By Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer

I llicit networks affect everyone in our modern, globalized world. From human trafficking in Eastern Europe to drug smuggling in East Asia, to the illicit arms trade in Africa, to terrorist cells in East Asia and insurgents in the Caucasus, transnational illicit networks have tentacles that reach everywhere. The trade in illegal narcotics is perhaps most worrisome, but of growing concern is the illicit trafficking of counterfeit items, weapons, natural resources, money, cultural property, and even people by shrewd, well-resourced, and nefarious adversaries. I have experience combating these threats personally at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. As a young naval officer on a variety of ships, I spent a fair amount of time patrolling the global commons where transnational criminals in the guise of pirates and drug smugglers proliferate. I was in the Pentagon on 9/11 and personally experienced the global reach of modern terrorism. Later on, when I commanded U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), one of my subordinate commands was Joint Interagency Task Force–South in Key West, Florida, a multinational and interagency/interministerial command that counters drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere. I also experienced the pernicious effects that transnational crime has on our friends as it ranges throughout the entire Western Hemisphere. After leaving USSOUTHCOM to become commander at U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), I saw that Europe was also challenged by the same types of transnational crime. In response, I stood up the Joint/Interagency Counter Trafficking Center in Stuttgart, Germany, designed to counter transnational criminal networks in cooperation with our international partners. When I took command of USEUCOM, I also became the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). As SACEUR, I command Operation Active Endeavor, which counters trafficking in the Mediterranean, and Operation Ocean Shield, which is part of the international counterpiracy efforts off the Somali coast. In addition, we have pioneered responses to cyber threats. At the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, we have the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Computer Incident Response Center, and at USEUCOM, we are taking steps to create a subunified cyber command that will have links to both U.S. Cyber Command in the United States and USEUCOM in Germany. All of these organizations were designed to facilitate a whole-of-government approach, where all elements of national power work together in order to address emerging threats. Eventually, once societies understand the nature of the threats facing them, they will hope- fully mobilize nongovernmental assets, adopting a “whole of society” approach. When all of these elements work together, governmental and nongovernmental groups can join international regional and global groups to form a “whole of international society” approach, allowing us to close the seams that exist between nations and regions. Only then will we be able to close these illicit transnational networks. These networks have taken advantage of modern advances in communications and transportation to globalize. Narcotraffickers in the Andean Ridge, for instance, have expanded operations as far as their markets in the United States and Europe. Illegal arms merchants have expanded their operations around the world. Human smugglers have moved their slaves from underdeveloped countries to sex operations throughout the developed world. And, of course, we have all seen the global reach of modern transnational terrorism. No one is immune from this insidious threat. 

Center for Complex Operations Institute for National Strategic Studies By National Defense University Press Washington, D.C., 2013. 304p.

