José Carlos Hernández-Gutiérrez

The phenomenon of organized crime in Mexico is not new. However, it is no less true that, for a few years now, violence caused by or related to criminal organizations has been registering higher levels than ever. This has caused, from different spheres, to wonder if indeed the problem facing the country can still be called organized crime. Can non-state armed actors in Mexico qualify as terrorists? Have they evolved into some form of insurgency? The author of these pages, after conducting a bibliographic review on the variants of terrorism and insurgency used by some authors to refer to the Mexican case, affirms that Mexican criminal organizations are not terrorists or insurgents, but rather profit-making organizations that make a tactical use of terrorism and / or insurgency to achieve economic benefits or the goals of their organizations.

2021, Los desafíos de la globalización: respuestas desde América Latina y la Unión Europea

By Iffat Idris GSDRC, University of Birmingham 28 February 2019

This review presents findings on the prevalence and nature of serious and organized crime1: in Jordan, and efforts to combat this. The extremely limited literature on the topic indicates that Jordan has low levels of serious and organized crime: the main forms are smuggling of goods and drugs, and human trafficking. The influx of large numbers of Syrian refugees has promoted crime within refugee camps, but the impact on crime in Jordan overall appears limited.

The review drew on academic and grey literature, as well as media reports. It found very little literature on the topics covered in the query, and nothing on the links between tribal groups and organized crime or on specific drivers of crime. The dearth in literature is perhaps a reflection of low levels of organized and serious crime in Jordan – though, without data on this, it is impossible to assert this definitively. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2016: 13) highlights the problem of lack of data on serious and organized crime across the Middle East:

• In general, data on drugs, drug use, HIV, people living in closed settings, crime, corruption and terrorism in the region are scarce. Analytical studies on the profile of organized criminal groups involved in illicit trafficking, their modus operandi and the routes used are very limited, as is information on the relationship between organized crime and terrorism. This can be the result of a lack of capacity and/or infrastructure to generate, manage, analyse and report data, or the lack of or poor coordination amongst the relevant institutions.

Key findings of the review are as follows:

• Crime statistics – There is a dearth of crime statistics for Jordan, but available figures point to a rise in crime in recent years, notably murder, aggravated assault and kidnapping. A total of 24,000 crimes were recorded in 2016 (OASC, 2018). 

• Smuggling – Jordan’s long and remote desert borders with neighbouring countries make it susceptible to smuggling of cash, gold, fuel, narcotics, cigarettes and other contraband. Smuggling into Jordan tends to be small-scale, largely fuel and cigarettes. With regard to drugs, Jordan is more a corridor country than a destination point: the main drugs being captagon, heroin, hashish and marijuana. Large quantities of narcotics were seized by the authorities in 2017: increased seizures point to a rise in narcotics smuggling. 

• Money laundering and corruption – Jordan is not considered a hub for money laundering. Corruption is a bigger problem: Jordan ranked 52nd (out of 140 countries) for incidence of corruption (WEF, 2018: 313). Government efforts to contain and prosecute corruption have not been effective. 

• Trafficking – Jordan is a source, transit, and destination country for adults and children subjected to forced labour, domestic servitude, and sex trafficking. Trafficking victims in Jordan are primarily from South and Southeast Asia, East Africa, Egypt, and Syria; refugees from Syria, the Palestinian Territories, and Iraq are especially vulnerable to trafficking. Forced labour victims in Jordan experience withheld or non-payment of wages, confiscation of identity documents, restricted freedom of movement, unsafe living conditions, long hours without rest, isolation, and verbal and physical abuse. Diverse migrant women can be forced into prostitution: those who migrated to Jordan to work in restaurants and nightclubs; Egyptian women married to Jordanian husbands; out-of status domestic workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka who have fled their employers; Iraqi refugee women who have to provide for their families. 

• Crime in Syrian refugee camps – the literature indicates that, while crime is prevalent in Syrian refugee camps, it is not serious in nature: largely smuggling of camp vouchers and goods, though one report notes that the camps’ proximity to border areas of conflict makes them susceptible to smuggling and drug trafficking. While there are reports of a rise in crime in Jordan overall, this is attributed to economic pressures rather than the influx of Syrian refugees into the country. 

• Regional findings – A brief examination of serious and organized crime in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region points to a post-Arab Spring rise in transnational organized crime – facilitated by public disorder, deterioration in capacity of state law enforcement agencies, and economic hardship. Jordan is not explicitly mentioned, but given its geographic location, would likely be a target for such transnational crime networks.

