was prepared by the Research and Trend Analysis Branch, Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs under the supervision of Angela Me, Chief, Research and Trend Analysis Branch.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022, the political economy of Ukraine has been profoundly transformed.1 The aggression affected both licit and illicit trade routes, disrupted criminal organizations, and spawned new forms of informal and illicit exchange at the frontline and in the rear of the country. It has also led to the emergence of new challenges, such as the development of new skills and technologies that could be exploited by transnational organized crime. This report aims to address the following overarching questions: how has the ongoing war against Ukraine affected organized crime and illicit markets in Ukraine, and what are the possible implications for the country, the region and the international community? These questions are addressed through research into the following six areas: • Organized crime structures and their evolution • Drug supply and demand, including production and trafficking • Online scams, and cyber and telephone fraud • Arms trafficking • Economic crime, including smuggling of cigarettes and custom fraud • Trafficking in persons • The facilitation of illegal exit and draft evasion To address the overarching research question about the effects of the war on organized crime and illicit markets, the chapters compare data for the pre-war and post-invasion periods. The report covers the period of January 2021 to June 2024, with background data for 2019-2020 and preceding periods where available and relevant, used for contextualization. It is based on desk research and in-country fieldwork, with analysis of publicly available official statistics and secondary literature, court decisions and key informant interviews. Field data collection and analysis were conducted from December 2023 to June 2024 (see Annex A for more details). The overall purpose of this research is to provide an evidence base to the government of Ukraine and national agencies involved in responding to organized crime, the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations, and other UN Member States, for countering crime-related challenges emerging out of the war against Ukraine. This research focuses on government-controlled parts of Ukraine. Consideration of alleged war crimes is outside the scope of this research.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2025. 81p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Dnipro has long played a pivotal role in Ukraine’s political and economic development. Today, the city stands at another crossroads, as a key site for understanding how organized crime has evolved under the pressures of war. This report offers a detailed account of the city’s criminal landscape, drawing on field research, interviews, and open-source analysis.

The full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 has fuelled existing trends in Dnipro, a city already familiar with conflict since 2014. Dnipro’s proximity to the front line and its importance as a logistics and military hub have intensified its role in illicit markets, particularly in arms and drug trafficking. The city has also become one of the country’s most important bases for scam call centres, with around 30 000 people employed in operations that target victims across Russia, the EU and Ukraine itself. Many of these centres reportedly operate under the protection of law enforcement and are connected to organized crime groups. Meanwhile, corruption, which initially declined after the 2022 invasion, has made a strong comeback. Major procurement scandals, shrinking transparency and barriers to civil society participation in budget oversight suggest a renewed climate of impunity.

Dnipro’s drug economy remains resilient, with dealers reportedly targeting military personnel as clients. One trafficking group dismantled in 2024 had profits exceeding UAH10 million per month. Cases also show soldiers carrying drugs to the front or being recruited into distribution networks. While not unique to Dnipro, the city’s combination of trafficking infrastructure and military presence presents specific risks.

At the same time, the saturation of illicit weapons in the region has created a volatile environment. While organized crime groups generally avoid arms dealing, the volume of illegal stockpiles, trophy weapons and “contact-free” transactions makes Dnipro a critical node for monitoring arms flows returning from the front.

The city’s control over illicit flows —from drugs and weapons to extortion and fraud— is currently in flux. Historically shaped by figures who straddled the worlds of politics, business and crime, Dnipro has seen many of its key power brokers either exiled, imprisoned or under investigation. This has created a vacuum in which no single actor dominates, leaving the city open to new contests for control. At the same time, groups from Dnipro have spread across Ukraine, looking for safer places to work, including Odesa and Kyiv, raising the risk of increasing crime in those cities and beyond.

The report concludes that the city’s trajectory will depend on shifting political allegiances, the outcome of the war, and the extent to which Kyiv can reassert control. With national-level implications, Dnipro should be a key focus for any efforts to understand or disrupt Ukraine’s evolving organized crime landscape.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2025. 31p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

As Ukraine continues to resist Russia’s full-scale invasion, the port city of Odesa presents a paradox: while under frequent aerial assault, many aspects of life appear remarkably normal. This report explores how organized crime has not only survived but thrived in one of the country’s most strategically significant cities.

Odesa’s relative stability, growing economy, and reopened ports have created an oasis for criminal economies, guided by one rule: anyone can do business, as long as they do not interfere with others. This ‘free city’ model has allowed Odesa to emerge as a hub for scam call centres, synthetic drug production and tax evasion surrounding lucrative grain exports.

The study delves into a troubling overlap between legitimate business and criminal enterprise. For instance, the booming grain trade – critical for Ukraine’s economy – is plagued by fraud, shell companies and collusion with sanctioned actors. At the heart of this is the use of cash to conduct large transactions, depriving the Ukrainian state of an estimated $3 billion between May 2022 and May 2024.

Meanwhile, Odesa’s role in conscript smuggling has grown as draft evasion surges, driving prices higher. Call centres have become one of the city’s most profitable illicit ventures, targeting victims across Europe and beyond. Some rogue actors from the city’s volunteer units have also helped facilitate the resurgence of the night-time vice economy, moving drugs and sex workers to clients during curfew.