By MARIANA OLAIZOLA ROSENBLAT AND LUKE BARNES

Political violence in the United States has increased in recent years and shows no signs of declining.1 This trend was underscored in September 2025 by the assassination of conservative activist Charlie Kirk at Utah Valley University. In the two weeks before and after Kirk’s killing, shooting incidents in Colorado, Minneapolis, and Dallas seized public attention.2 Executive Summary Amid growing concern about the relationship between online rhetoric and real-world violence, this report examines how violent extremist actors across the ideological spectrum use digital platforms to respond to, amplify, and exploit acts of political violence in the United States. Drawing on opensource intelligence (OSINT) gathered initially from March 24 to June 6, 2025, and then extended to include a period following Kirk’s assassination, this analysis reveals sophisticated cross-platform strategies employed by far-right, far-left, violent Islamist, and nihilistic violent extremist (NVE) actors. This report uses “violent extremist” to refer to individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals, as well as those who commit violence driven by generalized hatred rather than a coherent ideology. Key Findings • Violent extremist groups systematically exploit trigger events—high-profile incidents of violence—to recruit supporters, justify their ideologies, and call for retaliatory action. • These groups employ multi-platform strategies, using mainstream sites like X for visibility and recruitment while maintaining a presence on private or semi-private platforms for coordination and more extreme content. • Far-right groups capitalized on cases like the Austin Metcalf stabbing and the Iryna Zarutska killing to advance narratives of White victimhood and justify threats against perceived enemies. • Activities of both far-left and far-right networks revealed a troubling convergence around antisemitic targeting. • Violent Islamic groups are more aggressively monitored than domestic groups espousing similar levels of violence. • Violent Islamist groups, facing stricter moderation than domestic extremists, have migrated to decentralized platforms like Rocket.Chat while disseminating symbolic propaganda elsewhere. • Nihilistic Violent Extremist (NVE) communities glorify violence across ideological lines for shock value and digital notoriety, making their threats harder to predict based on political triggers. This report aims to bring clarity to a conversation clouded by vagueness and partisanship. It first maps the domestic threat landscape, offering timely examples of online violent discourse from across the ideological spectrum targeting US individuals or institutions, and sets out a clear definitional framework for types of speech that carry legal significance under US constitutional doctrine. It closes with practical recommendations for online service providers and policymakers.

New York: NYU Stern Center for Businsss, 2025. 36p.

By Katarzyna Jaskoa, Gary LaFree, James Piazzac , and Michael H. Beckerd

Although political violence has been perpetrated on behalf of a wide range of political ideologies, it is unclear whether there are systematic differences between ideologies in the use of violence to pursue a political cause. Prior research on this topic is scarce and mostly restricted to self-reported measures or less extreme forms of political aggression. Moreover, it has generally focused on respondents in Western countries and has been limited to either comparisons of the supporters of left-wing and right-wing causes or examinations of only Islamist extremism. In this research we address these gaps by comparing the use of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and worldwide using two unique datasets that cover real-world examples of politically motivated, violent behaviors. Across both datasets, we find that radical acts perpetrated by individuals associated with left-wing causes are less likely to be violent. In the United States, we find no difference between the level of violence perpetrated by right-wing and Islamist extremists. However, differences in violence emerge on the global level, with Islamist extremists being more likely than right-wing extremists to engage in more violent acts.

Political violence in the United States has increased in recent years and shows no signs of declining.1 This trend was underscored in September 2025 by the assassination of conservative activist Charlie Kirk at Utah Valley University. In the two weeks before and after Kirk’s killing, shooting incidents in Colorado, Minneapolis, and Dallas seized public attention.2 Executive Summary Amid growing concern about the relationship between online rhetoric and real-world violence, this report examines how violent extremist actors across the ideological spectrum use digital platforms to respond to, amplify, and exploit acts of political violence in the United States. Drawing on opensource intelligence (OSINT) gathered initially from March 24 to June 6, 2025, and then extended to include a period following Kirk’s assassination, this analysis reveals sophisticated cross-platform strategies employed by far-right, far-left, violent Islamist, and nihilistic violent extremist (NVE) actors. This report uses “violent extremist” to refer to individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals, as well as those who commit violence driven by generalized hatred rather than a coherent ideology. Key Findings • Violent extremist groups systematically exploit trigger events—high-profile incidents of violence—to recruit supporters, justify their ideologies, and call for retaliatory action. • These groups employ multi-platform strategies, using mainstream sites like X for visibility and recruitment while maintaining a presence on private or semi-private platforms for coordination and more extreme content. • Far-right groups capitalized on cases like the Austin Metcalf stabbing and the Iryna Zarutska killing to advance narratives of White victimhood and justify threats against perceived enemies. • Activities of both far-left and far-right networks revealed a troubling convergence around antisemitic targeting. • Violent Islamic groups are more aggressively monitored than domestic groups espousing similar levels of violence. • Violent Islamist groups, facing stricter moderation than domestic extremists, have migrated to decentralized platforms like Rocket.Chat while disseminating symbolic propaganda elsewhere. • Nihilistic Violent Extremist (NVE) communities glorify violence across ideological lines for shock value and digital notoriety, making their threats harder to predict based on political triggers. This report aims to bring clarity to a conversation clouded by vagueness and partisanship. It first maps the domestic threat landscape, offering timely examples of online violent discourse from across the ideological spectrum targeting US individuals or institutions, and sets out a clear definitional framework for types of speech that carry legal significance under US constitutional doctrine. It closes with practical recommendations for online service providers and policymakers.

