By Jonah Rexer

Multinationals in the extractive sectors of weak states may face resource theft by armed groups. This criminality is often abetted by state corruption, even though firms are willing to pay for protection. I study indigenization in Nigeria's oil sector, which increased participation by Nigerian firms substantially. Despite evidence that local firms are of lower quality, localization increases output and reduces oil theft. A bargaining model illustrates that political connections align law enforcement incentives, solving commitment problems. Data on raids by government forces show that local firms receive preferential law enforcement protection. I find that connections to military elites drive the local advantage.

.Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University, 2022. 113p  

By Malore Dusenbery, Josh Fording, Jennifer Yahner, Jeanette Hussemann, Robbie Dembo

Victims of crime can experience serious harms and face significant costs with long-term implications for their economic security and safety. From 2022 to 2024, the Urban Institute and NORC at the University of Chicago conducted a National Study of Victim Compensation Program Trends, Challenges, and Successes, which included evaluations of four state crime victim compensation programs. This brief presents our evaluation of New York State’s victim compensation program to understand its utilization and professionals’ and victim claimants’ perspectives on its ability to meet victims’ needs. We conclude that the New York compensation program serves a vital role helping victims address the financial burden of crime with many strengths and recent improvements. Although participants identified some gaps in coverage, the program is overall comprehensive, with no limits on medical costs and increases to property and funeral coverage. And despite challenges making changes to compensation coverage, professionals appreciate that the program has been able to evolve eligibility and benefits based on victims’ needs, which we hope they continue to do for new communities (e.g., migrants) and emerging costs (e.g., informal economy wages). The program has made great efforts to be accessible, with multiple ways to submit a newly shortened application, frequent training and outreach to victim assistance providers and other programs, and a statewide awareness campaign and needs assessment in 2023. The program also recently enacted several major changes to improve the accessibility and equity of the program, particularly eliminating the requirement to report to law enforcement and changing the policy on contributory conduct for homicide claims. Professionals in the compensation program and the community offered recommendations for improving New York’s compensation program regarding awareness and accessibility, compensation coverage, and program funding and staffing. The most common suggestion was to do more public information campaigns and advertising to increase people’s awareness of the program before they become victims. The program could also conduct training and education alongside providers and educate programs in underserved communities beyond victim assistance programs, including schools, hospitals, YMCAs, social services, and family service providers. Additional staff are needed to efficiently process claims, respond to claimant outreach, and help claimants understand the appeals process. Spanish-speaking staff in particular could help reduce the number of Latino claimants who want but do not get help. Potential solutions to increase staff recruitment and retention include increasing salaries, providing more resources on vicarious trauma, and opening up more career paths for staff who start in the compensation program. Many of these findings and recommendations align with those emerging nationally in conversations about how to improve victim compensation programs. We are grateful that programs such as New York’s remain open to evaluation and eager to understand how to continue increasing awareness and accessibility of the program across the state and within underserved communities, maximizing coverage, and improving their efficiency and effectiveness so they may best serve all victims in need.

Washington, DC: Urban Institute 2024. 24p.

By Shana Conroy and Danielle Sutton

"This Juristat article relies on multiple data sources to examine the nature and prevalence of violent victimization of seniors. In addition, the article presents the various factors associated with perceptions of crime and safety among seniors. Self-reported data from the 2019 General Social Survey on Canadians’ Safety (Victimization) are presented first, detailing seniors’ experiences of violent victimization and their perceptions of safety. The sections that follow present police-reported data from the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey and the Homicide Survey, providing detail on annual trends, accused-victim relationships and incident characteristics. While 2020 was an unusual year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, police-reported incident data were similar for 2019 and 2020. As such, this article reports the latest police-reported data from 2020"

Ottawa] : Statistics Canada = Statistique Canada, 2022. 35p.

By Michael T. Light , Julia T. Thomas

Unauthorized immigration, already a divisive and controversial subject in American society, was reframed as a grave national security threat after the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001. Yet, despite substantial public, political and policy attention to the issue of undocumented immigration and terrorism, there has been relatively little empirical assessment of the relationship between unauthorized immigration flows and terrorist activity. We attempt to fill this gap by combining newly developed estimates of the unauthorized population, a novel use of sentencing and prosecutorial data to measure terrorism-related activity, and multiple data sources on the criminological, socioeconomic, and demographic context from all 50 states from 1990 to 2014. We then leverage this unique dataset to examine the longitudinal, macro-level relationship between undocumented immigration and various measures of terrorism. Results from fixed effects negative binomial models suggest that increased undocumented immigration over this period is not associated with terrorist attacks, radicalization, or terrorism prosecutions.

