By Melanie L. Fillmore and Lane K. Gillespie, et al.

House Concurrent Resolution No. 33 (HCR33) was introduced in the Health and Welfare Committee, and passed by both houses of the Legislature in March 2020. HCR33 recognizes Missing and Murdered Indigenous Persons (MMIP) as a crisis in Idaho, designates May 5th as a day of awareness for MMIP, and supports efforts to further investigate incidence rates, underlying causes, and possible solutions through collaborative efforts. Public testimony in support of the resolution came from a diverse group of stakeholders, including legislative sponsors, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Idaho, tribal legal and justice practitioners, and Indigenous advocates. The following passages serve as a reminder of the central role of Idaho’s tribes, and the opportunities and challenges in addressing MMIP.

Missing Persons • Missing persons cases are dynamic and missing persons data may represent individuals or incidents of missing persons. There are more incidents than individuals, as some individuals go missing more than once. Understanding this distinction is important to understanding the impact of MMIP in terms of people and resources. • Idaho’s average missing persons rate is approximately 10.59 per 100,000 persons. The average rate for Indigenous persons in Idaho is 18.99 per 100,000 persons. • A disproportionate percentage of Idaho’s missing persons are identified as Indigenous, as much as 2.1 times their proportion of the population. • Approximately 63% of Idaho’s Indigenous missing persons have been missing for more than 1 year. • Most of Idaho’s Indigenous missing persons are female (75%), in contrast with Idaho’s non-indigenous missing persons of which 28.8% are female. • Fifty percent of Idaho’s Indigenous missing persons went missing as adults and 50% went missing as juveniles. Among non-indigenous missing persons, 61.5% went missing as adults and 33.5% as juveniles. • On average in Idaho, there are 81.6 Indigneous missing persons entries in NCIC each year; and entries for Indigneous missing persons average 3.39% of annual missing persons entries in the state. • In 2020, NCIC entries for Indigenous persons were 3.38% of total entries in Idaho, compared to 1.76% of total entries nationwide. Homicide • Indigenous persons are disproportionately represented in deaths attributable to assault (3.05 times their proportion of the population). • There is variation across homicide data sources in counting potential Indigenous murder victims. • Homicide cases involving Indigenous persons occur in tribal jurisdictions and non-tribal jurisdictions

Submitted to the Idaho Legislature, September 30, 2021.2021. 59p.

By Neil Donnelly

To examine 10-year trends in offending by females in New South Wales (NSW) between 2014 and 2023. METHOD Data were extracted from the NSW Police Force’s Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS) for all people proceeded against by the NSW Police Force between 2014 and 2023. The number and proportion of offences committed by female and male offenders are presented. Offending trends are examined across 32 specific offence categories using the average annual percentage change in offences and the Kendall’s rank order correlation test to determine statistical significance. This analysis is conducted for the entire population of female and male offenders regardless of age, then repeated for the subset of young offenders. RESULTS Between 2014 and 2023 the number of females proceeded against by NSW police increased by 40%, compared to just 17% for males. The proportion of female offenders grew by around 15%, from 19% of all offenders in 2014 to 22% of all offenders in 2023. Female offenders were most commonly proceeded against for steal from retail store (12%), possess/use drugs (12%), domestic violence (DV) assault (11%), non-DV assault (7%) and breach bail conditions (7%). Much of the overall growth in female offending can be explained by increases in a small number of high-volume offence categories. These include: breach of Apprehended Violence Orders (12% increase in female offences from 2014 to 2023 versus a 7% increase in male offenders); breach bail conditions (12% vs. 8%); DV assault (8% vs. 2%); and non-DV assault (4% vs. 1%). The average annual number of female offenders (compared to males) also increased across several lower volume offences, although these contributed less to the growth in female offending overall. Most predominantly: sexual touching, sexual act and other sexual offences (13% vs. 2.5%); motor vehicle theft (12% vs. 9%); prohibited weapons offences (8% vs. 4%); break and enter non-dwelling (7% vs. stable); and trespass (6% vs. 3%). Trends and offending patterns were similar for young female offenders aged 10-17 years. One difference was the number of young female offenders grew by just 20% between 2014 and 2023 (compared to relatively stable trends for young male offenders). CONCLUSION While there has been a long-term increase in the number of female offenders proceeded against by the NSW Police Force, they continue to represent a small proportion of all offenders. Further analysis utilising representative surveys may provide insight int

Sydney: NSW BUREAU OF CRIME STATISTICS AND RESEARCH - 2024. 14p.

