By Sofia Avila

Workplace raids are visible and disruptive immigration enforcement operations that can result in the detention of hundreds of immigrants at one time. Despite concerns about the impact of raids on children’s well-being, there is limited research on how these tactics affect their academic performance. Using school-level testing data from 2015 to 2019, I compare changes in the performance of Hispanic students in schools close to a workplace raid to white students in the same schools and Hispanic students at control schools. I find exposure to a raid lowered the scores and passing rates of Hispanic students in standardized tests taken 40 days after the operation. I further find that students in schools closer to the raid experienced more pronounced drops in performance, but I do not detect strong evidence that performance decreases were caused by interruptions to schooling. These findings provide new evidence on the spillover effects of workplace raids, underscoring the potential role of immigration enforcement in generating disparities in Hispanic children’s educational outcomes.

Sociological Science 11: 258-296 2024.

By David K Hausman

The US government maintains that local sanctuary policies prevent deportations of violent criminals and increase crime. This report tests those claims by combining Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deportation data and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) crime data with data on the implementation dates of sanctuary policies between 2010 and 2015. Sanctuary policies reduced deportations of people who were fingerprinted by states or counties by about one-third. Those policies also changed the composition of deportations, reducing deportations of people with no criminal convictions by half-without affecting deportations of people with violent convictions. Sanctuary policies also had no detectable effect on crime rates. These findings suggest that sanctuary policies, although effective at reducing deportations, do not threaten public safety.

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2020 Nov 3;117(44):27262-27267.

By Chloe N. East , Annie Laurie Hines , Philip Luck , Hani Mansour and Andrea Vel´asquez

We examine the labor market effects of Secure Communities (SC)–an immigration enforcement policy which led to over 454,000 deportations between 2008-2014. Using a difference-in-differences model that takes advantage of the staggered rollout of SC, we find that SC significantly decreased the employment share of likely undocumented male immigrants. The policy also led to a decrease in the employment rate of citizens. The employment effects on citizens are concentrated among males working in medium-skilled occupations, particularly in sectors that traditionally rely on likely undocumented workers. The results are consistent with complementarities in production between low-skilled immigrants and higher-skilled citizens.

Unpublished paper, 2020. 61p.

By UK Home Office

1. Immigration is important for Britain. For centuries people have come to this country to build a better life, contributing economically and culturally to our society and helping to rebuild our country after major shocks such as the Second World War. From Uganda to Ukraine, Britain has also proudly played its part in offering refuge – and in many cases, a fresh start – to those fleeing violence and persecution overseas. 2. It is precisely because of immigration’s historic significance to our country, that it must be properly controlled and managed, so that the public can have confidence in the system, so that it properly benefits the UK and so that the system itself is fair. Delivering such an immigration system, coupled with strong border security, is one of the foundations of this Government’s Plan for Change. 3. Over recent years, proper control and management of the immigration system has been lost. While much attention has rightly been focused on the surge in illegal migration across the Channel, reaching a peak of 45,744 small boat arrivals in 2022, there has been less focus on the rapid increase in the levels of legal net migration since 2019. Levels of net migration were approximately 200,000 per year throughout most of the 2010s and have risen from 224,000 in the year to June 2019 to a record high of 906,000 in the year ending June 2023- a four-fold increase in the space of under four years. 1 4. At the same time as a significant expansion in overall levels of migration, driven by particularly by non-EU nationals and their dependants coming to the UK for work and study, the mix of visa holders also changed – shifting increasingly away from higher-skilled migration, and towards lower-skilled migration. 5. Those unsustainably high levels of migration have also added extra demand to our public services and our housing supply during a decade when both are already stretched, adding to pressure on key services and the housing market, and fragmenting social relations. High levels of migration can also result in widespread labour exploitation, as migrant workers’ rights are violated, and employers who play by the rules are undercut. 6. It is this Government’s intention to restore confidence in the immigration system, so that we can support and see benefits from migration whilst ensuring it is properly controlled and is not used as an alternative to fixing problems here in the UK. That is what this White Paper seeks to achieve. THE CASE FOR CHANGE 7. Net migration hit a record high of +906,000 in June 2023 and quadrupled from its level of 224,000 in June 2019. In the latest data, for the year ending June 2024, net migration was +728,000. While levels of net migration have come down slightly in the latest year, it remains significantly above the level of net migration at any period in recent history, having averaged between 200,000 to 300,000 per year from 2010 to 2019.2 8. Recent high levels of net migration have been driven by non-EU nationals and their dependants coming to the UK for work, study, and humanitarian reasons. This includes temporary factors such as humanitarian migration from Ukraine and Hong Kong. Recent policy changes have reduced the number of migrants particularly on the health and care and study routes. 9. The recent significant increases followed the introduction of new immigration policies in 2020, following the UK's departure from the EU – a system which made a number of key changes as part of the transition to a single EU/non-EU set of rules, including reducing the overall skills threshold for migration from degree-level (Regulated Qualifications Framework Level 6 or RQF 6) to A-Level-equivalent (RQF 3), and setting a new basic salary threshold for all countries at £25,600.