As Ukraine looks to reconstruction, the report warns that Odesa is at risk of becoming a template for criminal capture of public funds. Billions of hryvnias in aid are earmarked for rebuilding infrastructure and cultural landmarks in the city, but without effective safeguards, these funds may fall into the hands of corrupt networks.

This report offers insights into how illicit economies evolve during conflict and why stronger responses are needed now to prevent long-term damage.

Geneva: the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2025. 31p.

By Cecilia Farfán-Méndez, Karen Bozicovich and Pier Angelli De Luca

This article presents the results of a pilot test conducted with a group of experts on existing challenges and emerging and future threats that the region faces regarding illicit trade in firearms and ammunition. The pilot test was carried out within the framework of designing a methodology for the Hemispheric Study on Illicit Trafficking of Firearms and Ammunition, mandated by paragraph 66 of Resolution 2945 (XLIX-O/19) on Advancing Hemispheric Security: A Multidimensional Approach, passed on the 49th Regular Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS). This mandate falls under the responsibility of the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, specifically the Department against Transnational Organized Crime and the Department of Public Security. The pilot test was conducted by the latter. The findings from the pilot test reveal a possible road to follow. Out of the 95 challenges identified, 39 were classified as “high priority.” Among these, challenges requiring low resource investment and capable of being implemented in the short to medium term—while producing effective and tangible results—were identified. On the other hand, preventing and mitigating the identified threats will require, mainly, efforts in the public sphere, including coordination among state institutions and branches of government, intersectoral coordination (especially with manufacturing, importing/ exporting, intermediary, transport, and technology companies), and international cooperation with multilateral organizations and between countries. The lack of secure and protected information generation, analysis, and exchange was identified in at least four of the seven dimensions into which the threats were grouped. This finding is also positive for states, as anticipating such information related threats could be achieved in the short and medium term, and in some cases without the need for signification budget modifications.

Washington, DC: Organization of American States - OAS, 2025. 18p.

By the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA)

A large variety of individuals, many of them designated as high-value targets, groups and networks shape the complex supply of cocaine to the EU. Criminal networks involved in cocaine trafficking are highly resilient, with some operating across several continents. For example, some locations in the Middle East, such as the United Arab Emirates, have emerged as a safe haven for top-level organisers of cocaine trafficking to the EU. Further, criminal networks originating from the EU or the EU’s neighbourhood have also become established in key locations in South America, or maintain direct contacts with suppliers. Trusted members of the criminal networks are sent to arrange and supervise these shipments.

Wholesalers are involved in the acquisition, storage and distribution of cocaine to regional and local markets. Local criminal networks then usually take care of mid-level or retail distribution or both. However, some Albanian-speaking criminal networks have made successful attempts to apply an end-to-end business model from producing or transit countries in South America to retail distribution within the EU and beyond (see Box Cocaine trafficking by criminal networks from Western Balkans). This includes financing, access to suppliers in the producing or transit countries, transportation, extraction, storage, distribution and money collection.

The substantial profits associated with the cocaine trade have attracted numerous EU-based criminal networks to become involved. Several of these operate in the main EU distribution hubs and also organise shipments from countries of origin and transit to the EU. The majority of the criminal networks reported to Europol have been active for more than 10 years, with some actors having played a key role for decades, such as Italian networks, while new players are on the lookout for a bigger share of the cocaine market, such as Albanian, Belgian, British, Dutch, French, Irish, Moroccan, Serbian, Spanish and Turkish networks (UNODC and Europol, 2021).

Lisbon: EUDA, 2023. 11p.

By Nynke M. D. Niezink · Paolo Campana

This study examines the mechanisms underpinning the emergence of violence among individuals in the organized crime milieu. Methods : Relying on criminal event data recorded by a UK Police Force, we apply a longitudinal network approach to study violent interactions among offenders. The data span the period from 2000 to 2016 and include 6,234 offenders and 23,513 organized crime related events. Instead of aggregating these data over time, we use a relational event-based approach to take into consideration the order of events. We employ an actor-oriented framework to model offenders' victim choices in 156 violent events in the OC milieu. Results - We fnd that the choice of offenders to target a particular victim is strongly affected by their mutual history. A violent act is often preceded by a previous act of violence, both in the form of repeated violence and reciprocated violence. We show that violence is strongly associated with prior co-offending turning sour. We uncover a strong efect for previous harassment as a retaliation cum escalation mechanism. Finally, we fnd evidence of conflicts within organized crime groups and of violence being directed to offenders with the same ethnic background. Conclusions - Relational effects on victimization are consistently stronger than the effects of individual characteristics. Therefore, from a policy perspective, we believe that relational red fags (or risk factors) should play a more central role. A focus on harassment could be valuable in the development of an early intervention strategy.

Journal of Quantitative Criminology (2023) 39:655–678

By Omar García-Ponce

The study of criminal violence has received increasing attention in political science over the past 15 years, as organized criminal groups have grown and diversified worldwide, unleashing unprecedented waves of violence. This article presents a critical assessment of the current state of political science scholarship on criminal violence. It discusses the sources and dynamics of organized criminal violence, emphasizing the reconceptualization of state–criminal group relationships in the literature, shifts in illegal markets, and the political incentives fueling criminal wars. It also examines how states and societies respond to criminal violence. State responses include punitive approaches, institutional reform, and community-based interventions, while societal responses can be examined through the lenses of exit (e.g., migration, disengagement), voice (e.g., political participation, collective resistance), and loyalty (i.e., compliance with state authorities or criminal groups). The article also addresses conceptual and methodological challenges, policy implications, and ethical considerations inherent in this field of study and identifies promising pathways for future research. 

Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 2025. 28:435–56 

By Jonathan P. Caulkins, Bishu Giri

Illegally manufactured fentanyl (IMF) kills enormous numbers of people in the U.S. and Canada. Since the emergence of modern heroin markets in the late 1960s, supply control has been associated with meaningful reductions in opioid use and harms in at least six cases worldwide. However, countering supply effectively depends on understanding what the dominant drug-trafficking routes are. New data on fentanyl seizures presented here largely reinforce previous understanding that most IMF enters the U.S. from the south. These data call into question tariffs and other policies and policy justifications that treat the threat from the northern border as comparably severe.

U.S. counties bordering Mexico and Canada show significantly higher rates of large fentanyl seizures, compared with counties that do not border our foreign neighbors—where “large” is defined as over a kilogram of powder or more than 1,000 pills, quantities indicative of wholesale trafficking. The 80 counties along the land borders recorded 2,461 large seizures between 2013 and 2024, averaging about 31 per county, while the other 3,064 counties documented 12,358 seizures, averaging only 4 per county. By weight, of all the fentanyl in those big land-border seizures in 2013–24, about 99% of the pills and 97% of the powder were found along the border with Mexico; by comparison, large seizures along the Canadian border are relatively rare. If we look at the recent years—2023 and 2024—distributions remain the same. San Diego County, California, leads in powder-form large fentanyl seizures; and Pima County, Arizona, records the highest volume of pill-form large fentanyl seizures.Drugs seized could be in transit to other places, or they might be intended for local consumption. Therefore, it is useful to contrast a county’s share of large seizures with its share of the population, which serves as a proxy for the size of the local market. Counties along the Mexican border account for only 2.35% of the U.S. population; but in 2023–24, they hosted about 40% of the nationwide quantity of fentanyl appearing in large seizures, for both powder and pills. By contrast, counties in the lower 48 states that border Canada account for 3.1% of the U.S. population but only 1.2% of the powder and just 0.5% of the pills obtained in large seizures.

To determine which counties look like import or transit centers, we developed a Disproportionality Index (DI), which compares a county’s proportion of large seizures against its proportion of the national population. On that scale, 1.0 means that seizures are proportionate to local population; below 1.0 indicates less than expected; and over 1.0 indicates more seizures than expected. Because of random fluctuations, a county can be a bit above or below 1.0, but we consider DIs above 2.5 noteworthy.

The counties with the highest DIs for 2023–24 were along the U.S.–Mexican border. For example, Imperial County, California, had a DI of 111 for fentanyl pills and 100 for powder. In contrast, in the county along the Canadian border with the greatest number of large seizures (Wayne County, Michigan, home of Detroit), the DIs were 0.5 for pills and 1.9 for powder, yielding an average DI of less than 2.0.

Only three other counties or collections of counties along the Canadian border had an average DI greater than 1. One (Okanagan County, Washington) stemmed from drugs seized from a Mexican-led organized-crime group that was supplying populations near the Canadian border. Another cluster (Juneau and Ketchikan) was suggestive of Alaska markets possibly being supplied from Canada. The third (Whatcom County, Washington) was locally significant (DI of 2.2 for powder) but small overall (Whatcom County accounted for just 0.15% of total powder seized).

Efforts to counter drug flows need to be grounded in data. The analysis here contradicts views—such as those used to justify certain tariffs—that treat the flows across the southern and northern borders as being comparably important.[1]

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2025. 15p.

By U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION

Summary:

This Commission Spotlight examines how China-linked scam centers are fueling corruption and violence in Southeast Asia, paving the way for greater Chinese influence in the region, and directly harming Americans in the process. Its findings are based on the Commission’s March 2025 hearing on “Crossroads of Competition: China in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands”; fact-finding trips to the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia; and open source research.

Key Findings:

Chinese criminal networks operate industrial-scale scam centers across Southeast Asia that steal tens of billions of dollars annually from people around the world—a massive criminal enterprise that rivals the global drug trade in scale and sophistication.

The Chinese criminals behind scam centers have built ties—some overt, some deniable—to the Chinese government by embracing patriotic rhetoric, supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and promoting pro-Beijing propaganda overseas. As a result, Chinese crime syndicates have expanded across Southeast Asia with, at a minimum, implicit backing from elements of the Chinese government.

The spread of China-linked scam compounds in Southeast Asia is fueling corruption and violence, promoting human trafficking, undermining the ability of governments in the region to control what happens in their territory, and promoting human trafficking.

China is exploiting the problem of scam compounds to increase its leverage over Southeast Asian governments, conduct intelligence and influence operations, and expand its security footprint in the region.

Beijing has selectively cracked down on scam centers that target Chinese victims, leading Chinese criminal organizations to conclude that they can make greater profits with lower risk by targeting citizens of wealthy countries such as the United States.

