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Posts tagged organized crime
An analysis of Cash Collection Systems Related to the European Drug Market

By Nacer Lalam

Money laundering is practised exclusively by criminal organisations that have attained a proven level of professionalism. It occurs at a certain point in the criminal cycle because it enables an illicit enterprise to legitimise the origin of their funds and benefit from their gains while remaining unpunished. Nonetheless, most professional traffickers think in a sequential manner, that is, first they are interested in how to set up their activity (purchase, logistics, distribution) and only much later in how they are going to hide the origin of the profits they make.

However, the money-laundering phase is crucial for those involved in the criminal world. Moreover, public authorities have been working to combat money laundering for more than thirty years, with, of course, varying degrees of success, depending on the relevant legal provisions, their application and preventive effects.

In the context of the European drug market, this paper provides an exploratory analysis of a method of laundering drug money that law enforcement agencies (LEAs) identify through the use of ‘cash collectors’. We first highlight the main actors of cash collecting linked to drug trafficking, then we discuss its organisation, especially the interpenetration of networks, and, finally, we highlight some salient elements of public responses to the problem in a number of European countries.

Lisbon:  European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) , 2022. 25p.

The Nexus Between Drug Markets and Gun Violence in the European Union. Background Paper Commissioned by the EMCDDA

By Astrid De Schutter and Nils Duquet 

Firearms trafficking in the European Union (EU) is driven by criminal demand and is a key enabler for other criminal activities such as drug trafficking . Criminals seek to acquire firearms for instrumental purposes, namely to facilitate their criminal activities, where they use guns to threaten, intimidate or assault others (criminals or non-criminals) , but they can also be acquired for the reputation afforded through the possession of – especially certain types of – firearms . Previous studies have shown that handguns are the type of firearm most commonly possessed by criminals in Europe as they are lightweight, easy to conceal and generally reliable. While automatic rifles can also be very effective for intimidation and assault purposes, their possession by criminals is less common . Criminal demand for firearms comes from various types of criminals ranging from international drug traffickers, armed robbers, youth gangs involved in street drug dealing, human traffickers, loan sharks, professional assassins and so on. Yet not all criminals have equal access to firearms. Given that legal access to firearms is almost impossible for criminals in Europe, they acquire them through other means. These firearms can, for example, be stolen from legal gun owners or state stockpiles, bought from a local criminal arms dealer or trafficked internationally. Interviews with experts, as well as previous studies, suggest also that the criminal demand for firearms is increasing in various EU Member States. Due to the traditionally closed character of illicit gun markets in Europe, firearms are often only accessible to criminals when they have the necessary criminal connections. Younger and less experienced criminals tend to experience more difficulties in their attempts to acquire firearms. In the past decade, however, law enforcement agencies from various European countries have noted an increased availability of firearms for criminals in their country. Previous studies have linked this to various trafficking methods, including the continuous supply of conflict legacy weapons from the Western Balkans, the increased trafficking in easy-to-reactivate firearms and in easy-to-convert blank-firing weapons and Flobert-calibre firearms. The possibilities generated by the internet have further eroded the closed character of illicit gun markets in Europe. The increased availability of firearms is believed to have ‘facilitated the gradual trickling-down of the possession and use of firearms to lower segments of the criminal hierarchy in several EU Member States, especially in western Europe’. In 2021 Europol noted that the use of violence in serious and organised crime seemed to be increasing in the EU, both in frequency and severity, augmented by the frequent use of firearms and explosives. A 2021 comparative study on gun violence in Europe, coordinated by the Flemish Peace Institute, concluded that firearms trafficking in Europe is not only driven by criminal demand, but is also strongly connected to criminal gun violence. The observed increased availability of various types of firearms to criminals has led to an escalation of criminal gun violence in several European countries and sometimes also to arms races among criminals. The study also concluded that shootings in the criminal underworld in Europe are mainly connected to the drugs trade and enabled by firearms trafficking. A 2018 EMCDDA study on drug-related homicide concluded that this type of homicide is more likely to involve the use of firearms than other means of violence. Findings from project TARGET state that young men (under the age of 35) are the main victims and perpetrators of lethal gun violence. This is also the case for non-lethal gun violence, but there is a more even age distribution in this category.  In 2019 the EMCDDA and Europol noted that the criminal use of firearms, including automatic weapons, by organised crime groups involved in European drug markets appeared to be increasing. According to Europol, the use of violence related to the trade in drugs – cocaine and cannabis in particular – has escalated in recent years, and the availability of firearms and explosives is a key enabler for this violence. A previous study concluded that more research is needed to uncover the dynamics between drug markets in Europe and gun violence: ‘While there is clearly a link between the illegal drug trade and firearm violence, this connection and its enabling elements are an important avenue for further research’ (18). Counteracting drug-related gun violence requires a good intelligence picture of its scope, characteristics and dynamics. The objective of this report is to analyse the nexus between gun violence and the illegal drug market in Europe. To reach this objective, this paper addresses the following research questions: 1. What is the nexus between firearms trafficking and drug trafficking in the European Union? 2. What are the scope and characteristics of drug-related firearms violence in the European Union? 3. How does this violence impact society?    

