By John P. Sullivan, Nathan P. Jones 

This chapter covers the early history of bandits including the role of bandits in revolution (e.g., Pancho Villa), the rise of urban guerrillas (e.g., Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution, Carlos Marighella (the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla)) in Brazil and the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and the transition from ideological revolt to the criminal insurgency. The later transition will focus on the transition to crime by the FARC and ELN in Colombia succeeded by Bacrim in Colombia, mega-gangs in Venezuela, and Brazilian gangs (i.e., The Commando Vermelho and Primeiro Comando da Capital), followed by the rise of a criminal insurgency waged by territorial (third-generation) gangs (including maras such as MS-13 and Barrio 18 in Central America) and criminal cartels. The nexus between prison gangs and criminal gangs and the emergence of criminal enclaves (such as the Triple Frontier and Ciudad del Este) will be explored. A common thread will be a discussion of crime and social banditry (Hobsbawm) as mechanisms of revolt. Urban crime and instability and the emergence of crime wars and criminal insurgency will be discussed in context of state transition, globalization, and the rise of transnational organized crime.

London; New York: Routledge, 2021, 28p.

By Angélica Durán-Martínez

Objective/context: After the paramilitary demobilization in Colombia, Cali and Medellín—major cities with a long history of political and criminal violence—saw a decline in violence despite the continuing operation of criminal groups. Yet, while Cali remained more violent than the national average, with criminal groups displaying less ability to regulate local affairs and security, Medellín became less violent than the national average and criminal groups engaged in more intensive governance. Methodology: I compare these cities using case studies constructed through fieldwork and interviews with security officials, NGO and social leaders, and former members of groups, drawing on my long-term, ongoing research engagement in both locations. Conclusions: The contrast between these cities exemplifies varied manifestations of post-conflict criminality. I argue that this variation in criminal governance is connected to the wartime balance of power, specifically, the level of territorial control and political connections armed groups had before the demobilization. Where control and political connections of paramilitary before demobilization were high, post-conflict crime groups were more likely to engage in governance behaviors. By contrast, disputed territories during wartime were likely to experience less criminal governance. Drawing on path dependence ideas, I introduce an overlooked mechanism through which wartime orders affect criminal behavior: learning processes inside and outside criminal groups. Originality: I show that to fully understand post-conflict criminality, it is crucial to consider armed actors peripherally involved in the war but essential for territorial control, whereas to understand criminal governance, the mid-ranks of armed groups and learning processes are crucial.

Revista Colombia Internacional ,2024. 35p.

By Matthew J. Lindquist,  Eleonora Patacchin, Michael Vlassopoulos., Yves Zenou 

We study spillover effects within co-offending networks by leveraging the deaths of co-offenders for causal identification. Our results demonstrate that the death of a co-offender significantly reduces the criminal activities of other network members. We observe a decaying pattern in the magnitude of these spillover effects: individuals directly linked to a deceased offender experience the most significant impact, followed by those two steps away, and then those three steps away. Moreover, we find that the death of a more central co-offender leads to a larger reduction in aggregate crime. We also provide evidence consistent with a new theoretical prediction suggesting that the loss of a co-offender shrinks the future information set of offenders, altering their perceptions of the probability of being convicted and consequently affecting their criminal behavior. Our findings highlight the importance of understanding spillover for policymakers seeking to develop more effective strategies for crime prevention.  

  Bonn:: Institute of Labor Economics - IZA, 2024.

By Pamela B. Teaster; Erica Wood; Sally B. Hurme; E. Carlisle Shealy

This is the full report resulting from a four-part environmental scan of the issues of abuse by guardians and systemic guardianship abuse, requested in 2021 by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), showing that more work and reform related to abuse and fraud by individual guardians and the guardianship system are required. The scan consisted of a literature review of research; a scan of the data landscape; a scan of legal, policy, and practice context; and considerations for data collection. This paper is the full report of the scan and its findings. On June 30, 2021, the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services received a request for information from Senators Elizabeth Warren and Robert Casey about the roles of the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services concerning the collection of data on adult guardianship — particularly data on abuse and fraud by guardians. Part 1 was an extensive literature review. Part 2 examined how states collect data on adult guardianship. Part 3 highlighted the difficulties in determining the number of adults with guardians as well as the prevalence of abuse by guardians. Building on this research, the authors recommended federal actions to help states detect and address abuse.

