By Rosa Gibson

In Alaska, pretrial detainees comprise much of the state’s prison population. Electronic monitoring—made possible by recent bail reforms—provides a pathway to pretrial release for those who cannot afford to pay bail. Using GPS data, the Pretrial Enforcement Division can monitor the location of a releasee’s ankle monitor for supervisory purposes. But when law enforcement seeks warrantless access to that data to investigate crimes other than the one for which a releasee is awaiting trial, that intrusion raises concerns under Alaska’s constitutional right to privacy. This Note argues that the Alaska judiciary, which is best positioned to guard the privacy of pretrial releasees in this area, should treat warrantless searches of this type as per se unreasonable, absent narrow exceptions. This Note posits that a reverse location search of pretrial electronic monitoring data for general investigative purposes constitutes a “search” under both the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions. Through the contextualization of Alaska’s use of electronic monitoring, analysis of the impact of Alaska’s constitutional right to privacy on the search inquiry, and analogy to the constitutionally suspect geofence search, this Note demonstrates that requiring a warrant for this data for investigative purposes is consistent with Alaska’s search-and-seizure jurisprudence. Acknowledging the inherent tradeoffs involved in pretrial release, this Note strives to establish a workable middle ground where law enforcement can access sophisticated tools in the interest of public safety without abandoning the privacy values the Alaskan people have enshrined in their constitution.

By  Beth Colgan and Jordan B. Wood

This Article provides a comprehensive statewide study of a practice by which courts order defendants to pay financial sanctions—fines, costs, and probation fees—by serving terms of incarceration. Though several states authorize these practices, to date, very little is known about the extent to which payment via incarceration occurs and the different ways it is employed. This Article examines the use of the practice in Nebraska, where it is colloquially referred to as “sitting out.” Our study specifically focuses on all misdemeanor cases in Nebraska county courts with judgments (an adjudication of guilt and/or sentencing) during the year 2019.

This study examines the ways in which payment via incarceration is consistent with and diverges from the archetypal “modern debtors’ prison,” in which penalties related to the nonpayment of fines are widespread, imposed against people of limited means and particularly people of color, and which carry the risk that the inherent revenue-generating qualities of financial sanctions will pervert crime policy.

We find that Nebraska’s practices are consistent with that archetype in that payment via incarceration is deeply integrated into the jurisdiction’s legal systems as evident through its widespread use. We discover that courts ordered 10,027 defendants to pay financial sanctions via incarceration in over a quarter of all misdemeanor cases in our dataset, an alarmingly high rate. Those defendants also sat out a notably high amount of financial debt—$2,105,462 in the aggregate. At $150 per day (the rate at which Nebraska credits incarceration against financial debt), the defendants in our study spent a minimum of 14,036 days in Nebraska county jails to pay off fines, costs, and probation fees.

The results of the study are also consistent with a second archetype— that in modern debtors’ prisons, people of limited means, and particularly people of color, are subjected to financial sanctions they have no meaningful ability to pay and punished for their poverty when payment is not forthcoming. Our findings illustrate that many defendants who were subjected to sitting out were convicted for offenses frequently linked to poverty and many were declared indigent by the court for the purposes of appointing counsel. Further, the cases in our database exhibit troubling racial disparities.

Other findings, however, complicate the narrative surrounding modern debtors’ prisons, especially with regard to revenue-generation incentives of government actors. On its face, sitting out appears to undermine the idea that government actors are motivated by revenue generation. Unlike systems in which the debt remains outstanding, when a defendant is ordered to sit out financial sanctions, the debt is paid off by the incarceration. This ensures that revenues are never secured, while leaving the jurisdiction to bear the expense of incarceration. To investigate this issue and track how money moves into and out of government coffers when sitting out is employed, we create an original typology of the various forms of payment via incarceration useful for studying Nebraska’s system and those in other jurisdictions. What we find is geographic diversity in the mechanisms for sitting out that carry different fiscal implications.

After presenting the study’s results, we conclude by discussing the key takeaways of our research, its limitations, and several law and policy implications that open potential avenues for future research.