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) 2023. 57p.

Seaports: Monitoring the EU’s Floodgates for Illicit Drugs

By EUDA and the Regional Intelligence Liaison Office Western Europe (RILO-WE) of the World Customs Organization (WCO)

This report was prepared jointly by the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) and the Regional Intelligence Liaison Office Western Europe (RILO-WE) of the World Customs Organization (WCO), in order to support the European Ports Alliance Public Private Partnership (European Ports Alliance). To this end it provides an overview of seizures of drugs in or destined for EU seaports in the period from January 2019 to June 2024. As the report notes, there are significant gaps in the available data, which is a major barrier to developing a better understanding of the current situation and trends. As a result, the report’s findings need to be interpreted with a degree of caution. • Based on data provided by WCO RILO-WE, a total of 1 826 tonnes of drugs were seized at or in transit to EU seaports in the period between January 2019 and June 2024, out of which more than 1 244 tonnes were seized at EU ports (about 68 %). The data available indicates that the majority of the total quantity was seized from container ships (at least 1 507 tonnes, 82.6 % of the total). However, this is likely to be a significant underestimate of all drugs seized in or destined for EU ports during this period, due to the absence of data and gaps in reporting from several EU Member States. • Eighteen EU countries reported to the WCO on seizures carried out at a total of 96 EU ports (of which 40 are in Spain). However, the data submitted by these countries is not comprehensive, as some countries only reported a limited number of cases. For example, two key Member States only reported two cases each to the WCO during the five-and-a-half-year period in question, while the actual number of seizures in these countries during this time was much higher. • Among the 33 seaports that belong to the European Ports Alliance, nine appear not to report drug seizures to the WCO. The analysis also indicates that some seaports that are currently not members of the European Ports Alliance are significant targets for maritime drug trafficking. • Seventeen EU ports seized over 10 tonnes of drugs in this period, with Antwerp (BE) seizing the largest quantity (483 tonnes). • Cocaine appears to be the drug trafficked in the largest quantity to EU ports, with about 1 487 tonnes seized, representing 81.7 % of the total quantity of drugs in the dataset. Cannabis resin appears to be the second most trafficked drug, with about 260 tonnes seized, or 14.2 % of the total. For some drug types, only small numbers of seizures were reported (e.g. only 35 seizures of herbal cannabis were recorded). • The ports of Antwerp (BE) and Rotterdam (NL) seized the largest quantities of cocaine (about 443 tonnes and 181 tonnes respectively) and heroin (8.1 tonnes and 5 tonnes respectively). • The ports of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (ES) and Huelva (ES) seized the largest quantities of cannabis resin (42 tonnes and 30 tonnes respectively). • The available data indicate that at least 21.7 tonnes of captagon were seized at EU seaports during this period. The majority came from one seizure in Salerno (IT) in 2020 (14.2 tonnes). It is noteworthy that no captagon seizures were reported to the WCO in EU ports after 2020. • The large quantities of drugs seized on average per shipment — more than 500 kilograms of cocaine and more than 1.3 tonnes of cannabis resin — and in total during the period, confirm that criminal networks are still able to use EU ports to smuggle wholesale amounts of various drugs, especially cocaine. This in turn indicates that EU ports are infiltrated by organised criminal networks to a significant degree, implying the likely corruption among port staff including port workers and law enforcement officials. In addition, violence has been observed in connection with drug smuggling in many EU ports. 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025 2025. 32p

GOLD, GANGS, AND GOVERNANCE: INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES IN THE GRIP OF ORGANIZED CRIME How Illegal Mining and Organized Crime Threaten Ecuador’s Amazon and its Indigenous Peoples

By Amazon Watch

This report, developed by Amazon Watch in collaboration with various Indigenous and human rights organizations, addresses the recent security crisis in Ecuador and the impacts of the repressive policies implemented by the government of Daniel Noboa. It highlights the increasing influence of organized crime and illegal mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon. This research exposes how criminal economies not only pose a threat to the livelihoods of Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, and traditional rural communities by endangering their territorial governance projects and the sustainability of their ways of life, but also severely compromises the ecological integrity of the Amazon. The conclusion contains a series of recommendations aimed at ensuring the rights of the civilian population in the context of the non-international armed conflict recently declared by the national government to address this crisis. It particularly emphasizes the need to provide protection guarantees and establish coordination mechanisms with the organizational structures of Indigenous peoples and nationalities, whose territorial governance projects are at risk. Additionally, it underscores the urgency of strengthening the government’s institutional capacity by developing coordinated actions to halt the advance of illegal economies, declaring the Amazon in a state of emergency, and taking immediate measures to prevent its destruction

Oakland, CA: Amazon Watch, 2024. 24p.

