By William J. Sabol and Thaddeus L. Jjohnson

Although significant gaps remain, disparities between Black and White people continued to narrow at nearly every stage of the criminal justice process between 2016 and 2020. In some cases, the pace of the decline slowed; in others, the disparity gap closed entirely.

These trends extend patterns from 2000 to 2016 that were identified in CCJ's first report on correctional control by race and sex. Subsequent reports will explore trends in disparity among female populations and by ethnicity, assess trends in multiple states, and seek to identify what, if any, policy changes may have contributed to reductions in racial disparities.

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2022. 36p.

By Guyora Binder,and Ekow Yankah

The widely applauded conviction of officer Derek Chauvin for the murder of George Floyd employed the widely criticized felony murder rule. Should we use felony murder as a tool to check discriminatory and violent policing? The authors object that felony murder—although perhaps the only murder charge available for this killing under Minnesota law—understated Chauvin’s culpability and thereby inadequately denounced his crime. They show that further opportunities to prosecute police for felony murder are quite limited. Further, a substantial minority of states impose felony murder liability for any death proximately caused by a felony, even if the actual killer was a police officer, not an “agent” of the felony. In these “proximate cause” jurisdictions, felony murder is far more often used to prosecute the (often Black) targets of police violence, than to prosecute culpable police.

Previous scholarship on prosecution of felons for killings by police criticized such proximate cause rules as departures from the “agency” rules required by precedent. But today’s proximate cause felony murder rules were enacted legislatively during the War on Crime and are thus immune to this traditional argument. The authors instead offer a racial justice critique of proximate cause felony murder rules as discriminatory in effect, and as unjustly shifting blame for reckless policing onto its victims. Noting racially disparate patterns of charging felony murder, and particularly in cases where police have killed, the authors call on legislatures to reimpose “agency” limits on felony murder as a prophylactic against discrimination. Finally, the authors widen this racial justice critique to encompass felony murder as a whole, urging legislatures to abolish felony murder wherever racially disparate patterns of charging can be demonstrated.

17 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 157 (2022).

By The ACLU of Northern California

California was once the nation’s leader in public defense. Long before the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the state must provide a lawyer to poor people charged with crimes, many counties in California already did so. Yet today, after years of neglect by the state, California is in the midst of a decades-long public defense crisis. A main cause is the reliance on “flat-fee” contracts with for-profit private attorneys and firms, where lawyers are paid a set amount for a limitless number of cases. These agreements lock attorneys and their clients in a financial conflict of interest where the lawyers’ fees are pitted against quality, zealous representation for those accused of crimes. Flat-fee systems have a well-documented history of providing worse representation and fueling mass incarceration and California has been called out, decade after decade, for allowing them to flourish.

This report examines the actual contracts California counties use and finds that they are woefully deficient in providing necessary resources to private contractors in order for them to adequately represent their clients, they uniformly fail to limit the number of cases attorneys can handle at once, and they provide little to not oversight or supervision for the lawyers who defend people when their lives are on the line. We synthesize the decades of research from within the state and around the country that show these systems should be eliminated and recommend that California finally do just that

San Francisco: ACLU of Northern California, 2025. 27p.

