By Joseph Lelliott

Previous research by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and others has shown that trafficking in persons could not occur on a large scale without the aid of corruption. Corruption facilitates all stages of trafficking, from the initial recruitment of victims through to situations of exploitation themselves. It also hinders effective investigation, prosecution, and punishment of perpetrators and allows traffickers to operate with impunity.

This report, developed through the partnership between ASEAN-Australia Counter Trafficking and UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, examines how trafficking in persons and corruption legislation in ASEAN Member States (AMS) criminalises corruption as a facilitator of trafficking. It aims to identify current linkages between trafficking in persons and corruption in the criminal provisions of AMS legislation and highlights potential ways for provisions to be applied in practice to punish corruption that facilitates trafficking.

Trafficking in persons is of major concern throughout Southeast Asia, including in the ten ASEAN Member States. Evidence strongly indicates that various types of exploitation are widespread in the region. Previous research by UNODC and others has shown that trafficking in persons could not occur on a large scale without the aid of corruption. Corruption facilities all stages of trafficking, from the initial recruitment of victims through to situations of exploitation themselves. It also hinders the effective investigation, prosecution, and punishment of perpetrators and allows traffickers to operate with impunity. This report examines how trafficking in persons and corruption legislation in ASEAN Member States criminalizes corruption as a facilitator of trafficking. It has two aims: 1. To identify current linkages between trafficking in persons and corruption in the criminalization provisions of ASEAN Member States’ legislation. 2. To highlight how trafficking and corruption criminalization provisions can be applied in practice to punish corruption that facilitates trafficking.

Bangkok, Thailand: United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 2025. 142p.

By The Human Rights Watch

Investigates the Saudi public investment fund and its use to consolidate economic and political power under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

The Human Rights Watch, November 20, 2024, 95 pp.

By Marija Risteska and. Ljupka Trajanovska

This analytical report presents findings from the conducted comparative analysis of the existing national legislation, international legal framework and semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Recommendations contained in this report pertain to regulation of sexual extortion as a form of corruption in the Criminal Code, Law on Prevention of Corruption and Conflict of Interests and in the Law on Prevention and Protection of Women from Violence and Domestic Violence. Incrimination of sexual extortion in the national legislation would make North Macedonia among the few countries in the OSCE region to have legislatively recognized and institutionalized gendered forms of corruption, leading to reducing its impact on women.

Prague: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2021. 60p.

By Alex Papadovassilakis, et al.

One year ago, in the early hours of January 15, 2024, Bernardo Arévalo was sworn in as president of Guatemala. His inauguration marked the culmination of a historic upset, in which Arévalo – a rank outsider campaigning on a promise to root out high-level graft – bested a series of candidates linked to elite corruption networks attempting to tighten their grip on the state. Arévalo and his party, the Seed Movement (Movimiento Semilla), then survived a wave of legal attacks that sought to prevent the president-elect from even taking office. Having accomplished his improbable rise to the presidency, Arévalo has spent his first year in power pursuing the paradoxical task of advancing an anti-corruption agenda in a country where corruption is the norm. Guatemala’s institutions have long been infiltrated by corrupt actors seeking to plunder state funds for personal gain and further illicit schemes, while the justice system has long responded to the interests of elites seeking to shield themselves from prosecution for these transgressions. Arévalo took on this mission with only limited tools at his disposal. The president inherited a compromised set of ministries and executive agencies, responsible for administering billions of dollars in public funds. His inexperienced party, Semilla, founded in July 2017 and thrust into power for the first time, remains a minority force in a Congress dominated by old guard lawmakers. And the administration is reckoning with a hollowed-out justice system that has shown far more interest in persecuting Arévalo and Semilla than investigating high level corruption and organized crime. Faced with these restraints, the Arévalo administration has neither been able to develop a coherent plan for tackling corruption nor succeed in enacting tangible anti-graft reforms. The government has also dedicated valuable time and resources to repelling controversial legal attacks from prosecutors linked to the elite networks that oppose Arévalo’s reformist platform. Within this highly unstable environment, InSight Crime embarked on an investigation aimed at evaluating the main roadblocks to implementing an anti-corruption agenda in the current political climate in Guatemala. We have focused on resistance presented by corruption networks embedded in key branches of the state.

Insight Crime, 2025. 7p,

By Raoul Farrar

This report details current migration and human-smuggling dynamics in the extreme south of Algeria. The study assesses how Algerian authorities manage migration flows and human smuggling along the borders with Niger and Mali. The report comprises three sections: The first offers a brief history of the evolution of migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Algeria, and migrants’ experiences there. The second details the practicalities of human smuggling (strategies, prices, modus operandi and routes) in Algeria’s borderlands with northern Mali and northern Niger (Bordj Badji Mokhtar, Timiaouine, Tinzaouatine, In Guezzam). The third section assesses how the Algerian authorities address irregular migration, scrutinizing recent policy developments, including the 2015 repatriation deal between Algeria and Niger and its effects. The study concludes with a number of policy recommendations on how Algeria can better cope with irregular migration in the future.

Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2020. 60p.

By Bryan L. Sykes, Meghan Ballard, Andrea Giuffre, Rebecca Goodsell, Daniela Kaiser, Vicente Celestino Mata, Justin Sola

Research on punishment and inequality finds that people with criminal records routinely avoid systems of surveillance. Yet scholarship on monetary sanctions shows that many people experiencing poverty with criminal legal system debt are also involved with the state in other domains of social life. How can these literatures be resolved? In this article, we posit that past research can be reconciled through a focus on financial double-dealing—disparate and contradictory economic entanglements that redistribute welfare resources from individuals to the criminal legal system and its institutional affiliates. Drawing on nationally representative survey data, as well as unique data collected on people with monetary sanctions in seven states, we find that individuals and families receiving cash and noncash public assistance are significantly more likely to owe monetary sanctions and are less likely to pay them. We discuss the implications of multiple-system involvement for ongoing surveillance.

RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences January 2022, 8 (1) 148-178