Unpublished report, 2022. 146p.

By John K. Roman, Anthony Washburn; Sofia Rodriguez; Caterina G. Roman; Elena I. Navarro; Jesse T. Brey; Benjamin M. Reist

This final report of the HAVEN Project (Harms After Victimization: Experience and Needs), which was launched in 2020 as an update to the 1996 National Institute of Justice study, Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look. This document reports on the HAVEN Project’s use of data, measurement, and analytic tools that were not originally available in 1996; it also examines the HAVEN Project’s expansion of the taxonomy of harms from victimization and development of a survey instrument and methodology to facilitate the collection of self-reported data on the harms from violent victimization across multiple dimensions that are typically excluded from violent crime harms measurement. The HAVEN Project also introduced a regression-based cost-benefit model that may be integrated into causal models. The key research questions discussed in this final report are: if regression models of victimization harms, including estimates of the variance in harms experienced by victims, are feasible; how integrated data systems (IDS) can be employed to estimate trajectories of harms using the harm taxonomy developed, and what the strengths and limitations of those data systems; if those new definitions of direct and indirect harms to victims change estimated costs of victimizations, and if those new definitions are applicable to all crimes; if household survey data can generate estimates of the incidence of each victimization trajectory, and what can be learned from the analyses about those harms that may not require hospitalization; if new cost benefit analysis (CBA) methodologies can improve the quality of program evaluations that include harms to victims; and which types of victimization are most harmful.

Chicago: NORC at the University of Chicago, 2023. 37p.

By Janique Kroese, Wim Bernasco, Aart C. Liefbroer, Jan Rouwendal

Studies investigating the role of single-parent families in adolescent delinquency have seldom differentiated between types of single-parent families. Furthermore, they have typically assumed that parental disruption is a discrete event marking an abrupt change between dual-parenthood and single-parenthood. Using Dutch longitudinal population register data, we estimated fixed-effects panel models to assess (1) whether the event of parental disruption, either by parental separation or by parental death, increases subsequent adolescent delinquency and (2) whether parental disruption, either by parental separation or by parental death, has anticipatory, immediate, or delayed effects on adolescent delinquency. Our results showed that both parental separation and parental death seem to boost adolescent delinquency, and we found no difference between these types of single-parent families. However, when distinguishing between anticipatory, short-term, and long-term effects, we found a short-term increase in adolescent delinquency after a parental separation and an anticipatory reduction in adolescent delinquency before a parental death. Future research should pay more attention to diversity in the composition of single parent families, as well as to the anticipatory, short-term, and long-term consequences.

Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology (2024) 10:288–308

By Benjamin Artz and  David M. Welsch:

We employ a unique 10-year panel dataset from California to examine both the effect crime has on homelessness as well as the effect homelessness has on crime. Our main estimator accounts for endogeneity by incorporating dynamics, controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and relaxing the strict homogeneity assumption for our key variables of interest. We find strong evidence that regions experiencing increases in property crime, but not violent crime, should expect a practically significant, 2024. 69p..in homelessness, whereas increases in homelessness increase the number of violent crimes, but not property crimes. Robustness and falsification checks confirm the results.

Bonn:  Institute of Labor Economics - IZA, 2024. 49p.

By Julia Tolmie, Rachel Smith, and Denise Wilson

How intimate partner violence (IPV) is conceptualized affects what we see when we look at situations involving IPV and what we think the solutions to the problem of IPV are—either in individual cases or in the development of broader legal and policy responses. In this article, it is suggested that while conceptualizing IPV as coercive control is an improvement over previous understandings, it does not go far enough. Coercive control must be located within a broader conceptualization of IPV as a form of social and systemic entrapment if it is not to operate in a harmful manner for victim-survivors.