Soc Sci Res. 2021 February ; 94: 102512. doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2020.102512. 

By Michael T. Light and Isabel Anadon

The dramatic increase in both lawful and unauthorized immigration in recent decades produced a groundswell of research on two questions: (1) Does immigration increase violent crime? and (2) What policy responses are most effective at addressing unauthorized immigration (e.g., sanctuary policies, deportations, etc.)? For the most part, these bodies of work have developed independently, and thus we know little as to whether the insights from one inform the other. This Article fills this gap by first reviewing both areas of research and then triangulating shared findings between them. In doing so, we focus on three contemporary immigration policies: (1) increased deportation; (2) “sanctuary” policies, and (3) “amnesty” laws. Our review provides little evidence to suggest that immigration increases the prevalence of violence. For this reason, policies aimed to enhance public safety by reducing immigration are unlikely to deliver on their crime reduction promises.

103 Marq. L. Rev. 939 (2020).

By Graham C. Ousey and Charis E. Kubrin

Are immigration and crime related? This review addresses this question in order to build a deeper understanding of the immigration-crime relationship. We synthesize the recent generation (1994 to 2014) of immigration-crime research focused on macrosocial (i.e., geospatial) units using a two-pronged approach that combines the qualitative method of narrative review with the quantitative strategy of systematic meta-analysis. After briefly reviewing contradictory theoretical arguments that scholars have invoked in efforts to explain the immigration-crime relationship, we present findings from our analysis, which (a) determined the average effect of immigration on crime rates across the body of literature and (b) assessed how variations in key aspects of research design have impacted results obtained in prior studies. Findings indicate that, overall, the immigration-crime association is negative—but very weak. At the same time, there is significant variation in findings across studies. Study design features, including measurement of the dependent variable, units of analysis, temporal design, and locational context, impact the immigration-crime association in varied ways. We conclude the review with a discussion of promising new directions and remaining challenges in research on the immigration-crime nexus.

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2018. 1:63–84

By Christian Gunadi; Yuyan Shi,

Recreational cannabis legalization (RCL) has been advocated as a way to reduce the number of individuals interacting with the US criminal justice system; in theory, however, cannabis decriminalization can achieve this objective without generating the negative public health consequences associated with RCL. It is still unclear whether RCL can bring additional benefits in terms of reducing cannabis possession arrests in states that have already decriminalized cannabis. OBJECTIVE -  To examine whether RCL was associated with changes in cannabis possession arrests in US states that had already decriminalized cannabis during the study period and whether these changes differed across age and racial subgroups. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS - This repeated cross-sectional study used cannabis possession arrest data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCRP) for US states from 2010 through 2019. Statistical analysis was conducted from October 6, 2021, to October 12, 2022. EXPOSURES -  Implementation of statewide RCL. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES - Cannabis possession arrest rates per 1000 population per year were assessed with a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design and were used to estimate the association of RCL with arrest rates in RCL states that had or had not decriminalized cannabis before RCL. This association was also examined in subgroups for age (adults vs youths) and race (Black vs White). RESULTS - This study included UCRP data for 31 US states, including 9 states that implemented RCL during the study period (4 without and 5 with decriminalization) and 22 non-RCL states. In the 4 states that had not decriminalized cannabis before legalization, RCL was associated with a 76.3% decrease (95% CI, −81.2% to −69.9%) in arrest rates among adults. In the 5 states that had already decriminalized cannabis, RCL was still associated with a substantial decrease in adult arrest rates (−40.0%; 95% CI, −55.1% to −19.8%). There was no association of RCL with changes in arrest rates among youths. In addition, changes in arrest rates associated with RCL did not differ among Black and White individuals. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE -  In this repeated cross-sectional study, RCL was associated with a sizable reduction in cannabis possession arrests among adults in states that had already decriminalized cannabis during the study period (2010-2019), albeit the magnitude was smaller compared with states that had not decriminalized cannabis before RCL. In addition, RCL did not seem to be associated with changes in arrest rates among youths or disparities in arrest rates among Black and White individuals. 

JAMA Netw Open. 2022 Dec 5;5(12):e2244922

By Jon Heidt

This report reviews the key research literature on the impact of decriminalization, depenalization, diversion, and harm reduction programs from countries in Europe, North America, South America Oceania, and several U.S. states including California, Maine, Oregon, and Washington state. From this review, key indicators emerged in two domains: crime and criminal justice and mental and public health. Crime and criminal justice indicators include crime rates, levels of organized crime, rates of imprisonment, levels of public disorder (e.g., open air drug use and dealing), drug use trends and patterns, drug availability and price, rates of treatment uptake, addiction and overdose, police clearance rates, costs of enforcement, and functioning. Mental and public health indicators include drug use rates and patterns, rates of drug treatment participation, and rates of drug related mortality. These indicators were used to evaluate the impact that different approaches to drug policy have on society.