Americans are now among the top global targets of China-linked scam centers, with an estimated $5 billion lost to online scams in 2024 alone—a 42 percent increase over the previous year.

Washington, DC:

U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION

2025. 12p.

Organized Crime and National Security in Spain:

Challenges and Responses

Edited by Andrés de Castro

This book offers an analysis of how organized crime operates in Spain and the security apparatus designed to contain it. Organized crime is currently one of the most serious security threats facing democratic societies. Despite its intense presence and the responses that states have articulated in recent decades, little attention has been paid to the measurement of the effectiveness of the means adopted to combat it. Thus, this volume delves into this issue and performs an analysis of the police dimension of the response to organized crime in Spain. Firstly, this volume describes the international phenomenon of organized crime and its evolution in Spain, and continues by analyzing the profile and the characteristics of the different police forces and their resources and capabilities. This book then discusses the consequences of the measures at international level, European Union level, and local level, in relation to other police forces. Finally, the volume addresses the legal and public policy efforts that Spanish Law Enforcement Agencies have made in supervising or regulating their own police forces, which is necessary to carry out a detailed analysis of the consequences on the presence and strength of organized crime in the structures, strategies and decisions that Spain adopted over the last decades. As a result, this book builds on and updates the previous work by international scholars and proposes an interesting methodology that can contribute to the advancement of security studies.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 265p.

By Martina Baradel & Niles Breuer

This paper addresses a significant gap in drug market literature by examining high-level drug trafficking networks in Japan. We focus on three aspects: the structure of drug importation networks, the impact of transport methods on these structures, and the role of Japan’s mafia, the yakuza. Using novel statistical techniques that extend exponential random graph models (ERGMs) to multi-network samples, we analyse 573 Japanese trial documents on wholesale drug importation. We test the theory that trafficking operations with higher information-processing demands exhibit more efficiency-oriented network structures, while governance-type groups avoid expanding into trade activities. Our findings support these theories, showing that networks with higher information-processing demands are more efficiency-oriented but maintain security. Conversely, smaller networks with simpler transport methods prioritise security and concealment. Additionally, the yakuza do not organisationally engage in drug trafficking; when involved, yakuza members act as independent entrepreneurs.

Global Crime Volume 25, 2024 - Issue 3-4

By Nacer Lalam

Money laundering is practised exclusively by criminal organisations that have attained a proven level of professionalism. It occurs at a certain point in the criminal cycle because it enables an illicit enterprise to legitimise the origin of their funds and benefit from their gains while remaining unpunished. Nonetheless, most professional traffickers think in a sequential manner, that is, first they are interested in how to set up their activity (purchase, logistics, distribution) and only much later in how they are going to hide the origin of the profits they make.

However, the money-laundering phase is crucial for those involved in the criminal world. Moreover, public authorities have been working to combat money laundering for more than thirty years, with, of course, varying degrees of success, depending on the relevant legal provisions, their application and preventive effects.

In the context of the European drug market, this paper provides an exploratory analysis of a method of laundering drug money that law enforcement agencies (LEAs) identify through the use of ‘cash collectors’. We first highlight the main actors of cash collecting linked to drug trafficking, then we discuss its organisation, especially the interpenetration of networks, and, finally, we highlight some salient elements of public responses to the problem in a number of European countries.

Lisbon:  European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) , 2022. 25p.