Violence Against WomenVolume 30, Issue 1, January 2024, Pages 54-74

By Miguel Basto-Pereira, David P. Farrington, Laura Maciel

This work aims to investigate the role of sequences of risk factors from childhood to young adulthood in predicting subsequent criminal convictions. This study uses the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development (CSDD) dataset, a prospective longitudinal research study that followed 411 males from South London from the age of 8 to 61 years. Temporal sequences of risk factors at ages 8–10, 12–14, and 16–18 were analyzed as predictors of subsequent criminal convictions up to the age of 61. Risk factors related to poverty, parenting problems, and children’s risk-taking predisposition at ages 8–10 emerged as prevalent starting points for the most highly predictive developmental sequences leading to convictions. The risk of a criminal conviction significantly increased if these risk factors were followed by low IQ scores or association with delinquent friends at ages 12–14, and by school and professional problems or drug addiction during late adolescence (ages 16–18). At each developmental stage, specific risk factors intricately combine to form chains of risk during development, subsequently predicting criminal convictions. A trajectory-of-risk-need-responsivity approach that identifies and breaks chains of risk factors that generate and enhance favorable conditions for criminal convictions is discussed.

Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology (2024) 10:242–264

By Ido Kilovaty

The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, which shut down gas supply to the entire East Coast back in May 2021, has sparked debate as to the regulation of the pipeline’s cybersecurity. After ten years of inaction on the matter, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has issued two mandatory directives on pipeline cybersecurity. This Article delves into the propriety of the TSA as a pipeline security regulator, as well as the incomplete and ineffective approach currently laid out in the TSA’s pipeline cybersecurity directives. This Article argues that there may be other agencies more suitable for the task, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, acting under the auspices of the Department of Energy. It also provides specific recommendations as to the substance of any prospective pipeline cybersecurity regulation, such as the creation of more open-ended and flexible cybersecurity objectives as opposed to the current approach of prescriptive standards.

Houston Law Review, Vol. 60, 2023, Kilovaty, Ido, Cybersecuring the Pipeline (March 29, 2022). Houston Law Review, Vol. 60, 2023,

By Simon D. Venema, Marieke Haan, Eric Blaauw, René Veenstra

Little is known about the conditions under which paternal incarceration is harmful to children and the mechanisms that explain this. This study addressed the family relationship context in the associations between paternal incarceration and adolescents' internalizing and externalizing problem behaviors. Using data from the Future of Families and Child Wellbeing Study, a moderated mediation model was specified where paternal incarceration predicted adolescents’ internalizing and externalizing problem behaviors through family relationship quality, and where the mediating role of family relationship quality was moderated by pre-incarceration family relationship characteristics. Using latent profile analyses, three pre-incarceration family clusters were identified (“Cohesive”; “Fragmented”; “Disharmonious”). Analyses indicated that the association between paternal incarceration and family relationship quality differed across pre-incarceration family clusters and that decreased father mother relationship quality mediated the negative association between paternal incarceration and adolescents’ internalizing and externalizing problem behaviors among “Cohesive” and “Fragmented”, but not among “Disharmonious” family clusters. The findings suggest that adolescents with more harmonious pre-incarceration family relationships are most vulnerable to the negative consequences of paternal incarceration. The study demonstrates the need to consider the family relationship context to understand the intergenerational consequences of incarceration.

Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology (2024) 10:213–241

By Corrie Williams, Tara Renae McGee, Shannon Walding, Christine E. W. Bond

While conduct problem behaviour initiated in early childhood often escalates in frequency and seriousness through adolescence, a notable deceleration is typically seen by mid-adolescence. It has been hypothesised that prosocial behaviour, characterised by acts like sharing and comforting, may play a role in this deceleration. However, there is a distinct gap in the current literature when it comes to understanding the temporal dynamics between the acceleration of prosocial behaviours and the deceleration of conduct problem behaviour. This study seeks to bridge this gap. Using a General Cross-Lagged Panel Model (GCLM) and data from the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children (LSAC), we investigated temporal dynamics and sequence of how the acceleration of prosocial behaviour influences the deceleration of conduct problem behaviour between ages 4 and 15. Results indicate that increases in prosocial behaviour facilitate the deceleration of conduct problem behaviour, with increases in prosocial behaviour preceding decreases in conduct problem behaviour. Further, we show a cumulative effect of increases in prosocial behaviour on decreases in conduct problem behaviour over time. This knowledge provides a foundation for understanding how timely prevention and intervention strategies that include the mechanisms for increasing prosocial behaviour may interrupt the con duct problem behaviour trajectories of children and adolescents.

Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology (2024) 10:169–192

By Ido Kilovaty

Generative AI platforms, like ChatGPT, hold great promise in enhancing human creativity, productivity, and efficiency. However, generative AI platforms are prone to manipulation. Specifically, they are susceptible to a new type of attack called “prompt injection.” In prompt injection, attackers carefully craft their input prompt to manipulate AI into generating harmful, dangerous, or illegal content as output. Examples of such outputs include instructions on how to build an improvised bomb, how to make meth, how to hotwire a car, and more. Researchers have also been able to make ChatGPT generate malicious code. This article asks a basic question: do prompt injection attacks violate computer crime law, mainly the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act? This article argues that they do. Prompt injection attacks lead AI to disregard its own hard-coded content generation restrictions, which allows the attacker to access portions of the AI that are beyond what the system’s developers authorized. Therefore, this constitutes the criminal offense of accessing a computer in excess of authorization. Although prompt injection attacks could run afoul of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, this article offers ways to distinguish serious acts of AI manipulation from less serious ones, so that prosecution would only focus on a limited set of harmful and dangerous prompt injections.

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Vol. 58, 2025, Kilovaty, Ido, Hacking Generative AI (March 1, 2024). Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Vol. 58, 2025,

By The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),

Substance use and mental health issues have significant impacts on individuals, families, communities, and societies. The National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), conducted annually by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), provides nationally representative data on the use of tobacco, alcohol, and other substances including illicit drugs; substance use disorders; receipt of substance use treatment; mental health issues; and receipt of mental health treatment among the civilian, noninstitutionalized population aged 12 or older in the United States. NSDUH estimates allow researchers, clinicians, policymakers, and the general public to better understand and improve the nation’s behavioral health. SAMHSA is steadfast in its efforts to advance the health of the nation while also promoting equity. Therefore, this report, based on 2023 NSDUH data, contains findings on key substance use and mental health indicators in the United States by race or ethnicity. The 2021 to 2023 NSDUHs used multimode data collection, in which respondents completed the survey in person or via the web. Methodological investigations led to the conclusion that estimates based on multimode data collection in 2021 and subsequent years are not comparable with estimates from 2020 or prior years. Although estimates from 2021 to 2023 can be compared,6 this report presents NSDUH estimates from 2023 only. Results from the 2023 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables show comprehensive estimates related to substance use and mental health for 2022 and 2023. The 2023 Companion Infographic Report: Results from the 2021, 2022, and 2023 National Surveys on Drug Use and Health shows comparisons of selected estimates from 2021 to 2023. Behavioral Health by Race and Ethnicity: Results from the 2021-2023 National Surveys on Drug Use and Health shows comparisons of selected estimates for racial or ethnic groups using pooled data from the 2021 to 2023 NSDUHs to increase the precision of estimates. Survey Background NSDUH is an annual survey sponsored by SAMHSA within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). NSDUH covers residents of households and people in noninstitutional group settings (e.g., shelters, boarding houses, college dormitories, migratory workers’ camps, halfway houses). The survey excludes people with no fixed address (e.g., people who are homeless and not in shelters), military personnel on active duty, and residents of institutional group settings, such as jails, nursing homes, mental health institutions, and long-term care hospitals.

Washington, DC: Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.

By NSW Domestic Violence Death Review Team

This report is the most comprehensive data analyses the Domestic Violence Death Review Team has undertaken to date, presenting detailed findings from over two decades of domestic violence homicides in NSW. It provides crucial insights to guide policymakers, service providers and advocates in preventing, responding to, and aiding recovery from domestic violence.

The dataset has continued to grow year-on-year, not only in the number of cases— now over 1,800— but also in relation to the breadth and complexity of the data captured. The analysis in this report identifies a range of key findings and themes to direct the Team’s work as it recommences its in-depth case review analyses over the next reporting period.

Key findings

• Almost one-third of all homicides in NSW occurred in a context of domestic violence.

• While most homicides overall involved the deaths of males, females were far more likely to be killed in a domestic violence-context homicide.

• Approximately 80% of intimate partner violence homicides involved men killing women.

• Men who killed their female intimate partner were almost always the domestic violence abuser in the relationship, while women who killed men were almost always the victim of their partner’s violence.