Firms and Labor in Times of Violence: Evidence from the Mexican Drug War

By Hale Utar

This paper examines how firms in an emerging economy are affected by violence due to drug trafficking. Employing rich longitudinal plant-level data covering all of Mexico from 2005–2010, and using an instrumental variable strategy that exploits plausibly exogenous spatiotemporal variation in the homicide rate during the outbreak of drug-trade related violence in Mexico, I show that violence has a significant negative impact on plant output, product scope, employment, and capacity utilization. Resilience to violence differs widely across different types of employment within firms and across firms with different characteristics. Employment decline is driven by blue collar employment only. Dissecting within- and cross-plant heterogeneity points to a local labor supply channel where particularly plants utilizing low-wage, female, blue-collar workers are impacted. Consistent with a blue-collar labor supply shock, the results show a positive impact on average blue-collar wages and a negative impact on average white-collar wages at the firm level. Output elasticity of violence is also shown to be larger among low-wage, female-intensive but also domestically buying and selling plants. These findings show the rise of drug violence has significant distortive effects on domestic industrial development in Mexico and shed light on the characteristics of the most affected firms and the channels through which they are affected.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2022. 121p.

Cash is King: Impact of the Ukraine War on Illicit Financial Flows in South Eastern Europe

By Vanya Petrova

Illicit cross-border financial flows – estimated at US$1–1.6 trillion a year globally – are harming economic development on a national and global level. This is particularly true when such flows originate in heavily étatist economies, with no effective division or independence of the private from the public or state-owned sector. Autocracies have long utilized obfuscated corporate ownership structures and illicit financial flows (IFFs) for nefarious purposes such as bribery, corruption and improper lobbying to secure anything from technologies and know-how to economic and political influence on countries of interest. Russia has established a pattern of malign economic impact in Europe through its cultivation of ‘an opaque network of patronage across the region that it uses to influence and direct decision-making’ in key markets and institutions. IFFs in the Balkan region, in particular, are manifold, multi-directional and, proportionally, large as a percentage of GDP. While global illicit outflows are 3–5% of world GDP, IFFs in the Balkans are estimated at about 6% of the region’s GDP. The common denominator of the Western Balkan countries is their vulnerabilities kindled by institutional weakness and state capture. IFFs promote rent-seeking and criminal behaviour, reduce governments’ capacity to support development and inclusive growth, undermine the rule of law and jeopardize the business environment. Illicit flows drain public resources, reduce the scope and quality of public services and, thus, undermine confidence in state institutions. The Kremlin has repeatedly taken advantage of its integration into the Western financial system to exploit governance gaps through the corrosive effect of illicit finance.7 The brutal invasion of Ukraine shed a harsh light on the sobering dangers of kleptocracy and the risks to which Europe – and the world – has exposed itself by taking a lax approach to dirty money. Russia’s war in Ukraine could exacerbate these circumstances and accelerate further IFFs in the Balkan region – a crucial entry point and essential route for a plethora of illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, illicit trade and contraband.8 Due to imposed travel bans, Serbia is one of the few remaining routes for Russians to establish themselves in the region. Since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, Russian nationals have registered more than 5 000 companies in Serbia, over 1 000 being limited liability companies and nearly 4 000 entrepreneurial businesses.9 The establishment of so many companies in the country offers fertile ground for money laundering.10 As observed in the Serbian national risk assessment by the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering, limited liability companies and entrepreneurs pose a particularly high degree of threat with respect to money laundering. Through such means wealthy Russians could seek investment opportunities and use existing connections to launder money in real estate and other sectors traditionally vulnerable to IFFs in the region. The primary goal of this report is to assess the major enablers and vulnerabilities of illicit finance in the eight Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. More concretely, the study aims to analyze the primary IFFs sources and channels in the region, and identify any emerging trends concerning modus operandi, routes, business models, use of information and communications technology. In addition, the study intends to inspect the pressing challenges to border control, police and anti-money laundering authorities to effectively prevent, investigate and counter organized crime involved in cash smuggling and money laundering. Finally, the report aims to suggest feasible recommendations for improvement. The analysis presented is based on information collected through mixed methods research consisting of qualitative and quantitative desk research and in-depth interviews with key professionals from different organizations and professional affiliations in the eight countries. A total of 15 semi-structured interviews were conducted with experts from regional organizations, customs agencies, national anti-money laundering authorities, national revenue agencies, national customs agencies and NGOs, as well as with journalists and academics. A guiding questionnaire with key questions and topics was shared with the field researchers to facilitate the work and to ensure consistency in the information collection process.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s , 2023. 24p.