By Ohioans To Stop Executions

Ohio’s cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment sys­tem has come into sharp focus with the release of two reports that exam­ine four decades of the state’s death penal­ty record and draw stark­ly dif­fer­ent con­clu­sions about the future of Ohio’s death penal­ty. On March 30, Ohioans to Stop Executions (OTSE) pub­lished Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Confronting the Wrongful Conviction Crisis in the State of Ohio, doc­u­ment­ing the record of mis­takes and errors that result­ed in 12 exon­er­a­tions. “The death penal­ty in Ohio is a sys­tem defined more by its capac­i­ty for error than its pur­suit of jus­tice,” the report states, con­clud­ing, “It’s time for Ohio to end its death penal­ty.” Two days lat­er, out­go­ing Attorney General Dave Yost released his eighth and final Capital Crimes Report, call­ing the state’s years-long pause on exe­cu­tions “a mock­ery of the jus­tice sys­tem” and com­plain­ing that Ohio has pro­vid­ed death-sen­tenced pris­on­ers with “more than their fair share of due process.” AG Yost urges law­mak­ers to pass leg­is­la­tion that would allow exe­cu­tions to resume.

Beyond Reasonable Doubt cen­ters on data OTSE argues Ohioans can no longer ignore: since the state rein­stat­ed cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment in 1981, it has exe­cut­ed 56 peo­ple and exon­er­at­ed 12 oth­ers from death row — mark­ing one exon­er­a­tion for every five exe­cu­tions car­ried out. Collectively, OTSE notes that these 12 men lost 245 years of their lives to wrong­ful impris­on­ment. “It turns out that Ohio has a mas­sive wrong­ful con­vic­tion prob­lem, far worse than any­one imag­ined,” said Kevin Werner, Executive Director of OTSE. Mr. Werner added that “[a]ttempts to restart exe­cu­tions will result in the exe­cu­tions of inno­cent peo­ple, and no one wants that.”

In addi­tion to the 12 indi­vid­u­als who have been wrong­ful­ly sen­tenced to death, Beyond Reasonable Doubt iden­ti­fies an addi­tion­al 12 “shad­ow exon­er­a­tions,” or cas­es in which indi­vid­u­als faced cap­i­tal indict­ments and were sen­tenced to life in prison rather than death and were lat­er proven inno­cent. The same issues are present in both groups of 12 cas­es: pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al mis­con­duct, coerced tes­ti­mo­ny, false eye­wit­ness iden­ti­fi­ca­tions, and false or mis­lead­ing foren­sic evi­dence. “The records of the 24 men exon­er­at­ed after cap­i­tal indict­ments are no ‘suc­cess sto­ries’ of the legal sys­tem; they are indict­ments of it,” the report states. “They prove that in Ohio, the dif­fer­ence between a free man and a dead man is often noth­ing more than a lucky pub­lic records request or the per­sis­tence of postconviction counsel.”

By James Stone

For incarcerated people litigating pro se, the civil discovery process is vitally important. When imprisoned litigants lack meaningful access to discovery, their cases become swearing contests they are bound to lose, and wrongdoing in prison goes unaddressed. Yet for these same plaintiffs, civil discovery is defunct. The vast majority of incarcerated plaintiffs, including those with promising or meritorious claims, are unable to navigate either to or through litigation’s discovery phase. Part diagnosis and part treatment, this Article is the first to explore in depth how the discovery process—as designed and implemented—fails those pursuing civil-rights claims against their jailers, betraying both a crisis in prison litigation and a failure of our procedural regime.

Relying on both case research and extensive interviews with federal judges, staff attorneys, prison rights lawyers, formerly incarcerated people, and prison officials, the Article chronicles prison discovery’s written and unwritten rules and their failures. It begins with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which map awkwardly or not at all onto prison litigation. It then discusses the much broader amalgam of practical impediments to evidence gathering in prison. These include profound informational asymmetries, resource disparities, and hostility between prison defendants—who create and control much of the evidence relevant to incarcerated people’s claims—and imprisoned plaintiffs.

The Article then scrutinizes the dockets and filings of two hundred recent federal cases arising out of two different prisons in two different districts: Louisiana State Penitentiary in Louisiana and Menard Correctional Center in Illinois. The research reveals startling disparities between the districts’ case-management decisions and cultures, resulting in stark differences in prison litigants’ discovery prospects. Incarcerated litigants’ current chances of evidencing and vindicating claims may be largely contingent on the district in which their prison sits—what some incarcerated people call “justice by jurisdiction.” Arguing that this situation is both untenable and preventable, the Article suggests multiple concrete avenues for reform.