• Over 25% of people killed in a context of domestic violence were born outside of Australia.

• Almost 19% of people killed in the context of domestic violence identified as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander.

• For 90% of children killed there was a history of intimate partner violence between their parents.

• Over 80% of relative/kin domestic violence-context homicide offenders had a history of experiencing mental health issues.

Sydney: Government of New South Wales, 2024.

By Iffat Idris GSDRC, University of Birmingham 28 February 2019

This review presents findings on the prevalence and nature of serious and organized crime1: in Jordan, and efforts to combat this. The extremely limited literature on the topic indicates that Jordan has low levels of serious and organized crime: the main forms are smuggling of goods and drugs, and human trafficking. The influx of large numbers of Syrian refugees has promoted crime within refugee camps, but the impact on crime in Jordan overall appears limited.

The review drew on academic and grey literature, as well as media reports. It found very little literature on the topics covered in the query, and nothing on the links between tribal groups and organized crime or on specific drivers of crime. The dearth in literature is perhaps a reflection of low levels of organized and serious crime in Jordan – though, without data on this, it is impossible to assert this definitively. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2016: 13) highlights the problem of lack of data on serious and organized crime across the Middle East:

• In general, data on drugs, drug use, HIV, people living in closed settings, crime, corruption and terrorism in the region are scarce. Analytical studies on the profile of organized criminal groups involved in illicit trafficking, their modus operandi and the routes used are very limited, as is information on the relationship between organized crime and terrorism. This can be the result of a lack of capacity and/or infrastructure to generate, manage, analyse and report data, or the lack of or poor coordination amongst the relevant institutions.

Key findings of the review are as follows:

• Crime statistics – There is a dearth of crime statistics for Jordan, but available figures point to a rise in crime in recent years, notably murder, aggravated assault and kidnapping. A total of 24,000 crimes were recorded in 2016 (OASC, 2018). 

• Smuggling – Jordan’s long and remote desert borders with neighbouring countries make it susceptible to smuggling of cash, gold, fuel, narcotics, cigarettes and other contraband. Smuggling into Jordan tends to be small-scale, largely fuel and cigarettes. With regard to drugs, Jordan is more a corridor country than a destination point: the main drugs being captagon, heroin, hashish and marijuana. Large quantities of narcotics were seized by the authorities in 2017: increased seizures point to a rise in narcotics smuggling. 

• Money laundering and corruption – Jordan is not considered a hub for money laundering. Corruption is a bigger problem: Jordan ranked 52nd (out of 140 countries) for incidence of corruption (WEF, 2018: 313). Government efforts to contain and prosecute corruption have not been effective. 

• Trafficking – Jordan is a source, transit, and destination country for adults and children subjected to forced labour, domestic servitude, and sex trafficking. Trafficking victims in Jordan are primarily from South and Southeast Asia, East Africa, Egypt, and Syria; refugees from Syria, the Palestinian Territories, and Iraq are especially vulnerable to trafficking. Forced labour victims in Jordan experience withheld or non-payment of wages, confiscation of identity documents, restricted freedom of movement, unsafe living conditions, long hours without rest, isolation, and verbal and physical abuse. Diverse migrant women can be forced into prostitution: those who migrated to Jordan to work in restaurants and nightclubs; Egyptian women married to Jordanian husbands; out-of status domestic workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka who have fled their employers; Iraqi refugee women who have to provide for their families. 

• Crime in Syrian refugee camps – the literature indicates that, while crime is prevalent in Syrian refugee camps, it is not serious in nature: largely smuggling of camp vouchers and goods, though one report notes that the camps’ proximity to border areas of conflict makes them susceptible to smuggling and drug trafficking. While there are reports of a rise in crime in Jordan overall, this is attributed to economic pressures rather than the influx of Syrian refugees into the country. 

• Regional findings – A brief examination of serious and organized crime in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region points to a post-Arab Spring rise in transnational organized crime – facilitated by public disorder, deterioration in capacity of state law enforcement agencies, and economic hardship. Jordan is not explicitly mentioned, but given its geographic location, would likely be a target for such transnational crime networks.