PNAS 2022 Vol. 119 No. 30 e2122593119

By Abby Córdova and Helen Kras

 With a focus on the implementation of women’s police stations (WPS), we posit that local policies that address violence against women can result in positive feedback effects on institutional legitimacy. We theorize that WPS increase police legitimacy among women by improving perceptions of personal safety and government responsiveness. To test our hypotheses, we rely on municipal and public opinion data from more than 100 municipalities in Brazil. The results of our multilevel analysis indicate that WPS produce positive feedback effects among women, resulting in higher trust in the police among women than men and closing the gender gap in perceptions of police effectiveness. Incorporating an instrumental variable in the analyses yields similar results, suggesting that these effects are not endogenous. Moreover, the results of our mediation models show that WPS’ positive effects on women’s views of police legitimacy are driven by improved perceptions of personal safety, and not perceptions of government responsiveness. 

Comparative Political Studies 2020, Vol. 53(5) 775–808 

Sandra Walklate , Charlotte Barlow

The purpose of this paper is to develop an understanding of positive policing in relation to domestic abuse by opening up what is meant by this approach through an examination of what is taken for granted about it within much of the academic literature. Using data from a small-scale study involving case file analysis and interviews with police officers, the paper suggests in practice, positive policing involves a wide range of actions on the part of police officers. In exploring this data, the paper introduces the concept of ‘contextual safeguarding’ as a key feature of ‘positive policing’ in relation to domestic abuse. The paper makes the case for understanding ‘positive policing’ in the context of domestic abuse through the lens of ‘contextual safeguarding’ and that this would have beneficial consequences for wider debates on this issue.

Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, Volume 19, 2025,

By Eric Hershberg, Edward Maguire, Steven Dudley

In October 2012, the U.S. government designated MS-13 as a transnational criminal organization (TCO), raising serious questions about the breadth of the gang’s criminal capacity. Some analysts have pointed to a steady growth and professionalization of this criminal organization, but insufficient data has hindered the formulation and implementation of policies aimed at countering this trend. Our multiyear project proposed to fill gaps in the extant literature by conducting qualitative and quantitative research designed to assess MS-13’s transnational criminal capacity. More specifically, our objectives were to: 1) conduct extensive interviews with local stakeholders, gang experts, and MS-13 members in three major metropolitan areas, including two in the U.S. and one in El Salvador; 2) analyze qualitative and quantitative data gathered through tested survey and interview instruments and from official sources, with particular attention to the following factors: type of criminal activities, organizational structure, inter- and intra-gang relationships, level of community penetration, accumulation of social capital, development and migration patterns, and recruitment strategies; 3) utilize social network analysis techniques to quantify the social reach of gang member respondents; and 4) disseminate project findings to relevant constituencies in law enforcement, policymaking circles, academe, and the general public. The purpose of our research was to provide policymakers and law enforcement officials with a comprehensive understanding of MS-13 by measuring the extent and range of the organization’s criminal activity and mapping its social networks. Our goal was to generate empirical data that could serve as a foundation upon which to shape new policies and practices. Specifically, our hope was that the data would provide insights regarding the optimal allocation of law enforcement resources, the likely movements of MS-13, and the design of intervention and suppression strategies. 

Washington DC: U..S. Department of Justice,  2019. 11p.