By: Rosanna Smart, Andrew R. Morral, James P. Murphy, Rupa Jose, Amanda Charbonneau, Terry L. Schell

In this report, part of RAND's Gun Policy in America initiative, researchers systematically review the scientific literature that has examined the likely effects of various gun laws. In the fifth edition of this report, the authors incorporate more-recent research in their synthesis of the available scientific data regarding the effects of 18 state firearm policies on firearm injuries and deaths, violent crime, suicides, the gun industry, defensive gun use, and other outcomes. By highlighting where scientific evidence is accumulating, the authors hope to build consensus around a shared set of facts that have been established through a transparent, nonpartisan, and impartial review process. In so doing, they also illuminate areas in which more and better information could make important contributions to establishing fair and effective gun policies.

By Alice Baxter

The government has announced that it is establishing a statutory public inquiry into grooming gangs. The inquiry begins work on 13 April 2026. Why have there been calls for an inquiry? By the early 2010s, multiple child sexual abuse scandals had prompted public concern about the state response to organised and systematic child sexual abuse. These included revelations about media personalities such as Jimmy Savile and Rolf Harris as well as about organised child sexual abuse in towns such as Rotherham, Oldham and Rochdale. In 2014 Theresa May, then Home Secretary, established a non-statutory inquiry panel into the issue. The inquiry panel was replaced by a statutory public inquiry (the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, or IICSA) in 2015, after the Home Secretary told the House of Commons that the panel had lost the trust of victims and survivors. IICSA took seven years to complete, making 20 recommendations in its final report in 2022. In July 2024, Oldham Council wrote to the Home Secretary requesting a public inquiry into child sexual exploitation in the local area. In October 2024, the Minister for Safeguarding and Violence Against Women and Girls, Jess Phillips, refused Oldham Council’s request (PDF). The minister wrote that it should be for Oldham Council itself to decide to commission a local inquiry, rather than for the government to intervene. This decision became the focus of considerable parliamentary and press attention in January 2025, in part driven by comments made by the US tech CEO Elon Musk on social media. Also in January 2025, the then Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, told the House of Commons that none of IICSA’s recommendations had been implemented. The government asked Baroness Casey of Blackstock to run a “rapid audit” on gang-based exploitation and report to the government on what further work was needed. Baroness Casey reported in June 2025, recommending that the government establish both a national police operation and a national inquiry

By Devon Ziminski , Julia P Schleimer and  Meron Girma 

Community violence interventions (CVI) encompass a range of strategies aimed at reducing community firearm violence among those most affected. While CVI is an umbrella term, specific CVI approaches across the United States differ markedly in their underlying theoretical frameworks, specific program activities, and populations served. These different CVI approaches have not been well defined or uniformly understood. Given unprecedented financial support for CVI from local, state, and federal sources in recent years, increased research attention to understanding the implementation and impacts of these programs, and growing efforts by policymakers, practitioners, and community leaders to enact CVI programs, it is important to understand how CVI is defined and characterized in applied discourse (eg, among CVI practitioners, funders, and scholars). This grey literature review aimed to synthesize how CVI practitioners, funders, and scholars commonly characterize CVI approaches and how those approaches relate to previously identified CVI theoretical frameworks. Following processes similar to a scoping review, we conducted a grey literature search to locate and synthesize information from webpages (eg, from community groups and academic organizations) and (non-peer reviewed) reports from web sources discussing CVI approaches. We identified nine main CVI approaches commonly mentioned in applied CVI discourse: 1. Violence interruption/street outreach; 2. Group violence interventions (GVI)/focused deterrence/group violence reduction strategy (GVRS); 3. Hospital-based violence intervention programs (HVIP); 4. Built environment/place-based/Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED); 5. Behavioral science interventions/cognitive behavioral interventions; 6. Victim/trauma/survivor programs/resources; 7. Mentoring/fellowship programs; 8. School-based/related youth interventions; and 9. Diversion/deflection programs. These approaches operated at multiple intervention levels and drew on various theoretical frameworks. Findings from this scoping review provide a timely summary of how CVI is characterized in applied discourse, which can support the field in operating from a shared understanding of what constitutes CVI and, in turn, inform CVI research, practice, and policy-making.