By Nicholas Chan and Alana Cook

It is well recognised that both domestic and non-domestic violence vary over the course of the year often rising in summer and spiking during holiday periods and with other key events. This paper shows the daily number of domestic violence (DV) and non-DV assaults recorded by the NSW Police Force on each date of the year to observe the extent to which violence increases on public holidays and other significant dates1 . Figure 1 shows the median daily number of criminal incidents of assault recorded by police from the years 2010 to 2023. To minimise the impact of abnormal crime patterns during the COVID pandemic, the chart excludes the years 2020 and 2021. The chart shows that across the year, there are clear peaks on several dates. The largest spike for both DV assault and non-DV assault occurs on New Year’s Day (1 January). Obvious spikes in assault also occur on Australia Day (January 26), ANZAC Day (April 25), New Year’s Eve (31 December), Christmas Day (December 25) and Boxing Day (December 26).

Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 2024. 4p.

By Charles C. Lanfear, David S. Kirk , Robert J. Sampson

Most homicides in the United States are committed using a handgun, but little research examines gun carrying over critical stages of the life course and changing contexts of violence. Notably, although most of the handgun homicides are committed by adults, most research on concealed gun carrying focuses on adolescents in single cohort studies. Using more than 25 years of longitudinal multi-cohort data from Chicago, 1994–2021, we show that pathways of concealed gun carrying are distinct between adolescence and adulthood. Adolescent carrying is often age-limited and responsive to direct exposure to gun violence (witnessing and victimization), while adult carrying is a persistent behavior that is less tied to direct exposure. The onset of concealed carry is also a strong predictor of later gun use (shooting or brandishing), and we find distinct patterns of gun use between individuals who first carry in adolescence versus adulthood. We discuss the implications of these dual pathways for research and policies on firearm use.

Sci. Adv. 10, 2024, 12p.

By Rohit Acharya and Rhett Morris

In 2020, the average U.S. city experienced a surge in its homicide rate of almost 30%—the fastest spike ever recorded in the country. Across the nation, more than 24,000 people were killed compared to around 19,000 the year before.

Homicides remained high in 2021 and 2022, but in 2023 they began to fall rapidly. Projections suggest the national homicide rate in 2024 is on track to return to levels close to those recorded in 2019, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet that spike in murders continues to deliver major costs in terms of the lives lost, the people incarcerated, and the perception of decreased safety across the country.

Some commentators have suggested the increase in homicides during 2020 was a response to the murder of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer in May of that year. Others hypothesized that it was caused by a police “pull back,” in which officers chose to do less work in reaction to the protests that followed Floyd’s death.

As more information has become available, these theories appear to be less supported by evidence than some initially thought.1 The evidence indicates that the national homicide rate was already on track to reach a peak far above the previous year even before Floyd was killed.As Figure 1 demonstrates, murders began to rise rapidly in mid-April of 2020. Cell phone data show this is when residents started leaving home more often as lockdown policies eased and the weather grew warmer. During the 6-week period from April 12 to May 23 (weeks 16 to 21 in Figure 1), homicides went up by an average of 17 murders each week.

After Floyd was killed on May 25, the national homicide rate continued to follow this trend, with additional increases during the 2 weeks around Memorial Day and the 2-week period around July 4. But even the highest point of these additional increases was less than 40 murders above the pre-existing trend. While it’s true that homicides did temporarily rise more than they were already on track to following Floyd’s death, these additional increases are unlikely to explain the 5,000 additional murders seen during the year.

This leaves us with a question: What happened that could have caused homicides to spike in 2020, remain high for 2 years, and then start to decline rapidly in 2023?

New data offers a potential explanation. In this report, we analyze thousands of police records and compare them to changes that occurred in U.S. cities just before homicides started to surge. This showed that the spike in murders during 2020 was directly connected to local unemployment and school closures in low-income areas. Cities with larger numbers of young men forced out of work and teen boys pushed out of school in low-income neighborhoods during March and early April, had greater increases in homicide from May to December that year, on average. The persistence of these changes can also explain why murders remained high in 2021 and 2022 and then fell in late 2023 and 2024.