By C. Proffit

Twenty-five years ago, Krivo and Peterson wrote a seminal piece on the context of disadvantage and its threshold effects. In The Structural Context of Homicide: Accounting for Racial Differences in the Process, they emphasize that extreme contexts of disadvantage may diminish the significance of certain structural conditions that contribute to higher crime rates, particularly in relation to homicide. However, remarkably few studies consider the threshold effects of disadvantage when studying homicide. Although their research primarily focuses on race groups and the varying degree of disadvantage as a crime-generating condition, the unequal distribution of disadvantage in communities may have unique effects on certain forms of violence, particularly gang homicide. This study will (1) explore how community predictors of gang homicide differ across contexts by comparing neighborhoods with extreme levels of disadvantage to those with low-moderate levels of disadvantage and (2) examine differences in this context of disadvantage between gang-related and nongang-related homicide to assess if differences emerge between these categorizations of lethal violence. Findings reaffirmed Krivo and Peterson’s conclusion. Disadvantage was associated with increases in gang homicide only in low to moderately disadvantaged areas while effects diminished in extremely disadvantaged communities.

  American Journal of Criminal Justice , July 2025

By The International Crisis Group

Born of Port-au-Prince’s most powerful gangs, Viv Ansanm has raised the criminal threat overhanging Haiti’s state and civilians to alarming heights. The gang coalition announced itself to the world by besieging the Haitian capital in early 2024, triggering former Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s resignation. After consolidating its hold on much of the city, Viv Ansanm has expanded into neighbouring departments, tightened its grip on the main roads connecting Port-au-Prince to the rest of the country and mounted attacks on the airport, essentially cutting Haiti off. Gangs’ violent offensives have killed over 16,000 people since 2022. But a rising death toll and diversifying criminal portfolio, now including extortion, piracy and drug trafficking, have not stopped gangs from claiming to represent the country’s downtrodden, especially on social media. UN approval of a new foreign force to combat the gangs could shift the balance of power. But it is vital that plans are in place not just to overpower the gangs but also to persuade them to demobilise. Haitian business and political elites have relied on paramilitary forces to protect their interests since the 1950s dictatorship of Francois Duvalier, or “Papa Doc”. But in the wake of the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, gangs have mutated, evolving from tools in the hands of the most powerful to overlords of Haiti. Two main gang groupings – the G-9, whose most public figure was Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue, and the Gpèp, under Gabriel Jean Pierre, known as “Ti Gabriel” – fought for supremacy after Moïse’s murder. Even as the two faced off, gang leaders discussed whether to strike agreements to scale down the death toll among their members and spare resources. Mediators managed to craft several pacts among local groups to divvy up coveted turf. Late in 2023, reports emerged that the country’s two main gang coalitions had merged into one platform; their first joint offensive began months later replace the current transitional government. The concrete result they aspire to is a general amnesty for leaders and members. Haiti and its foreign partners are looking to beef up their ability to respond to the gangs with force. The UN Security Council has approved a new security operation, dubbed the Gang Suppression Force, to replace the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission, which started up in 2024 but has never had the personnel or resources needed to check the gangs. The new force aims to incorporate 5,500 military personnel and expects to draw on reliable funding. Its mandate appears to give it more operational independence and the leeway to adopt more aggressive tactics. But until the force’s deployment, which is expected to commence around April 2026, Haiti’s authorities will have to turn to other methods. A task force, led by Haiti’s prime minister and powered by U.S. private military companies, has already used drones to hit gang members in their urban strongholds, killing over 200 people. Foreign partners are also providing training to the newly reconstituted army. Meanwhile, citizens exhausted by the threat to their neighbourhoods have established self-defence groups, provoking a brutal riposte from the gangs. Alongside its violent expansion, Viv Ansanm has sought to transform its public profile from that of a predatory criminal force into that of an ideological crusader. Crime bosses say their mission is to protect the poorest Haitians from rapacious elites and colonial powers that historically have oppressed this black Caribbean nation. Chérizier and other gang leaders have even announced the creation of a new political party, albeit without taking the steps needed to register it formally. While continuing to enrich themselves at the expense of Haitians rich and poor, their message has nevertheless become more overtly political: they appear intent on guaranteeing that their allies are part of the next administration, which should be formed by 7 February 2026 toreplace the current transitional government. The concrete result they aspire to is a general amnesty for leaders and members. Haiti and its foreign partners are looking to beef up their ability to respond to the gangs with force. The UN Security Council has approved a new security operation, dubbed the Gang Suppression Force, to replace the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission, which started up in 2024 but has never had the personnel or resources needed to check the gangs. The new force aims to incorporate 5,500 military personnel and expects to draw on reliable funding. Its mandate appears to give it more operational independence and the leeway to adopt more aggressive tactics. But until the force’s deployment, which is expected to commence around April 2026, Haiti’s authorities will have to turn to other methods. A task force, led by Haiti’s prime minister and powered by U.S. private military companies, has already used drones to hit gang members in their urban strongholds, killing over 200 people. Foreign partners are also providing training to the newly reconstituted army. Meanwhile, citizens exhausted by the threat to their neighbourhoods have established self-defence groups, provoking a brutal riposte from the gangs. A well-resourced, properly informed and expertly commanded Gang Suppression Force could help change the balance of force on the ground and push the gangs onto the back foot. Port-au-Prince and its foreign counterparts, however, must take care to mitigate the dangers of civilian casualties and violations of human rights, ensuring that robust accountability systems are in place. Once the force is up and running, the Haitian government should also overcome the coordination failures that have plagued previous security campaigns. In particular, the government should appoint members to the National Security Council and ask them to design a strategy that lays out each institution’s role in fighting the gangs. Even so, it remains unlikely that force aone will entirely extricate gangs from the communities they control or sever the nexus with politics that has bedevilled Haiti for over half a century. Though informal negotiations with gangs take place on a regular basis – to gain access to people in need of humanitarian aid or to keep businesses open – many Haitians oppose the idea of formal dialogue with the perpetrators of crimes they consider unforgivable. Government officials have correctly said the Haitian state cannot engage in talks from a position of weakness. But if the new multinational force and revamped Haitian security forces allow the authorities to gain the upper hand and broadcast their armed superiority, state officials should look to use dialogue as a means of convincing the gangs to cut their losses, reduce violence against civilians and, eventually, demobilise

