By Baroness Bertin

The Independent Pornography Review is an assessment of the legislation, regulation and enforcement of pornography. The review provides recommendations for government, regulatory bodies, and the sector to ensure that harmful impacts of pornography are addressed.

London: Department for Science, Innovation and Technology2025. 215p.

By Amnesty International

Based on 112 interviews – including with 51 children – Amnesty International examined the impact of gang violence on children in Haiti. Abuses and violations documented in eight communes of the West Department included: recruitment and use of children, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and killings and injuries. The impact of the violence on children with disabilities was also documented. The report shows how gangs exploit children in desperate conditions including to run deliveries, gather information, and do domestic chores. Girls as young as 14 spoke of how multiple gang members raped them during attacks on neighbourhoods or after abductions. Researchers documented cases of children who lost limbs and sustained other catastrophic injuries due to stray bullets or from being targeted. Child protection actors said they need significantly more resources to address the situation. The Haitian government must immediately step up efforts to address this assault on childhood, including through mobilizing international assistance. Donors and the humanitarian community must ensure that funding and technical expertise are made available to support Haitian authorities, including in developing a comprehensive child protection plan. Community-based initiatives are needed to start an effective reintegration process for children associated with the gangs. Crucial services such as education and psycho-social support are at the heart of ensuring rehabilitation for the victims  

London: Amnesty International, 2025. 68p.

Edited by  Nick Lowles

The far right poses its biggest political threat in Britain since World War Two. At the ballot box, on the streets and online, the far right – in all its guises – is increasingly confident, assertive and growing. With Donald Trump returning to the Presidency of the United States and Elon Musk, the world’s richest man, financially and ideologically supporting the British far right, we can only assume that the threat will grow in 2025. REFORM UK Britain faces a genuine far-right political threat for the first time in our history, in the form of Reform UK: Reform UK received 4.2m votes in the 2024 general election, a 14.3% vote share Support for Reform UK has continued to grow since the election and now regularly tops opinion polls The party currently has 218,000 members and, with an influx of money and experienced political campaigners, is becoming an increasingly professional outfit RIOTS 2024 saw the worst race riots in 100 years, following the murder of three young girls in Southport by 18-year-old Axel Rudakubana: Violence broke out in 18 towns and cities across England While activists from known far-right organisations were involved in the trouble, most incidents emerged from localised, post-organisational far-right networks The riots were fuelled by disinformation and the widely reported claim across the entire far right that the authorities were covering up the Islamist motives of the attacker. Despite Axel Rudakubana not being a Muslim, much of the far right still refer to him as such HOPE not hate identified the man behind the Southport Wake Up Telegram group, which played a central role in stirring up the violence. He was recently imprisoned for seven years TOMMY ROBINSON Former EDL leader Stephen Lennon, better known as Tommy Robinson, continues to be the most influential far-right activist outside Reform: Lennon held a demonstration of 30,000 to 40,000 people in London in July, the largest far-right protest ever Lennon has acquired more than one million followers on X, and his tweets on the day of the big demonstration were seen by 58m people He was imprisoned for 18 months in late October for contempt of court He received support from Elon Musk, including funding RADICAL RIGHT ECOSYSTEM Fuelling the British far right is a growing, increasingly confident and well-resourced radical-right ecosystem, which spans traditional media, new media and a burgeoning number of individual actors: GB News is increasingly the mouthpiece for Reform UK A growing number of radical-right activists are leaving platforms like GB News to establish their own media outlets, backed by donations and subscriptions from supporters Academic-turned-activist Matt Goodwin is playing an increasingly important role in supporting Reform, backed by a Substack with more than 70,000 followers TERRORISM Far-right terrorism continues to pose a major threat in the UK: Twenty-three people who were far-right sympathisers were convicted under terrorist legislation A new violent cult called 764, closely linked to the nazi Satanist group Order of Nine Angles, is active in Britain A growing number of extremely violent young men are becoming increasing ideologically fluid, drawing inspiration from a diverse array of extremes in order to justify their thoughts and acts of violence. The Southport killer Axel Rudakubana is a case in point DEMOCRACY The public continue to be downbeat about the state of democracy and politics in the UK: 40% of Britons in a poll of 23,000 support a “strong and decisive leader who has the authority to override or ignore parliament” over a representative parliamentary democracy 68% do not believe that politicians listen to people like them, with just 9% believing they do The more pessimistic people are about their own lives, the more likely they are to support Reform UK, to believe multiculturalism is failing, and to oppose immigration    

London: Hope Not Hate, 2025. 140p.

By  Anne Marie Munene, Christine Harris, Deborah Rest, Etracy Rukwava, Goldie Joseph, Hadnet Tesfom Habtemariam and Kaffy Kazep.

  Over the past decade, Women for Refugee Women’s (WRW) groundbreaking research on women in immigration detention has shown that the majority of asylum-seeking women detained are survivors of rape and other forms of gender-based violence, including domestic violence, forced marriage and sexual exploitation. Locking up women who have already survived serious violence and abuse retraumatises them, causing profound and long lasting damage to their mental health. Since WRW started campaigning on this issue there have been important changes to women’s detention, including a huge reduction in the numbers detained: from over 300 women at any one time in 2014, to around 100 women now. Yet despite this progress, for women who continue to be locked up, the harms of detention remain. New research we have carried out has found that despite the Home Office banning practices through which male detention centre staff see women in intimate situations, these practices nonetheless continue. In mid-2016 the Home Executive Summary Office banned male staff from carrying out ‘constant supervision’ of women deemed at risk of suicide – yet in our survey of 40 women, 71% of respondents subject to ‘constant supervision’ since the ban came in told us they us had been watched by male staff. This means they will have been watched by men in situations including while in bed, on the toilet, in the shower or getting dressed. Survey respondents who told us they had been subject to constant supervision by male staff included women detained as recently as 2024. Since coming to power in July 2024 the Labour Government has made welcome commitments to prioritise survivors of gender-based violence and make sure they receive the support they need. We urge the Government to ensure that asylum seeking survivors are included in these commitments by taking the practical and achievable step of ending women’s immigration detention, and setting up a new   

London: Women for Refugee Women, 2025. 23p.