These analyses point to new answers and offer focused solutions that civic leaders can use to prevent future spikes in murder and reduce current levels of violence. We present these findings in detail below in three main sections:

First, we review evidence from existing research that reveals a formula for how violence develops in cities.

Second, we analyze detailed administrative data from a single city with multiple spikes in murder prior to the COVID-19 pandemic to illustrate how this formula applies to local communities.

Finally, we use lessons from this analysis to offer a new explanation for the national spike in homicides in 2020 and make recommendations on how to avoid future increases in murder.

Brookings, 2024. 20p.

By The U.S.Drug Enforcement Administration

The most significant drug-related threat to Indiana is posed by Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTO), particularly the Cartel de Sinaloa (CDS) and the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Mexican DTOs dominate the wholesale supply of illicit opioids (both fentanyl and heroin), cocaine, methamphetamine, and Mexico-grown marijuana in the state. The opioid threat remains dire and is of grave concern.

Washington, DC: U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Intelligence Report; 2024. 7p.

By Michael Ahn Paarlberg

Policy responses to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) within migrant receiving countries often conflate all organizations which conduct illegal activity in multiple countries based on the mafia or cartel model. This model imagines the TCO to be the most evolved form of organized crime: deeply institutionalized, well resourced, hierarchically structured, highly profitable, and diversified in their criminal activities. Such a model informs law enforcement and immigration policies which are often draconian and counterproductive to citizen security. In reality, transnational crime is highly varied in organization, activities, scope, and membership. A major TCO type that defies the mafia archetype is the transnational gang. This study seeks to nuance our understanding of TCOs, illustrated by case studies of two transnational gangs, MS-13 and Satudarah, by advancing the concept of criminal remittances to locate agency in transnationalization. As the case studies demonstrate, for transnational gangs, the remittance of criminal activity is not at the organization level but at the individual and state level. Thus the transnationalization of crime can itself be the product of state foreign and migration policies.

Comparative Migration Studies volume 10, Article number: 24, 2022, 20p.

By Moamen Gouda and Anouk S. Rigterink

This study investigates the long-term relationship between slavery and violent crime in the USA. Although qualitative evidence suggests that slavery perpetuated violence, there has been no largeN study supporting this claim. Using county-level data, we find that the percentage of slaves in the population in 1860 is linked with violent crime in 2000. This result is specific to violent crime, robust to instrumenting for slavery and varying the approach to missing crime data, and not driven by biased crime reporting. Investigating the theoretical mechanisms driving these results, we find that historical slavery affects inequality (like Bertocchi and Dimico, 2014), white Americans’ political attitudes towards race (like Acharya et al., 2016b) and black American’s political attitudes – in opposite directions. Results suggest that inequality and black American’s political attitudes mediate the observed effect on violence.

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 11515, Dec 2024, 50 pages

By Amnesty International

Enforced disappearance is both a crime under international law and a serious human rights violation. When a person is deprived of their liberty and their fate or whereabouts concealed, the lives of their families, loved ones and communities are put on hold while they wait to learn of what has happened to them and where they are. In Colombia, as in other countries in the Americas, many of the people left waiting or searching for their loved ones after an enforced disappearance have turned uncertainty into a force for change. Firstly, to find the victims of enforced disappearance. Second, to demand truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence. Third, to continue the struggle to ascertain the fate and whereabouts of other people’s loved ones and to defend human rights. Women play a leading role in this story. They are the ones who have overwhelmingly taken on the task of searching for the victims of enforced disappearance in Colombia. In doing so, not only have they raised their voices against the injustice of the enforced disappearance imposed on them, but they have also acted as searchers and human rights defenders. In Colombia, taking on these roles means exposing themselves to unacceptable risks, threats and attacks. Whether they are searching for a loved one, helping someone else to search for a loved one, or defending the rights of victims of enforced disappearance and their families, women who search face arbitrariness, impunity and violence, sometimes from the state and sometimes from non-state actors, especially state security forces and armed opposition groups. In most cases, this violence is gendered. The nature of the risks, threats and attacks that women searchers face often intersect with their gender. Among other forms of violence against women, threats relate to their bodies or to their assigned or assumed gender roles, and perpetrators disproportionately use sexual violence against women. However, women searchers not only continue their work, but also put forward proposals for action to ensure that the state respects, guarantees and protects their rights. The most recent manifestation of this driving force is the approval of Law 2364 of 2024, a proposal that emerged from a group of organizations and communities of women searchers who spoke of their own life experiences, analysed them and used them to draft a bill designed to urge the state to take appropriate measures to end this scourge. With this report, Amnesty International begins a process of documenting the situation of risks, threats and attacks faced by women searchers in Colombia and, based on this, a process of monitoring the implementation of Law 2364 of 2024, which will continue over the next few years. This first part documents the story of Yanette Bautista, Andrea Torres and the Nydia Erika Bautista Foundation (FNEB), an organization of women searchers and victims of enforced disappearance that accompanies other organizations and communities in their own cases.