Under the Radar: Corruption’s Role in Fueling Arms Diversion

By Michael Picard and Colby Goodman

As armed conflicts surge and organised crime activity rises, a new report from Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) and Transparency International US (TI-US) reveals how corruption is quietly but consistently enabling weapons to fall into the wrong hands.

Under the Radar: Corruption’s Role in Fueling Arms Diversion investigates over 400 cases of diversion across 70 countries and shows how corruption, including bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of authority, serves as a key enabler of illicit arms flows.

The report’s release comes at a time of intensifying global concern over weapons diversion. It shows how corruption-fuelled diversion has empowered organised crime, fuelled armed conflict and violence, weakened military effectiveness, and undermined governance and security around the world.

“Despite greater recognition of corruption’s corrosive effect on arms control policies, corruption has often been sidelined in efforts to assess risks of arms diversion like a detective ignoring key clues in a recurring crime,” said Colby Goodman, Senior Researcher at TI US and TI-DS and one of the report’s authors. “Some states’ actions in recent years to add corruption risk assessments are a critical first step to better tackling this global scourge.”

The report provides critical information and tools for states to help identify and mitigate corruption-fuelled arms diversion as they develop new national arms control policies and engage in ongoing discussions within the United Nations on curbing arms diversion.

“The vast amounts of weapons diverted to terrorist groups in the past war on terror is a stark reminder of what happens when governments lose sight of corruption risks in the name of national security,” said Dr. Francesca Grandi, Head of Advocacy at Transparency International Defence & Security. “As demand for arms imports grows amid increasing global insecurity, this report offers practical and effective tools for arms exporting countries to strengthen integrity in their export control systems. It should also help spark more serious conversations globally, at the United Nations and in other fora, about sharing corruption-related information to prevent arms diversion.”

Some of the reports key findings include:

  • The theft or embezzlement of state-owned weapons for private gain is the most common type of corruption-fuelled diversion, accounting for over 350 cases. Bribery and abuse of authority remain a serious concern for diversion.

  • Corruption facilitates diversion at each stage of a weapon’s lifecycle, including production, international transfers, active use and storage, and disposal. The active use and storage stage had the most corruption-fuelled diversion cases followed by the disposal, international transfer, and production stages.

  • Many of the corruption-fuelled diversion cases resulted in devastating consequences for civilians. In more than 200 cases, military or security personnel reportedly colluded with illicit actors, such as insurgents or terrorists, in connection with arms diversion, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries.

To address this urgent issue, the report offers key analysis and recommendations for states engaged in arms exports and imports:

  • Strengthen national policies by explicitly identifying corruption as a key risk for arms diversion and developing implementation guidelines that incorporate targeted risk assessment questions that measure key, often overlooked defence and security institutional controls.

  • Improve international collaboration on corruption in arms transfers by sharing information on corruption risks in arms transfers within the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) framework and establishing working groups within the ATT and other multilateral for deeper discussions on the topic.

  • Support research and foreign aid to curb corruption-fuelled arms diversion, including funding studies on related issues and efforts to strengthen the integrity of defence and security institutions.

London: Transparency International, 2025. 50p.

Bad Pharma: trafficking illicit medical products in West Africa

By Flore Berger and Mouhamadou Kane 

West Africa has become a hotspot for the trafficking of medical products, with estimations that the illicit market makes up to 80% of medical products in Burkina Faso and Guinea, the two case studies of this brief. Despite its enormous scale, there are gaps in knowledge that this report seeks to address by providing a qualitative analysis of the market’s key characteristics and enablers (corruption and insecurity), and an assessment of national and regional responses. Recommendations l The complex supply chains feeding the illicit market for medical products dictate that responses must be international, and at the very least regional, to be effective. ECOWAS hence has a key role to play at the regional level to enhance cross-border intelligence gathering and cooperation. l National authorities are best placed to tackle the structural drivers (affordability and accessibility) behind the demand for illicit medical products, and should work simultaneously on awareness campaigns, as well as on wider distribution of and access to key high-demand products such as antimalarials. l Civil society has a key role to play. In addition to supporting the awareness-raising effort, civil society is also central in holding people accountable (including customs officials and politicians, for example) by denouncing cases of corruption and malfeasance.  

