By: Ghaleb Krame, Amanda Davies, Magdalena García & Noé Cuervo Vázquez 

This paper explores the power struggle between the Chapitos and Mayiza factions of the Sinaloa Cartel and its implications for U.S. and Mexican law enforcement. Employing scenario analysis, payoff matrices, and Nash equilibria, the study evaluates potential outcomes of this conflict and their impact on cartel power dynamics. While the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) is poised to exploit instability and expand its influence over fentanyl trafficking and key territories, for the United States of America (U.S.A.), this internal fragmentation complicates efforts to control the opioid crisis. In Mexico, Omar García Harfuch faces the challenge of stabilizing cartel-affected regions and countering CJNG’s growth. A Mayiza victory is seen as the most favorable outcome, reducing violence and curbing CJNG’s expansion. Coordinated intelligence-sharing and strategic responses are essential for regional stability.

Security Journal (2025) 38:57

By The Justice Policy Institute

The presence of law enforcement in schools has been a controversial issue for decades. Dual concerns about rising rates of violence among youth coupled with increased attention paid to school shootings were a catalyst for federal funding for more police, frequently referred to as “School Resource Officers” (SROs), in schools. In fact, rates of youth violence were plummeting independent of law enforcement interventions and the impact of SROs on school shootings has been dubious at best. Additionally, SROs have been linked with exacerbating racial disparities in justice involvement and youth being driven deeper into the juvenile and adult criminal justice systems. Rather than preventing crime, SROs have been linked with increased arrests for non-criminal, youthful behavior, commonly known as the school-to-prison pipeline.  

Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute, 2020. 8p.

By Yvon DanduranA discussion of organized crime and governance is not complete until it addresses the question of police governance and its impact on the fight against organized crime, illicit markets and money laundering. Given the relative failure of law enforcement to control organized crime and contain illegal markets, a focus on police governance forces us to consider how law enforcement priorities are set and law enforcement strategies adopted and implemented. This in turn may lead us to conclude, as I am about to suggest, that we me need to both increase the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts and reduce our expectations with respect to the impact that law enforcement can really have on controlling organized crime and illicit markets. In our discussions thus far, we acknowledged that public awareness of organized crime and its consequences is an important starting point, but that we also need to find more effective ways to control organized crime and counter its activities. Most of us recognize that law enforcement and regulatory enforcement are crucial elements of effective action against organized crime, yet we must also recognize that the actual impact of law enforcement is usually quite limited. Countering organized crime requires establishing effective police governance and accountability. Governance includes key management issues such as policy formation and implementation, the determination of priorities and strategies, the allocation of resources, deployment strategies and decisions, the implementation of standards, the prevention of corruption internally, and the maintenance of internal discipline. It follows that weak governance can undermine the effectiveness of police actions against organized crime. At the same time, transnational organized crime entails policing in a transnational context and, with this, come the pressing and complex governance and accountability issues presented by the growth of cross-border policing,  transnational policing, and the growing reliance on multi-jurisdictional police teams. In many instances, one is not talking about a single police force, but broad and ill-defined security networks.3 As Walsh and Conway explained, “(m)achinery that is struggling to cope with the governance and accountability challenges presented by the domestic operations of home based police forces may well prove seriously deficient when confronted with the formers’ activities on other sovereign territories, or domestic operations by foreign based police forces  

Vancouver, BC: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform, 2020. 15p.