Public Report on Chicago Police Training on the Use of Force

From the introduction; This Report from community representatives of Chicago’s Use of Force Community Working Group offers our feedback on the Chicago Police Department’s (CPD) training on de-escalation and the use of force. The Working Group was first convened in the summer of 2020 in response to the requirements of the federal civil rights Consent Decree designed to bring an end to the CPD’s pattern of police brutality and racial discrimination. Over the course of two years, the Working Group persuaded the CPD to make transformative changes to its policies governing police use of force. 1 Last fall, we issued a Public Report on CPD’s new policies, including areas still in need of change. 2 The new policies, if implemented and enforced on the ground, have the potential to dramatically reduce unnecessary CPD violence and improve public safety.

Second Report of the Community Representatives of Chicago’s Use of Force Working Group. 2023March 2023. 24p.

By : Lex Stevens, Winifred Agnew-Pauley, Matthew Bacon, Helen Glasspoole-Bird, Nadine Hendrie, Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes, Charlie Lloyd, Mark Monaghan, Rivka Smith, Charlie Sutton 

This article explores how discretion is managed and exercised across senior, middle, and street levels of policing. It uses qualitative data from two studies in England. The first, a study across three police force areas, involved interviews and focus groups with 221 people who were designers, deliverers, and recipients of police-led drug diversion. The second study used 354 hours of ethnographic observation and 21 interviews to examine stop-and-search practices in one other police force. Rather than a simply expanding scope of discretion at lower levels of the hierarchy, the findings reveal a multi-level process of cascading constraints and subsidiary discretion. At each level, we observe the exercise of occupational professionalism and autonomous judgement, but higher-level constraints shape how discretion is applied in pursuit of organizational professionalism.

By Murat C. Mungan. J. Shahar Dillbary

We consider a framework which brings together losses arising from rent-dissipation and the workhorse model of law enforcement. Governmental actors engage in a contest to share the proceeds from the enforcement of the law through monetary fines, which leads to rent-dissipation. This causes monetary sanctions to be costly, rendering the model used for studying nonmonetary sanctions a better fit for their analysis. The effect of rent-dissipation on optimal sanctions is directly related to the sanction elasticity of offenses measured at the classic optimum (i.e., where the expected sanction equals the direct harm from the offense). When offenses are inelastic, the optimal sanction is smaller than the classic optimum and it is decreasing in the degree of rent-dissipation; and a legislator who does not fully internalize contest costs chooses an overly-punitive sanction which is smaller than the classic optimum. The opposite results are obtained when offenses are elastic. We discuss implications and extensions.

By Daniel C.K. Chow

Multinational companies (MNCs) with valuable trademarks in China seek criminal enforcement against counterfeiting because other available avenues of relief, such as administrative and judicial remedies, have proven to be ineffective. While MNCs prefer enforcement through China’s Police, the Public Security Bureau (PSB), many MNCs are unaware of the significant hidden dangers of using the PSB.Most MNCs will delegate enforcement of trademark rights to their Chinese subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are known to make illegal payments to the PSB that may violate the laws of the PRC as well as the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). These acts expose MNCs to draconian penalties under PRC law and the FCPA. MNCs can be unaware of these illegal practices because many MNCs organize their business structures and intellectual property (IP) management strategies in ways that shield MNCs from reviewing some of the on-the-ground actions by their Chinese subsidiaries. This Article exposes these risks, explains how some of these risks arise, and makes suggestions on how MNCs can structure their business organizations and IP management structures in China to eliminate or mitigate these risks. *

By William Downs

Who handles complaints against the police?

A member of the public can make a complaint if they are dissatisfied with the police. 

There are three crucial actors in the police complaints system:

• Professional standards departments (PSDs) are specialist teams based within every police force in England and Wales. They are responsible for handling most complaints for their force.

• The Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) is an independent body that oversees the police complaints system. It also conducts independent investigations into some of the most serious police complaints and conduct matters.

• Local policing bodies (either the police and crime commissioner or the deputy mayor for policing and crime, depending on the area) are responsible for monitoring their force’s complaint handling and conducting some complaint reviews.

By Cornelius Friesendorf

For post-conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding efforts to have a chance of success, security gaps need to be closed. Domestic law enforcement agencies tend to be too weak or unreliable after war to enforce the law and fight serious crime. As a consequence, operations against organised crime, the arrest of suspected war criminals and the protection of minorities depend on international intervention forces. Much attention has been paid to domestic police reform and the problems of deploying international civilian police. This book examines the under-explored role of international military missions in post-conflict law enforcement, with a focus on serious crime. The military is under pressure to fill security gaps. Yet military involvement in crime-fighting is problematic practically (soldiers are generally not trained and equipped for it), politically (crime-fighting is seen as military mission creep) and normatively (it undermines the delineation of military and policing functions). Military support of law enforcement poses a major dilemma in peace operations. Decision-makers continue to struggle with this dilemma in an ad-hoc fashion, while scholars have so far provided few empirical accounts. This book focuses on post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo. It argues that the pros of military involvement in law enforcement outweigh the cons, given the continuing lack of strong police forces, the criminalised nature of contemporary wars and the negative influence of spoilers onstabilisation and peacebuilding efforts. Military support of the fight against serious crime is not sufficient for these efforts to succeed, but it is necessary. This book has three objectives. It describes the role of NATO and EU military missions in law enforcement in BiH and Kosovo from the 1990s through early 2009, thus filling an empirical knowledge gap. By formulating a strategy for military involvement in law enforcement, the book also makes a normative contribution to the debate on peace operations. Drawing on, among other sources, interviews in these two ‘international protectorates’, the book shows that military support of the fight against serious crime has lacked effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy, examples of success notwithstanding. Third, the book adds conceptual value to the debate on peace operations, by drawing on security governance, Security Sector Reform and Security Sector Governance. These concepts help to understand the military role in post-conflict law enforcement and to guide improved efforts.

Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) , 2010. 207p.