By: Colin Murphy

3D printing, a technology only a few decades old, has progressed in quality and affordability. It has moved from the realm of industrial prototype, through cutting-edge design and technology, to finally end up in the homes of hobbyists and enthusiasts. This welcome and useful process has delivered new and affordable solutions to a range of subjects and fields, and has changed the shape of manufacturing from large factories to small bespoke businesses. However, this innovation has also developed a darker side and has been adopted by those with criminal intent, including for the manufacture of firearms. While converted or backstreet guns are not a new phenomenon, the advent of 3D printing has extended the range of people able to obtain a firearm to include those with no practical skills or tools or indeed any criminal connections. In the space of little over a decade, the concept of homemade guns using 3D printing techniques has evolved from a simple yet effective one-shot pistol to a semi automatic hybrid rifle. These firearms have made their way into the hands of criminals and extremists with menacing intent. They have also featured in high-profile shootings with fatal consequences. It is important to acknowledge that this nascent method of firearm production is developing at a rapid speed. Authorities and law enforcement agencies are recognising the growing threat that these firearms pose, and are adapting their understanding, approach and expertise. In addition, legislators around the world are beginning to adapt their laws to address this emerging threat. In the EU, possession of a 3D-printed firearm is an offence, but not possession of, publicity for or distribution of digital blueprints or hard copies. IN THIS BRIEFING • Introduction • 3D printing • Craft production of privately-made firearms . • Progression of 3D printed firearms • Users of 3D printed firearms • Addressing the issue

Members' Research Service PE 775.889 – August 2025

By Swethaa Ballakrishnen

Using 60 interviews with a range of minority law students and early career legal professionals (primarily differentiated by race, gender identity, religion, and disability), this Article illuminates the cruciality of empirical Critical Race Theory to understand individual deviance within the legal profession and develops a framework – blasé – for considering interactional violence that is not legally or socially cognizable as discrimination but still causes harm. These data reveal that discrimination was minimized and denied to varying degrees for all minority respondents. However, for genderqueer respondents whose identities had not achieved a high degree of sociolegal legibility, these denials had low contestability and were often without contrition. Unlike microaggressions which might have resonance in common cultural parlance as operationalizations of structural violence, what distinguishes blasé discrimination, I argue, is the ordinariness of the act in interactional parlance alongside its relative unlikeliness to be seen as problematic when confronted. It is this possibility of defense and justification in the face of being challenged that makes blasé and its ambiguous parameters worthy of our attention in identity jurisprudence. This exploration of the blasé response to discrimination sheds light on the opportunities available for revealing structural inequalities when analysis begins from the perspectives of peripheral actors.

By Daniel C.K. Chow

Multinational companies (MNCs) with valuable trademarks in China seek criminal enforcement against counterfeiting because other available avenues of relief, such as administrative and judicial remedies, have proven to be ineffective. While MNCs prefer enforcement through China’s Police, the Public Security Bureau (PSB), many MNCs are unaware of the significant hidden dangers of using the PSB.Most MNCs will delegate enforcement of trademark rights to their Chinese subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are known to make illegal payments to the PSB that may violate the laws of the PRC as well as the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). These acts expose MNCs to draconian penalties under PRC law and the FCPA. MNCs can be unaware of these illegal practices because many MNCs organize their business structures and intellectual property (IP) management strategies in ways that shield MNCs from reviewing some of the on-the-ground actions by their Chinese subsidiaries. This Article exposes these risks, explains how some of these risks arise, and makes suggestions on how MNCs can structure their business organizations and IP management structures in China to eliminate or mitigate these risks. *