By David Spencer

New guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council for judges and magistrates to follow when sentencing offenders are both significant and controversial. The Imposition of community and custodial sentences guideline, due to come into effect on the 1st April 2025, sets out the considerations for judges and magistrates when sentencing an offender who has been found or pleaded guilty in the criminal courts. The Imposition of community and custodial sentences guideline instructs courts to request and consider, prior to sentencing, a pre-sentence report before forming an opinion about sentencing. Pre-sentence reports enable the court to have as much information as possible about the offender, including the risk they pose to the public, before passing sentence. Judges and magistrates are instructed that they need not order a pre-sentence report only if they consider it unnecessary. The new guideline requires that from the 1st April 2025 a presentence report will “normally be required” when sentencing offenders from one of a whole host of different and specified groups – while some groups are included, others are excluded. In particular, those within the cohort where a pre-sentence report will “normally be required” include individuals who are from an ethnic, faith or cultural minority group. While there is nothing specifically preventing a court requesting a pre-sentence report for other offenders, those who are white or male will not, unless they can fit themselves into one of the other groupings available, qualify under the criteria that “a pre-sentence report will normally be considered necessary”. The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Rt Hon Shabana Mahmood MP, has made clear that she does not agree with the new Imposition guideline and, given the Sentencing Council have refused to withdraw it, she is willing to legislate to prevent “two-tier justice”. On the 28th March 2025 the Lord Chancellor said: “I have been clear in my view that these guidelines represent differential treatment, under which someone’s outcomes may be influenced by their race, culture or religion. This is unacceptable, and I formally set out my objections to this in a letter to the Sentencing Council last week. I am extremely disappointed by the Council’s response. All options are on the table and I will legislate if necessary.” The Lord Chancellor is right. There must be no two-tier justice – which the new guideline represents – and the government should legislate without delay to correct the Sentencing Council’s error. In conversation with the authors at Policy Exchange, the Rt Hon Jack Straw – the former Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice who created the Sentencing Council – has expressed his strong support for Rt Hon Shabana Mahmood MP. He said: “I strongly support the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Shabana Mahmood MP, in the position she is taking relating to the new Imposition Guideline that the Sentencing Council have published. It is clear that the Government will need to take steps to correct the error. Given the crossparty support for this to be resolved, as shown by the position of the Shadow Secretary of State, Robert Jenrick, I hope that this can be done quickly.” Pre-sentence reports, typically written by a probation officer, are key to judges and magistrates deciding whether to sentence an offender to prison or to a non-custodial community order – particularly in borderline cases. As a result, deciding which defendants are to be included in the cohorts where a pre-sentence report will “normally be required”, and which don’t, can be key in deciding who goes to prison and who doesn’t. The Sentencing Council, which produced the new guideline, is an independent non-departmental body that is sponsored by the Ministry of Justice. The Labour government, under Prime Minister the Rt Hon Gordon Brown, created the Sentencing Council through section 118 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The Council commenced operations in April 2010. The framework for the creation of sentencing guidelines evolved during the period of Labour in office between 1997 – 2010. Two bodies associated with the production of guidelines for the sentencing of offenders – the Sentencing Advisory Panel and Sentencing Guidelines Council – were created (and subsequently abolished). We outline the history of this period in chapter 2 of this report. The Sentencing Council is responsible for the preparation of sentencing guidelines for judges and magistrates to follow when sentencing offenders. Section 120 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 specifies that the Sentencing Council must prepare: “(a) sentencing guidelines about the discharge of a court’s duty under section 73 of the Sentencing Code (reduction in sentences for guilty pleas), and (b) sentencing guidelines about the application of any rule of law as to the totality of sentences” and may prepare sentencing guidelines about any other matter. We outline how the Sentencing Council is required to operate, under statute, in chapter 3 of this report. The membership of the Council is made up of both judicial and non-judicial members. Eight members of the Council are appointed by the Lord Chief Justice with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor (“judicial members”) and six members are appointed by the Lord Chancellor with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice (“non-judicial members”). We outline the current membership of the Sentencing Council, how members (continued_

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 43p.

Angela R. Riley & Sarah Glenn Thompson

The Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees no individual will be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. But, pursuant to the dualsovereignty doctrine, multiple prosecutions for offenses stemming from the same conduct do not violate the Clause if the offenses charged arise under the laws of separate sovereigns, even if the laws are otherwise identical. The doctrine applies to tribal prosecutions, but its impact in Indian country is rarely studied. Such an inquiry is overdue, particularly as the scope of crimes potentially subject to dual tribal and federal prosecutions has broadened in recent years. This Article is the first to undertake a preliminary examination of the dual-sovereignty doctrine in the tribal–federal context and describe the complex interplay between the doctrine and the rest of the criminal law fabric in Indian country. Perhaps most significantly, it includes an original typology highlighting when a defendant may be subject to the doctrine, which sovereigns have the authority to prosecute, pursuant to what source of power each sovereign operates, and when and how the sequence of prosecutions matters, if at all. This leads to the Article’s central thesis: Indian tribes are separate sovereigns with inherent sovereignty, and, under current conditions, the dual-sovereignty doctrine plays a central role in ensuring safety in Indian country. The doctrine’s application in Indian country, however, creates unique complexities that may threaten tribal sovereignty and raise issues of unfairness for defendants. This Article offers numerous reforms—some highly ambitious and others more modest—to address these issues.