By Astrid De Schutter and Nils Duquet 

Firearms trafficking in the European Union (EU) is driven by criminal demand and is a key enabler for other criminal activities such as drug trafficking . Criminals seek to acquire firearms for instrumental purposes, namely to facilitate their criminal activities, where they use guns to threaten, intimidate or assault others (criminals or non-criminals) , but they can also be acquired for the reputation afforded through the possession of – especially certain types of – firearms . Previous studies have shown that handguns are the type of firearm most commonly possessed by criminals in Europe as they are lightweight, easy to conceal and generally reliable. While automatic rifles can also be very effective for intimidation and assault purposes, their possession by criminals is less common . Criminal demand for firearms comes from various types of criminals ranging from international drug traffickers, armed robbers, youth gangs involved in street drug dealing, human traffickers, loan sharks, professional assassins and so on. Yet not all criminals have equal access to firearms. Given that legal access to firearms is almost impossible for criminals in Europe, they acquire them through other means. These firearms can, for example, be stolen from legal gun owners or state stockpiles, bought from a local criminal arms dealer or trafficked internationally. Interviews with experts, as well as previous studies, suggest also that the criminal demand for firearms is increasing in various EU Member States. Due to the traditionally closed character of illicit gun markets in Europe, firearms are often only accessible to criminals when they have the necessary criminal connections. Younger and less experienced criminals tend to experience more difficulties in their attempts to acquire firearms. In the past decade, however, law enforcement agencies from various European countries have noted an increased availability of firearms for criminals in their country. Previous studies have linked this to various trafficking methods, including the continuous supply of conflict legacy weapons from the Western Balkans, the increased trafficking in easy-to-reactivate firearms and in easy-to-convert blank-firing weapons and Flobert-calibre firearms. The possibilities generated by the internet have further eroded the closed character of illicit gun markets in Europe. The increased availability of firearms is believed to have ‘facilitated the gradual trickling-down of the possession and use of firearms to lower segments of the criminal hierarchy in several EU Member States, especially in western Europe’. In 2021 Europol noted that the use of violence in serious and organised crime seemed to be increasing in the EU, both in frequency and severity, augmented by the frequent use of firearms and explosives. A 2021 comparative study on gun violence in Europe, coordinated by the Flemish Peace Institute, concluded that firearms trafficking in Europe is not only driven by criminal demand, but is also strongly connected to criminal gun violence. The observed increased availability of various types of firearms to criminals has led to an escalation of criminal gun violence in several European countries and sometimes also to arms races among criminals. The study also concluded that shootings in the criminal underworld in Europe are mainly connected to the drugs trade and enabled by firearms trafficking. A 2018 EMCDDA study on drug-related homicide concluded that this type of homicide is more likely to involve the use of firearms than other means of violence. Findings from project TARGET state that young men (under the age of 35) are the main victims and perpetrators of lethal gun violence. This is also the case for non-lethal gun violence, but there is a more even age distribution in this category.  In 2019 the EMCDDA and Europol noted that the criminal use of firearms, including automatic weapons, by organised crime groups involved in European drug markets appeared to be increasing. According to Europol, the use of violence related to the trade in drugs – cocaine and cannabis in particular – has escalated in recent years, and the availability of firearms and explosives is a key enabler for this violence. A previous study concluded that more research is needed to uncover the dynamics between drug markets in Europe and gun violence: ‘While there is clearly a link between the illegal drug trade and firearm violence, this connection and its enabling elements are an important avenue for further research’ (18). Counteracting drug-related gun violence requires a good intelligence picture of its scope, characteristics and dynamics. The objective of this report is to analyse the nexus between gun violence and the illegal drug market in Europe. To reach this objective, this paper addresses the following research questions: 1. What is the nexus between firearms trafficking and drug trafficking in the European Union? 2. What are the scope and characteristics of drug-related firearms violence in the European Union? 3. How does this violence impact society?    

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) 2023. 57p.

By EUDA and the Regional Intelligence Liaison Office Western Europe (RILO-WE) of the World Customs Organization (WCO)

This report was prepared jointly by the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) and the Regional Intelligence Liaison Office Western Europe (RILO-WE) of the World Customs Organization (WCO), in order to support the European Ports Alliance Public Private Partnership (European Ports Alliance). To this end it provides an overview of seizures of drugs in or destined for EU seaports in the period from January 2019 to June 2024. As the report notes, there are significant gaps in the available data, which is a major barrier to developing a better understanding of the current situation and trends. As a result, the report’s findings need to be interpreted with a degree of caution. • Based on data provided by WCO RILO-WE, a total of 1 826 tonnes of drugs were seized at or in transit to EU seaports in the period between January 2019 and June 2024, out of which more than 1 244 tonnes were seized at EU ports (about 68 %). The data available indicates that the majority of the total quantity was seized from container ships (at least 1 507 tonnes, 82.6 % of the total). However, this is likely to be a significant underestimate of all drugs seized in or destined for EU ports during this period, due to the absence of data and gaps in reporting from several EU Member States. • Eighteen EU countries reported to the WCO on seizures carried out at a total of 96 EU ports (of which 40 are in Spain). However, the data submitted by these countries is not comprehensive, as some countries only reported a limited number of cases. For example, two key Member States only reported two cases each to the WCO during the five-and-a-half-year period in question, while the actual number of seizures in these countries during this time was much higher. • Among the 33 seaports that belong to the European Ports Alliance, nine appear not to report drug seizures to the WCO. The analysis also indicates that some seaports that are currently not members of the European Ports Alliance are significant targets for maritime drug trafficking. • Seventeen EU ports seized over 10 tonnes of drugs in this period, with Antwerp (BE) seizing the largest quantity (483 tonnes). • Cocaine appears to be the drug trafficked in the largest quantity to EU ports, with about 1 487 tonnes seized, representing 81.7 % of the total quantity of drugs in the dataset. Cannabis resin appears to be the second most trafficked drug, with about 260 tonnes seized, or 14.2 % of the total. For some drug types, only small numbers of seizures were reported (e.g. only 35 seizures of herbal cannabis were recorded). • The ports of Antwerp (BE) and Rotterdam (NL) seized the largest quantities of cocaine (about 443 tonnes and 181 tonnes respectively) and heroin (8.1 tonnes and 5 tonnes respectively). • The ports of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (ES) and Huelva (ES) seized the largest quantities of cannabis resin (42 tonnes and 30 tonnes respectively). • The available data indicate that at least 21.7 tonnes of captagon were seized at EU seaports during this period. The majority came from one seizure in Salerno (IT) in 2020 (14.2 tonnes). It is noteworthy that no captagon seizures were reported to the WCO in EU ports after 2020. • The large quantities of drugs seized on average per shipment — more than 500 kilograms of cocaine and more than 1.3 tonnes of cannabis resin — and in total during the period, confirm that criminal networks are still able to use EU ports to smuggle wholesale amounts of various drugs, especially cocaine. This in turn indicates that EU ports are infiltrated by organised criminal networks to a significant degree, implying the likely corruption among port staff including port workers and law enforcement officials. In addition, violence has been observed in connection with drug smuggling in many EU ports. 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025 2025. 32p