By Stephanie Leutert and Caitlyn Yates

In recent years, hundreds of thousands of migrants have sought asylum annually along the U.S.-Mexico border—either by arriving at ports of entry or by turning themselves in to Border Patrol agents. In response, U.S. authorities have enacted a range of policies, which have oscillated between channeling asylum seekers into specific legal pathways and either partially or fully blocking their access to the U.S. immigration system. During each shift, migrants have reacted in varying ways, such as by creating asylum waitlists or encampments along the border. In November 2018, the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas at Austin began publishing quarterly reports on asylum processing at ports of entry. As of January 20, 2025, there is no longer any asylum processing at the border. On this day, President Donald Trump assumed office for a second term and immediately halted all asylum processing—including both at and between ports of entry. This shift left hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers in limbo across Mexico, without any path to make an asylum claim in the United States. Simultaneously, the Mexican federal government has also increased its immigration enforcement at its borders and across the country’s interior. Specifically, it has expanded the number of migration-focused checkpoints on highways heading north, deployed more soldiers to the U.S.-Mexico border, and bussed apprehended migrants to cities in southern Mexico. The Trump Administration’s elimination of foreign assistance has also hurt Mexican civil society organizations, with some migrant shelters struggling to provide food and other basic resources. This February 2025 asylum processing update focuses on current U.S. asylum policies at ports of entry and migrants’ experiences in Mexican border cities. It draws on phone and WhatsApp interviews with Mexican government officials and members of civil society organizations on both sides of the border from February 17, 2025 through February 24, 2025. It also relies on local news articles to fill in any gaps.

Austin, TX: The Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law, 2025. 14p.

By Suleman Lazarus, Mina Chiang, and Mark Button

This study examines how cybercriminals exploit deceptive recruitment tactics and digital platforms to entrap and exploit victims in human trafficking withinthe cybercrime context. It employs Migration and Transnationalism perspec-tives to elucidate the intersection of human trafficking and cybercrime opera-tions in Cambodia. Using thematic analysis of victim testimonies, we identify six main themes: (1) Deception and Recruitment, (2) Manipulation and Control,(3) Exploitation and Forced Labor, (4) Trading and Movement, (5) ScammingMethods, and (6) Escape and Rescue. While the following analysis explores thevictim’s first-hand experiences within these themes, it also reflects the accounts of other victims referenced in his story. Human traffickers enticed victims with fraudulent job offers and misleading promises, compelling them to pay significant recruitment fees. After recruitment, they manipulated vic-tims through tactics such as visa deception and bribery at immigration to ensure compliance and control. They subjected victims to harsh working conditions, enforcing extended hours, unrealistic targets, and physical punish-ments for underperformance. Strict security measures and trading between companies and compounds further complicated escape efforts. Criminal Strained victims to forge identities and exploit targets via social media, effec-tively turning them into online fraudsters. However, some managed to escape with assistance from NGOs, highlighting the vital role of organizational sup-port in rescue operations. We highlight the need for targeted interventions and support for victims of such complex cybercrime enterprises.tions

Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner OHCHR 2023).

By Amnesty International

This briefing presents Amnesty International’s findings and observations from a week-long research trip to Tijuana, Mexico, in February 2025, whose purpose was to document the human rights impacts of changes to US migration and asylum policies since President Trump took office on 20 January 2025.1 In particular, it focuses on the end of applying for asylum at the US-Mexico border and the situation of asylum seekers in Mexico. This briefing does not provide detailed information about mass immigration arrests and detentions in the United States, nor an analysis of the discriminatory impacts of these measures. The cumulative effects and harms of the Trump administration’s punitive and discriminatory immigration and asylum measures are the subject of Amnesty International’s ongoing monitoring and analysis of the situation in the United States. During the trip to Tijuana, Amnesty International interviewed people seeking safety, met with legal, humanitarian and social service providers, local and international organizations, and visited shelters and spaces where migrants and asylum seekers are staying. The organization spoke with two Mexican men who had recently been deported from the United States to Mexico, as well as with 35 people seeking safety (almost half of whom were women) from Belarus, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Russia and Venezuela. Amnesty International interviewed local and international organizations operating in Tijuana including Al Otro Lado (AOL), Asylum Access México and Haitian Bridge Alliance. The organization also visited and spoke with those running migrant shelters, including Borderline Crisis Center, Casa de los Migrantes, Casa de los Pobres, El Rubi, Jardin de las Mariposas and Villa Haitiana. The interviews with Spanish-language speakers were conducted in Spanish, while interviews with non-Spanish speakers were conducted in English with interpretation assistance from staff of local organizations and other people seeking safety. Amnesty International requested meetings with the San Diego offices of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE declined the meeting request and CBP did not respond. The organization’s request to visit the Otay Mesa Detention Center in San Diego was denied. Various individuals and organizations spoke to Amnesty International on the condition of anonymity. Their names have not been included in this report.  

London: Amnesty International, 2025. 24p.