Key findings of the review with regard to efforts to combat serious and organized crime in Jordan are as follows: 

• Agencies - A number of government agencies are involved in combating serious and organized crime, including trafficking. Key among these is the Public Security Directorate (PSD), which includes the Anti-Narcotics Department. The PSD and Ministry of Labour have a joint Anti-Trafficking Unit. 

• Legislation – The Anti-Human Trafficking Law was passed in 2009 but there are shortcomings with regard to meeting international standards in both the legal provisions and, even more, in enforcement. Challenges with the latter include victims being too afraid to file complaints, repatriation of victims, non-availability of evidence, and perpetrators being located out of the jurisdiction/reach of the country or hidden from the police. Jordan's Penal Code criminalizes corruption, including abuse of office, bribery, money laundering and extortion, but again the law is not implemented effectively. 

• Support from international partners – The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the main international development organization supporting the Govt. of Jordan to combat serious and organized crime. Its interventions are often part of wider regional programmes, notably the Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP) which strengthening the capacities of international airports to detect and intercept drugs, other illicit goods and high-risk passengers (including foreign terrorist fighters), and the Container Control Programme (CCP) which helps member states strengthen their border control capacity and detect illicit goods in cargo containers. Interventions by other development partners include an EU project to combat human trafficking (JEMPAS) and the UK Jordan Security Sector Programme, aimed at reducing internal security threats in Jordan. etc.

K4D Helpdesk Report 537. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2019. 13p.

By Folahanmi Aina and John Sunday Ojo

Violent extremist organisations (VEOs) use social media platforms to promote extremist content and coordinate agendas.  The use of digital platforms to disseminate information and coordinate activities by VEOs in Nigeria has grown considerably in recent years. This report analyses the adoption of social media before and after attacks by Boko Haram, Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Ansaru. In the post-attack environment, Boko Haram, ISWAP and Ansaru use platforms to claim responsibility and display their strengths against the state’s security forces. By demonstrating their capacity to attack state security forces, the three groups aim to erode the public’s confidence in the state military’s capacity to safeguard national security. The key findings of this report are as follows: Boko Haram, ISWAP and Ansaru previously leveraged popular social media platforms, including YouTube, Facebook, Telegram and Instagram. These platforms were used to promote propaganda and create awareness regarding upcoming attacks. However, all three groups have now had their use of these platforms restricted or banned. ISWAP has switched to using WhatsApp as a secure platform for communication before, during and after attacks. Rocket.Chat and Telegram have also been instrumental in ISWAP’s information dissemination. Boko Haram uses Telegram to share its activities in the pre-attack and post-attack environments. Ansaru has yet to appear on social media platforms due to its underground activities, which are hard to monitor. The recent acquisition of high-speed satellite internet has enhanced ISWAP’s communication with its audience and enabled coordinated attacks. Combating the exploitation of social media platform by VEOs requires a multidimensional approach. Effective collaboration with technology companies becomes imperative to identify extremist content. Building technological infrastructure for the state requires synergistic collaboration with the military and intelligence agencies to enable the removal of extremism from social media platforms. Devising multilingual and specialised algorithms to detect coded extremism messages and audio-visual content is essential for effective counter-extremism digital architecture. Investing in current technology through research and algorithm development must be prioritised to identify violent extremist content in Nigeria and beyond.

London: Global Network on Extremism & Technology, 2023. 30p.

By Suzanne Newcombe, Sarah Harvey, Jane Cooper, Ruby Forrester, Jo Banks and Shanon Shah

The word ‘cultic’ is applied to a diverse range of online activity. This label is not always intended to convey a negative judgement; for example, individual influencers, music groups and brands aspire to a ‘cult following’. However, the use of the words ‘cult’ or ‘cultic’ is usually intended by the speaker as a judgement to draw attention to something that may have some elements typically associated with religion (for example, idealisation of a particular individual, a specific worldview and/or ritual practices) as well as the potential to cause harm and violence. This report proposes three ideal-typical groupings of online cultic activity that can glorify and inspire violent extremisms: ‘Cultic’ Religious Groups, ‘Online Cultic Milieus’ and ‘Cultic Fandoms’. This is not an exhaustive description of online activity that has been termed ‘cultic’ in popular culture, but it provides a good starting point for further analysis. This report argues that the understanding of ‘cults’ and online activity needs to be carefully nuanced; the complexities of online and offline activities that might result in violent extremism need to be analysed and risk assessed at the level of both group/social movement and individual. It is important to understand that there are a range of ways individuals interact with these cultic online environments that may or may not represent warning signs or pathways into violent extremism. A holistic understanding of both the nature of the cultic online milieu and an individual’s engagement with that environment is warranted before making assumptions about the nature of any individual’s engagement.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), July 2023.