122 Colum. L. Rev. 1899 (2022).

By Hayli Millar, Megan Capp, Raelyn O’Hara

Bail law reform has become a highly politicized issue in Canada, reflecting polarizing demands to both lessen and increase restrictions in granting bail. While some scholarly literature assesses and critiques bail and remand law and processes, there is exceptionally limited gender-disaggregated data and research on adult women’s bail and remand experiences.1 When assessing women’s interactions with the criminal justice system (CJS), most scholarly research and government publications speak about women’s unique offence patterns and gendered pathways to criminalization and then jump to assessing women’s imprisonment experiences, largely excluding any consideration of women’s pre-trial and trial experiences. In 2023-2024, we gathered and assessed the available literature on women and bail and women and remand in Canada. We engaged with primary data in the form of government-published statistics, select case law and secondary research, reviewing more than 250 sources including some comparative international research. With this literature review, we present our key findings. The annotated bibliography below captures some of what we know about women’s bail and remand experiences within the Canadian context. Our contribution builds on the work we have previously done through the International Center for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR) on the rights of criminal justice-involved parents, especially women and their children. In brief, the 31 annotations focus attention on the urgent need for primary research on how seemingly neutral bail laws and practices uniquely impact women, especially due to intersecting identities such as race, parenthood, and other social factors. Our contribution is crucial and timely. In Canada, the national remand rate for women now surpasses that of men, with women making up over 75% of provincial and territorial custody admissions in 2022/2023. Our literature review and the annotations illustrate the importance of not only addressing the social determinants of women’s criminal justice involvement but also investing in more effective community-based alternatives for women, with a focus on mental health and substance use services. This is of particular importance when one considers the mainly non-violent offences that women commit and that many justiceinvolved women have complex, overlapping, and unmet social, economic, parenting, and physical and mental health needs, which are often compounded by trauma.

Vancouver, BC: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy , 2025. 59p.

By David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, Catherine M. Grosso, Michael Laurence, Jeffrey A. Fagan, and Richard Newell

The Eighth Amendment’s “narrowing” requirement for capital punishment eligibility has challenged states since it was recognized in Furman v. Georgia in 1972. This article examines whether California’s death penalty scheme complies with this requirement by empirically analyzing 27,453 California convictions for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter with offense dates between January 1978 and June 2002. Using a 1,900-case sample, we examine whether California’s death penalty statute fails to comply with the Eighth Amendment’s narrowing test. Our findings support two conclusions. First, the death-eligibility rate among California homicide cases is the highest in the nation during that period and in the ensuing decade. We find that 95 percent of all first-degree murder convictions and 59 percent of all second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter convictions were death eligible under California’s 2008 statute. Second, a death sentence is imposed in only a small fraction of the death-eligible cases. The California death sentencing rate of 4.3 percent among all death-eligible cases is among the lowest in the nation and over two-thirds lower than the death-sentencing rate in pre-Furman Georgia.

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Volume 16, Issue 4, 693–730, December 2019

By Jennifer Mason McAward

This largest-ever study of adjudicated violations of Brady v. Maryland provides a detailed and nuanced understanding of who suppresses material evidence in criminal cases, why, how, where, and how often. Its findings complicate the conventional wisdom that Brady violations are the work of nefarious prosecutors who intentionally withhold material evidence from criminal defendants. While it is true that bad faith permeates this area of constitutional non-compliance, a substantial minority of Brady cases stem from good faith errors and suppression by law enforcement officers. Most Brady violations occur in a small number of states, and most often state courts provide relief. And while there is not quantitative evidence of an epidemic, the individual effects of Brady violations are severe. On average, a defendant whose Brady rights are violated spends more time in prison than a defendant who is later exonerated. When government officials routinely violate a clearly established constitutional right like Brady with such negative consequences, the time is ripe for evidence-based interventions to enhance constitutional compliance. The insights from this study point to a new range of strategies. For example, focusing on preventing good faith Brady errors, especially in non-homicide cases, may be substantially more productive than focusing on punishing bad faith Brady violationsa tactic that has proven to be frustratingly unsuccessful. Relatedly, working with law enforcement officers to better identify and submit potential Brady evidence to prosecutors may create a smoother pipeline for the eventual production of material evidence to defendants. Ultimately, by providing unprecedented detail about historical Brady violations, this study will serve the cause of future overall Brady compliance.

Vanderbilt Law Review (forthcoming April 2025), 67p.