By Fiona Robertson, Hui Yin Chuah, Abdullah Mohammadi, and Jennifer Vallentine

  Migration within and towards Southeast Asia is a dynamic, mixed and enduring phenomenon influenced by historical, socio-cultural, economic, and geopolitical factors. From the Mekong region to movements between Indonesia and Malaysia, these migration practices are rooted in the region’s history and continue to evolve today.11 Significant events such as the large-scale displacement during the 1950s–70s Vietnam War, persistent systemic persecution of Rohingya, and the recent conflicts in Myanmar have accentuated the complexity of mixed migration in the region. Uneven economic development across Southeast Asia has further fuelled migration, attracting workers from lower-income countries to larger economies that offer greater opportunities. Additionally, climate change and environmental disasters have increasingly influenced migration patterns in the region.22 Combined, these factors contribute to both regular and irregular migration patterns, with porous borders and limited access to regular pathways exacerbating the prevalence of irregular migration. Bangladesh, one of world’s largest migrant sending countries, accounting for 7.4 million migrants living abroad as of 20203 and host to 989,585 Rohingya refugees as of July 2024, faces economic pressures and protracted displacement that drive many individuals towards irregular migration. The route from Bangladesh to Malaysia, particularly via boat across the Bay of Bengal, is a prominent irregular migration pathway. Similarly, Indonesia is a major migrant-sending country, especially of migrant workers, with 4.6 million migrants globally as of 2020.5 The Indonesia-Malaysia migration corridor, which 55 per cent of Indonesian migrants travelled in 2017, is characterised by a high degree of irregularity, with nearly half lacking legal status.6 Malaysia and Thailand, known for their relative economic and political stability, comparatively welldeveloped economies and established diaspora communities, are key destination countries in Southeast Asia. However, they face distinct challenges related to irregular migration. Economic opportunities, especially in low-skilled sectors, attract migrants from neighbouring countries across porous borders, making both countries host to large populations of migrants in irregular situations. As of 2017, the World Bank estimated that Malaysia hosts approximately 1.23–1.46 million migrant workers who are in irregular situations, predominantly from Bangladesh and Indonesia.7 Malaysia also hosts 190,370 registered refugees and asylum seekers, 88 percent of whom are from Myanmar.8 Thailand, which hosts 4.9 million migrants, serves as a primary destination for migrant workers from neighbouring Southeast Asian countries and a transit and destination point for asylum seekers and refugees.9 As of 2018, Thailand hosted approximately 811,437 migrant workers in irregular situations from Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, and Viet Nam,10 in addition to 86,539 refugees, including about 5,500 urban refugees, as of November 2024.11 Both Malaysia and Thailand are central to understanding the dynamics of irregular migration and the effectiveness of policies aimed at promoting safe and regular migration pathways. However, while there are estimates of the number of migrants in irregular situations across Southeast Asia, the often-covert nature of irregular migration makes accurate and timely estimations of its scale challenging. Despite their significant presence and contributions to the labour force and host societies, migrants in irregular situations face precarious conditions, including the constant threat of arrests, detention, and deportation due to their irregular status, as well as lack of access to education, healthcare, formal livelihoods, and sustainable housing. Additionally, those taking irregular pathways often encounter various protection risks along their journeys, including extortion, sexual and physical abuse, and trafficking in persons. Addressing the issue of irregular migration requires a multifaceted approach that recognises the diverse backgrounds and experiences of people on the move and addressing the motivations and drivers that compel individuals to undertake irregular journeys. A common narrative suggests that the lack of information about regular and safe migration pathways is a significant driver of irregular migration.12 This information gap, coupled with the lack of awareness of the risks associated with irregular journeys and limited accessible regular pathways, often compel many individuals to opt for irregular routes.13 In response, policy and programming initiatives have increasingly turned to information-dissemination and awareness-raising campaigns to mitigate irregular migration, as well as people smuggling and trafficking in persons. For example, between 2015 and 2019, European Union (EU) member states invested more than 23 million euros in 104 information and awarenessraising campaigns with the aim of reducing irregular migration towards Europe.14 In Bangladesh, the EU contributed 15.9 million euros to the five-year Prottasha project and a further 20 million euros in 2023 to Prottasha II15 which aims to promote sustainable reintegration and safe migration. The project includes awareness-raising about safe migration and the risks of migrating through irregular channels as a key component.16 In 2023, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the EU launched a series of audio-visual products as part of the ASEAN Safe and Fair Migration Campaign, aimed at better protection of migrant workers in Southeast Asia.17 In fact, the focus on information dissemination is not new; it was highlighted as one of the key strategies in a 2012 United Nations (UN) background paper on good practices in preventing people smuggling.18 However, despite the increase in policies and programming surrounding information dissemination on migration, there remains a challenge in assessing their effectiveness in preventing and reducing the risks associated with irregular migration. Under the mandate of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (Bali Process), the 2023 Adelaide Strategy for Cooperation (the Strategy) recognises ‘Irregular Migration’ and ‘Public Information Campaigns’ as two key cooperation areas across the Bali Process structure. The Strategy welcomes initiatives that build the preparedness of Bali Process Member States to respond to irregular migration and calls for support to ‘members to develop and implement effective public information campaigns, raise public awareness and promote digital literacy, including among youth, to reduce irregular migration and promote safe and legal migration’.19 As key origin, transit, and destination points across the Bali Process region, the four selected Bali Process Member States—Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand—provide valuable contextual insights for the purpose of this assessment. Against this background, this assessment aims to provide evidence-based insights and actionable policy recommendations on the information needs and perceptions surrounding irregular migration in key Bali Process Member States in South and Southeast Asia. It will identify the nuanced information needs of people on the move, assess their perceptions and motivations, and evaluate the role of information in migration decision-making, facilitating the design of information campaigns targeted at changing behaviours of persons at risk of irregular migration. Additionally, the assessment will examine interventions designed to bridge information gaps behind irregular migration.   

Bangkok:  Regional Support Office of the Bali Process ; Geneva: Mixed Migration Centre, 2025. 67p.