Vancouver, BC:  International Centre for Criminal Law Reform, 2021. 80p.

By Yvon DanduranA discussion of organized crime and governance is not complete until it addresses the question of police governance and its impact on the fight against organized crime, illicit markets and money laundering. Given the relative failure of law enforcement to control organized crime and contain illegal markets, a focus on police governance forces us to consider how law enforcement priorities are set and law enforcement strategies adopted and implemented. This in turn may lead us to conclude, as I am about to suggest, that we me need to both increase the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts and reduce our expectations with respect to the impact that law enforcement can really have on controlling organized crime and illicit markets. In our discussions thus far, we acknowledged that public awareness of organized crime and its consequences is an important starting point, but that we also need to find more effective ways to control organized crime and counter its activities. Most of us recognize that law enforcement and regulatory enforcement are crucial elements of effective action against organized crime, yet we must also recognize that the actual impact of law enforcement is usually quite limited. Countering organized crime requires establishing effective police governance and accountability. Governance includes key management issues such as policy formation and implementation, the determination of priorities and strategies, the allocation of resources, deployment strategies and decisions, the implementation of standards, the prevention of corruption internally, and the maintenance of internal discipline. It follows that weak governance can undermine the effectiveness of police actions against organized crime. At the same time, transnational organized crime entails policing in a transnational context and, with this, come the pressing and complex governance and accountability issues presented by the growth of cross-border policing,  transnational policing, and the growing reliance on multi-jurisdictional police teams. In many instances, one is not talking about a single police force, but broad and ill-defined security networks.3 As Walsh and Conway explained, “(m)achinery that is struggling to cope with the governance and accountability challenges presented by the domestic operations of home based police forces may well prove seriously deficient when confronted with the formers’ activities on other sovereign territories, or domestic operations by foreign based police forces  

Vancouver, BC: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform, 2020. 15p.

By Mary Allen and Cristine Rotenberg

In December, 2014, the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA) changed the laws related to the sex trade, shifting the focus of criminalization from those who sell their own sexual services onto those who purchase sexual services and those who benefit financially from others’ sexual services. This article examines changes in sex-trade-related crime reported by police before and after the change in legislation.Between 2010 and 2019, there was a 55% decline in sex-trade-related crime driven by a 95% decline in incidents of stopping or impeding traffic, or communicating for the purpose of offering, providing or obtaining sexual services. Most of this decline occurred prior to the adoption of the PCEPA in 2014.Fewer women were accused or charged in incidents of stopping or communicating offences after the introduction of the PCEPA. The number of men accused in incidents relating to stopping or communicating offences also dropped considerably between 2010 and 2014. Charging rates also declined for men accused in this type of incident, but not to the same extent.With the drop in charges for stopping or communicating offences, there was a large decline in the number of court cases involving these offences. Fewer women were tried in court for stopping or communicating offences in the five-year period after the new legislation than the five-year period preceding the change (-97%). In addition, far fewer women were found guilty, and, of those, none were sentenced to custody.The PCEPA placed a new focus on activities related to the purchasing of sexual services. Between 2015 and 2017, incidents of the new offence of obtaining sexual services from an adult increased sharply before declining for two consecutive years. Individuals accused in these incidents were mostly men.After the drop in the number of men accused in incidents of stopping or communicating offences prior to the PCEPA, the number of men accused increased once the new legislation was in place (obtaining sexual services from an adult). There was also an increase in men accused in incidents of obtaining sexual services from a minor. Most of the men accused of purchasing sexual services were charged. In the courts, over four in five men tried for obtaining services from a minor were found guilty, and this was the case for about one in seven cases of obtaining sexual services from an adult.The number of police-reported incidents related to profiting from the sexual services of others increased after the change in legislation, as procuring and receiving material benefit incidents reached a high point in 2019, almost double what was reported in 2010.Both before and after the change in legislation, men were more often accused in incidents related to procuring or receiving material benefit than women, even more so after the PCEPA (67% of accused were men prior to the PCEPA and 82% after). This shift was the result of the drop in women accused in these incidents, coupled with a substantial increase in the number of men accused. In the courts, among cases involving a charge related to profiting from sexual services, men were more likely than women to be convicted in the five-year period before and after the PCEPA. Most of those convicted in these cases were sentenced to custody. Though an infrequent offence in terms of the number of cases processed, advertising sexual services offences also saw high conviction rates.After the PCEPA, fewer sex-trade-related offences occurred on the street or in an open area and proportionally more took place in a home or a commercial dwelling unit such as a hotel. This was driven by a considerable decline in offences that are public by definition (i.e., stopping or impeding traffic or communicating offences). The increase in incidents occurring in a home or a commercial dwelling unit is mostly explained by the large increase in incidents of procuring or receiving material benefit as well as the creation of the new offence related to obtaining sexual services from an adult.

Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2021. 29p.

By  Almudena Arcelus, Carlos Chiapa, Pierre Cremieux, Maria Garibotti, Owen Hearey, Yeseul Hyun, Lu Jinks, Jee-Yeon Lehmann, Yao Lu, Kritika Narula, Lolo Palacios, Haimin Zhang 

Immigrants are an integral part of the U.S. economy. According to 2022 data from the U.S. Census Bureau, there are approximately 46 million immigrants in the United States, representing close to 14 percent of the total U.S. population. Immigrants participate in the civilian labor force at higher rates than native-born U.S. workers, and they are an important source for U.S. labor force growth that will help offset the large-scale retirement of baby boomers. A significant part of the growth in the foreign-born labor force in the United States over the past decade is associated with the arrival of immigrants who hold a bachelor’s degree or higher. Immigrants in the United States participate in a wide variety of occupations, ranging from high-skilled, high-wage jobs such as physicians and engineers to low-wage jobs such as agriculture work and food manufacturing. During the COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdowns in the United States, immigrants played critical roles in key sectors of the economy, including healthcare, scientific research and development, agriculture, and food supply. Analysis by the Immigration Research Initiative, a nonpartisan think tank, estimates that in 2021, immigrants contributed $3.3 trillion to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), which represents 17 percent of total U.S. GDP. In addition to the civilian workforce, immigrants also serve in the U.S. military. As of 2022, nearly 731,000 veterans of the U.S. armed forces were born outside the United States, representing approximately 4.5 percent of the U.S. veteran population, with Mexican and Filipino immigrants comprising the largest groups of foreign-born veterans. 

Boston: The Analysis Group, 2024. 166p.