  OCWAR-T Policy Brief 5 | August 2023, Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 10p.

Cocaine Connections: Links Between the Western Balkans and South America

By Fatjona Mejdini

Organized crime groups from the Western Balkans have over the last 20 years established a remarkably strong foothold in South America in their pursuit of cocaine that they ship to and distribute in Europe and beyond. They have evolved from minor European players into prominent international criminal enterprises in this illicit global commodity trade, building durable relationships at both ends of the highly lucrative supply chain. Their rise has been spurred, in part, by luck. Two key factors have favoured them: an unprecedented surge in cocaine production in South America and insatiable demand for the drug in Europe. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s European Drug Trends Monitor suggests that after reaching record high levels in 2023, and despite a drop in seizures in the beginning of 2024, cocaine availability remains stable, if not on the rise, in Europe.1 Indeed, record seizures are being documented at key EU ports and the bloc’s drugs monitoring agency, the European Union Drugs Agency, announced in March 2023 another annual increase in the levels of cocaine detected in wastewater, continuing an upward trend that began in 2016.2 But guile has played an equally important role in the success of these groups, which have leveraged the smuggling expertise and paramilitary training established during the Balkan ethnic conflicts and civil unrests of the 1990s. Playing the long game, they have learned from and won the respect of the Italian mafia, among others, while retaining an agility that has allowed them to seize market opportunities. This has largely been achieved – so far, at least – without provoking debilitating blowback from rival players. The research for this report focused on Western Balkan organized crime groups and was conducted within this framework. Consequently, the dynamics observed in South American countries are explored solely in relation to these criminal groups. The report aims to provide a detailed understanding of their presence in South America and the broader implications that this has for their future in the context of the Western Balkans. Balkan brokers have been crucial to their success in establishing symbiotic local relationships. They have forged strong and enduring connections in the cocaine-producing countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, from cartels to coca farmers. They have also been able to establish strong bases and key relationships in dispatching countries such as Brazil, Ecuador and, more recently, the neighbouring Caribbean region. Not only have they managed to navigate the South America’s criminal environment with relative ease, but in some cases they have also proved able to forge relationships within high-level business and political circles in the countries where they operate.3 To avoid disruptions to their operations at the wholesale source, they have intentionally maintained a professional working distance from other foreign criminal organizations operating in South America, especially the infamous Mexican cartels. However, they have managed to expand their footprint in global cocaine markets, partly through arrangements with some of Europe’s most prominent criminal organizations, such as the Dutch–Moroccan networks, the Kinahan cartel and Italian mafia groups like the ’Ndrangheta and the Camorra. They have also displayed creativity by employing various forms of trafficking methods. These extend beyond the use of container ships, to also encompass cargo and leisure vessels and planes. Their presence in South America and the international cocaine supply chain has left a conspicuous footprint that has been tracked by law enforcement activity. Over the past three years, half of the targets of Europol-coordinated cocaine operations have been linked to individuals and networks from this region, thanks in part to the crackdown on communication platforms such as EncroChat and SKY ECC, which were widely used by criminal organizations from the Western Balkans.4 Western Balkan criminals have been accused of transporting tens of tonnes of cocaine from South America to major ports in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and elsewhere. Although these major European entry hubs appear to be the primary channels for criminal organizations from the Western Balkans, these actors also utilize ports in the Balkans region as transit points for trafficking cocaine elsewhere in Europe. Their involvement in the global illicit cocaine trade is not confined to the European consumer market, however. Western Balkan groups have been linked to significant seizures on other continents as well, including one of the largest cocaine seizures in US history (more than 20 tonnes, worth more than US$1 billion).5 Western Balkans groups have also, in recent years, been using their strong presence in South America to target even wealthier markets, such as Australia, using Africa and Southern Europe as transit regions.6 These criminal entities have also left a trail of blood. Since 2010, at least 19 people from the Western Balkans believed to be linked with cocaine trafficking have been killed in South America, according to GI-TOC records. Their activities have exacerbated instability in certain South American countries such as Ecuador, as they relentlessly secure supplies of cocaine and its safe shipment – at any cost. This research report identifies the links between criminal actors from the Western Balkans and the South American cocaine trafficking market. It provides an overview of the factors that have impelled the region’s organized crime groups towards South America and addresses the implications arising from their presence in that region. The study sheds light on their origins and operations, revealing common patterns despite the diverse backgrounds from which they have emerged. The study finds that links between the Western Balkans and South America have existed for around three decades but have significantly intensified in the last two. It predominantly focuses on organized crime groups from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, but also makes reference to those from other countries in South Eastern Europe where relevant, in relation to their collaboration in the cocaine trade. It is important to note that international law enforcement organizations, in their reporting, often refer to criminal groups from the Western Balkans as ‘Albanian-speaking networks’7 or the ‘Balkan Cartel’.8 The former is used to denote criminal groups of Albanian nationality that speak Albanian, while the latter refers to criminal groups of Slavic origin that speak the Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian language.9 These terms indicate ethnicity and linguistic variations among actors rather than their organizational characteristics. Inter-ethnic cooperation between organized crime groups in the Western Balkans has a long history, particularly in the trafficking of weaponry and ammunition, cigarettes, fuel and drugs, and human smuggling. In some cases, integrated organized crime groups have emerged bringing together members from different countries within the region. But these groups prefer to retain their independence, and there is no evidence of the creation of cartels in the Western Balkan region.10 Organized crime groups in the region generally have a clear leadership structure, but Balkan organized crime groups operating in South America appear to prefer a horizontal organizational structure that allows flexibility. Due to the transnational nature of cocaine trafficking, these groups have become adaptable. Often, their trafficking operations in South America are seen as ‘joint ventures’ or ‘projects’ that bring together organizations or groups of criminals from different countries and ethnic backgrounds who happen to be in the right place and have the necessary resources and skills to achieve the desired outcome. The extensive supply chain coordination needed to procure, transport, process and distribute the drug has prompted enhanced flexibility within these groups. Therefore, in this report, the terms ‘organized crime groups’ and ‘criminal networks’ will be used interchangeably.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2025. 48p.