By Julia Kupper and Reid Meloy

This pilot study examines the correlation of online and on-the-ground behaviours of three lone-actor terrorists prior to their intended and planned attacks on soft targets in North America and Europe: the Pittsburgh synagogue shooter, the Buffalo supermarket shooter and the Bratislava bar shooter. The activities were examined with the definition of the proximal warning indicator energy burst from the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18), originally defined as an acceleration in frequency or variety of preparatory behaviours related to the target. An extensive quantitative and qualitative assessment of primary and secondary sources was conducted, including raw data from different tech platforms (Gab, Discord and Twitter–now X) and open-source materials, such as criminal complaints, superseding indictments and court trial transcripts. Preliminary findings of this small sample suggest an inverse relationship between the online and offline behaviours across all three perpetrators. The average point of time between the decision to attack and the actual attack was five months, with an elevation of digital activities in the three months leading up to the incident, along with some indications of offline planning. In the week prior to the event, social media activity decreased–specifically on the day before the acts of violence with two subjects going completely dark–while terrestrial preparations increased. On the actual day of the incident, all assailants accelerated their tactical on-the-ground actions and resurfaced in the online sphere to publish their final messages in the minutes or hours prior to the attack. It appears that the energy burst behaviours in the digital sphere and the offline actions can be measured in both frequency and variety. Operational implications of this negative correlation are suggested for intelligence analysts, counter-terrorism investigators and threat assessors.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2023. 36p.

By Nafees Hamid and Cristina Ariza

Question: Are those radicalised offline or online more of a threat? Which group is harder to detect, more successful in completing attacks, and more lethal when they do so? Is the pattern different for youth versus older perpetrators and for men versus women? This report investigates these questions. Database: We created a database containing 439 perpetrators involved in 245 attacks between 1 January 2014 and 1 January 2021. It includes every publicly known completed attack and an extensive sampling of thwarted attacks. Attacks were all jihadist‑linked in eight Western countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Type of radicalisation: In our database, radicalisation primarily happens offline; over half the individuals in our database had been radicalised via offline networks. Success and lethality: Individuals who were radicalised offline were three times more likely than individuals radicalised online to complete an attack successfully. Those radicalised offline are 18 times more lethal than individuals in the online category. Those radicalised online are almost eight times more likely to fail than to succeed. Group attacks: Individuals who were radicalised offline are almost three times more likely to attack or plot in groups than individuals radicalised online. Success of group attacks: While groups were more likely to be thwarted by the police than to succeed (regardless of how individuals had been radicalised), successful groups of people radicalised offline were more lethal than their lone actor counterparts (15%). Family and friends: Some 87% of those with radicalised friends and 74% with radicalised relatives plotted or attacked together. Foreign fighters: Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), who were mostly radicalised offline, have the same success rate as non‑FTFs. But success rate increases if they have spent more than a year in a terrorist training location. Age: Online radicalisation is on the rise for young people (born from the 2000s onwards), although most individuals, including young people, are still radicalised offline. Gender: Women appear to be more likely to have been radicalised online. Bottom line: Those radicalised offline are greater in number, more successful in completing attacks and more deadly than those radicalised online.  

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College London. 2022. 40p.

By John Sunday Ojo, Samuel Oyewole & Folahanmi Aina

Nigeria has confronted several security conundrums in recent years, including armed banditry, which poses a severe threat to the north-west and the entire nation. North-west Nigeria has been hit by an unprecedented wave of kidnappings, maiming, killings, population displacements, cattle rustling, and disruption of socio-economic activities due to the rise of armed bandits in the region. These events have created a climate of uncertainty that has become a cause for concern for the government and the citizenry. Relying on secondary sources of data, this article examines the causes, manifestations, and dimensions of armed banditry in north-west Nigeria, and its security implications. It provides a survey of both the visible and less-visible actors in the conflict. The article argues that armed banditry in the north-west and other parts of Nigeria transcends pastoralist insurgency, as evident in the dominant narratives, considering the multiplicity of complexly connected causal factors, actors, manifestations, and dimensions that are present in the threats posed by this development. The article also shows the negative impacts of armed banditry on human and national security in the region.