Community gun violence in US cities is both rare and highly concentrated. Decades of research and practice show that shootings cluster within a very small number of people, places, and social networks. Effective violence reduction therefore requires identifying and engaging the individuals at very high risk of being involved in gun violence in the immediate future (i.e., very high-risk individuals, or VHRI).

This new brief is designed to support jurisdictions working to implement community violence intervention approaches by improving their ability to identify VHRI. The brief provides 1) a concise synthesis of the research evidence on risk for involvement in community gun violence, and 2) guidance on how to implement structured processes to identify the people driving violence within their communities.

By The Louisville Office of Violence Prevention

The Louisville Metro Gun Violence Dashboard is updated daily, providing users with real-time information regarding criminal homicides and shootings [4]. Offering a broad view of gun violence, the dashboard includes information on year-to-date trends, victim demographics, and mapping visuals that use neighborhood, council districts, ZIP codes, and police districts. Since its launch, the dashboard has received approximately 100,000 views through June 30, 2025.

By Nicholas Barnes

Over the last decade, organized criminal violence has reached unprecedented levels and has caused as much violent death globally as direct armed conflict. Nonetheless, the study of organized crime in political science remains limited because these organizations and their violence are not viewed as political. Building on recent innovations in the study of armed conflict, I argue that organized criminal violence should no longer be segregated from related forms of organized violence and incorporated within the political violence literature. While criminal organizations do not seek to replace or break away from the state, they have increasingly engaged in the politics of the state through the accumulation of the means of violence itself. Like other non-state armed groups, they have developed variously collaborative and competitive relationships with the state that have produced heightened levels of violence in many contexts and allowed these organizations to gather significant political authority. I propose a simple conceptual typology for incorporating the study of these organizations into the political violence literature and suggest several areas of future inquiry that will illuminate the relationship between violence and politics more generally.

Perspectives on Politics. 2017;15(4):967-987.

By Renato Rivera Rhon | Gabriel Funari

The Southern Cone tri-border area —comprising Ciudad del Este (Paraguay), Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil) and Puerto Iguazú (Argentina)— constitutes one of the most distinctive cross-border spaces in South America. Its particular geographical configuration combines densely populated urban areas with strategic riverine zones that facilitate intense cross-border circulation. More than 650,000 inhabitants coexist in an integrated social space marked by intense movement of people and one of the most heavily used commercial routes on the continent.

Within this environment of high mobility and commercial dynamism, smuggling has consolidated itself as the principal structuring axis of illicit economies. Since the creation of the free trade zone in Ciudad del Este in 1995, the region became a re-export centre for products destined mainly for the Brazilian market. Cigarettes, electronic products and alcoholic beverages enter Brazil as contraband, mobilized by local family clans and transnational illicit networks.

The report identifies a criminal ecosystem of coexistence characterized by interdependence, profitability and the historical continuity of illicit markets, sustained by commercial free movement, corruption and institutional fragility. Unlike other border areas in South America, the tri-border area presents high levels of criminal activity but low levels of violence, without armed disputes over territorial control or manifestations of criminal governance based on extortion or systematic coercion.

The report analyses the evolution of organized crime in the region, from the era of the “comboios” to the specialization of riverine routes and the “ant smuggling” model. It also examines the presence of the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), which has consolidated control over clandestine ports in specific sectors of the Paraná River, without exercising generalized authority over the regional population.

Beyond smuggling, the report addresses cannabis trafficking produced in Paraguay, cocaine trafficking, arms trafficking and money laundering. Ciudad del Este emerges as a strategic financial node where commercial companies, real estate businesses, gambling houses and crypto-asset operations proliferate, facilitating the movement of illicit capital. The study also finds that the Argentinian side of the tri-border area has emerged as an increasingly prevalent smuggling hub over the past five years, generating new contraband routes and new security threats in the region.

The study is based on fieldwork and direct observation conducted in Ciudad del Este, Foz do Iguaçu and Puerto Iguazú, including interviews with members and former members of security forces, customs officials, judicial officials, academics and journalists specialized in the criminal dynamics of the tri-border area.