By Payal Shah , Physicians for Human Rights

The escalating conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has caused a “massive influx” of widespread sexual violence perpetrated by the DRC military, armed groups associated with neighboring countries, United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, and community members, according to a new report published today by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR). This widespread and severe sexual violence – at least 113,000 cases reported by the UN in 2023 alone – demands immediate action by the DRC government, neighboring countries, and the global community to support survivors and end the violence, PHR said. “Our report establishes a staggering influx of people who have suffered conflict-related sexual violence – including rape and sexual slavery – being treated in health facilities across eastern DRC, said Payal Shah, JD, report co-author and director of research, legal, and advocacy at PHR. “Survivors are facing sexual violence due to increasing insecurity and insufficient food and cooking wood in Internally Displacement Persons (IDP) camps. Yet clinicians lack the resources to treat this growing number of survivors and ensure forensic documentation for accountability.” “Massive Influx of Cases”: Health Worker Perspectives on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo documents clinicians’ testimonies about patients who faced violent encounters with armed forces, which included armed sexual assault by multiple perpetrators, penetration with foreign objects, and forced captivity. The health workers reported that the sexual violence resulted in a wide range of medical and psychological harms, including lacerations, paralysis, sexually transmitted infections, unwanted pregnancies, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The resurgence of violence and related displacement has led to staggering levels of sexual violence, with the UN reporting more than 113,000 cases registered in 2023. Documented cases of conflict-related sexual violence more than doubled in the first half of 2024, compared to the same period in 2023. These figures are likely underestimates due to the challenges of reporting. Medicines San Frontiers (MSF) reports that the organization treated more than 17,000 cases of sexual violence in only five provinces of DRC in the first five months of 2024. The United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) also reports 940,000 people displaced in 2024 alone, bringing the total to 6.4 million people displaced in DRC. PHR’s new report is among the first studies to date to document the perspectives and accounts of health workers who have cared for child and adult survivors of conflict-related sexual violence in eastern DRC. “The world must not look away from these violations of international law,” said Shah. “The DRC government, other parties to the conflict, and regional and international actors must act now to prevent conflict-related sexual violence by improving security in eastern DRC, including around IDP camps, and addressing food and fuel shortages. Clinicians tell us they urgently need resources for better medical care, psychosocial support, and forensic documentation to prevent long-term suffering by survivors of sexual violence and to ensure survivors can pursue justice.”PHR’s findings are based on semi-structured interviews with 16 health care professionals and humanitarian workers in conflict-affected areas of North and South Kivu, DRC. PHR’s survivor-centered research methodology mitigates the risk of retraumatizing survivors and captures the perspectives of clinicians, who are witnesses to the physical and psychological trauma endured by survivors. The clinicians interviewed by PHR report: Survivors of conflict-related sexual violence are as young as three years old.A stark increase in sexual violence cases in Minova, Kirotche, and Goma health zones as violence has “increased dramatically” in North Kivu and South Kivu since 2022.Survivors experienced violence at the hands of multiple perpetrator groups, including various governmental military forces, rebel, and militia groups active in the conflict:Members of multiple armed groups, including those supported by the DRC’s neighbors(such as March 23 Movement or M23) and the DRC military itself, were identified by survivors as perpetrators who used sexual violence to instill fear, intimidate, and displace affected communities.Community members, family members, peers, and employers were also identified as perpetrators of sexual violence, as well as staff affiliated with the United Nations.One health care worker below described the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (UN MONUSCO) forces giving “favors” to families in exchange for sexual relations with their children.Sexual violence was perpetrated by Swahili, Lingala, and Kinyarwanda speaking perpetrators.Survivors also report multiple forms of sexual violence, including rape in captivity as well as penetration with foreign objects.In one case, a survivor reported to a health worker being held for five days and in another case a survivor reported being held in captivity for one month before escaping.Survivors reported rapes after leaving IDP camps or their communities to look for food or firewood for cooking in insecure areas nearby the displacement camps.Survivors presented at health facilities with a range of medical and psychological needs, including lacerations, sexually transmitted infections, unwanted pregnancies, incontinence, paralysis, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and developmental delays.Survivors reported multiple drivers of sexual violence, including being forced from their homes by armed actors, experiencing sexual violence while fleeing along dangerous routes, and being attacked while searching for food or firewood, as resource shortages forced them into unsafe areas.Health care providers struggle to cope with the crisis as they lack adequate supplies, staffing, training, or compensation to manage the acute influx of survivors.Significant barriers for survivors to access care include limited forensic documentation capacity in the health sector, a lack of resources, fear and stigma, and inadequate access to health services, including contraception and abortion care. Eastern DRC’s decades-long conflict escalated in North and South Kivu in 2021 with the reemergence of the M23 rebel group, which UN experts have identified as being controlled by Rwanda. The conflict’s escalation has led to widespread attacks against civilians, mass displacement, a weakened health system, and food insecurity. The ongoing conflict has also increased the incidence of communicable diseases, including mpox. The capacity of the DRC health system to respond to sexual and gender-based violence, already weak, has been further weakened, with many survivors unable or unwilling to seek care due to stigma, facility closures, and fear of further violence. The planned withdrawal of international peacekeeping forces by the end of 2024, including the MONUSCO and the East African Community Regional Force (EAC-RF), has raised concerns about the potential for further escalation. PHR’s report calls on all parties to the conflict to abide by international human rights law and to take immediate steps to end conflict-related sexual violence. It urges the international community to strengthen monitoring, investigation, and documentation of conflict-related sexual violence, and to promote accountability and justice for violations by all parties. PHR also calls on the international community to ensure the withdrawal of MONUSCO is managed and monitored to ensure that prevention and accountability for sexual violence is not hindered and that knowledge and capacity is transferred to local actors. The DRC health workers interviewed by PHR identify a range of practical recommendations to policymakers and donors to improve the response to the crisis, as well as emerging good practices to support child survivors of sexual violence in DRC, notably child-friendly spaces and child-focused programming.

 New York: Physicians for Human Rights, 2024. 46p.  

By Pryce S. Michener, Elyse Bianchet, Shannon Fox, Elizabeth A. Evans & Peter D. Friedmann 

Background

Opioid-related overdose is the leading cause of death for people recently released from incarceration, however treatment with medications for opioid use disorder (MOUD) during incarceration can reduce the mortality risk. This study seeks to qualitatively analyze perceptions of post-release overdose risk from the perspectives of people who received MOUD while incarcerated in one of eight Massachusetts jails during 2021–2022 using the Risk Environment Framework to guide analyses.

Methods

N = 38 participants with lived experience of MOUD treatment during incarceration who are now living in the community were interviewed on factors that may contribute to or protect against post-release overdose risk. Themes were identified inductively and deductively using the Risk Environment Framework and its domains, which organizes themes along physical, social, economic, and policy environments on both the micro- and macro- scales.