London: Amnesty International, 2024. 64p.

By Ionel Zamfir and Colin Murphy

The rise of digital technologies represents a double-edged sword for women's rights. On the one hand, the digital environment has enabled women to build networks and spread awareness about the abuse they suffer, such as through the #Metoo movement. On the other, it has provided abusers and misogynists with new tools with which they can spread their harmful content on an unprecedented scale. With the development of artificial intelligence, these trends, both positive and negative, are expected to continue. Against this backdrop, it has become clear that digital violence is as harmful as offline violence and needs to be tackled with the full force of the law, as well as through other non-legislative measures. Moreover, the digital content causing the harm – images, messages, etc. – needs to be erased. This is particularly important, as the impact on victims is profound and long-lasting. The European Union has adopted several pieces of legislation that aim to make a difference in this respect. The directive on combating violence against women, to be implemented at the latest by June 2027, sets minimum EU standards for criminalising several serious forms of cyberviolence and enhances the protection of and access to justice for victims. EU legislation on the protection of privacy is also having an impact on cyberviolence. For example, the new Digital Services Act imposes an obligation on big digital platforms in the EU to remove harmful content from their websites. This is instrumental in removing intimate or manipulated images that are disseminated on the internet without the person's consent; almost all such images portray women, according to existing data. Member States use a multiplicity of legal approaches to tackle this issue, combining criminalisation of specific cyber offences with the use of general criminal law. In some Member States, an explicit gender dimension is also included.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024. 11p

By Sofia Amaral, Aixa Garcia-Ramos, Selim Gulesci, Sarita Oré, Alejandra Ramos, & Maria Micaela Sviatschi

Gender-based violence (GBV) at schools is a pervasive problem that affects millions of adolescent girls worldwide. In partnership with the Ministry of Education in Mozambique, we developed an intervention to increase the capacity of key school personnel to address GBV and to improve students’ awareness as well as proactive behaviors. To understand the role of GBV on girls’ education, we randomized not only exposure to the intervention but also whether the student component was targeted to girls only, boys only, or both. Our findings indicate a reduction in sexual violence by teachers and school staff against girls, regardless of the targeted gender group, providing evidence of the role of improving the capacity of key school personnel to deter perpetrators. Using administrative records, we also find that in schools where the intervention encouraged proactive behavior by girls, there was an increase in their school enrollment, largely due to an increased propensity for GBV reporting by victims. Our findings suggest that effectively mitigating violence to improve girls’ schooling requires a dual approach: deterring potential perpetrators and fostering a proactive stance among victims, such as increased reporting.

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 11506, Nov 2024, 64p.

By Megan Steele-Baser; Alyssa L. Brown; Denise V. D’Angelo; Kathleen C. Basile, Rosalyn D. Lee, ; Antoinette T. Nguyen, & Cynthia H. Cassell

Intimate partner violence (IPV) can include emotional, physical, or sexual violence. IPV during pregnancy is a preventable cause of injury and death with negative short- and long-term impacts for pregnant women, infants, and families. Using data from the 2016–2022 Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System in nine U.S. jurisdictions, CDC examined associations between IPV during pregnancy among women with a recent live birth and the following outcomes: prenatal care initiation, health conditions during pregnancy (gestational diabetes, pregnancy-related hypertension, and depression), substance use during pregnancy, and infant birth outcomes. Overall, 5.4% of women reported IPV during pregnancy. Emotional IPV was most prevalent (5.2%), followed by physical (1.5%) and sexual (1.0%) IPV. All types were associated with delayed or no prenatal care; depression during pregnancy; cigarette smoking, alcohol use, marijuana or illicit substance use during pregnancy; and having an infant with low birth weight. Physical, sexual, and any IPV were associated with having a preterm birth. Physical IPV was associated with pregnancyrelated hypertension. Evidence-based prevention and intervention strategies that address multiple types of IPV are important for supporting healthy parents and families because they might reduce pregnancy complications, depression and substance use during pregnancy, and adverse infant outcomes

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2024, 6p.