While that happens, the administration, with the support of donors, should expand the program that is now providing exit ramps for minors in the gangs’ ranks. In cooperation with international experts, it should also start to design a transitional justice system that provides benefits and a measure of judicial reprieve to those who disarm and cooperate with the authorities, while also guaranteeing that there will be no general impunity. It is hard to understate the damage gangs have wrought in Haiti, killing and raping thousands, creating the hemisphere’s worst humanitarian crisis and destroying the lives of millions. Understandably, many Haitians refuse to contemplate responding to the horrors they have endured with anything less than crushing retaliation. But even if the Gang Suppression Force lives up to its promise, it is hard to compute the possible cost in lives and resources of a campaign to destroy the gangs. At some stage, negotiations from a position of strength aimed at protecting civilians and disarming the gangs would serve Haiti far better as a first step on the long path to stability.

Port-au-Prince/New York/London/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2025. 49p.

By Tinenenji Banda and Marja Hinfelaar

Zambia is a significant source of critical minerals including copper, cobalt, lithium, nickel and graphite. Interest in Zambia’s minerals is growing, particularly from Western countries and China. Unfortunately, due to governance weaknesses, there is ample corruption and illicit financial flows at several transaction levels in the value chain. This U4 Issue therefore identifies government interventions Zambia can use to curtail corruption considering existing political pressures.