By Aase Villadsen, Nicolás Libuy, Emla Fitzsimons 

This project examined whether adverse childhood experiences (ACEs), positive childhood experiences (PCEs) and the levels of violent crime in children’s neighbourhoods are associated with children’s involvement in violence. Previous research suggests that ACEs are associated with involvement in violence, while PCEs are associated with decreased risk of involvement in crime and violence. There is some evidence that the relationship between ACEs, PCEs and involvement in violence is affected by the amount of violent crime in the local area. This study explored whether these factors are associated with three violence outcomes, measured at ages 14 and 17: assault perpetration, the carrying or using of a weapon and gang involvement. It primarily used data on around 14,000 children from the Millennium Cohort Study (MCS), a study that is tracking a cohort of children born around the millennium. It also used police-recorded crime data to understand the amount of violent crime in the local area. The ACEs examined by this study were: having a single parent; experiencing parental breakup; domestic violence; verbal abuse; physical abuse; parental alcohol abuse; parental drug use; parental mental health issues; poor parental relationships; poor parent-child relationship; and, having a parent with a long-term disability/illness. The list of PCEs included: having low-risk peers; positive peer experiences; good school connectedness; positive teacher-child relationships; participation in activities and hobbies; living in a safe neighbourhood; and feeling safe in the playground. Key findings : A higher number of adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) is associated with an increased risk of children engaging in violence. Having two or more ACEs compared to none increased the risk of assault perpetration by 19%, weapon involvement by 57% and gang involvement by 61%. Having six or more ACEs increased the risk of assault perpetration by 45%, weapon involvement by 150% and gang involvement by 154%. The combination of ACEs associated with the highest risk included parental drug use, single parenthood, domestic violence, physical abuse and long-term parental disability or illness. A higher number of positive childhood experiences (PCEs) is associated with a decreased risk of children engaging in violence. Having three to four PCEs compared to zero to two PCEs reduced the risk of assault perpetration by 12%, weapon involvement by 33% and gang involvement by 28%. Having six to seven PCEs reduced the risk of assault perpetration by 35%, weapon involvement by 66% and gang involvement by 59%. The combination of PCEs associated with the lowest risk included low-risk peers, good school connectedness, positive teacher-child relationship and positive peer experiences. The link between ACEs and violence was reduced when children also had a high number of PCEs. Having high numbers of PCEs partially offset the risks associated with ACEs. Children who had both a high number of ACEs and PCEs, compared to those with a high number of ACEs and low PCEs, had a lower risk of involvement in violence. For example, among children with three or more ACEs, the risk of assault perpetration fell by 22%, weapons involvement by 49% and gang involvement by 39% for those who also had five or more PCEs. ACEs and PCEs better explain violence involvement than neighbourhood crime rates. Children growing up in high-violence neighbourhoods were more vulnerable to involvement in violence. For example, the likelihood of weapons involvement was 62% higher for children growing up in the 20% most violent areas. However, neighbourhood crime levels were no longer associated with violence perpetration once characteristics, including ACEs and PCEs, were taken into account. There is some evidence that differences in experiences of violence by ethnicity can be explained by family socioeconomic characteristics and exposure to ACEs and PCEs. Black children had higher rates of assault perpetration (53.3% and 47.6%, respectively) than White children (41.7%). This difference in assault rates disappeared after controlling for socioeconomic family characteristics and ACEs and PCEs, suggesting much of the difference can be explained by differences in exposure to these family factors. However, this analysis was limited by a small sample size of children from individual ethnic minority groups and is, therefore, not as secure as some of the other findings. Interpretation and implications This study provides valuable information about the relationship between ACEs, PCEs, neighbourhood safety and children’s involvement in violence. It is one of only a few studies to present evidence from an English or Welsh context. Insights from this study should be combined with findings from other research to identify and support the children who are most vulnerable to involvement in violence. These findings should be interpreted carefully. Although the study looked at whether factors are associated with violence, it cannot confirm whether these factors caused violence. For example, children who experienced physical abuse were more likely to commit violence, but we can’t rule out the possibility that this relationship is explained by another factor. Perhaps children who experienced abuse are also more likely to experience other hardships, which are the real drivers behind their involvement in violence. While this study used statistical techniques to try to rule out some other potential drivers, it was not able to capture all of these. The strengths of this study included its use of a large nationally representative sample, the use of statistical methods that deal with missing data and maintain a representative sample and the fact that it found similar results across several additional analyses and robustness checks. The results of the study should be considered alongside its limitations: • Sexual abuse and the involvement of household members in crime are commonly described as ACEs but were not available in the MCS data set and were not examined in this study. • The study relied on police-reported crime data to measure neighbourhood violent crime. However, much crime goes unreported to the police, especially in deprived areas. The findings on neighbourhood violence are less secure as a result. • The analyses examining more serious types of violence in smaller subgroups of children, such as children from smaller ethnic groups, have smaller samples and are less precise 

London: Youth Endowment Fund, 20225. 227p.

By The Mixed Migration Centre

  Drawing on more than 1,000 surveys with refugees and migrants, this infographic examines their perceptions of dangerous locations, direct experiences of abuse and harsh conditions and their interactions with and perceptions of smugglers. Additionally, it explores the sources of information that refugees and migrants relied on before and during their journey, as well as their access to assistance.  

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 6p.

By The Mixed Migration Centre

Sudan serves as a key country of transit for movements along the Central Mediterranean Route, linking countries in East and the Horn of Africa to North Africa. Since the outbreak of conflict in April 2023, safe migration routes through the country have shifted away from Khartoum and migrants from conflict-affected regions are more reliant on smuggling networks to overcome limited mobility options and restrictive visa policies in neighbouring countries. This snapshot examines migrants' perceptions of their smugglers, the services they provide, and the abuses that migrants perceive smugglers to be perpetrating. It should be noted that while interviews with migrants were carried out in the second half of 2024, most respondents had been in Sudan since before the outbreak of war in April 2023 and are reflecting both on their interactions with smugglers along the journey to Sudan and once in the country. This is the first of two snapshots published on smuggling dynamics along routes to and within Sudan. The second snapshot on the role of smugglers is available here. Key findings • Over half of migrants felt that their smugglers helped them to reach their intended destination (59%) and did not feel intentionally misled by their smugglers (56%). • Perceptions varied by age, with youth (aged 18-24) expressing less confidence in their smugglers than older respondents (aged 25+). • The main services supplied by smugglers were providing accommodation (45%) and food/water (46%), facilitating border crossings (33%), and dealing with authorities (32%). Youth were more reliant on smugglers for crossing borders and dealing with authorities compared to older migrants (56% and 41% vs. 25% and 29%, respectively). • More than half of respondents (58%) described their smuggler as a "service provider or businessperson". Youth more often perceived their smugglers as criminals than older respondents (33% vs. 15-18%). • Few migrants (9%) perceived smugglers as perpetrators of abuse during their journey. For those who did (n=28), kidnapping (18 cases), detention (16 cases), physical violence (10 cases), and robbery (7 cases) were the top abuses.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2025. 10p.

