technology on police outcomes depends heavily on how it is implemented in the larger context of organizational systems and culture. The effect is also conditioned by a broad body of evidence that the key mandates depend on far broader foundations than on any specific technology. Conclusions Evidence-based policing cannot be built from isolated findings, such as marginal changes in outputs or outcomes associated with new technologies. Linking new technologies to joined-up systems of targeting, testing, and tracking is required before we can ask whether the technologies are cost-effective.

Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing (2025)

By David Spencer

Summary of Recommendations 1. Given the very poor performance of the Metropolitan Police across a wide range of areas for an extended period – including prior to the present Commissioner’s term of office and particularly in relation to the fight against crime – the Home Secretary should become the “policing body” for the Metropolitan Police. This would remove the Mayor of London’s role in relation to oversight of policing in the capital. Shifting direct political oversight to the Home Secretary, as the minister principally responsible to Parliament for policing and crime, will enable both Government and Parliament to exercise far greater scrutiny and influence over the force’s performance in a way which has the potential to deliver the significant improvements which are required. 2. To enable the Metropolitan Police to shift the force’s principal focus to local crime fighting, the Government should transfer responsibility for the national leadership of the police counterterrorism network from the Metropolitan Police to a national Counter-Terrorism Policing body led by a Chief Constable. 3. The Chief Inspector of Constabulary should return the Metropolitan Police to the “Engage” process – more commonly known as “Special Measures”. The force was, based on performance across several areas, erroneously removed from the “Engage” process inmore commonly known as “Special Measures”. The force was, based on performance across several areas, erroneously removed from the “Engage” process in January 2025. There should be a presumption that all materials relating to the “Engage” process should be made publicly available. The current lack of transparency provides the public with little confidence that the necessary steps are being taken to deliver substantial improvements in the force’s performance. 4. The Home Secretary should order an inspection of the Metropolitan Police’s approach to protest policing using section 54 (2B) Police Act 1996. This should include consideration of both the strategic approach and operational tactics used, including what new strategies and tactics are required to more effectively deal with large-scale and widespread protests. This should consider the strategies and approaches used in other jurisdictions to determine what might be learned and adopted by the force – in particular the willingness of police chiefs to use non-human based means of “creating distance” between officers and protestors. 5. The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police should review the performance of his most senior leaders and where individuals have been found to have failed to perform to the necessary standard, in some cases over very long periods, they should be replaced at the earliest opportunity. There should also be a substantial change in the approach to performance management for middle and senior leaders in the organisation – including being prepared to more willingly remove officers and staff who fail to deliver the necessary levels of performance, particularly in relation to fighting crime. Data should be published on every senior officer’s performance on crime-fighting throughout their leadership career. There should be a substantial increase in the transparency of the force’s Frontline Policing performance meetings, where local police commanders are questioned on their performance. This should include the publication of performance data, the publication of the meeting’s minutes and the option for members of the public to attend these meetings through online hosting. 

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 52p.

By Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer and  Alisa Whitfield

Immigrants held in United States detention centers experience a de facto denial of their right to access to counsel. The 38,000 immigrants detained each day are largely held in remote facilities, where they experience extremely poor—often abusive—conditions; the inability to contact counsel or prepare their cases; and a legal framework that is stacked against them. Many scholars have studied the overlapping challenges detained immigrants face in a hostile regime and have proposed solutions ranging from ending immigration prison to providing universal representation for all those detained to revising legal rationales for detention. These ideas are good ones. However, as we work towards such goals, tens of thousands remain detained with little recourse. As a partial way to bridge that gap, we argue for a transformative, collaborative model of access to justice that focuses on community empowerment and combines the work of organizers, attorneys, and law students in clinics.

 This article uniquely blends both theory and practical perspectives to advance a theory of abolition-minded provision of legal services in detention. First, we explore the legal right of access to counsel for detained immigrants, with an overview of Constitutional and international human rights models. We then examine the severe barriers to this counsel that immigration detention creates. We then use theories of abolition and legal pedagogy to explore an innovative and critical model for expanding justice in immigration detention. We propose primary goals of increasing access to counsel, empowering communities, and supporting organizing to work towards the end of immigration detention.

 This article was inspired by our experiences representing detained immigrants in a clinical setting, with law students, and in coalition with agencies and organizers working on the ground. Through examples, stories, and even photographs, we weave in insights from this ongoing collaborative project to advance a framework for bridging the immigration detention justice gap.

Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper 25-18, 2024

By Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya

We synthesize research on conflict as a fundamental economic phenomenon, arguing that the implications of the ”dark side of self-interest” have received insufficient attention in economics. We define conflict as interactions where parties choose costly inputs that are adversarially combined against one another — distinct from the collaborative input combinations typical in economic models. We make four key contributions: First, we demonstrate that conflict induces economically significant costs comparable to or exceeding traditional deadweight losses. Second, we explain how these costs vary across contexts based on property rights protection, state capacity, and cultural norms. Third, we show how incorporating conflict into economic models leads to substantially different predictions than traditional models — including inverse relationships between compensation and productivity; distortions in comparative advantage; prices determined by power rather than solely by preferences endowments, and technology. Fourth, attributes of modern states such as centralization in the presence of law, checks and balances, other forms of distributed power, and the bureaucratic form of organization can partly be thought of as restraining conflict and appropriation, with implications for governance and economic development. Overall, in the presence of conflict and appropriation, power considerations cannot be separated from economics and first-best models are not empirically plausible.