By Jonathan Gu

Between 2016 and 2023, the number of young people aged 10 to 13 years found guilty of an offence fell markedly. This paper examines if this decline and other trends can be explained by the 2016 High Court of Australia decision (RP v R (‘RP’)), which clarified the application of doli incapax. We examine trends in: (1) the volume of court appearances for 10-13 year olds, (2) whether these court appearances resulted in a proven offence, (3) for proven matters, the severity of the penalty, (4) the extent to which prosecutors withdrew all charges, and (5) the extent of guilty pleas. METHOD We analyse NSW and national data on outcomes from Children’s Court cases involving 10-17 year olds, finalised between 2010 and 2023. Using these data, we investigate whether and why the five outcomes have changed over time for 10-13 year olds. Possibilities examined include: the RP decision; trends in the nature of the offence children have been accused of; the increased use of specialist Magistrates in the NSW Children’s Court; and demographics of defendants. RESULTS There is little evidence to suggest that the RP decision had any impact on the volume of court appearances involving a 10-13 year old. However, among 10-13 year olds that NSW Police proceeded against to court, there has been a dramatic decline in the proportion with a proven court outcome; the percent proven fell from 76% in the 2015-16 financial year to 16% in 2022- 23, which temporally coincides with the RP decision. Among the proven matters, the RP decision had no clear impact on the penalty imposed. The decrease in the proportion of proven charges cannot be explained by changes in the types of offences committed by 10-13 year olds (i.e., they are not increasingly committing types of crimes that are harder to prosecute), nor by specialist Magistrates, or the demographic characteristics of individuals proceeded against. The drop in proven matters is, however, linked with prosecutors increasingly withdrawing all charges (growing from 12% to 53% from 2015-16 to 2022-23) and 10-13 year olds pleading guilty less frequently (falling from 54% to 14% from 2015-16 to 2022-23). Similar shifts occurred in Victoria and South Australia. CONCLUSION By stipulating what is required to rebut doli incapax, the 2016 High Court of Australia’s decision RP v R likely reduced the number of young people aged 10-13 found guilty of a criminal offence. 

(Crime and Justice Bulletin No. 268). 

Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 2025. 38p.

By HM Prison and Probation Service and Ministry of Justice (UK)

Why should the Criminal Justice System be concerned with the mental health of those passing through the system? We know that rates of mental ill-health are high among those who pass through the CJS. Around a third of people11 who find themselves in police custody have some form of mental health difficulty, as do 48 per cent of men and 70 percent of women in prison. Some 38 per cent: of people on probation supervision are recorded as having a mental health issue. But why does this matter? First, because people with a mental illness need and deserve treatment. Entry into the CJS can provide a second chance for people who have been missed by other services to access that treatment and an incentive for them to take up that offer. Second, because mental illness and the symptoms associated with it can trigger criminal behaviour and therefore bring a person into contact with the CJS. Decisions then need to be made on whether a criminal charge is in the public interest or whether an alternative disposal (such as diversion into mental health treatment) would be more appropriate. Third, mental illness, particularly the more severe forms, can affect an individual’s ability to understand and participate in the criminal justice process. They may need additional support to understand the questions put to them during an investigation or at trial or they may lack the mental capacity to plead or stand trial. Fourth, the criminal justice process itself, for example the experience of custody, can have a severe and negative impact on someone’s mental health, particularly if they are already suffering a mental illness. In these circumstances, there is a duty of care to try to mitigate these wherever possible. This includes a duty to reduce the risks of suicide and self-harm, which we know to be high in criminal justice populations. For all these reasons, it is essential that those with a mental health condition or disorder are identified as early as possible in their journey through the CJS, particularly where that problem is severe. Once the mental health issue is identified, information relevant to that issue must be shared between agencies so that appropriate support and treatment can be offered, and the right decisions made at each step of the journey from arrest to sentence and post-sentence supervision in custody or in the community. This inspection, the first on this topic to involve all of the criminal justice inspectorates, and to consider post-sentence supervision, as well as the period leading up to trial, focuses on these critical issues: • Are people with a mental illness identified when they first come into the CJS? • Is this information passed on through the rest of the system from the police and defence lawyers to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the courts or from the courts to the probation and prison services so that the right decisions can be made about next steps? • Are people with a mental illness entering the CJS being properly assessed and then referred for help or treatment where this is identified as necessary? • What is the quality of support they are getting? Is it timely and adequately resourced or are people having to wait many months to get it? • Are the most seriously mentally ill people being looked after in appropriate settings and places of safety, or is custody still having to be used?