By Amazon Watch

This report, developed by Amazon Watch in collaboration with various Indigenous and human rights organizations, addresses the recent security crisis in Ecuador and the impacts of the repressive policies implemented by the government of Daniel Noboa. It highlights the increasing influence of organized crime and illegal mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon. This research exposes how criminal economies not only pose a threat to the livelihoods of Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, and traditional rural communities by endangering their territorial governance projects and the sustainability of their ways of life, but also severely compromises the ecological integrity of the Amazon. The conclusion contains a series of recommendations aimed at ensuring the rights of the civilian population in the context of the non-international armed conflict recently declared by the national government to address this crisis. It particularly emphasizes the need to provide protection guarantees and establish coordination mechanisms with the organizational structures of Indigenous peoples and nationalities, whose territorial governance projects are at risk. Additionally, it underscores the urgency of strengthening the government’s institutional capacity by developing coordinated actions to halt the advance of illegal economies, declaring the Amazon in a state of emergency, and taking immediate measures to prevent its destruction

Oakland, CA: Amazon Watch, 2024. 24p.

By Hale Utar

This paper examines how firms in an emerging economy are affected by violence due to drug trafficking. Employing rich longitudinal plant-level data covering all of Mexico from 2005–2010, and using an instrumental variable strategy that exploits plausibly exogenous spatiotemporal variation in the homicide rate during the outbreak of drug-trade related violence in Mexico, I show that violence has a significant negative impact on plant output, product scope, employment, and capacity utilization. Resilience to violence differs widely across different types of employment within firms and across firms with different characteristics. Employment decline is driven by blue collar employment only. Dissecting within- and cross-plant heterogeneity points to a local labor supply channel where particularly plants utilizing low-wage, female, blue-collar workers are impacted. Consistent with a blue-collar labor supply shock, the results show a positive impact on average blue-collar wages and a negative impact on average white-collar wages at the firm level. Output elasticity of violence is also shown to be larger among low-wage, female-intensive but also domestically buying and selling plants. These findings show the rise of drug violence has significant distortive effects on domestic industrial development in Mexico and shed light on the characteristics of the most affected firms and the channels through which they are affected.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2022. 121p.

By Vanya Petrova

Illicit cross-border financial flows – estimated at US$1–1.6 trillion a year globally – are harming economic development on a national and global level. This is particularly true when such flows originate in heavily étatist economies, with no effective division or independence of the private from the public or state-owned sector. Autocracies have long utilized obfuscated corporate ownership structures and illicit financial flows (IFFs) for nefarious purposes such as bribery, corruption and improper lobbying to secure anything from technologies and know-how to economic and political influence on countries of interest. Russia has established a pattern of malign economic impact in Europe through its cultivation of ‘an opaque network of patronage across the region that it uses to influence and direct decision-making’ in key markets and institutions. IFFs in the Balkan region, in particular, are manifold, multi-directional and, proportionally, large as a percentage of GDP. While global illicit outflows are 3–5% of world GDP, IFFs in the Balkans are estimated at about 6% of the region’s GDP. The common denominator of the Western Balkan countries is their vulnerabilities kindled by institutional weakness and state capture. IFFs promote rent-seeking and criminal behaviour, reduce governments’ capacity to support development and inclusive growth, undermine the rule of law and jeopardize the business environment. Illicit flows drain public resources, reduce the scope and quality of public services and, thus, undermine confidence in state institutions. The Kremlin has repeatedly taken advantage of its integration into the Western financial system to exploit governance gaps through the corrosive effect of illicit finance.7 The brutal invasion of Ukraine shed a harsh light on the sobering dangers of kleptocracy and the risks to which Europe – and the world – has exposed itself by taking a lax approach to dirty money. Russia’s war in Ukraine could exacerbate these circumstances and accelerate further IFFs in the Balkan region – a crucial entry point and essential route for a plethora of illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, illicit trade and contraband.8 Due to imposed travel bans, Serbia is one of the few remaining routes for Russians to establish themselves in the region. Since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, Russian nationals have registered more than 5 000 companies in Serbia, over 1 000 being limited liability companies and nearly 4 000 entrepreneurial businesses.9 The establishment of so many companies in the country offers fertile ground for money laundering.10 As observed in the Serbian national risk assessment by the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering, limited liability companies and entrepreneurs pose a particularly high degree of threat with respect to money laundering. Through such means wealthy Russians could seek investment opportunities and use existing connections to launder money in real estate and other sectors traditionally vulnerable to IFFs in the region. The primary goal of this report is to assess the major enablers and vulnerabilities of illicit finance in the eight Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. More concretely, the study aims to analyze the primary IFFs sources and channels in the region, and identify any emerging trends concerning modus operandi, routes, business models, use of information and communications technology. In addition, the study intends to inspect the pressing challenges to border control, police and anti-money laundering authorities to effectively prevent, investigate and counter organized crime involved in cash smuggling and money laundering. Finally, the report aims to suggest feasible recommendations for improvement. The analysis presented is based on information collected through mixed methods research consisting of qualitative and quantitative desk research and in-depth interviews with key professionals from different organizations and professional affiliations in the eight countries. A total of 15 semi-structured interviews were conducted with experts from regional organizations, customs agencies, national anti-money laundering authorities, national revenue agencies, national customs agencies and NGOs, as well as with journalists and academics. A guiding questionnaire with key questions and topics was shared with the field researchers to facilitate the work and to ensure consistency in the information collection process.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s , 2023. 24p.