By Rebecca Rabinovitch,

In 2019, two appeal court decisions found that the administrative segregation regime used in Canada’s federal corrections system violated prisoners’ constitutional rights. While the two decisions differed in their analyses, some key points emerged: a constitutional system for segregating prisoners would need to ensure prisoners did not experience prolonged periods of severe isolation, and would need independent review of decisions to isolate prisoners. In response to these decisions, Bill C-83 was introduced. Among other changes, this bill aimed to abolish administrative segregation and replace it with a new system of structured intervention units (SIUs), intended to allow more humane separation of prisoners in line with the constitutional requirements identified by the appeal court decisions. However, this bill was criticized by many experts from the beginning of the legislative process as making insufficient change to truly vindicate the rights in question. Many worried that SIUs would be, in effect, administrative segregation under a new name. Now, as the five-year review of Bill C-83 approaches, there is an opportunity to assess whether SIUs have met the constitutional standards they were intended to realize. Through examination of the available data on SIUs – including documents from the Implementation Advisory Panel and Correctional Service Canada itself – this report examines the ongoing and serious violations of prisoners’ Charter rights under this system. The documented failures of the SIU regime in allowing these violations to continue highlights the urgency with which the review of Bill C-83 should be conducted. Under the SIU system, prisoners still experience a problematic degree of isolation. Many prisoners do not receive adequate time outside of their cells or engaged in meaningful human contact. Legislative standards for these activities are framed as obligations to provide opportunities rather than to ensure these standards are met, meaning that isolation can occur even when there is legislative compliance. However, prisoner refusals of offered opportunities cannot fully explain the degree of isolation present in SIUs, indicating that noncompliance with the legislation is a factor as well. These continuing conditions of severe isolation demonstrate that the holdings of the appeal court decisions relating to the duration of isolation and procedural fairness around isolation decisions cannot be dismissed as limited in relevance only to the former system of administrative segregation. Prisoners also continue to experience extended stays in SIUs. While the CCRA requires that prisoners be transferred out of the SIU as soon as possible, there is no cap on the duration of SIU stays to prevent prolonged isolation. A portion of the prisoners experiencing prolonged SIU stays also experience significant isolation caused by not receiving their entitlements to time outside of their cells and time in meaningful human contact. Under the Mandela Rules, the international standards for the treatment of prisoners accepted by Canada, this group of prisoners is experiencing torture. While Bill C-83 introduced a mechanism for review of SIU decisions by Independent External Decision Makers (IEDMs), this system contains serious flaws that impede its ability to provide  adequate procedural fairness. This problem is particularly urgent given the findings that prisoners continue to experience the very serious threats to life, liberty, and security of the person presented by the harmful degree of isolation faced in SIUs. In particular, IEDM review occurs after long periods of confinement in the SIU, and is reliant on information provided by Correctional Services Canada. This information has not been consistently complete or accurate, presenting a significant barrier to fair review. Even worse, many prisoners face delays in being referred to IEDM review at all, as well as delays in implementation of IEDM decisions. Finally, the SIU system has implications for the s. 15 Charter equality rights of particularly vulnerable groups of prisoners. Black and Indigenous prisoners are significantly overrepresented in the SIU population, meaning that these marginalized groups are placed at a heightened risk of experiencing the negative effects of SIU residence. Prisoners with mental health needs are also overrepresented in SIUs, despite their unique vulnerability to the psychological harms of isolation. The system of IEDM review has not succeeded in returning members of these groups to the general prison population, in part due to inconsistent provision of information about prisoners’ mental health status and social history factors to IEDMs. In combination, these problems indicate that serious violations of prisoners’ Charter rights remain prevalent in the SIU system. Bill C-83 cannot be said to have resolved the constitutional problems identified by the appeal courts of Ontario and British Columbia in their examination of the administrative segregation regime. As such, a thorough and expeditious five-year review of Bill C-83, involving civil society and aimed at reconsidering all aspects of SIUs, including compliance and enforcement, is imperative. In addition to the need to approach this review with urgency, this paper identifies further recommendations key to creating a system that can adequately respect prisoners’ Charter rights, including the following: • Amend the CCRA to define “solitary confinement” in line with the international standards set out in the Mandela Rules, • Prohibit prolonged solitary confinement (solitary confinement lasting over 15 days), • Prohibit solitary confinement for prisoners with serious mental health issues, and • Mandate improved data-sharing with the public and civil society   

The John Howard Society of Canada & David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights, 2023. 43p

By Chris Horwood and Bram Frouws

Almost 10 months after damning human rights reports and global publicity exposed Saudi Arabian state-driven border killings of migrants – labelled by Human Rights Watch as possible crimes against humanity - the deaths and injuries continue. New evidence appears to indicate that the Saudi border authorities at their southern border with Yemen are continuing to use live weapons to fire indiscriminately at Ethiopians and Yemenis crossing the border irregularly. This update report argues that while the crimes being committed are murderous and grievous, the level of inaction and impunity in the face of global exposure and condemnation should also disturb us all.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 9p.

