By M. D. Vattel. Introduction by Graeme R. Newman

A foundational work of international law, still resonant today.

First published in the eighteenth century and issued in authoritative English editions throughout the nineteenth, The Law of Nations by Emer de Vattel shaped how statesmen, jurists, and diplomats understood the rights and duties of sovereign powers. In this monumental treatise, Vattel applies the principles of natural law to the real conduct of nations, addressing war and peace, treaties and alliances, commerce and neutrality, diplomacy, and the limits of lawful power.

Rejecting both utopian idealism and brute realpolitik, Vattel argues that true national interest is inseparable from justice, restraint, and respect for sovereignty. Nations, like individuals, are bound by moral obligations arising from their coexistence in a shared international society. His careful analysis of war, intervention, and treaty obligations established enduring standards that influenced constitutional debates, foreign policy doctrine, and the development of modern international law.

This edition preserves a work that continues to illuminate contemporary conflicts and global challenges. Clear-eyed, systematic, and profoundly influential, The Law of Nations remains essential reading for anyone seeking to understand how lawful order, moral principle, and power intersect in the affairs of nations.

The theses advanced in The Law of Nations remain strikingly relevant to contemporary international disputes, particularly those involving intervention, recognition of governments, and claims of humanitarian necessity. Vattel’s insistence on sovereignty as the cornerstone of international order places clear limits on the legitimacy of external interference in the internal affairs of states. While he allows that extreme cases—such as manifest tyranny threatening the very existence of a people—may raise difficult moral questions, he consistently warns that powerful states are prone to disguise ambition and interest under the language of justice.

This caution is especially pertinent when considering recent controversies surrounding efforts by the United States to promote regime change in Venezuela, including diplomatic, economic, and political measures aimed at displacing the government of Nicolás Maduro. From a Vattelian perspective, such actions raise fundamental questions about lawful authority, the limits of collective judgment, and the distinction between moral condemnation and legal right. Vattel argues that no nation may unilaterally assume the role of judge over another sovereign without undermining the mutual independence on which international society depends. To do so, he suggests, risks converting international law into a mere instrument of power.

At the same time, Vattel’s framework does not deny the reality of gross misrule or humanitarian suffering. Rather, it demands rigorous scrutiny of motives and means. Economic coercion, diplomatic isolation, and recognition of alternative authorities would, in his analysis, need to be justified not by ideological preference or strategic advantage, but by clear evidence that such measures genuinely serve the common good of nations and do not erode the general security of the international system. His emphasis on proportionality, necessity, and respect for established sovereignty stands in tension with modern practices of intervention that rely on contested doctrines of legitimacy.

Viewed through this lens, contemporary debates over Venezuela illustrate the enduring force of Vattel’s central warning: that the stability of international relations depends less on the moral claims of individual powers than on shared restraint. His work reminds modern readers that the erosion of sovereignty in one case—however rhetorically justified—sets precedents that may ultimately weaken the legal protections upon which all nations, strong and weak alike, rely.

P.H. Nicklitn etc. Philadelphia. 1829. Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026 p.424.

The Blackstone Commentaries on Criminal Law are part of Sir William Blackstone's influential 18th-century work, Commentaries on the Laws of England. This comprehensive treatise, published between 1765 and 1769, is divided into four volumes. The fourth volume, "Of Public Wrongs," focuses on criminal law. The other volumes are "Of the Rights of Persons," "Of the Rights of Things," and "Of Private Wrongs. "”

In "Of Public Wrongs," Blackstone provides a detailed examination of the criminal laws of England, aiming to demonstrate their justice and mercy. Despite the severe penalties of the time, later known as the "Bloody Code," Blackstone's work sought to rationalize and justify the legal system's approach to crime and punishment.

The Commentaries were groundbreaking for their readability and accessibility, making complex legal principles understandable to a broader audience. They played a significant role in the development of both British and American legal systems and continue to be referenced in legal education and court decision

Edited by Murdoch Watney

The chapters in this volume focus on the future of law and related disciplines: human rights and access to medical care, corruption and money laundering in state procurement, counterfeit medical products, IPR waiver on COVID-19 vaccines, emergency powers, freedom of expression, prison healthcare, the impact on labour law, access to courts and digital court processes, access to education and the impact on insurance law are but a few possible topics which are addressed.

Johannesburg, UJ Press, 2022. 288p.

By Fred Butcher, Amanda B. Cissner, and Michael Rempel

  Mandatory minimum sentencing laws gained traction in the late 1970s and early 1980s amidst rising crime rates, a “tough-on-crime” push, and punitive enforcement related to the “War on Drugs.”. Under mandatory minimums, individuals receive a stipulated amount of prison time, with no accounting for the circumstances of the offense or the characteristics of the person charged. As minimums typically flow from the charge and a person’s criminal history, they confer outsized power on prosecutors; in plea negotiations, prosecutors can wield the threat of a higher charge with a minimum for someone hesitant to accept a plea. Judges also lose discretion, and defense attorneys lose opportunities to present mitigating circumstances. In 1984, the federal Sentencing Reform Act established the U.S. Sentencing Commission, requiring that federal courts impose sentences within a range specified by the Commission and eliminating parole for federal charges. Many states took their cue from federal efforts, introducing minimum sentences and restricting the ability of parole boards to reduce sentences through good-time or earned-time credits. Proponents viewed sentencing guidelines (including mandatory prison) as a limit on judicial discretion and a means to eliminate disparities in sentencing. They touted the idea of “truth in-sentencing”—giving people charged, crime survivors, and the public an accurate idea of how much time those sentenced would actually serve. Minimums also arose in response to the perception—ginned up at the time and since debunked—that the more rehabilitative approach of the 1960s had failed to tamp down crime rates and recidivism. Recent decades, however, have seen mandatory minimums fall into disrepute. Several decades of harsh sentencing policies contributed to the astronomical growth of the U.S. prison population, which peaked at 1.6 million people held on an average day in 2009, a total which omits about 750,000 additional people held in local jails that year. The rapid consolidation of mass incarceration over these decades did not increase safety; evidence points instead to a modest increase in recidivism among individuals subject to custodial sanctions. Similarly, mandatory minimums and other sentencing laws passed in the 1970s and 1980s increased (and here more than modestly) persistent racial disparities in the criminal legal system. Black Americans today continue to be disproportionately represented in prison populations and are more likely to be charged with offenses subject to mandatory minimums—leading to longer sentences—than white Americans.8 According to the most recent analysis by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, among those detained in prisons nationwide, there were nearly identical Black and white populations (34% vs. 32%). Considering their representation in the general population, Black people are imprisoned at a rate five times greater than white people. Over the past two decades, numerous states, including New York, have weakened or eliminated mandatory minimum sentencing laws.10 Many of these reforms focused on eliminating minimums that apply primarily to drug offenses. This narrow focus has neglected much of the imprisoned population, as drug offenders make up a small percentage of those in prison. In 2022, the Vera Institute of Justice estimated just over half of New York’s approximately 300,000 prison sentences were the result of mandatory minimum sentencing laws. Declaring the laws “morally and fiscally unsustainable,” the organization called for their abolition.

New York: Center for Justice Innovation. 2022, 31pg