By Timothy Cubitt, Anthony Morgan and Rick Brown

Drawing on a survey of 13,302 online Australians, this study examines the characteristics and behaviours of respondents who viewed child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and fringe or radical content online, or both. In the past 12 months, 40.6 percent of respondents had viewed fringe or radical content and 4.5 percent had viewed CSAM. Among respondents who viewed CSAM, 64.7 percent had also viewed fringe or radical content, while 7.1 percent of those who viewed radical content had also viewed CSAM. Respondents who viewed only CSAM or only fringe or radical content were similar to one another. Respondents who viewed both were more likely to be younger and male and had higher rates of criminal justice system contact and diagnosed mental illness. Their online activity, including the platforms used, also differed.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 708. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 16p.

By Claire Provost,

U.S. leads global drug war

The role of the United States in exporting the destructive war on drugs to other countries is unparalleled. Since 1971, the U.S. has spent more than a trillion dollars on the war on drugs, prioritising law enforcement responses and fuelling mass incarceration within its borders. It has also played a leading role in pushing and funding punitive responses to drugs internationally. This has continued despite clear evidence that such approaches don’t work to achieve their stated aims (ending drug use and sales) while having devastating effects on rights and health, including mass criminalisation, disease transmission, repression and displacement.

This report demonstrates how U.S. assistance has supported and expanded destructive and deadly anti-drug responses in low- and middle-income countries around the world. It also presents new follow-the-money data analysis on U.S. international drug control spending by various government departments and budgets. This includes official development assistance (ODA) intended to support poverty reduction and other global development goals; and three case studies – Colombia, Mexico, and the Philippines – to reveal the damage done by this spending.

Vast and complex global network

The 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report by the U.S. State Department described a “whole of government approach” to drug control and a strategy of deep collaboration and “capacity building” with counterparts in other countries. A vast and complex global network of U.S. government agencies, programs, and activities has been developed in the ongoing “war on drugs.”

U.S. support for drug enforcement internationally includes financial, material and technical assistance. The U.S. drug war bureaucracy is expansive, involving numerous agencies of the government, including the Department of Defense (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), State Department, Department of Homeland Security, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as the infamous Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), under the Department of Justice (DOJ). By 2023, the DEA had 93 foreign offices in 69 countries.

Follow the money

Over the decade between 2015-2024, a total of almost $13 billion of U.S. taxpayer money was allocated to “counternarcotics” activities internationally.

For fiscal year 2025, the President requested $1 billion for international “counternarcotics” activities. Almost half of this request was to be received and spent by the DEA ($480 million); the second largest planned intermediary for this spending was to be the State Department’s INL bureau (about $350 million).

Separate budget documents from the involved departments contain further detail on where and how international drug control funding is to be spent. For instance, the U.S. Department of State’s 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) showed that Latin America was budgeted to receive more than half ($225 million) of the total $375 million for “counternarcotics” requested by the department and its agencies (including INL and USAID). Colombia was to be the largest single country recipient ($115 million).

Aid donors (led by the U.S.) spent almost $1 billion of their ODA on “narcotics control” projects in dozens of low- and middle-income countries over the decade 2013-2022. No donor contributed more to these “narcotics control” budgets than the U.S.

Controversially, the U.S. has been increasingly classifying drug control spending as ODA: in 2020, it counted just over $30 million like this; in 2021 that figure was $309 million (and while it dropped to $106 million in 2022, this was still higher than earlier years).

Profit-making companies are also benefiting from this ODA spending on “narcotics control.” The top “channel” for this spending has been private companies (“private sector institutions,” receiving $244 million over the decade) followed by the governments of countries funded ($202 million), and then multilateral organisations such as UNODC ($77 million).