The Southern Cone tri-border area thus reveals a highly collaborative and adaptable criminal ecosystem, where smuggling functions as a base economy connecting flows, actors and routes used for drug trafficking, arms trafficking and other illegal goods. Its persistence is explained by its relatively non-violent character, informal regulation sustained by family clans and limited state capacities in the face of complex transnational dynamics.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.. 2026. 31p.

By Nuria Sánchez , Guadalupe Blanco-Velasco , Linda M. Geven , Jaume Masip , Antonio L. Manzanero 

A comprehensive analysis of wrongful convictions in Spain was conducted. Out of 447 Supreme Court judgments made between 1996 and 2022, 243 cases involving a successful appeal made by a person claiming their innocence were examined in terms of the characteristics of wrongfully convicted individuals, the crime types, and the factors contributing to these judicial errors. An average rate of nine wrongful convictions per year was found, mostly for crimes against public safety and property, with a significant overrepresentation of foreign citizens. Legal professionals’ misconduct was identified as the main factor contributing to these wrongful convictions. The mean time between the judgment and the conviction being overturned was around 4.5 years. More than half of the cases were reopened due to evidence indicating that the alleged crime never occurred. While new evidence was the primary reason for reopening cases, only 3 % were reopened based on DNA evidence. The systematic methodology used in this research may serve as a model for future studies on wrongful convictions in other countries. To reduce wrongful convictions in Spain, several key measures must be implemented. Legal representation should be mandatory for all individuals accused of crimes, without exception. Legal professionals must receive enhanced training to minimize judicial errors. Furthermore, stricter forensic protocols should be established, and forensic experts must be properly accredited to prevent the misapplication of scientific evidence in legal proceedings. Additionally, reforms are needed to ensure that plea bargains are subject to more rigorous scrutiny, and that minor crimes are properly investigated.

Journal of Criminal Justice

Volume 103, March–April 2026,

By Vasiliki Georgoulas-Sherry & Hanna Hernandez

Collecting and analyzing data is essential for understanding and evaluating the court trends in Washington in past decades — as well as, at times, demographic differences such as disparities and disproportionalities — within the criminal justice system. Gaining insight into these trends and disparities is crucial for identifying and addressing criminal trends and systemic inequities. This issue continues to draw significant attention from a wide range of sources, including local, state, and federal agencies; advocacy organizations; policymakers; researchers; scholars; and community members. Ongoing evaluation of these trends and disparities is vital for promoting fairness, ensuring accountability, and advancing equity within the justice system. To respond to these impacts, the Criminal Justice Research & Statistics Center - the Washington Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) applied for and received the 2023 State Justice Statistics (SJS) grant from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) to assess this work. Through data from the Washington State Patrol (WSP) maintains the Computerized Criminal History (CCH), this report evaluates the court trends in the U.S. over the past 25 years, and the underlying court trends and demographic differences that impact the criminal justice system.

Olympia: Washington State Statistical Analysis Center, 2025. 46p.

By New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services Justice Lab

This report describes an analysis of racial and ethnic disparities in felony case processing in New York State at three processing points: arrests made in 2019, disposition of those arrests, and prison sentences imposed after convictions resulting from those arrests. 2019 was chosen as the benchmark because arrests made that year occurred prior to the implementation of landmark changes to the state’s bail, and evidence and information disclosure (discovery) laws. As a result, this analysis provides an overview of how the system functioned prior to those reforms and before the full impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted all facets of the state’s criminal justice system.

Albany: New York State, Division of Criminal Justice Services Justice Lab.. 2025. 22p.

By  Consumer Federation of America

Federal agencies, third parties, and other groups report on scam losses each year, but these numbers are only the tip of the iceberg in measuring the size and devastation experienced by those who are targeted. Behind these reports and big spreadsheets describing reported losses are shattered families, rent money lost, and grandmothers exploited. Newer technology is leading to a rise in these scams – in both severity and number: AI is supercharging these scams, social media platforms are enabling the spread, and data brokers facilitate targeting of victims, allowing criminals to reach consumers at massive scales while exploiting highly precise profiling to victimize vulnerable people. One of the biggest problems in fully understanding the scope of these scams is underreporting. Due to reporting fragmentation and communication, as well as the understandable devastation, embarrassment, and confusion that victims often feel, estimates on how many people report their losses to scams put it extremely low – often in the single digit percent of the actual number, according to conservative key government estimations. CFA is proud to publish this report that takes the most conservative estimate of underreporting and uses it to estimate The True Cost of Scams. While this issue is complicated to solve completely, there are significant unrealized opportunities for legislators, enforcement agencies, and industry to step up to address it.