Key findings of the review with regard to efforts to combat serious and organized crime in Jordan are as follows: 

• Agencies - A number of government agencies are involved in combating serious and organized crime, including trafficking. Key among these is the Public Security Directorate (PSD), which includes the Anti-Narcotics Department. The PSD and Ministry of Labour have a joint Anti-Trafficking Unit. 

• Legislation – The Anti-Human Trafficking Law was passed in 2009 but there are shortcomings with regard to meeting international standards in both the legal provisions and, even more, in enforcement. Challenges with the latter include victims being too afraid to file complaints, repatriation of victims, non-availability of evidence, and perpetrators being located out of the jurisdiction/reach of the country or hidden from the police. Jordan's Penal Code criminalizes corruption, including abuse of office, bribery, money laundering and extortion, but again the law is not implemented effectively. 

• Support from international partners – The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the main international development organization supporting the Govt. of Jordan to combat serious and organized crime. Its interventions are often part of wider regional programmes, notably the Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP) which strengthening the capacities of international airports to detect and intercept drugs, other illicit goods and high-risk passengers (including foreign terrorist fighters), and the Container Control Programme (CCP) which helps member states strengthen their border control capacity and detect illicit goods in cargo containers. Interventions by other development partners include an EU project to combat human trafficking (JEMPAS) and the UK Jordan Security Sector Programme, aimed at reducing internal security threats in Jordan. etc.

K4D Helpdesk Report 537. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2019. 13p.

By Andrés Cajiao | Paula Tobo | Mariana Botero Restrepo

Just how organized is organized crime? This report on the relationship between migration and organized crime along the Colombia–Panama border explores this recurring question in research on organized crime with the aim of demystifying two underexplored phenomena in Colombia. The first is the Gulf Clan (Spanish: Clan del Golfo), which calls itself the Gaitanist Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, a group that continues to control the region despite being the object of one of the most intensive intelligence and judicial operations in the country’s recent history. While the specifics of how the Clan operates are unknown, this report demonstrates that criminal governance always depends on a complex set of relationships between organized crime, local communities and the state. Violence and the threat of violence are not enough to govern. In fact, one of the main findings of this study is that the influence of organized crime means that irregular migration and the economy that arises around it do not operate through violence. The second phenomenon explored here is migrant smuggling, which is widespread in border areas. The actions taken by states and international organizations have not curbed this highly complex illicit economy. Although irregular migration is stigmatized and presents a serious humanitarian problem in the region, it has been key in reviving the economies of Urabá and the Darién Gap, along the Colombian border, which should play a central role in public policy discussions. Without a better understanding of migratory phenomena and the key players involved, there is little the state can do to guarantee people’s safety or recover territorial control where it has lost it.

Geneva: Global Initiative AGainst Transnational Organized Crime, 2022.