Results

The physical risk environment included loss of opioid tolerance during incarceration, polysubstance use, and the toxicity of the regional drug supply as key producers of increased risk for post-release overdose. Social drivers of risk included peer group risk norms—including peer-driven harm reduction practices and interpersonal relationships between drug sellers and buyers—as well as macro-level social determinants of health such as housing insecurity and availability of mental health services. Economic drivers of post-release overdose risk included lack of income generation during incarceration and employment challenges. Participants discussed several aspects of policy that contribute to post-release overdose risk, including availability of harm reduction supplies, public health services, and broader policy around MOUD.

Conclusions

The perspectives of people with lived experience are vital to understanding the disproportionate risks of overdose for those recently released from incarceration. Our results highlight the intersectional factors that produce and reproduce the post-release overdose risk environment, providing support for interventions across each domain of the Risk Environment Framework. By capturing perspectives from people with lived experience of OUD and incarceration during this critical period of risk, we can better identify interventions that target and mitigate overdose-related harm in this population.

Harm Reduction Journal (2024) 21:138

By Europol 

Intellectual property (IP) crime refers to the theft, infringement and unauthorised use of intellectual property ( 1 ) such as copyrights, designs, trademarks, patents, and geographical indications of origin, and crimes related to trade secrets. Common types of IP crime include counterfeiting (the manufacture, importation, distribution, storage and sale of goods that falsely carry the trademark of a genuine brand without permission) and piracy (the unauthorised copying, use, reproduction, and distribution of materials protected by intellectual property rights). IP crime continues to pose a threat to the EU’s internal security ( 2 ). The harm produced by IP crime is more significant than it appears at first sight. Not only because of its adverse economic effects, but especially in terms of impact on consumers’ health and safety, and on the EU’s natural environment. Criminal actors operating in IP crime are very adept at exploiting opportunities and loopholes, posing challenges to right holders, law enforcement and other relevant authorities. The scale of crime remains considerable. In 2022, approximately 86 million fake items were seized in the EU, with an estimated value exceeding EUR 2 billion. The most common products seized were games ( 3 ), packaging materials, toys, cigarettes, and recorded CDs/DVDs. 60 % of the goods were detained within the EU, and 40 % at the EU’s borders ( 4 ). The illegal trade in counterfeit goods was estimated to represent 5.8% of imports to the EU( 5 ). IP crime thrives because it fulfils a worldwide demand for low-priced goods, which is satisfied by criminal actors and networks operating across continents. Despite prevention campaigns to expose the health and safety dangers of purchasing and consuming counterfeit goods, besides the severe consequences for the industries and companies targeted, counterfeiting keeps appealing to or misleading consumers. IP crime entails a complex criminal process involving multiple steps and various actors. The infringement of intellectual property rights is only the initial stage of IP crime, as the final objective of counterfeiters is to profit as much as possible from the subsequent illicit sale of the fake goods introduced into the consumers’ market. IP crime relies on a multitude of enablers that make this criminal activity particularly successful and at the same time difficult to tackle. These enabling factors can be crimes in themselves, but can also be lawful activities misused for facilitating IP crime. This report explores the ecosystem of IP crime and its interactions with developments in our society. At the core of the report is a description of the criminal process by which the various types of IP crime are committed and the steps it entails. It assesses which key catalysts in today’s EU and global society drive IP crime, making it an area of opportunity for criminal actors. It zooms in on those factors – be they criminal acts or lawful activity misused for criminal purposes – that enable IP crime. At the same time, it considers how IP crime can function as an enabler of other serious and organised crimes. Ultimately, it describes IP crime’s harmful impact on EU citizens and  This report uses operational data from investigations contributed to Europol. The EUIPO has also collected contributions by the private sector. Case examples are used throughout the report as illustrations. Where relevant, open-source intelligence has been used to corroborate analytical findings. The focus on enablers invites law enforcement authorities (LEAs), legislators, relevant stakeholders and the public to work even more closely to reduce the harm of IP crime and identify the criminals behind it. A cohesive response by all stakeholders, both within and outside the EU, is a prerequisite toward the detection and dismantling of the criminal networks involved

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union , 2024. 45p.

By Ariel G. Ruiz Soto

Immigrants in the United States commit crimes at lower rates than the U.S.-born population, notwithstanding the assertion by critics that immigration is linked to higher rates of criminal activity. This reality of reduced criminality, which holds across immigrant groups including unauthorized immigrants, has been demonstrated through research as well as findings for the one state in the United States—Texas—that tracks criminal arrests and convictions by immigration status. A growing volume of research demonstrates that not only do immigrants commit fewer crimes, but they also do not raise crime rates in the U.S. communities where they settle. In fact, some studies indicate that immigration can lower criminal activity, especially violent crime, in places with inclusive policies and social environments where immigrant populations are well established. 