Manchester, UK: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation November 2021 117p.

By Saba Kassa

Politics matters for the success of anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts. This report discusses the political and governance factors that affect the performance of the justice system in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery. It also provides guidance on assessing these factors systematically with the goal of developing adaptive strategies to strengthen the justice chain in line with changing contexts. The Assessment and Monitoring Framework presented here is a state-of-the-art methodology to think and work politically to strengthen rule of law systems. It draws on the experience and insights of ICAR staff working with anti-corruption institutions across the globe. It responds to a gap in the existing toolbox of anti-corruption practitioners, given that existing political economy methodologies have not sufficiently focused on the contextual factors that impinge on the performance effectiveness of the different anti-corruption institutions constituting the justice chain.

Working Paper 52,

Basel, SWIT: Basel Institute on Governance, 2024. 24p.

By Jonathan Fisher

. At its most simple, the disclosure of unused material is the process whereby information gathered during an investigation is passed from the prosecution to the defence. The information disclosed should assist the defence in arguing the most compelling version of their case. The obligation placed upon the prosecution to disclose certain pertinent material acts as an essential safeguard. We have learnt through bitter experience that disclosure errors, whether deliberate or through negligence, can lead to cases collapsing or worse, a miscarriage of justice. Such events are lamentable and erode the public’s trust in the criminal justice system.. When in the autumn of 1981 I started practice at the Bar, my Opinions, Advices and Pleadings were written in manuscript or dictated into a hand-held tape-recording machine. They were then typed by a professional typist, using an Imperial typewriter with carbon paper to produce a copy. Similarly, most business records were kept on paper and retained manually in files. Rules regarding disclosure of unused material generated in a criminal investigation were governed by the innate fairness of the common law which required a prosecutor to pass information to a defendant where the material assisted the defence case.. Fifteen years later, it was recognised that a more sophisticated approach to disclosure was required. This followed a series of cases in which failure to disclose information to a defendant was responsible for some grievous miscarriages of justice. At the same time, reliance on documentary evidence and expert witness testimony increased. When the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA)1 was enacted, the new statutory based rules of disclosure were regarded as state of the art, providing a sound foundation for criminal trials to proceed on a sure footing in the new millennium. Since then, the technological revolution has brought radical changes in work practices, and the position now looks rather different. Nearly 30 years have passed since the CPIA was enacted. At that time, internet connections were typically made via dial-up modems, with downloading speeds sufficient for basic web browsing and email, but little more. As technology improved and information could be stored electronically, the volume of unused material generated in a criminal investigation grew exponentially. This development occurred against a background in which the CPIA did not directly address the way in which digital information should be reviewed by a prosecutor and made available to a defendant when the test for disclosure of unused material was satisfied. Concern regarding the operation of this process is the reason why previous Reviews were established. Yet the world has not stood still since the last Independent Review on this subject over a decade ago. Indeed, society in the United Kingdom continues to embrace technological advancements, including artificial intelligence, in many aspects of our lives. Furthermore, the very nature of criminal offending, as it has done throughout history, continues to evolve, taking advantage of new online enablers. The rise in digital material across the whole gamut of criminal cases, and its implications for the disclosure regime, is the very reason why I was tasked to consider, once again, whether the regime is fit for the modern age. Today, the largest investigation case on the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) system has 48 million documents (6.5 terabytes of data). With this volume of digital material, it is inconceivable that the totality of unused material generated in the investigation can be accurately reviewed and scheduled by investigating officers manually, in the traditional way. It is also a gross waste of resource for investigating officers to spend time on banal and unproductive activity. Electronic material has become commonplace in even the smallest of cases. Body camera material features (or should feature) in every case where a motorist is stopped by the police, and it is estimated that on average there are 7.4 digital devices in every home. Each of these devices can retain thousands of pieces of information which might be relevant to a prosecutor or defendant in a criminal case.

London: Home Office, 2025. 224p.

By Oscar Solórzano

This Working Paper explores the wide variety of non-conviction based (NCB) forfeiture laws in Latin America, with a special focus on the region’s predominant model, Extinción de dominio.

It argues that NCB forfeiture legislation, which allows for the recovery of stolen assets outside of criminal proceedings, can contribute significantly to a state’s criminal policy response to rampant economic and organised crime.