By Iffat Idris

Conflict in eastern Ukraine has been underway since 2014: the February 2014 ouster of pro-Russia President Yanukovych was followed in March by Russian annexation of Crimea, and its support for insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) – the latter is ongoing. This paper is a rapid literature review of the links between corruption, crime and conflict in eastern Ukraine. While Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was rooted both in Moscow’s historic claims to the peninsula, as well as moves by Kiev to move closer to the European Union, the ongoing insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) stems from structural factors such as industrial decline. Russian support for the Donbas insurgents, alongside its failure to recognise the republics that they announced (Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic), suggests that Moscow’s real goal is to put pressure on the Ukrainian government and prevent its integration into Western structures. The paper assesses the impact of the conflict on the economy of Crimea and Donbas. Russia has tried to demonstrate the benefits to Crimea of annexation by pumping vast resources into the region, but this resource injection has been unable to overcome the effects of wide-ranging Western sanctions. Donbas’ economy has been even more badly affected by ongoing conflict, with thousands displaced and an economic blockade imposed by Kiev greatly limiting trade. Here too, Moscow has had to step in with subsidies and humanitarian assistance. The paper also looks at the involvement of organised criminal groups (OCGs) in the conflict, and the impact of the conflict on organised crime in the region. With regard to the former it finds that OCGs played a big role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, fighting alongside Russian forces (without their insignia) and other volunteers. This highlights the complementary and symbiotic nature of the connection between criminal groups and the Russian state. OCGs in the Donbas region had strong links with the Yanukovych government in Ukraine, ousted in 2014 – hence it is no surprise that these groups were heavily involved in the Donbas insurgency. With regard to how organised crime has been affected by conflict, the paper finds that corruption was a massive problem in Ukraine long before the conflict in the east. Moreover, it involved all levels of the government system and was strongly linked to organised crime. OCGs were especially prevalent in Crimea, while Donbas was even more notorious for criminality. Post-Crimea’s annexation, links between OCGs in Crimea and in Russia became even stronger. Ironically, due to the vast influx of Russian development funds, Crimea represented an opportunity for embezzlement and corruption for Russian and Crimean OCGs. Closer ties were even forged between Russian OCGs and those in Ukraine. Since the conflict in Donbas began – and given the economic blockade, and falling Russian funding support - the region has become heavily dependent on organised crime. The paper also finds that oligarchs, with close ties to organised crime, have benefited hugely from Crimea becoming part of Russia, e.g. seizing property belonging to pro Ukraine business elites. Ties with political elites are equally strong: gangs gain protection from political patronage, in turn giving kickbacks to politicians. One final aspect explored in the paper is transnational crime. It finds that this has risen since the annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbas, including a rise in smuggling of illicit goods into Europe, and a rise in organised crime in Ukraine. Sevastopol could potentially take over as a smuggling hub from Odesa, while Crimea and Ukraine could become a global money laundering centre. Criminality in Russia has also increased, seen in rises in drug and arms trafficking and criminal cases. The drop in cross-border cooperation to combat crime has contributed to greater criminality. The paper concludes that corruption, crime and conflict are heavily intermeshed in eastern Ukraine, with each reinforcing the other in what appears to be a downward spiral of escalation.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 2. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 26p/

What’s new? Each year, hundreds of thousands of migrants cross the Darién Gap, a strip of jungle between Central and South America, on their way to the U.S. With little state presence in the area, Colombia’s Gaitanista drug syndicate is overseeing human smuggling rackets while gangs in Panama perpetrate assaults on migrants. Why does it matter? Illicit profits are soaring as the flow of migrants swells, with much of the money going to organised crime. Efforts by Colombia and Pan ama to impede the movement of people or weaken the criminal groups’ hold have so far failed to curb murder, rape and other attacks on migrants. What should be done? The days when the Darién Gap was a meaningful bar rier to mass migration are over. Enhanced law enforcement, redoubled efforts to quell crises in the main countries of departure and reinforced humanitarian assistance in the Darién could form part of regional efforts to manage irregular migration and protect the vulnerable.

Bogota; New York: Latin America Report N°102 | 3 November 2023

International Crisis Group, 2023. 46p.

By Tuesday Reitano

Finding responses to illicit financial flows (IFFs) and preventing the extraction, movement and secretion of wealth from the licit global economy has become a growing policy preoccupation. The scale of IFFs and their continued growth has been linked to damaging consequences for governance and the building of peaceful, inclusive societies that achieve development for their citizens. This paper draws on the body of research by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) to demonstrate how and why responses to IFFs are falling short.

This wide-ranging review concludes that:

• The response to IFFs is too focused on the international financial system, and has failed to recognise and integrate the need to also strengthen oversight and integrity in trade flows, which is one of the dominant means by which illicit value is transferred.

• Informal economic activity, and the size and growth of the informal sector in many economies is undermining the efficacy of regulatory and oversight instruments.

• Political will to tackle the problem appears to be lacking – instead, in a number of key states policymaking has been captured to serve the interests of those for whom the offshore financial system and other legal and regulatory loopholes are of significant benefit. Moreover, state actors are both a significant part of the problem, both as a source of IFFs and as a conduit to enabling their continuation.

The implications of such extensive state involvement are profound, ranging from an overly technical approach to the challenge; the capture and distortion of multilateral processes; the failure to link policy to insecurity and violence, and a closing space for civil society manifested in legal, reputational and physical threat. In the absence of political will, and given the way that the traditional avenues for policy and programmatic response have been compromised, the paper concludes by proposing a few ways to strengthen the response, including by building a stronger and more active role for civil society as activists, whistleblowers and sources of oversight and response; promoting financial inclusion and reducing informality, and focusing on the role of non state actors as potential gatekeepers to guard against IFFs.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 14. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham 2022. 45p.