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2024. 7p.

By Adam Teperski, Stewart Boiteux, and Callan Brown

Aim: To examine trends in drug driving charges, roadside drug testing, and population drug use in New South Wales (NSW) between 2008 and 2023. METHOD Data on drug driving proceedings and roadside drug testing were obtained from the NSW Police Force. Focusing on the period between 2008 and 2023, we describe trends in the number of drug driving charges laid by police, as well as changes in the volume of roadside drug tests undertaken by police and the detection rate over time. We also examine the profile of drivers who are proceeded against after testing positive and any differences in key characteristics over time. Finally, to support the interpretation of these results, we assess changes in drug use from two population drug use monitoring systems and consider associated trends in self-reported drug driving behaviours. RESULTS Between 2008 and 2023, the number of drug driving charges rose from an average of 102 per quarter in 2008 to 3,296 in 2023. This significant growth in charges followed the announcement of two expansions of the NSW Mobile Drug Testing (MDT) program, which resulted in a rapid increase in testing volumes from around 20,000 to 156,000 tests per year in 2008 and 2019 respectively. While the MDT expansions aimed to increase police capacity to detect and deter drug driving behaviours, we found a weak relationship between total testing volumes and subsequent detection rates, with the average detection rate varying between 2% and 18%. This suggests that the number of drug driving charges over this 15-year period was not simply a function of the number of tests conducted, but also related to when, where, and for whom tests were used. When we compared drug driving offenders charged in 2019 with those charged in 2023, we found that the 2023 cohort were more likely to be older, test positive for methamphetamine, reside in regional areas and have a prior drug driving charge. During the period we study, population-level drug use has remained relatively consistent. Meanwhile, the self-reported prevalence of drug driving has decreased at a steady rate, with this downward trend commencing prior to the start of the MDT program in NSW. CONCLUSION Sequential expansions of the MDT program have led to a considerable increase in the number of offenders charged with drug driving offences in NSW between 2008 and 2023. Recent growth in the roadside drug test detection rate and subsequent charges may be driven by police targeting of repeat drug driving offenders, and motorists who offend in regional areas. 

Bureau Brief, No. 172 Sydney, NSW: NSW Bureau of Crime  Statistics and Research. ....2024. 23p.

By Elaine Hennig and Benjamin Greaves

Since Harris County’s misdemeanor bond system was first declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in 2017, the county has implemented several reforms as part of the resulting settlement. Before the resolution of the lawsuit, indigent defendants were detained pretrial solely based on their inability to pay bond, while their wealthier counterparts could post bond and expect prompt release. The county corrected this wealth-based discrimination by requiring the majority of misdemeanor defendants to be released on personal recognizance (PR) bonds, which do not require an upfront cash payment. By providing defendants with a new system for bonding out of jail that does not discriminate based on income, the implemented reforms ensure that defendants are not prematurely punished with jail time— upholding the principle of a ‘presumption of innocence’ for the criminally accused, and preventing taxpayers from footing the bill for unnecessary weeks or months of incarceration. Though these changes have only been applied to misdemeanor cases, several ongoing lawsuits have set the stage for reforms that could similarly improve the felony bond system. While these two systems are legally different, the rationale for reform remains the same: protecting constitutionally guaranteed rights and preventing wealth-based discrimination. Despite the more equitable reforms to Harris County’s misdemeanor system, opponents of bond reform frequently criticize the changes. Though many opponents still claim to support the principles of reform, they regularly scapegoat bond reform for the various failures of the criminal legal system. Through the use of misinformation, propagation of false narratives, and exploitation of race-based disparities, they portray bond reform as a threat to public safety. Unfortunately, this disinformation effort is facilitated by local media outlets, who amplify the voices of opponents and disseminate the narratives they promote. This report aims to examine media coverage of bond in Harris County, and to better understand the media’s role in shaping the narrative of bond reform. It draws on a content analysis of 226 news articles run by six Houston-area television stations between January 2015 and June 2021. Stories qualified for selection if they discussed bond reform, bond debates, and/or people who allegedly committed crimes while out on bond. While bias in coverage was the primary focus of this analysis, we also reviewed 15 other key variables, such as referenced ‘experts’ and the defendant’s race or ethnicity. This analysis reveals that many local media stations disproportionately publish biased articles in their reporting on bond. The media consistently provide a platform for opponents of bond reform to represent bond release as a threat to public safety, while frequently failing to contextualize opponents’ claims or feature an alternative view. In cherry-picking and sensationalizing stories about defendants who are arrested while out on bond, media outlets construct a distorted narrative of dangerous releasees, in effect exaggerating the risks of bond reform and minimizing its positive impact. These efforts continually undermine bond reform, serving only to generate fear of people released on bond pretrial. The shift in news coverage of bond is perhaps best seen through a comparison of coverage prior to and following the implementation of Harris County’s proposed settlement in 2019. Over the 48-month period from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2018, 42 total articles focused on bond in relation to  reform or released defendants. Of those articles, only 33 percent were found to be negatively biased. In contrast, over a shorter 30-month period from January 1, 2019, to June 30, 2021, not only did the number of bond-focused articles more than quadruple to 184, but the percentage of negatively biased articles nearly doubled to 61. Although bias in media coverage is one of the most—if not the most—alarming variables analyzed in this report, several other variables have revealed similarly concerning trends. With ongoing attacks against bond reform efforts in Texas and in Houston specifically, recognizing and correcting these trends in media coverage is critical to ensuring that Harris County residents have a more informed perspective of both misdemeanor bond reform and bond reform more generally.   