By The American Immigration Council

The Torrance County Detention Facility (Torrance) is one of approximately 200 facilities across the United States where Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detains immigrants with pending removal proceedings. Located in the rural New Mexico desert, this detention facility holds a notorious reputation for its inhumane living conditions and for the speed at which individuals detained there go through their removal proceedings, often without adequate legal counsel. Despite these noted abuses, in September 2021, ICE placed over 100 Haitian migrants into Torrance while they awaited removal proceedings. For months thereafter, the media continued to report on a variety of obstacles Haitians endured in detention including inadequate access to legal counsel.

Due to the increase in complaints from individuals being held at Torrance, the American Immigration Council (The Council) sought to ascertain whether particular barriers to due process exist for Haitian nationals, as well as to investigate the overall treatment of Haitian nationals at Torrance. The request sought data related to individuals detained at Torrance from January 1, 2021, including arrest/apprehension information, immigration status, biographic information, detention history, and release information. ICE responded by providing data between January 1, 2021 and November 17, 2022, and this is what we found when we analyzed it:

ICE's Use of Racial Classifications Are Unreliable, Labeling Most Detained Individuals “White:” Individuals in detention at Torrance represented 54 different countries spanning five different continents. However, 86 percent of individuals detained at Torrance were categorized as racially “white.” The data suggests that ICE failed to systematically document the race of detained individuals.

Africans Had the Highest Lengths of Detention at Torrance: Because ICE’s race categorizations proved unreliable, researchers grouped detained individuals by continent to measure the impact geographic location has on detention lengths. The data showed that African migrants had the highest lengths of detention.

ICE Officers Continued to Populate Torrance Despite Multiple Warnings: During the reviewed time period, ICE had substantial warning signs that Torrance was not equipped to house detained migrants through failed inspections, COVID surges, staffing shortages, and even

government oversight agency reports recommending shutting the facility down. Despite these warning signs, the data showed that ICE continued to detain migrants at Torrance, putting them at risk.

Oversight Efforts Seemingly Reduced the Detained Population at Torrance—But Only Temporarily: The data shows that between August and November 2022, a period that included the suicide of Kesley Vial at Torrance and a government report calling for the closing of Torrance, the population of Torrance consistently decreased. However, in December 2022, ICE began repopulating the facility.

Washington, DC: The American Immigration Council, 2024. Published: October 24, 2024

EJI’s report documents the abduction, abuse, and enslavement of Africans for nearly five centuries.

Between 1501 and 1867, nearly 13 million African people were kidnapped, forced onto European and American ships, and trafficked across the Atlantic Ocean to the Americas, including the British, French, and Spanish colonies that would later comprise the United States.

Two million people died during the barbaric Middle Passage.

The global trafficking that separated millions of women, men, and children from their homes, families, and cultures destabilized African countries and left them vulnerable to conquest, colonization, and violence for centuries.

And in the Americas, a caste system based on race and color emerged in tandem with legal and political systems to codify white supremacy and enshrine enslavement as a permanent and hereditary status. That racial hierarchy continues to haunt our nation today.

The enslavement of human beings occupies a painful and tragic space in world history. Denying a person freedom, autonomy, and life represents the worst kind of abuse of human rights.

Many societies tolerated and condoned human slavery for centuries. But in the 15th century, an expanded and terrifying new era of enslavement emerged that has had a profound and devastating impact on human history.

The abduction, abuse, and enslavement of Africans by Europeans for nearly five centuries dramatically altered the global landscape and created a legacy of suffering and bigotry that can still be seen today.

After discovering lands that had been occupied by Indigenous people for centuries, European powers sent ships and armed militia to exploit these new lands for wealth and profit starting in the 1400s. In territories we now call “the Americas,” gold, sugar, tobacco, and extraordinary natural resources were viewed as opportunities to gain power and influence for Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Scandinavian nations.

Europeans first sought to enslave the Indigenous people who occupied these lands to create wealth for foreign powers, resulting in a catastrophic genocide. Disease, famine, and conflict killed millions of Native people within a relatively short period of time.

Determined to extract wealth from these distant lands, European powers sought labor from Africa, launching a tragic era of kidnapping, abduction, and trafficking that resulted in the enslavement of millions of African people.

Between 1501 and 1867, nearly 13 million African people were kidnapped, forced onto European and American ships, and trafficked across the Atlantic Ocean to be enslaved, abused, and forever separated from their homes, families, ancestors, and cultures.

The Transatlantic Slave Trade represents one of the most violent, traumatizing, and horrific eras in world history. Nearly two million people died during the barbaric Middle Passage across the ocean. The African continent was left destabilized and vulnerable to conquest and violence for centuries. The Americas became a place where race and color created a caste system defined by inequality and abuse.

In the “colonies” that became the United States, slavery took on uniquely appalling features. From New England to Texas, Black people were dehumanized and abused while they were enslaved and denied basic freedoms. Legal and political systems were created to codify racial hierarchy and ensure white supremacy. Slavery became permanent and hereditary, defined by race-based ideologies that insisted on racial subordination of Black people for decades after the formal abolition of slavery.

Millions of Black people born in the U.S. were subjected to abuse, violence, and forced labor despite the young nation’s identity as a constitutional democracy founded on the belief that “all men are created equal.” Racialized slavery was ignored, defended, or accommodated by leaders while the new nation gained extraordinary wealth and influence in the global economy based on the forced labor of enslaved Black people.

The economic legacy of the Transatlantic Slave Trade—including generational wealth and the founding of industries that continue to thrive today—is not well understood.

Montgomery, AL: Equal Justice Initiative, 2023. 150p.