Harm Reduction International | Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 47p.

By Gunes A. Aşık, Naci Mocan:

We analyze the expressive content of government action, focusing on Istanbul Convention, an international treaty aimed at protecting women against violence, signed and ratified by 39 countries. In 2021, ten years after signing the Convention, the Turkish government withdrew from it, on the grounds that it "was hijacked by a group of people attempting to normalize homosexuality, which is incompatible with Turkey's social and family values." Although this withdrawal did not alter existing laws or law enforcement practices, women's rights advocates viewed it as a signal of tolerance for violence against women. We use two separate datasets on female murders from independent sources. Analyses, including a difference-in-difference model with male homicide data, show that the withdrawal led to an additional 70 female murders per year, primarily committed by intimate partners. The effect is more pronounced in provinces where the long-governing religious-conservative coalition parties have stronger voter support and in provinces with lower education levels. We also show that Turkey's entry into the Convention in 2011 had the opposite impact, leading to a decrease in female murders. The signing of the Convention, which acted as a normative signal against violence, and the subsequent enactment of comprehensive legislation strengthening deterrence, had distinct effects. The signaling effect of the Entry was more significant in the same provinces that reacted more strongly to the Exit: those with lower education levels, stronger support for the governing party, and the Eastern region of the country. These findings indicate that government actions are interpreted as normative signals by society.

Bonn, Germany: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 56p

By Nina Hudson, Rachel Moody, Heather McKay, Rae Kaspiew

The guide presents research-based insights that challenge common stereotypes, highlighting the diverse experiences of victims and survivors and offering practical examples and approaches for professionals to implement in their practice. It is intended for use by professionals within the Australian justice sector, specifically police, lawyers, and judicial officers.

This resource aims to support a more trauma-informed, victim-centred approach within the Australian justice system, ultimately fostering a greater understanding of the complexities of sexual assault. It was developed in response to calls for improvements in the justice system's handling of sexual assault cases and draws on research from over 100 Australian and international sources.

Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2024. 83p.

By Najla Nassif Palma

The idea that Rio de Janeiro has been plunged into an actual “war” against organized crime is widely discussed and is supported by an ever-increasing number of people in Brazil. Not surprisingly, such discourse has led to less protection for the civilian population, particularly in the so-called favelas, while allowing security forces to carry out operations with even greater relative impunity. This article argues that although urban violence in Rio de Janeiro is indeed a serious problem, it does not reach the threshold required to be considered a non-international armed conflict.

International Review of the Red Cross (2023), 105 (923), 795–827.

By Jennifer Cearns and Charles Beach

Contraband Cultures presents narratives, representations, practices and imaginaries of smuggling and extra-legal or informal circulation practices, across and between the Latin American region (including the Caribbean) and its diasporas. Countering a fetishizing and hegemonic imaginary (typically stemming from the Global North) of smuggling activity in Latin America as chaotic, lawless, violent and somehow ‘exotic’, this book reframes such activities through the lenses of kinship, political movements, economic exchange and resistance to capitalist state hegemony. The volume comprises a broad range of chapters from scholars across the social sciences and humanities, using various methodological techniques, theoretical traditions and analytic approaches to explore the efficacy and valence of ‘smuggling’ or ‘contraband’ as a lens onto modes of personhood, materiality, statehood and political (dis)connection across Latin America. This material is presented through a combination of historic documentation and contemporary ethnographic research across the region to highlight the genesis and development of these cultural practices whilst grounding them in the capitalist and colonial refashioning of the entire region from the sixteenth century to the present day.

London: UCL Press, 2024. 294p.