 CESifo Working Paper No. 12135, 2025

By Kristina Amerhauser | Audrey Thill 

  Cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia rely heavily on information and communications technology, financial fraud, trafficking for forced criminality, corruption and elite capture. This creates what can be described as ‘compound crimes’, reflecting how cyber scam operations are both based in physical compounds and involve multiple criminal markets. While estimates vary, the scale of funds defrauded from scam victims each year is in the tens of billions of US dollars and trending upward. In addition, illicit proceeds are generated from exploitation of trafficked persons, illegal gambling and corruption. The scale of illicit financial flows represents a clear threat to national economies, governance and international security. Cyber scam operations and their enabling networks operate at scale across Southeast Asia and beyond. They have reportedly trapped hundreds of thousands of people inside compounds where they are forced to conduct scams. Some operations retain workers through debt bondage, psychological coercion and financial incentives. Significant diversity in operational models – from high-security compounds to thousands of smaller operations located in apartments and other small premises – creates varied patterns of financial flows across jurisdictions. The money laundering process is part of a sophisticated financial service ecosystem. Most concerning is how networks of actors operate at scale and at the intersection of legitimate and illegitimate economies by using licensed crypto exchanges, registered fintech platforms and traditional banking services. Some are ‘crime as a service’ providers, explicitly providing money laundering services to cyber scam operations and doing so with corporate efficiency. This means that moving and laundering money has evolved into a marketplace-type structure where actors remain anonymous to others within the network. Governments, the private sector and civil society actors have sought innovative responses to disrupt the illicit industry. These include initiatives that ‘follow the money’ and disrupt the money laundering networks used by cyber scam operations. While some work has begun to explore illicit financial flows stemming from scam operations, notably related to cryptocurrencies, important gaps persist. Less is known about the wider set of financial flows, the mechanisms used to transfer proceeds in and out of the region and the networks involved. This policy brief seeks to help fill this gap by mapping wider related payments and providing insights into how money is moved and where it ultimately ends up. It concludes by providing actionable policy recommendations for Southeast Asian governments as well as regional and global financial service providers. Crucially, these recommendations identify entry points for disrupting the operations of the transnational organized crime groups that run cyber scam operations. The key findings include: Actors involved in cyber scams and trafficking for forced criminality often use cryptocurrency to move illicit money. They also use cash, fintech – such as peer-to-peer (P2P) payment apps – gaming or gambling platforms, bank transfers, shell and front companies, credit cards and pre-paid cards. The role of the formal banking sector in these financial flows appears significant, as many scam-related transfers are initiated by the victim from their own bank accounts before being converted into cryptocurrencies at different steps of the laundering process. While most financial institutions likely process these transactions unwittingly, evidence suggests they may be enabled by regulatory loopholes such as weak know-your-customer (KYC) requirements and/or excessively high minimum thresholds for reporting suspicious transactions. After being laundered and converted back into fiat currency4 from cryptocurrency, illicit funds are also likely to be moved again through the formal financial system.

Many of the fintech and cryptocurrency platforms that money laundering networks use to convert cryptocurrencies back into fiat are registered companies and hold financial service licences. Some owners of these platforms have close connections to the political and business elites in the countries of registration, suggesting influence over financial regulation and an interest in maintaining a policy environment amenable to the large-scale laundering of criminal proceeds. Transnational organized crime groups in Southeast Asia generate highly lucrative profits. This creates a vicious cycle: greater profits enable these groups to expand their influence, including over public officials and the financial sector, which in turn reduces scrutiny of cyber scam compounds and related suspicious financial transactions. With their growing wealth, these criminal networks invest further into other types of crime and crime-as-a-service infrastructure, generating additional profits that allow them to strengthen their influence and market position   
Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2025. 44p.

By Winnona DeSombre Bernsen

If the United States wants to increasingly use offensive cyber operations internationally, does it have the supply chain and acquisition capabilities to back it up—especially if its adversary is the People’s Republic of China? 

 The Cyber Statecraft Initiative’s new report from CSI nonresident fellow Winnona DeSombre Bernsen, Crash (exploit) and burn: Securing the offensive cyber supply chain to counter China in cyberspace,  is the first to conduct a comparative study within the international offensive cyber supply chain, comparing the United States’ fragmented, risk-averse acquisition model with China’s outsourced and funnel-like approach.

 Strategic competition between the United States and China has long played out in cyberspace, where offensive cyber capabilities, like zero-day vulnerabilities, are a strategic resource. Since 2016, China has been turning the zero-day marketplace in East Asia into a funnel of offensive cyber capabilities for its military and intelligence services, both to ensure it can break into the most secure Western technologies and to deny the United States from obtaining similar capabilities from the region. If the United States wishes to compete in cyberspace, it must compete against China to secure its offensive cyber supply chain.

Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2025. 44p