By Alex Papadovassilakis, et al.

One year ago, in the early hours of January 15, 2024, Bernardo Arévalo was sworn in as president of Guatemala. His inauguration marked the culmination of a historic upset, in which Arévalo – a rank outsider campaigning on a promise to root out high-level graft – bested a series of candidates linked to elite corruption networks attempting to tighten their grip on the state. Arévalo and his party, the Seed Movement (Movimiento Semilla), then survived a wave of legal attacks that sought to prevent the president-elect from even taking office. Having accomplished his improbable rise to the presidency, Arévalo has spent his first year in power pursuing the paradoxical task of advancing an anti-corruption agenda in a country where corruption is the norm. Guatemala’s institutions have long been infiltrated by corrupt actors seeking to plunder state funds for personal gain and further illicit schemes, while the justice system has long responded to the interests of elites seeking to shield themselves from prosecution for these transgressions. Arévalo took on this mission with only limited tools at his disposal. The president inherited a compromised set of ministries and executive agencies, responsible for administering billions of dollars in public funds. His inexperienced party, Semilla, founded in July 2017 and thrust into power for the first time, remains a minority force in a Congress dominated by old guard lawmakers. And the administration is reckoning with a hollowed-out justice system that has shown far more interest in persecuting Arévalo and Semilla than investigating high level corruption and organized crime. Faced with these restraints, the Arévalo administration has neither been able to develop a coherent plan for tackling corruption nor succeed in enacting tangible anti-graft reforms. The government has also dedicated valuable time and resources to repelling controversial legal attacks from prosecutors linked to the elite networks that oppose Arévalo’s reformist platform. Within this highly unstable environment, InSight Crime embarked on an investigation aimed at evaluating the main roadblocks to implementing an anti-corruption agenda in the current political climate in Guatemala. We have focused on resistance presented by corruption networks embedded in key branches of the state.

Insight Crime, 2025. 7p,

By Raoul Farrar

This report details current migration and human-smuggling dynamics in the extreme south of Algeria. The study assesses how Algerian authorities manage migration flows and human smuggling along the borders with Niger and Mali. The report comprises three sections: The first offers a brief history of the evolution of migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Algeria, and migrants’ experiences there. The second details the practicalities of human smuggling (strategies, prices, modus operandi and routes) in Algeria’s borderlands with northern Mali and northern Niger (Bordj Badji Mokhtar, Timiaouine, Tinzaouatine, In Guezzam). The third section assesses how the Algerian authorities address irregular migration, scrutinizing recent policy developments, including the 2015 repatriation deal between Algeria and Niger and its effects. The study concludes with a number of policy recommendations on how Algeria can better cope with irregular migration in the future.

Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2020. 60p.

By Bryan L. Sykes, Meghan Ballard, Andrea Giuffre, Rebecca Goodsell, Daniela Kaiser, Vicente Celestino Mata, Justin Sola

Research on punishment and inequality finds that people with criminal records routinely avoid systems of surveillance. Yet scholarship on monetary sanctions shows that many people experiencing poverty with criminal legal system debt are also involved with the state in other domains of social life. How can these literatures be resolved? In this article, we posit that past research can be reconciled through a focus on financial double-dealing—disparate and contradictory economic entanglements that redistribute welfare resources from individuals to the criminal legal system and its institutional affiliates. Drawing on nationally representative survey data, as well as unique data collected on people with monetary sanctions in seven states, we find that individuals and families receiving cash and noncash public assistance are significantly more likely to owe monetary sanctions and are less likely to pay them. We discuss the implications of multiple-system involvement for ongoing surveillance.

RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences January 2022, 8 (1) 148-178