By Marcena Hunter

While gold is often referred to as a blood mineral due to its role in conflict financing, the relationship between the gold sector, instability and violence is far more nuanced, with complex regional dynamics. In the gold production hub of West Africa, where artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) is pervasive, an increasing tide of insecurity and violence in recent years adds to the complexity of the sector. Woven into the region’s convoluted web of actors, activity and supply chains are criminal networks that link local mines to international trade hubs, exploiting the gold sector for financial gain and power. The analysis in this report demonstrates that the reality of the relationships between gold, conflict and criminality challenges the simplistic narrative of ‘blood minerals’ used to finance conflict, offering a far more nuanced understanding of the significance of the gold sector in West Africa. Rather, gold is closely intertwined with survival, money, power and criminality. Criminality, fragility and violence While literature on the relationship between gold and instability has often focused on conflict financing, the interplay between gold, governance and criminality can contribute to instability and violence before any form of conflict financing takes place. Criminal exploitation of the gold sector is fostered by persistent and widespread informality, due in part to the significant barriers to entry in the formal sector, and the lack of support for informal miners and gold traders. As a result, corrupt and criminal elites in the political and business spheres can capture illicit gold flows, further contributing to community frustrations that can give rise to conflict. Limiting access to the gold sector by restricting access to mine deposits or conducting crackdowns on unlicensed ASGM can also undermine the legitimacy of state actors. Thus, efforts to stabilize West Africa must account for complex criminal interests while also addressing the long-standing grievances and expectations of local communities.1 Such efforts are critical in both conflict-laden areas and stable areas to reduce the risk of conflict spreading. Where the gold sector contributes to conflict financing in West Africa, it can vary significantly in form and value. In locations where conflict and gold mining overlap, armed groups may target the gold sector by taxing mining and trade activities, demanding payment from miners for providing security, or establishing checkpoints along roads to mine sites and trade hubs for payment collection. Members of armed groups may also directly engage in gold mining, either for personal financial gain or to benefit the group. Yet in many regions, gold is not the primary source of revenue for armed groups; other industries like the livestock sector are also targets. Sitting in the space between increased fragility and conflict are local self-defence and identity militia groups, which can act in cooperation or in competition with the state.2 In West Africa, these groups fall on a spectrum ranging from hybrid security institutions to mafia-style protection rackets run by ‘violent entrepreneurs’. There is a heavy overlap between these groups and the gold sector, with many instances of groups providing security at gold mine sites and along transportation routes. Yet, the origins of the different groups, their roles in local communities and the gold sector, and their role in conflict dynamics vary greatly.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2022. 61p.

By The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT)

With inflation at its highest levels since 2008, the international economy finds itself amid a cost of-living crisis. In many countries, inflation has reached multi-decade highs, with both headline and core inflation continuing to rise and broaden beyond food and energy prices. Inflation has also been intensified by post-COVID economics and the Russian invasion of Ukraine – both of which have driven global commodity prices higher. Among the cascading effects of inflation on the global economy is the negative impact it has on the market dynamics that drive illicit trade. Specifically, high levels of inflation can have a disastrous impact on consumer purchasing power. In turn, reduced purchasing power coupled with increased poverty reduces consumer “product affordability,” which is widely regarded as the primary driver for illicit trade. When prices rise faster than incomes, people can afford to buy fewer goods and services and cheaper goods including illicit and black-market products become more tempting. Given these dynamics, where inflation incentivizes consumers to choose cheaper, illicit alternatives, governments will necessarily need to be more vigilant in their efforts to defend their economies from illicit trade. In this light, Turkiye presents a valuable opportunity to raise awareness on the relationship between inflation and growth in illicit trade. proTurkiye is experiencing high inflation rates. In October 2022, inflation climbed to a 25-year high of 85.5 %. Consequently, the impacts of soaring inflation leading to price increases have created a notable erosion of consumer purchasing power in Turkiye. Turkiye already faces challenges from illicit trade on multiple fronts. For example, it is an important source country for illicit plant protection products, counterfeit goods are widespread, and the country grapples with the harmful effects of illicit tobacco, alcohol and petroleum products. Moreover, the government’s goal of making Turkiye a top pharma hub by 2023 is threatened by a lucrative market for illegal pharmaceuticals. This situation is exacerbated by Turkiye’s location in the region, which makes it a key transit hub for both complete counterfeit products and counterfeit components. In principle and practice, the challenge of product “affordability” is a long-standing driver for illicit trade. Keeping that in mind, inflation amplifies a problem that usually already exists. In Turkiye’s case, inflation can be expected to intensify the problem and, consequently, requires its government to likewise intensify efforts to mitigate illicit trade. This report explores the situation of illicit trade in Turkiye, addresses its susceptibility to inflation, outlines the issues that must be addressed, and presents a set of policy recommendations that could help the government and other stakeholders fortify their efforts to control illicit trade.

The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT) , 2022. 24p.