The paper emphasises the importance of critically reviewing and harmonising domestic practices of NCB forfeiture around emerging standards, so that they can reach their large potential in asset recovery. Ensuring their alignment with international human rights and other recognised norms and procedural rules ultimately builds trust, lends legitimacy and fosters judicial cooperation in international NCB forfeiture cases.

Working paper 54.

Basel, SWIT: Basel Institute on Governance, 2024. 61p.

By The Maryland Equitable Justice Collaborative

  This report outlines 18 recommendations to address the urgent need for criminal justice reform and reduce racial disparities in Maryland’s prisons and jails. Developed through over a year of research, analysis, and collaboration with experts, service providers, and impacted community members, these recommendations provide clear steps for change. The report summarizes key research, data, and proposed actions to help reduce the overrepresentation of Black people in its criminal legal system.

Maryland’s criminal legal system has decreased in size by almost every measure.  Arrest rate, jail population, prison population, and the number of people on parole and probation2 are all on the decline3 and below the national average. However, these gains obscure a troubling reality: racial disparities within the system remain stark and, in some instances, have worsened.5 Maryland's Black population, which constitutes only 30% of the State's residents, represents a disproportionate segment of those entangled in the criminal legal system. Alarmingly, Black people account for 51% of arrests,6 59% of the jail population,7 71% of the prison population,8 71% of the parole population,9 and 53% of the probation population.10 This persistent racial injustice highlights the urgent need for reform within the system to address these inequities. About MEJC -  MEJC is a joint initiative led by the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) and the Maryland Office of the Public Defender (MOPD) to address the racial disparities in the incarceration of Black people in Maryland prisons and jails. MEJC’s existence is a recognition that Maryland’s decarceration efforts have not reduced the glaring racial disparities in our criminal legal system and that we must abandon the outdated notion that they will. MEJC’s recommendations also acknowledge that the current criminal legal system produces inequitable results for Black people and, without radical change, will continue to do so at alarming rates. Therefore, MEJC has taken a clear-eyed look at current policies, informed by historical and systemic injustices, which directly contribute to the disproportionate outcomes and harm to Black people in Maryland’s criminal legal system. The data and statistical findings in this first annual report reveal much more than numbers; they represent real lives impacted by a system that too often fails our children; disproportionately punishes Black people and other communities of color; and neglects basic human dignity in our prisons and jails. In this report, MEJC, in partnership with policy experts, educators, and community voices, presents clear, urgent recommendations that could reverse these inequities. This is a pivotal moment for Maryland’s criminal legal system. MEJC presents the opportunity to confront these unfair outcomes head-on and build a system that reflects Maryland’s highest values of fairness, community, and opportunity. RECOMMENDATIONS In recognition of the all-encompassing nature of racial disparities in our criminal legal system, MEJC’s recommendations address comprehensive aspects of an impacted person’s experience, from how and why a person first encounters law enforcement to how the system supports or does not support a person’s journey back from incarceration. All recommendations are rooted in data and evidence that clearly demonstrate (1) the inefficiencies or inadequacies of our current policies, (2) the disparate outcomes for Black people because of the status quo, and (3) the efficacy of the recommended solutions.    

Baltimore: Office of the Maryland Attorney General, 2025. 111p.

By Lindsay Bing, Rebecca Goldstein , Helen Ho , Devah Pager, and Bruce Western

  US courts regularly assess fines, fees, and costs against criminal defendants. Courtrelated debt can cause continuing court involvement and incarceration, not because of new crimes, but because of unpaid financial obligations. We conducted an experiment with 606 people found guilty of misdemeanors in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Study participants were randomly selected to receive relief from all current and prior fines and fees assessed for criminal charges in the county. Fee relief reduced jail bookings 21 mo after randomization and the effect persisted over 44 mo of follow-up. Although fee relief reduced incarceration, financial sanctions had no effect on indicators of lawbreaking. Instead, the control group (who obtained no relief from fines and fees) were rearrested at significantly higher rates because of open arrest warrants for nonpayment. These results indicate the long-term and criminalizing effects of legal debt, supporting claims that financial sanctions disproportionately harm low-income defendants while contributing little to public safety

PNAS 2024 Vol. 121 No. 51 e2415066121 

by Jens Ludwig and Sendhil Mullainathan

Algorithms (in some form) are already widely used in the criminal justice system. We draw lessons from this experience for what is to come for the rest of society as machine learning diffuses. We find economists and other social scientists have a key role to play in shaping the impact of algorithms, in part through improving the tools used to build them.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES VOL. 35, NO. 4, FALL 2021, 26p.