Outlaw biker crime The relationship between Outlaw Motorcycle Gang membership and criminal behavior

By Sjoukje van Deuren

Although Dutch Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCGs) have been around since the late nineteen seventies, it was not until the turn of the century that Dutch OMCGs increasingly started to attract attention from both the authorities and the general public. In 1996, a report on Dutch organized crime provided a starting point for the government’s view that OMCGs in general and the Hells Angels in particular, are hotbeds for serious and organized crime that need to be addressed. In the report, members of the Amsterdam Hells Angels were accused of being involved in serious and organized crime, such as the trade, import, and transit of synthetic drugs (Bovenkerk & Fijnaut, 1996). In 2012, the presumption that members of at least some OMCGs were involved in organized crime, a growing fear of inter-club feuds, and the feeling that Dutch OMCGs were exhibiting themselves as untouchable and above the law, spurred the minister of Security and Justice to announce a multi-pronged, whole-of-government approach (Van Ruitenburg, 2020). This integrated approach was aimed at combating criminal OMCGs via all legal options available, including criminal, civil, and administrative means. Initially all OMCGs of the former Dutch Council of Eight – a consultative body established in 1996 by the Hells Angels and seven other motorcycle clubs to avoid turmoil and inter-club rivalry – were subjected to the integrated approach. In the context of the integrated approach, various actors, such as the police, local governments, and tax authorities closely work together to raise barriers against the OMCG subculture.1 The approach aims to hinder the criminal opportunities of OMCG members, reduce the popularity of the OMCG subculture, and target the untouchable image of OMCGs by addressing the OMCGs on the individual and on the club level. On the individual level, focal points of the approach are prioritizing the criminal prosecution of individual OMCG members, and reducing the number of OMCG members working for the private security sector or the government. Criminal prosecution is specifically targeted at OMCG board members in an effort to rid the clubs of their management. On the club level, club houses are closed down and OMCG-related events are prohibited. Clubhouses are believed to be important locations for the planning and execution of (organized) crime, while OMCGrelated events provide opportunity for the escalation of conflict. More recently, the Dutch Public Prosecution Office successfully filed petitions to the civil court to ban those Dutch OMCGs deemed to be most heavily involved in crime. Overall, the integrated approach is much more focused on the structural aspects of OMCGs as collectives, rather than on specific forms of (organized) crime committed by individual members. Importantly, when the integrated approach was implemented in 2012, there was scant knowledge on the crimes of the various Dutch OMCGs, and on whether and in which (continued)

Amsterdam: Free University of Amsterdam, 2023. 175p.

Organised crime and conflict: implications for peacebuilding

By Louisa Waugh and Zahbia Yousuf

While there are known threads between criminality and conflict, most interventions to tackle either are rarely based on this knowledge. Therefore, integrating approaches to address both criminality and conflict at once continue to be a struggle.