Washington, DC: Consumer Federation of America, 2026, 31p.

By the Federal Trade Commission

Reported losses associated with financial fraud and scams have been increasing, garnering attention from law enforcement, private industry, policymakers, and the general public. In 2024, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) received 2.6 million reports of fraud and scams, including $12.5 billion in reported losses. Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) received 859,532 complaints in 2024, including $16.6 billion in reported losses (of which $13.7 billion were attributed to cyber-enabled fraud). These frauds and scams can deprive victims of their savings, deteriorate their overall financial health, and undermine public confidence in the financial system. A range of federal entities have roles in countering scams; this In Focus highlights the roles of federal law enforcement, financial regulators, and the FTC.

Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission, 2026. 3p.

By Nikos Passas, Stratos Georgoulas, Christos Kouroutzas, Dimitris Paraskevopoulos 

This paper analyzes the Tempi railway tragedy of 28 February 2023 as a case of state-corporate crime and institutional corruption rather than a mere accident, focusing on the systemic endangerment of Greece’s mass transportation system. Drawing on qualitative content analysis of official documents and media records, 76 semi-structured interviews, and ongoing participant observation, the study reconstructs how safety-critical investments and controls were undermined by corrupt practices, regulatory neglect, and austerity-driven privatization. The analysis shows how criminogenic asymmetries, dysnomie, and the normalization of deviance allowed unlawful and “lawful but awful” policies to hollow out the railways’ safety function while serving mutually reinforcing state and corporate interests. These governance failures obscured systemic risk, facilitated the misrepresentation of violations as “human error,” and weakened transparency, accountability, and effective compliance in the rail sector. By situating Tempi within a comparative framework of state-corporate crimes and transport disasters, the paper highlights the blurred boundaries between financial crime, institutional corruption, and regulatory failure in critical infrastructure. It concludes with policy and compliance recommendations aimed at strengthening structural accountability, restoring institutional integrity, and reducing systemic risk in mass transportation governance.

Journal of Illicit Trade, Financial Crime, and Compliance, vol. 1, 205.

By Yvon Dandurand and Megan Capp

This article examines the erosion of rule-based, multilateral international cooperation against illicit trade and financial crime amid declining state commitment to the rule of law. It argues that while global cooperation remains essential, a new framework and leadership are needed to respond effectively to transnational crime in an increasingly fragmented international order.

Journal of Illicit Trade, Financial Crime, and Compliance. 2026.  (653a23)

By Laura Diorella Islas Limiñana

This thesis seeks to develop a better understanding of the transnational behaviour of drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) by documenting the role that Mexican DTOs had in the cocaine trafficking to Europe after 2008. This was the year when the Italian authorities announced their discoveries that there were business interaction between the Mexican DTOs and the Italian mafia groups. At the same time the Italian authorities were announcing their findings, my literature review showed a lack of analysis and documentation regarding the transnationalization of Mexican DTOs to Europe.

While most of the literature focuses on the explanation of the cartels inside Mexico, my research question focused on clarifying whether or not the Mexican DTOs are expanding their cocaine trafficking activities to Europe. At this point I considered the reports of the Italian authorities that affirm that the Mexican DTOs are relevant drug trafficking intermediaries in the cocaine trafficking routes to Europe.

To answer my research question, and to systematically describe the evolution of DTOs, a qualitative methods approach was deployed (Mohajan, 2018) with a case study design adapted from Yin (2003). My analysis was carried out through the use of multiple triangulation techniques that helped me to collect and study different types of data to understand the subject. I collected empirical information through 28 interviews with security personnel with experience in countering Mexican DTOs or in the cocaine routes to Europe. The information gathered from the security personnel, complemented by official reports and open source information, was useful to answer my research question and test my hypothesis.