Main points

• Intense competition for critical mineral value chains results in an increased risk of revenue leakage due to corruption and tax evasion. Illicit financial flows (IFF) threaten Zambia’s economic development and undermine its fiscal systems.

• Zambia has formal commitments in place, such as laws, regulatory institutions and international commitments, to battle corruption and IFFs, but the institutional architecture is fragmented and inadequately enforced. Inter-agency collaboration is required to address these challenges.

• Through a literature review, including a law and policy review, and a stakeholder mapping exercise with 21 key informant interviews with government, civil society, academic and industry representatives, we constructed a qualitative understanding of the key risk factors for corruption and IFFs.

• Significant factors are the lack of a transparent, coherent and disciplined mining licensing system; a non-transparent bidding process; public-private collusion across value chains; abuse of intermediaries and agents; and weak regulation in the sector.

• Opportunities for interventions are enhanced systems for disclosure and due diligence, reform of the Mining Cadastre, support for evidence-based policymaking, support for the organisation of the artisanal mining sector, enhanced quality of civil society organisation public discourse, and enhanced collaboration in anti-corruption agencies, while keeping political pressures in mind.

By Naomi Roht-Arriaza

Courts in several jurisdictions have recognised corruption as a direct human rights violation, enabling broader legal standing, integrating international law and focusing on victims. Case studies, predominantly from Latin America, illustrate different legal theories used to hold officials accountable and expand access to justice in anti-corruption proceedings. Consequently, the formulation of a stand-alone right has merit despite limitations.

By Caitlin Maslen

“Nature-based” solutions to climate change require the acquisition of large swaths of land for reforestation, afforestation, conservation and renewable energy sources. However, corruption in the land sector is already widespread and this additional demand for land may aggravate pre-existing corruption risks, as well as causing new ones. National governments and project implementers of land-based solutions should therefore implement anti-corruption measures in projects and, most importantly, ensure that they take into account the communities (such as Indigenous Peoples) who may already live on the land.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,, 2023. 24p.

By Maria Leonor Rodriguez Prat

In Cuba, the economic crisis and resource scarcity contribute to petty corruption, while opaque institutions and military control over key economic sectors enable forms of grand corruption. Cuba’s partial financial isolation both limits and obscures illicit inflows, but select recent cases indicate a growing vulnerability to transnational money laundering. While formal anti-corruption frameworks exist in Cuba, enforcement remains highly selective and politicised, particularly in cases involving state and military elites.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025, 29p.

By Adrian Robert Bazbauers and Anthea McCarthy-Jones

 The spread of illicit activity across the global economy presents significant challenges to international development. Despite the well-recognized global incidence of corruption, fraud, and money laundering in development-focused investment projects, the responses of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) to these threats remain understudied. Our article offers the first comprehensive study into the comparative historical emergence and evolution of MDB responses to illicit activity. By identifying and analyzing critical junctures in this history, we argue that the MDBs have tended to approach illicit activity as prohibited practices rather than criminal acts. We contend that this is an intentional choice made by the MDBs that absolves these organizations from any real responsibility in minimizing illicit activity, finding their concern to be ensuring contractual compliance in their lending operations rather than curtailing criminal behavior and their preference to be resolving contractual deviations in-house as opposed to coordinating with local jurisdictions and law enforcement agencies.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 112–128.

By Jonah Rexer

Multinationals in the extractive sectors of weak states may face resource theft by armed groups. This criminality is often abetted by state corruption, even though firms are willing to pay for protection. I study indigenization in Nigeria's oil sector, which increased participation by Nigerian firms substantially. Despite evidence that local firms are of lower quality, localization increases output and reduces oil theft. A bargaining model illustrates that political connections align law enforcement incentives, solving commitment problems. Data on raids by government forces show that local firms receive preferential law enforcement protection. I find that connections to military elites drive the local advantage.

.Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University, 2022. 113p  

By The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Focus on Illicit Payments: The document examines transnational bribery in the context of international investment agreements (IIAs) and other related instruments, highlighting efforts to combat corruption at various levels.