By Michael Picard and Colby Goodman

As armed conflicts surge and organised crime activity rises, a new report from Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) and Transparency International US (TI-US) reveals how corruption is quietly but consistently enabling weapons to fall into the wrong hands.

Under the Radar: Corruption’s Role in Fueling Arms Diversion investigates over 400 cases of diversion across 70 countries and shows how corruption, including bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of authority, serves as a key enabler of illicit arms flows.

The report’s release comes at a time of intensifying global concern over weapons diversion. It shows how corruption-fuelled diversion has empowered organised crime, fuelled armed conflict and violence, weakened military effectiveness, and undermined governance and security around the world.

“Despite greater recognition of corruption’s corrosive effect on arms control policies, corruption has often been sidelined in efforts to assess risks of arms diversion like a detective ignoring key clues in a recurring crime,” said Colby Goodman, Senior Researcher at TI US and TI-DS and one of the report’s authors. “Some states’ actions in recent years to add corruption risk assessments are a critical first step to better tackling this global scourge.”

The report provides critical information and tools for states to help identify and mitigate corruption-fuelled arms diversion as they develop new national arms control policies and engage in ongoing discussions within the United Nations on curbing arms diversion.

“The vast amounts of weapons diverted to terrorist groups in the past war on terror is a stark reminder of what happens when governments lose sight of corruption risks in the name of national security,” said Dr. Francesca Grandi, Head of Advocacy at Transparency International Defence & Security. “As demand for arms imports grows amid increasing global insecurity, this report offers practical and effective tools for arms exporting countries to strengthen integrity in their export control systems. It should also help spark more serious conversations globally, at the United Nations and in other fora, about sharing corruption-related information to prevent arms diversion.”

Some of the reports key findings include:

• The theft or embezzlement of state-owned weapons for private gain is the most common type of corruption-fuelled diversion, accounting for over 350 cases. Bribery and abuse of authority remain a serious concern for diversion.

• Corruption facilitates diversion at each stage of a weapon’s lifecycle, including production, international transfers, active use and storage, and disposal. The active use and storage stage had the most corruption-fuelled diversion cases followed by the disposal, international transfer, and production stages.

• Many of the corruption-fuelled diversion cases resulted in devastating consequences for civilians. In more than 200 cases, military or security personnel reportedly colluded with illicit actors, such as insurgents or terrorists, in connection with arms diversion, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries.

To address this urgent issue, the report offers key analysis and recommendations for states engaged in arms exports and imports:

• Strengthen national policies by explicitly identifying corruption as a key risk for arms diversion and developing implementation guidelines that incorporate targeted risk assessment questions that measure key, often overlooked defence and security institutional controls.

• Improve international collaboration on corruption in arms transfers by sharing information on corruption risks in arms transfers within the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) framework and establishing working groups within the ATT and other multilateral for deeper discussions on the topic.

• Support research and foreign aid to curb corruption-fuelled arms diversion, including funding studies on related issues and efforts to strengthen the integrity of defence and security institutions.

London: Transparency International, 2025. 50p.

By Flore Berger and Mouhamadou Kane 

West Africa has become a hotspot for the trafficking of medical products, with estimations that the illicit market makes up to 80% of medical products in Burkina Faso and Guinea, the two case studies of this brief. Despite its enormous scale, there are gaps in knowledge that this report seeks to address by providing a qualitative analysis of the market’s key characteristics and enablers (corruption and insecurity), and an assessment of national and regional responses. Recommendations l The complex supply chains feeding the illicit market for medical products dictate that responses must be international, and at the very least regional, to be effective. ECOWAS hence has a key role to play at the regional level to enhance cross-border intelligence gathering and cooperation. l National authorities are best placed to tackle the structural drivers (affordability and accessibility) behind the demand for illicit medical products, and should work simultaneously on awareness campaigns, as well as on wider distribution of and access to key high-demand products such as antimalarials. l Civil society has a key role to play. In addition to supporting the awareness-raising effort, civil society is also central in holding people accountable (including customs officials and politicians, for example) by denouncing cases of corruption and malfeasance.  

  OCWAR-T Policy Brief 5 | August 2023, Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 10p.