Focusing on cases in Colombia, Kosovo and Mali, this report aims to move away from the blunt tools of law and order (aimed at rupturing organised crime networks) and counter-terrorism (aimed at degrading armed groups). It recognises the potential of peace agreements and peacebuilding efforts as important vehicles for laying the foundations for sustainable peace.

London: Saferworld, 2022. 40p.

Failure of the State: Organised Crime and Mexico's Disappeared

By Lene Guercke

This Open Access book explores an issue that has received little attention in human rights research: organised criminal groups (OCGs) as perpetrators of human rights violations, especially disappearances. It takes an interdisciplinary approach, combining doctrinal legal research with a qualitative study on present-day disappearances in Mexico. Disappearances are a complex human rights violation that impacts not only the disappeared person but also their relatives, who are left in a limbo of uncertainty about their loved one’s fate. Originally part of state-led repression, today disappearances occur in varied contexts, often involving OCGs and other non-state actors. However, disappearances committed by non-state actors are not human rights violations under International Human Rights Law (IHRL), thereby potentially leaving a gap in the legal protection of victims. The book first analyses state obligations and case law involving state responsibility for human rights violations committed by non-state actors and applies the analysis to OCGs. This ‘internal’ legal perspective is complemented by an ‘external’ study based on interviews with human rights practitioners working on disappearances in Mexico, which often involve OCGs. The qualitative study offers a unique perspective on human rights protection ‘in reality’.

The book adds to scholarship on non-state actors and disappearances, and to incipient international legal scholarship on the issue of organised crime and international law. Moreover, the study on Mexico provides a richer understanding of challenges faced by practitioners ‘on the ground’ where OCGs commit human rights violations alongside, or in collusion with, state forces and against the backdrop of an overall failure of the state. The book may be of interest to a diverse audience, including legal scholars and practitioners, human rights scholars in fields such as political science, international relations, or socio-legal studies, as well as funders supporting the work of NGOs in Mexico and similar contexts, and NGOs themselves.

Cham: Springer Nature, 2025, 339p.

Mapping on Transnational Crime Routes in the New Silk Road: a Case Study of the Greater Mekong Sub-region 

By Hai Thanh Luong

The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), including five Southeast Asian countries and China, has experienced a significant increase in the cultivation of opium, trafficking of heroin and methamphetamine, and consumption of these illicit drugs. In recent years, the GMS has been expanded considerably as supply, destination, and transit route for illegal drug trade’s networks to and through, particularly when China officially applied ‘Belt and Road’ strategy. This paper reviews historical aspects and current trends in drug production and trafficking in the GMS, with special emphasis on Mekong River areas where China is ‘located’ as the heart of the transition. Some evidence consistent with the ‘supply, destination, and transit route’ arguments is found through locating and mapping drug trafficking networks to connect with China. Finally, this paper calls for some initial recommendations to improve the process of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the GMS within the scope of Belt and Road Initiative. 

The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 6 (2020) 20–35 

To become ‘ndrangheta in Calabria: organisational narrative criminology and the constitution of mafa organisations

By Anna Sergi  

  The ‘ndrangheta is a mafa group from Calabria, Southern Italy. Considerable eforts have been made to understand the structures and the organisation of this mafa, not only in the province of Reggio Calabria where it originated, but also in other Calabrian provinces and even outside the Calabrian region. Building on judicial data from a recent maxi-trial (Rinascita-Scott) against ‘ndrangheta clans in the province of Vibo Valentia, we build a theoretical approach based on narrative criminology applied to organisational studies of secretive organisations. We fnd a ‘script of narratives’ emerging from collaborators and affiliates' stories – about socialisation, discretion, and accreditation - which reveals how recognition and constitution of ‘added’ ‘ndrangheta clans are thought to work. This script helps us understand the constitutive power of narratives in mafas and critically approach the study of such organisations.

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:389–411 pages

Organized Violence 1989–2023, and the Prevalence of Organized Crime Groups

By Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson, and Magnus Öberg

This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non- state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 61(4), 2024, 673­ –693 pages

Organised Crime Groups in Cyberspace: A Typology

By Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo

Three categories of organised groups that exploit advances in information and communications technologies (ICT) to infringe legal and regulatory controls: (1) traditional organised criminal groups which make use of ICT to enhance their terrestrial criminal activities; (2) organised cybercriminal groups which operate exclusively online; and (3) organised groups of ideologically and politically motivated individuals who make use of ICT to facilitate their criminal conduct are described in this article. The need for law enforcement to have in-depth knowledge of computer forensic principles, guidelines, procedures, tools, and techniques, as well as anti-forensic tools and techniques will become more pronounced with the increased likelihood of digital content being a source of disputes or forming part of underlying evidence to support or refute a dispute in judicial proceedings. There is also a need for new strategies of response and further research on analysing organised criminal activities in cyberspace.