The analysis showed that despite Italian authorities’ claims and perceptions, the power of the Mexican cartels is very limited when talking about their presence and links in Europe, and resulted in four key findings. Firstly, that the perception of the Mexican DTOs as having trans-Atlantic powers is erroneous, because the evidence showed that there is no transatlantic expansion. Secondly, the analysis uncovered the internal, national and international variables that were observed to alter the evolution and behaviour of the Mexican DTOs. At the internal level, the variables included the loss of leadership and the grievances between groups. At the national level the identified variables were the democratic transitions, corruption and impunity networks. And at the international level the variables were the international drug demand, the changes in the international illicit world, the situation of governance and corruption in foreign countries and the geography of the region where the illicit business are taking place.

By: The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
This report presents an analysis of the drug markets in the European Neighbourhood Policy-East (ENP-East) countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus (1), Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It provides a top-level overview of the information available on drug production, trafficking, sale, use and harms, as well as exploring what is known about the drivers and facilitators of drug markets across the ENP-East region. It highlights drug-related threats and their potential implications for security and health. Due to its proximity as well as economic and social ties, developments in this region have potentially important implications for the EU. The analysis presented here focuses on the drug situation over the period 2018-2021, and specifically on key developments prior to the COVID-19 pandemic through to the end of 2021. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and its potentially significant implications for the drug situationare also considered, although solid information to inform the analysis is lacking. The ENP-East region comprises two geographically distinct groups of countries separated by the Black Sea and Russia (Figure 1). While there are similarities in the drug markets across these countries, their geographical location has influenced their domestic drug situations, including production, trafficking, sales and use. In the north-western part of the ENP-East region lie Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. These countries share borders with EU Member States, Russia and the Black Sea. In the south-eastern part of the region lie the Southern Caucasus countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The Southern Caucasus borders Iran, Russia, Türkiye and the Black Sea. The drug markets in the region continues to undergo significant change in terms of the production, trafficking, sale and use of illicit drugs. A key recent development has been the growth of online markets, which has been linked with the availability of a broader spectrum of drugs, particularly new psychoactive substances (NPS). Thereported emergence of new trafficking routes for heroin and cocaine through the Black Sea, with involvement of international criminal networks, is another relatively recent phenomenon that highlights the need for continuing vigilance in this area. New developments have also been noted in drug production, with synthetic drug production sites identified and dismantled in several countries in the region. In addition, there are concerns that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 may impact on drug flows and lead to increased drug-related harms, both in Ukraine and in neighbouring countries. The findings detailed in this report are based on semistructured interviews conducted between September and December 2021 with over 40 stakeholders in the six countries of the ENP-East region. Stakeholders included government representatives, law enforcement agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), researchers and international organisations. To substantiate the information that emerged from these interviews, scientific literature and other data and reports published by governmental and non-governmental entities were consulted. However, it is important to note that in general there is a lack of routinely collected and detailed information on the drug situation in the region. This highlights the importance of strengthening routine drug monitoring data systems for collecting and reporting reliable and comparable information.

By Brian Elderbroom, Peter Mayer, and Felicity Rose

Key Findings:

• Families with an immediate family member incarcerated spend an average of $4,195 annually to maintain contact and provide support; spouses/co-parents spend the most ($6,225 annually), followed by adult children ($5,470 annually).

• Families spend a total of $5.6 billion annually on commissary deposits, prison accounts, and other direct support for basic necessities and other items their family members might need.

  • Black family members spend $280 per month on direct support compared to $152 per month for white family members.

• On an annual basis, Black family members spend 2.5 times more ($8,005) than white family members ($3,251). 

  • Hispanic family members spend an average of $6,367 annually, and Native American family members spend an average of $6,464 annually.

This mixed-methods report quantifies the financial costs incurred by families when a loved one is incarcerated. Drawing on a nationally representative survey of adults with an immediate family member incarcerated for at least three months, supplemented by focus groups, the study documents both direct out-of-pocket spending and longer-term financial impacts. The central finding is that families pay large, recurring costs to maintain contact and provide for incarcerated loved ones, and they suffer persistent income losses that compound intergenerationally. The authors estimate that families collectively bear an annual financial burden of $348 billion. These costs are not distributed evenly: Black, Hispanic, Native American, and low-income families shoulder a disproportionate share, devoting more of their household resources to supporting incarcerated relatives. All in all, the findings highlight the far-reaching consequences of incarceration on family financial stability and intergenerational economic opportunities.