by Will Dobbie and Crystal S. Yang

In this article, we review a growing empirical literature on the effectiveness and fairness of the US pretrial system and discuss its policy implications. Despite the importance of this stage of the criminal legal process, researchers have only recently begun to explore how the pretrial system balances individual rights and public interests. We describe the empirical challenges that have prevented progress in this area and how recent work has made use of new data sources and quasi-experimental approaches to credibly estimate both the individual harms (such as loss of employment or government assistance) and public benefits (such as preventing non-appearance at court and new crimes) of cash bail and pretrial detention. These new data and approaches show that the current pretrial system imposes substantial short- and long-term economic harms on detained defendants in terms of lost earnings and government assistance, while providing little in the way of decreased criminal activity for the public interest. Non-appearances at court do significantly decrease for detained defendants, but the magnitudes cannot justify the economic harms to individuals observed in the data. A second set of studies shows that that the costs of cash bail and pretrial detention are disproportionately borne by Black and Hispanic individuals, giving rise to large and unfair racial differences in cash bail and detention that cannot be explained by underlying differences in pretrial misconduct risk. We then turn to policy implications and describe areas of future work that would enable a deeper understanding of what drives these undesirable outcomes.

Journal of Economic Perspectives 35 (4): 49–70. 2021.

By Jay Gormley, Gabrielle Watson, Gavin Dingwall, Jade Mouton, Jonathan Bild and Julian Roberts

Firearms offences are statistically rare yet in light of their potential for harm cause considerable public concern. The offences vary greatly in terms of their nature and possible sentences. As a result, the sentencing exercise is often complex. Courts must weigh the harm caused, intended, or which was reasonably foreseeable, as well as the culpability of the individual offender. Quantifying the harm caused can be particularly challenging where a firearms offence does not have an identifiable victim as firearms offences are inherently potentially harmful. An additional complexity arises in a small number of serious gun crimes which carry a mandatory minimum sentence. When sentencing these offences, the court must also consider whether exceptional circumstances may justify the imposition of a sentence which falls below the statutory minimum. This report examines research and sentencing guidance relating to firearms offences. These offences include a range of crimes varying in seriousness, although most create a risk of serious harm or death. We conducted a literature review of the social and socio-legal databases to uncover relevant publications for the period 2000-2024. As will be seen, most of the scholarship in the area focuses on restricting access to firearms rather than punishing offenders convicted of firearms offences. Within the more restricted domain of sentencing, the majority of publications address mandatory sentencing as a response to gun crime. Most Western nations have introduced mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for the more serious forms of gun crime. The project also conducted a review of the public opinion literature to seek any research exploring public knowledge of, and attitudes towards, sentencing for firearms offences. Understanding public opinion is recognised as a relevant consideration by sentencing commissions and councils around the world. 3. With respect to guidance, England and Wales is the only relevant comparator jurisdiction. While gun crime is a near-universal problem, differences in the definition of offences – and laws around gun ownership – makes it inappropriate to compare sentencing guidance or trends with the United States. Canada, Australia and New Zealand are more comparable countries, but none of these operate formal sentencing guidelines. Many of the firearms offences in Scotland also exist in England and Wales and stem from the same UK legislation. In addition, courts in England and Wales and Scotland also employ sentencing guidelines. These follow a similar step by step approach (albeit with important differences). For these reasons, we restrict our comparisons to England and Wales. Contents of the Volume Chapter 1 Firearms Offences: This chapter identifies the offences under consideration, including statistics on the prevalence of the offences, and summarises the current legal framework for sentencing these offences. Chapter 2 Firearms Offenders and Associated Offences: This chapter explores the connection between firearms offences and other violent crime. It addresses the way that the assessment of risk interacts with sentencing for firearms offences and the indicators of further or more serious offending (such as homicide). Finally, it discusses the background of offenders and the intersection between minority ethnic backgrounds and sentencing for firearms offences. Chapter 3 Sentencing Guidance for Firearms Offences: This chapter reviews the principles and purposes of the sentencing of firearms offences and also discusses the sentencing guidelines for firearms offences issued by the Sentencing Council for England and Wales. Chapter 4 Research on Sentencing Responses to Firearms Offences: The final chapter summarises findings from research on the sentencing of firearms offences. The chapter also discusses the limited research exploring public attitudes to sentencing offenders convicted of firearms offences.