By Rodante van der Waal

Reproductive injustice is an urgent global problem. We are faced with the increased criminalization of abortion, higher maternal and neonatal mortality rates for people of color, and

more and more research addressing the structural nature of obstetric violence. In this collection of essays, the cause of reproductive injustice is understood as the institutionalized isolation of (potentially) pregnant people, making them vulnerable for bio- and necropolitical disciplination and control. The central thesis of this book is that reproductive justice must be achieved through a radical reappropriation of relationality in reproductive care to safeguard the access to knowledge and care needed for safe bodily self-determination. Through empirical research as well as decolonial, feminist, midwifery, and Black theory, reproductive justice is reimagined as abolitionist care, grounded in the abolition of authoritative obstetric institutions, state control of reproduction, and restrictive abortion laws in favor of community practices that are truly relational.

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2025. 496p.

By Nina Mast

This spotlight details the racist history of tipping, federal and state policy governing tipped work, and the experience of tipped workers in the economy—both nationwide and in the South. Across the country, tipped workers are more likely to be people of color, women, women of color, or single parents, and are disproportionately born outside of the United States. Tipped workers earn low wages, experience high rates of poverty, and are vulnerable to exploitation in the workplace—particularly in the form of wage theft and sexual harassment. The South has the largest tipped workforce of any region. Tipped workers in the South are paid the second lowest median wage of any region, and most Southern states allow employers to pay tipped workers as little as $2.13 an hour. Hispanic workers in the South are overrepresented in tipped work, as are women—who account for 70% of the tipped workforce despite making up less than half of all workers in the region.

Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, June 18, 2024. 14p.

By Iran Human Rights

Qarchak Prison in Varamin (Tehran province) has become one of the darkest symbols of systematic human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Originally designed as a poultry farm, the facility has been transformed into an inhumane detention centre for women prisoners, including political prisoners. The conditions in this prison not only violate international principles such as the Bangkok Rules1 and the Nelson Mandela Rules but also disregard the most basic principles of human dignity. At Qarchak, women are confined in extremely cramped spaces with inadequate ventilation and lighting. They endure unsanitary drinking water, poor-quality food, lack of adequate healthcare services, and degrading, gender-based treatment as part of their daily suffering. Qarchak is not only a prison filled with violence and abuse but also, due to severe overcrowding and lack of basic facilities, many prisoners are deprived even of sleeping space, forced to sleep on the floor. The prison is also a glaring symbol of violations against women and mothers. Mothers whose children stay with them in this hazardous and polluted environment until the age of two when they are taken into state care. Often, these mothers have no means to find out about their children’s fate. Undocumented children born in this prison are caught in a cycle of deprivation and injustice from the moment they are born. IHRNGO Director, Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam stated: “Qarchak Prison is a symbol of the blatant denial of humanity and human dignity. The continued operation of such facilities is a stain on the conscience of the world. Today, more than ever, we must call on the international community not to remain silent in the face of such widespread human rights violations.” By publishing this report, IHRNGO reiterates its demand for the immediate closure of Qarchak Prison and the transfer of all prisoners to facilities that meet minimum international standards. The existence of such places, especially in the 21st century, is a stark reminder that justice and human dignity are still sacrificed in many parts of the world. We call on the international community, human rights organisations, and all conscientious individuals to take action to close down Qarchak Prison. This should not merely be seen as a domestic issue; it is a test for the international community to unite in defending human dignity and rights. The closure of Qarchak Prison is a necessary step toward securing prisoners’ rights and a symbol of global commitment to justice and humanity.

Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) , 2024. 18p.

By Ahmed Hussain, Ayla Bonfiglio

This report focuses on the nature and dynamics of human smuggling along this Eastern Route from the Horn of Africa across the Red Sea between locations of origin in Ethiopia and points of arrival along the coast of Lahj Governorate in Yemen. It examines the role of smugglers, the services they offer, the financial aspects of the journey, and how migrants perceive their

smugglers. The study is based on 346 surveys with migrants in Lahj, Yemen and 16 with smugglers in Ethiopia.

The Eastern Route is widely regarded as among the most dangerous mixed migration routes originating from the African continent, in terms of migrants' exposure to violence, abuse, and exploitation. This report, based on 346 surveys with migrants in Lahj, Yemen and 16 with smugglers in Ethiopia, focuses on the nature and dynamics of human smuggling along this route between locations of origin in Ethiopia and points of arrival along the coast of Lahj Governorate in Yemen. It examines the role of smugglers, the services they offer, the financial aspects of the journey, and how migrants perceive their smugglers. Additionally, the report delves into the abuses associated with smugglers, migrants’ protection strategies, and the forms of assistance that migrants receive from smugglers. This study was carried out against the backdrop of reduction in recorded migrant arrivals in Yemen, not merely because of the joint military campaign in the Red Sea and anti-smuggling campaigns by Yemeni and Djiboutian coastguards since August 2023, but also owing to decreased access to data collection in key transit locations along this route. The data provide some insight into these dynamics, which is critical to informing the work of humanitarian actors and policymakers, and fundamental for developing interventions that address the vulnerabilities of migrants along this precarious route. The key findings include: • Smugglers played a limited role in influencing respondents’ migration decisions (9%) and route selection (11%) between Ethiopia and coastal departure points in Djibouti or Somalia. Indeed, more than half of the respondents (57%) stated that they were not influenced by anyone in their decision to migrate, indicating that their choice was largely self-motivated rather than driven by persuasion. • Far from being coerced into using smugglers, migrants reported hiring smugglers to make the journey easier (75%) and cheaper (45%), and they were often proactive in initiating contact (85%) themselves. • The vast majority of respondents (95%) employed the services of one smuggler on their journey to Lahj, Yemen. Of these, most (62%) employed them for one part of the journey—likely for the Red Sea crossing. • In contrast to 4Mi data from the Central Mediterranean Route or the Southern Route (towards South Africa), showing smugglers provide a range of services to migrants, the primary service provided by smugglers along this section of the Eastern Route was arranging transit across borders (99%). • On average, 97% of the respondents paid around 300 USD to the smuggler for their services, largely for the sea crossing. With an average of 100,000 migrants crossing annually, this would amount to a smuggling business worth 30 million USD annually, a significant source of income for smugglers operating out of Djibouti. • Over half of surveyed migrants (60%) paid their smuggler in full before starting the journey, which, according to past MMC research, can be a driver of vulnerability, as migrants deplete their resources at the start of the journey and fall victim to smugglers extracting further compensation. • Despite actively seeking to employ smugglers and reporting that smugglers helped them to achieve their migration goal (99%), strikingly, all migrants felt that smugglers intentionally misled them. This finding stands out for its stark contrast with other migration routes, which portray a more mixed picture of misinformation, underscoring the unique and exploitive dynamics of the Eastern Route. • Smugglers were rarely trusted (2%) by migrants as reliable sources of information; with this in mind, few respondents used smugglers as information sources before (12%) and during the journey (28%). • 72% perceived smugglers as perpetrators of abuse in dangerous locations along the route, identifying physical violence (82%), death (68%), and robbery (58%) as the top