Austin: TEXAS CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUITY, 2021. 34p.

By Maurice Ogbonnaya 

What began as a struggle for the political and economic autonomy of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has morphed into organised crime of transnational dimensions that has turned the West African coast and the Gulf of Guinea into one of the most unsafe maritime zones in the world and is decimating Nigeria’s economy. The crimes include kidnapping for ransom, maritime piracy, armed robbery at sea, the theft and smuggling of oil and other contraband products, illegal oil refining and bunkering. This report analyses the current drivers of organised crime in the region, arguing that crime has become a fundamental element of the struggle. Key findings • The Niger Delta region accounts for most of Nigeria’s estimated daily oil production of 2.5 million barrels, which makes the country Africa’s largest producer of oil and the sixthlargest oil-producing country in the world. • State repression, poverty and widespread inequality, politics, greed and institutional corruption in the oil and maritime sectors have shaped the evolution of the struggle from a nationalist movement to an organised criminal enterprise. • The Nigerian government must tackle issues of environmental degradation, infrastructural underdevelopment, poverty, the lack of job- and income-generating opportunities, especially for the youth, and institutionalised corruption in the oil and maritime sectors.  

ENACT Africa, 2020. 22p.

By Oluwole Ojewale

Mining and the illicit trade in minerals have long been the source of social and environmental upheaval in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and coltan, a mineral essential to modern electronics, has become a particular focus of criminal networks. This study reveals a network of organised crime involved in the production and supply chain of coltan, and its connections to legitimate businesses in advanced economies. It raises awareness of the implications of this illicit trade and suggests multi-stakeholder interventions to prevent criminal networks from operating in the Great Lakes Region. Key findings • As 5G technology grows, the demand for coltan increases. • Much of the coltan produced by artisanal mining remains unaccounted for due to the government’s inability to access and regulate mines in remote territories. • Coltan smuggling is enabled by state collusion and corrupted networks of social relations. • Coltan smuggling flourishes because of the differences between the prices set in mining areas and those on the black market. • Environmental impact assessments are seldom carried out before exploration for coltan begins. • Sites of historical heritage and indigenous norms are violated by artisanal miners and foreign companies. • Exploitation of children, rape and gender-based violence are common at coltan mining sites.

ENACT Africa, 2022. 20p.

By Romi Sigsworth and Shaun Shelly

South Africa’s prohibitionist and punitive response to people who cultivate, sell and use drugs has failed to reduce the supply, demand or harms related to the use and trade in scheduled drugs. This report explores the universal costs and consequences of prohibition before providing a global contextualisation of current drug policy debates. It then outlines the historical context of drug policy in South Africa and suggests what might be done differently in the present and future to reduce the burden of drugs and drug policy in the country. Key findings • Despite the vast expenditure on a prohibitionist and criminal justice approach to drugs globally over more than five decades, drugs are more readily available at lower prices, drug use has increased significantly and the social and health harms associated with current policies and responses to drugs are substantial. • In South Africa, the criminalisation of people who use drugs is a massive burden on the police, courts and correctional services, as well as a significant barrier to resolving the economic, social and health challenges that communities face in developing an equitable and just society. • The current societal and political attitude towards people who use drugs, however, means that any changes to drug policy are unlikely to be radical or rapid until communities are  able to see the benefits of alternative approaches.

ENACT Africa, 2020. 28p.