By Fatjona Mejdini

Organized crime groups from the Western Balkans have over the last 20 years established a remarkably strong foothold in South America in their pursuit of cocaine that they ship to and distribute in Europe and beyond. They have evolved from minor European players into prominent international criminal enterprises in this illicit global commodity trade, building durable relationships at both ends of the highly lucrative supply chain. Their rise has been spurred, in part, by luck. Two key factors have favoured them: an unprecedented surge in cocaine production in South America and insatiable demand for the drug in Europe. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s European Drug Trends Monitor suggests that after reaching record high levels in 2023, and despite a drop in seizures in the beginning of 2024, cocaine availability remains stable, if not on the rise, in Europe.1 Indeed, record seizures are being documented at key EU ports and the bloc’s drugs monitoring agency, the European Union Drugs Agency, announced in March 2023 another annual increase in the levels of cocaine detected in wastewater, continuing an upward trend that began in 2016.2 But guile has played an equally important role in the success of these groups, which have leveraged the smuggling expertise and paramilitary training established during the Balkan ethnic conflicts and civil unrests of the 1990s. Playing the long game, they have learned from and won the respect of the Italian mafia, among others, while retaining an agility that has allowed them to seize market opportunities. This has largely been achieved – so far, at least – without provoking debilitating blowback from rival players. The research for this report focused on Western Balkan organized crime groups and was conducted within this framework. Consequently, the dynamics observed in South American countries are explored solely in relation to these criminal groups. The report aims to provide a detailed understanding of their presence in South America and the broader implications that this has for their future in the context of the Western Balkans. Balkan brokers have been crucial to their success in establishing symbiotic local relationships. They have forged strong and enduring connections in the cocaine-producing countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, from cartels to coca farmers. They have also been able to establish strong bases and key relationships in dispatching countries such as Brazil, Ecuador and, more recently, the neighbouring Caribbean region. Not only have they managed to navigate the South America’s criminal environment with relative ease, but in some cases they have also proved able to forge relationships within high-level business and political circles in the countries where they operate.3 To avoid disruptions to their operations at the wholesale source, they have intentionally maintained a professional working distance from other foreign criminal organizations operating in South America, especially the infamous Mexican cartels. However, they have managed to expand their footprint in global cocaine markets, partly through arrangements with some of Europe’s most prominent criminal organizations, such as the Dutch–Moroccan networks, the Kinahan cartel and Italian mafia groups like the ’Ndrangheta and the Camorra. They have also displayed creativity by employing various forms of trafficking methods. These extend beyond the use of container ships, to also encompass cargo and leisure vessels and planes. Their presence in South America and the international cocaine supply chain has left a conspicuous footprint that has been tracked by law enforcement activity. Over the past three years, half of the targets of Europol-coordinated cocaine operations have been linked to individuals and networks from this region, thanks in part to the crackdown on communication platforms such as EncroChat and SKY ECC, which were widely used by criminal organizations from the Western Balkans.4 Western Balkan criminals have been accused of transporting tens of tonnes of cocaine from South America to major ports in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and elsewhere. Although these major European entry hubs appear to be the primary channels for criminal organizations from the Western Balkans, these actors also utilize ports in the Balkans region as transit points for trafficking cocaine elsewhere in Europe. Their involvement in the global illicit cocaine trade is not confined to the European consumer market, however. Western Balkan groups have been linked to significant seizures on other continents as well, including one of the largest cocaine seizures in US history (more than 20 tonnes, worth more than US$1 billion).5 Western Balkans groups have also, in recent years, been using their strong presence in South America to target even wealthier markets, such as Australia, using Africa and Southern Europe as transit regions.6 These criminal entities have also left a trail of blood. Since 2010, at least 19 people from the Western Balkans believed to be linked with cocaine trafficking have been killed in South America, according to GI-TOC records. Their activities have exacerbated instability in certain South American countries such as Ecuador, as they relentlessly secure supplies of cocaine and its safe shipment – at any cost. This research report identifies the links between criminal actors from the Western Balkans and the South American cocaine trafficking market. It provides an overview of the factors that have impelled the region’s organized crime groups towards South America and addresses the implications arising from their presence in that region. The study sheds light on their origins and operations, revealing common patterns despite the diverse backgrounds from which they have emerged. The study finds that links between the Western Balkans and South America have existed for around three decades but have significantly intensified in the last two. It predominantly focuses on organized crime groups from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, but also makes reference to those from other countries in South Eastern Europe where relevant, in relation to their collaboration in the cocaine trade. It is important to note that international law enforcement organizations, in their reporting, often refer to criminal groups from the Western Balkans as ‘Albanian-speaking networks’7 or the ‘Balkan Cartel’.8 The former is used to denote criminal groups of Albanian nationality that speak Albanian, while the latter refers to criminal groups of Slavic origin that speak the Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian language.9 These terms indicate ethnicity and linguistic variations among actors rather than their organizational characteristics. Inter-ethnic cooperation between organized crime groups in the Western Balkans has a long history, particularly in the trafficking of weaponry and ammunition, cigarettes, fuel and drugs, and human smuggling. In some cases, integrated organized crime groups have emerged bringing together members from different countries within the region. But these groups prefer to retain their independence, and there is no evidence of the creation of cartels in the Western Balkan region.10 Organized crime groups in the region generally have a clear leadership structure, but Balkan organized crime groups operating in South America appear to prefer a horizontal organizational structure that allows flexibility. Due to the transnational nature of cocaine trafficking, these groups have become adaptable. Often, their trafficking operations in South America are seen as ‘joint ventures’ or ‘projects’ that bring together organizations or groups of criminals from different countries and ethnic backgrounds who happen to be in the right place and have the necessary resources and skills to achieve the desired outcome. The extensive supply chain coordination needed to procure, transport, process and distribute the drug has prompted enhanced flexibility within these groups. Therefore, in this report, the terms ‘organized crime groups’ and ‘criminal networks’ will be used interchangeably.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2025. 48p.