Democracy and Security, Volume 19, 2023 - Issue 4

y Fawzi Banao, Bertrand Laporte

The actions of terrorist groups destabilize border states and economies. The presence of mining activities, such as gold extraction, favors the illicit export of this ore to finance terrorist groups. Using COMTRADE data, we estimate gold customs fraud with mirror analysis (gold export missing) for 50 African countries between 2000 and 2019. We use ordinary least squares, two-stage least squares, generalized method of moments, and local impulse strategy in our empirical strategies to estimate the impact of terrorism on gold customs fraud. Our results suggest that states affected by terrorism must pay more attention to the trafficking of gold, as this is a valued mineral for terrorist groups. The response to conflict with terrorist groups cannot be solely military. The State must necessarily get the various state services to work together, particularly the army, the police, and customs. The institutionalization of this cooperation remains a real challenge for these states. Regarding customs administration efficiency, data analysis is at the core of customs modernization programs. Only internal and external trade data have been used in risk management systems. Cooperation with the armed forces must allow the acquisition of tools and skills to analyze other data sources, such as satellite data. Customs could then carry out all of its missions at the borders: collecting duties and taxes but also protecting the local/border economy and cutting off the funding sources for terrorist groups.

Clermont-Ferrand, France Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International, 2022. 27p.

Juan Diego Cárdenas - Javier Lizcano Villalba - Lara Susana Loaiza - Laura Alonso , etc.

There were always going to be dissident elements from the FARC, from those who were unconvinced by the peace deal or simply refused to consider it. However, the ex-FARC mafia is now growing at such a rate that Colombia’s entire peace process is at risk. Almost every peace process has had combatants who refuse to give up their arms. There was no reason that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) should be any different. Looking abroad first, the Northern Ireland peace process saw the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA, more commonly known as the IRA) reach the “Good Friday Agreement” with the British government in April 1998. It did not take long for the “Continuity IRA” and the “Real IRA,” which has now morphed into the “New IRA,” to appear. But while a series of bombs have been set off and some isolated killings have taken place, Irish dissident groups have been unable to win any significant support or rebuild the military capacity of the PIRA. …

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2019. 72p.

By Louise I. Shelley Dr.; John T. Picarelli; Allison Irby; Douglas M. Hart; Patricia A. Craig-Hart; Phil Williams Dr.; Steven Simon; Nabi Abdullaev; Bartosz Stanislawski; Laura Covill

The report presents three case studies of regions that are hospitable to transnational crime-terrorism interactions: Chechnya; the Black Sea region; and the tri-border area of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. The analysis of links between criminal and terrorist groups in these areas used a military intelligence method called "intelligence preparation of the battlefield," which involves the identification of areas where terrorism and organized crime are most likely to interact. Such areas are expressed not only in geographic terms but also conceptual terms; for example, the analysis identifies the way groups organize themselves, communicate, use technology, deploy their members, and share cultural affinities. Within each of these areas, investigators can identify indicators that suggest whether or not cooperation between specific terrorist and criminal groups are likely to occur. The general principle that previous research in this domain has developed is that terrorist and criminal groups have links via methods but not motives. This report concludes that although the motives of terrorists and organized criminals are most often different, the links that separate such groups are growing increasingly complex, such that the separation of motives is no longer unequivocal. This study identifies an evolutionary pattern whereby the sharing of methods leads to more intimate connections within a short time. Factors that influence this evolution are failed states, war-torn regions, and alliances developed in penal institutions and urban neighborhoods. The central recommendation is to incorporate crime analysis in the intelligence analysis of terrorism.

Washington, DC: U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2005. 115p.

By Ian M. Ralby

On January 13, 2017, the Atlantic Council launched a major study on downstream oil theft at its inaugural Global Energy Forum in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The present analysis draws on that launch event to examine the implications of the Downstream Oil Theft: Global Modalities, Trends, and Remedies report findings, and to suggest tangible next steps in both further investigating this global scourge and beginning to confront it effectively. The panel, moderated by Ambassador Richard Morningstar, the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s chairman, included the lead author of the report, Dr. Ian Ralby, a nonresident senior fellow of the center and chief executive officer (CEO) of I.R. Consilium; Éric Besson, former minister of industry, energy, and digital economy for the Republic of France; Dr. John Gannon, former Central Intelligence Agency deputy director for intelligence and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council; and Kola Karim, CEO of Shoreline Energy, an oil company in Nigeria. Though the panelists’ comments form a starting point for this analysis, they do not constitute the sole basis for this report. The implications of the study are extensive and point to a wide range of challenges, but six areas stand out as encompassing the most significant consequences of illicit downstream hydrocarbons activity: 1. The Energy Industry 2. Security, Terrorism, and Law Enforcement 3. The Environment 4. Finance and Economics 5. Politics and Policy 6. International Relations The present analysis focuses on the implications of the study for these six areas

Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017. 15p.

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