Springer Science + Business Media, LLC, 2008, 26p.

Serious, Therefore Organised? A Critique of the Emerging “Cyber-Organised Crime” Rhetoric in the United Kingdom

By Anita Lavorgna, and Anna Sergi

This paper, based on discourse analysis of policy documents, departs from a critique of the juxtaposition of the terms “serious” and “organised” in policies against organised crime in the UK. The conceptualisation of organised crime as national security threat supports our hypothesis that a similar critique can be applied to the emerging narrative of cyber-organised crime in the country. We argue that, whereby organised crime has become essentially “serious” as consequence of its characterisation as a national security threat, cyber crime is becoming “organised” in the policy narrative because of its seriousness. The seriousness and organisation of cyber crime justifies its inclusion within the national security agenda, thus accessing the procedural benefits of criminal intelligence assigned to national security threats. The implications associated to the evolution of such narratives in policy-making need to be assessed while policies are still developing.

International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 2016, 18p.

Beyond Ideology: Violent Extremism and Organized Crime in the Western Balkans

By Ruggero Scaturro | Giorgio Fruscione

In the Western Balkans, religious radicalization gained international attention in the early 2010s, with around 1 000 people travelling to Syria and Iraq to join jihadist groups between 2012 and 2016. The roots of this radicalization trace back to the Yugoslav wars, the presence of mujahideen networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Islamist charities spreading Salafi jihadism in the 1990s.

However, not all fighters from the Western Balkans are religiously motivated. Between 2014 and 2021, around 300 people fought in eastern Ukraine, mainly for political reasons, with Serbia being a major source of combatants supporting pro-Russian separatists. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this trend has resurged, with more individuals reportedly joining mercenary units like the Wagner Group.

Instability in the Western Balkans has also fuelled the spread of organized crime beyond the region, first across Europe and later to other continents. In the 1990s, the Yugo Mafia gained significant media attention in Northern Europe. Meanwhile, violent extremists from the Western Balkans maintain transnational connections through diaspora networks and using online platforms.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 45p.

Modeling the Role of Police Corruption in the Reduction of Organized Crime: Mexico as a Case Study

By Andrés Aldana, Hernán Larralde & Maximino Aldana

Among all types of corruption, police corruption is probably the one that most directly hurts society, as those trusted with protecting the people either side with the criminals that victimize the citizens, or are themselves, criminals. However, both corruption and its effects are very difficult to measure quantitatively other than by perception surveys, but the perception that citizens have of this phenomenon may be different from reality. Using a simple agent-based model, we analyze the effect on crime rates as a result of both corruption and the perception of corruption within law-enforcement corporations. Our results show a phase transition in which crime can propagate across the population even when the majority of police officers are honest. We find that one of the parameters that strongly controls crime incidence is the probability that regular citizens become criminals. In contrast, other actions, such as arresting crime lords, or the amount of crime-associated money that is confiscated, have little impact on the long-term crime incidence. Our results suggest that in addition to combating corruption within law-enforcement institutions, to further reduce the incidence of crime, policymakers should strive to restore confidence in these institutions and the justice system.

Youth Gangs in Liberia: Motives, Structure and Illicit Economies

By Ndubuisi Christian Ani, Feyi Ogunade and John Kamma 

Gangsterism in Liberia lies at the intersection of a society ravaged by civil war, a declining economy, social exclusion of a bulging underclass, collusion between state officials and illicit markets, and inefficient law enforcement. For youths, gang involvement offers a sense of belonging, a surrogate family structure, and a means of protection and economic benefits. Gangs are also available for hire by politicians, criminal networks and business people seeking to intimidate their opponents or protect properties. Key recommendations • A policy against gangsterism and criminal groupings is urgently needed in Liberia. A comprehensive policy would offer opportunities for a holistic response that involves the improved provision of public services, including enhanced law enforcement, in communities. • Youth-focused development is a critical priority for addressing the causes of gang violence and drug abuse in Liberia. Without discounting the importance of quick-impact youth empowerment initiatives, development programmes need to be long-term. • Schools should have drug prevention programmes. • International support could help Liberia establish treatment and rehabilitation centres to address substance abuse and criminality. • The Economic Community of West African States and African Union should establish a joint task force with Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea to disrupt kush production points Research Paper and supply chains  

ENACT Africa, 2025. 28p.