Edinburgh: Scottish Sentencing Council, 2025. 65p.

Chairman, Rt. Hon. David Gauke

This review of sentencing is tasked with a comprehensive re-evaluation of the sentencing framework in England and Wales, to ensure we are never again in a position where the country has more prisoners than prison places. This report – Part 1 of the Independent Sentencing Review’s conclusions – outlines the prison population challenge in figures, provides an explanation of why and how we got here, and advocates for an approach rooted in all statutory principles of sentencing and public service reform. Chapter one of this report examines trends in custody and the capacity pressures faced by HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS), which have brought the system dangerously close to collapse. At the end of 2024, over 85,000 individuals were held in the adult prison estate; these numbers undeniably exceed the population the system is designed to accommodate. The total prison population has grown by over 40,000 people since 1993, with adults sentenced for indictable offences now serving longer sentences. England and Wales also have one of the highest prison population rates in Western Europe. The probation service is similarly stretched: by September 2024, 240,497 individuals were under probation supervision, over 100,000 more than in 1993. Prison demand is expected to grow by an average of 3,000 people a year– the equivalent of building two large prisons per year. Without further government action, the prison population could reach up to 112,300 prisoners by November 2032.8 Chapter two summarises the drivers behind the increase in the use and length of custody. It concludes that the increase in the prison and probation population is not the consequence of a considered strategy as the most effective measure to reduce crime. Nor can it be explained by rising crime levels. In fact, latest estimates from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) showed there has been an overall general decline in incidents of headline crime since 2017. The increase has been the result of many decisions made by successive governments and a “tough on crime” narrative that has focused primarily on punishment – understood as incarceration and longer sentences – on occasion responding to embedded misunderstandings about sentencing and high-profile individual cases. In tandem, there has been an underinvestment in probation and other alternatives that can provide rehabilitation and reduce reoffending. Chapter three outlines the need for change, and advocates for a system rooted in all the current statutory principles of sentencing. The emphasis on longer-term imprisonment has placed significant strain on the system, forcing successive governments to adopt costly and high-risk emergency measures. These have attempted to both increase short-term capacity (often in ways which are expensive and risky) and reduce demand by expediting the release of prisoners, such as the measures we saw in the autumn of 2024 when prisoners were released 40 per cent (as opposed to 50 per cent) of the way through their sentence. This incoherent approach also comes at a fiscal cost: new prison programmes are estimated to cost between £9.4 billion and £10.1 billion.10 The piecemeal and unstrategic manner in which sentence lengths have increased in recent decades has meant that there has been insufficient consideration of all of the statutory aims of sentencing: punishment, crime reduction, reform and rehabilitation, public protection and reparation. Punishment is an important aim for the criminal justice system and prison plays a vital role in delivering punishment. But too often decision making has been based on an approach that punishment is all that matters, and that the only form of punishment that counts is imprisonment.

Rather than approach sentencing policy based on the evidence of what is likely to be most effective in reducing crime and reducing reoffending, too often the knee-jerk response has been to increase sentence lengths as a demonstration of government action.

London: Miniarey od Juarixw2025. 65p.

By  Julian Adler, Jethro Antoine, Kush R. Varshney

It is hard to know where we stand in the timeline of AI implementation in the criminal legal space. Part of the challenge is that the criminal legal “system” is in reality a multiverse of federal, state, and local jurisdictions.[1] More problematic still is the sheer ubiquity of AI and related technologies. “I think the most important thing people don't know is that tech is now working at mega scale,” observes Eric Schmidt, the former chairman and CEO of Google, cautioning—via the title of a recent Oscar-winning film—that tech is “everything everywhere all at once.”[2] What we do know is that AI is already in use in the criminal legal realm and, given the human propensity to reach for technological solutions to social problems, its further adoption is almost certainly unstoppable.[3] So how best to navigate the current moment of AI implementation? “We need a clear line in the sand: ‘these use-cases are OK, these are not,’” urges Sara Friedman of The Council of State Governments Justice Center. “The criminal legal system deprives people of their liberty. It shouldn’t be using AI to do this. There is a line when you are responsible for people’s lives; there are things you shouldn’t do.” 

New York: Center for Court Innovation, 2025. 9p.