dangers. • While smugglers were rarely regarded as trustworthy and were seen as perpetrators of abuse, only 22% of surveyed migrants viewed them as criminals. Indeed, most perceived their smugglers as service providers (64%), highlighting an inherent complexity in migrant-smuggler relationships. The same complexity can be seen in migrants’ strategies for keeping safe along the route: 18% cited hiring smugglers while 1% cited avoiding them to reduce the risk of abuse and crime.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 24p.

By Wilder Research

In the decade since Safe Harbor became Minnesota law, the state has built an extensive network in response to the sexual exploitation of youth, and more recently human trafficking, both sex and labor. The network spans from state and local government to Tribal Nations and community-based nonprofit programs. Founded on a public health approach within the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) in recognition of the significant health and social impacts created by exploitation and trafficking on populations, Safe Harbor also partners extensively with entities in public safety, human services, and human rights, including the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS), the Minnesota Department of Public Safety (DPS) and the Minnesota Coalition Against Sexual Assault (MNCASA) to offer a comprehensive multidisciplinary response. State law requires the Safe Harbor Director, based in MDH, to submit a biennial evaluation of the program to the Commissioner of Health under Minnesota Statute Section 145.4718. The purpose of the evaluation is to ensure Safe Harbor is reaching its intended participants, increasing identification of sexually exploited youth, coordinating across disciplines including law enforcement and child welfare, providing access to services, including housing, ensuring the quality of services, and utilizing penalty funds to support services. The Safe Harbor law passed in 2011 and after a three-year planning period called No Wrong Door, the Safe Harbor system was fully enacted in 2014. In the years since, Safe Harbor has submitted three evaluation reports to the legislature, beginning in 2015. Each evaluation was conducted by Wilder Research at the Amherst H. Wilder Foundation (Wilder) under a competitive contract with MDH. The evaluation process is an opportunity to hear and learn from trafficked and exploited youth as well as participants from a variety of disciplines who respond to the needs of these youth on a daily basis. For the current Phase 4 report, MDH contracted with Wilder again while MDH’s Safe Harbor Program produced accompanying evaluation materials. As a result, this Phase 4 Safe Harbor evaluation draws from complementary background reports that are combined to represent a variety of perspectives from both outside and within the Safe Harbor network. These resources not only evaluate Safe Harbor’s activities, but also address these activities in the context of significant current events including the global COVID-19 pandemic and the civil rights movement in Minnesota, as well as around the nation and world, in the wake of George Floyd’s murder. The supplemental evaluation materials, containing expanded findings, data, and appendix are contained in this document. All findings focus on the Safe Harbor network and activities between April 1, 2019, and June 30, 2021. The Wilder data collection and analysis took place between January 1, 2021, and June 30, 2021. The MDH data collection and analysis took place between September 1, 2020, and August 1, 2021. Between January 2021 and June 2021, Wilder interviewed grantees, multidisciplinary partners, and youth clients, and also surveyed youth clients to evaluate Safe Harbor. Wilder submitted its report including several findings and recommendations to MDH. Wilder found evidence for outcomes related to multidisciplinary partnership and access to services, including culturally specific services; the factors contributing to Safe Harbor’s impact; gaps and challenges; opportunities for improvement; and the pandemic’s impact on service provision. MDH analyzed the provision of the statewide Safe Harbor Regional Navigator component and the reach of the Safe Harbor Network to identify and serve youth, as well as availability, accessibility, and equity of Safe Harbor supportive services and shelter and housing, in addition to training for providers. MDH then submitted a Phase 4 evaluation report to the legislature including combined findings, recommendations, and conclusions. Summary recommendations are listed here, but included with further detail in the legislative report and within the supplemental evaluation materials included in this document: Recommended actions: ▪ Increase stakeholder ability to identify youth. ▪ Expand protections and services regardless of age and remain flexible in identifying service needs. ▪ Increase and improve access to services, especially for youth from marginalized cultures and greater Minnesota. ▪ Support more diverse and consistent staffing. ▪ Increase amount and cultural appropriateness of technical assistance, education, and training provided. ▪ Increase prevention efforts (by decreasing demand and identifying risk factors). ▪ Support improvement of more continuous, comprehensive, and robust outcome and process evaluation as well as inferential research. ▪ De-silo the response to sex and labor trafficking. ▪ Increase youth voice and opportunities within Safe Harbor. ▪ Heal organizational trauma to better help organizations, staff, and clients. ▪ Improve equity by conducting a cultural needs assessment with several cultural groups as well as strategically directing allocations of funds and resources to culturally specific groups. ▪ Strengthen relationships within the public health approach. ▪ Further promote government agency collaboration.

St. Paul, MN : Minnesota Department of Health, Safe Harbor, Violence Prevention Unit, Health Promotion and Chronic Disease Division 2021. 130p.