Legal Definitions and Jurisdiction: It discusses the legal definition of bribery, the role of public officials, and the complexities of jurisdiction and international cooperation in addressing transnational bribery.

Enforcement and Sanctions: Emphasis is placed on the enforcement of anti-bribery laws and the sanctions imposed on those involved incorrupt practices, including the responsibilities of transnational corporations (TNCs).

Policy Options: The document outlines policy options for addressing illicit payments in IIAs, ranging from non-inclusion to substantive provisions that tackle transnational bribery issues comprehensively.

United Nations, 2001 , 101 pages

By Svetlana Stephenson

Historical Context: The book explores the evolution of gangs in Russia, particularly during the 1990s when radical market reforms led to the rise of street gangs that evolved into sophisticated organized crime networks.

Gang Structure: Russian gangs are described as male-dominated, violent alliances that are deeply embedded in society, often overlapping with legitimate structures and mainstream institutions.

Economic Influence: Gangs transitioned from street-level extortion to more complex economic activities, including protection operations for large companies and involvement in the shadow economy.

Social Integration: Despite their criminal activities, gang members often maintain legitimate jobs and social ties, reflecting a unique"double helix" model of social incorporation in Russia.

Cornell University Press, 2015, 277 pages

 By Vivian Miller

Peter Christian "Paddy" Barrie was a seasoned fraudster who transferred his horse doping and horse substitution skills from British to North American racetracks in the 1920s. His thoroughbred ringers were entered in elite races to guarantee winnings for syndicates and betting rings in the prohibition-era United States. This case study of a professional travelling criminal and the challenges he posed for the Pinkerton National Detective Agency in the early 1930s war on crime highlights both the importance of illegal betting to urban mobsters and the need for broader and more nuanced critiques of Depression-era organised crime activities and alliances.

Cambridge, UK: Journal of American Studies, 2021. 22p.

By Lasha Gogidze

Under the current government, Uzbekistan is undergoing reforms to shift from a Soviet-style governance system to an open-market economy. Despite progress, the country remains an authoritarian state, marked by pervasive corruption in sectors like healthcare and education. Key institutions, influenced by the executive branch, lack due process, enabling arrests of activists and journalists on questionable charges. The civic space is restricted, with human rights defenders and journalists facing persecution for exposing government corruption. While reforms are underway, challenges persist in establishing transparency and democracy in Uzbekistan's governance model.

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer, 2023. 22p.

 By Khachik Harutyunyan and Caitlin Maslen   

After a protracted conflict and a period of self-rule from 2005, South Sudan is now the world’s most recent sovereign country. The young state faces considerable governance challenges; it regularly ranks at or near the bottom of international corruption indices. Corruption is systemic across all levels of government and pervades nearly every economic sector, and perpetrators enjoy widespread impunity. As such, it takes a heavy toll on the populace by diverting the wealth from the country’s extensive oil reserves into private pockets instead of public service provision or gross fixed capital formation. This kleptocratic dynamic is embodied in scandals such as the Cash Grab and Dura Saga scandals. The international community has called on the South Sudanese government to take stronger action to tackle corruption. However, progress has been slow, and corruption remains a major challenge for South Sudan's future development  

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer, 2023. 25p.

 By David Olusegun Sotola and Roberto Martinez B. Kukutschka  

Corruption in Sierra Leone remains a pervasive challenge. Since the end of the civil war in 2002, successive governments have made efforts to tackle corruption and hold perpetrators, especially those from the previous government, accountable, but challenges remain. Anti-corruption efforts have focused on amending laws, institutional frameworks and the establishment of a special anti-corruption judicial division but concerns about the backsliding of democracy in the country, weak checks on the power of the executive and the politicisation of the anti-corruption cause make it difficult to counter corruption effectively.

 Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2023. 21p.