London: UK Government, 2025. 82p. Annex; 15p.

By Ilias Chatzis, et al.

Illicit $nancial %ows (IFFs) – $nancial %ows that are illicit in origin, transfer, or use, that re%ect an exchange of value and cross country borders – are major impediments to sustainable development. !ey divert important resources away from state revenue and public investments, foster impunity, and ultimately erode criminal justice systems as a whole. !e harmful e&ects of illicit $nancial %ows and the need to reduce them are demonstrated by their inclusion in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as Target 16.4. It stipulates the goal to “signi$cantly reduce illicit $nancial %ows and arms %ows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime”. Progress towards this target is measured by SDG Indicator 16.4.1 (the “total value of inward and outward IFFs in current US dollars”), for which UNODC is the custodian together with UNCTAD. Organized crimes vary in their characteristics, objectives, and the extent to which they cross national borders. Consequently, the amount and nature of the IFFs they generate also varies. Given the transnational nature of smuggling of migrants (SOM) and cross-border tra"cking in persons (TIP), monitoring and combatting IFFs is crucially important for disrupting, prosecuting, and dismantling the organized criminal networks committing these dangerous crimes. !is Study focuses on the trends, nuances, and complexities surrounding IFFs associated with smuggling of migrants and tra"cking in persons into the European Union (EU), with speci$c attention paid to those relating to GLO.ACT partner countries.1 It is based on an analysis of available data, $eld research $ndings, and review of secondary literature. Smuggling of migrants For smuggling of migrants, the $ndings of this Study con$rm that the GLO.ACT partner countries are signi$cant countries of origin of smuggled people into Europe. According to Frontex, there were a total of 184,323 attempts at irregular entry into the EU by people from the four GLO.ACT partner countries during the $ve years between January 2018 and December 2022.2 According to Europol and Interpol, more than 90 per cent of irregular entries into the EU are facilitated by smugglers.3 !us, based on the detection of irregular entry attempts, it can be estimated that nearly 166,000 were smuggling incidents. As both the payment for and the cost of facilitating such smuggling generate IFFs, it follows that smuggling of migrants relating to GLO.ACT partner countries generates considerable IFFs. !e Study has also found that, from 2018 to 2021, the Eastern Mediterranean Sea route had been the route most commonly used by people from GLO.ACT partner countries to irregularly enter the EU.4 However, the trend changed in 2022 when the Western Balkans land route became the most popular for people from GLO.ACT partner countries. !is is apparent from the interceptions during 2022: there were 31,980 total detections for the Western Balkans land route followed by the Central Mediterranean Route with 15,062 total detections.5 !e Western Balkans route involves refugees and migrants leaving Türkiye, traveling through Greece or Bulgaria, exiting the EU, and traveling through North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and/or Albania before re-entering the EU via Hungary, Croatia, or Romania. !e Central Mediterranean Route is dominated by Libyan smuggling networks, who charge an average of US$1,500 - $1,800 per client to smuggle them from Libya to Italy by boat.6 In 2017, the peak year for arrivals on this route, organized criminal groups running smuggling operations along this route were estimated to have earned a gross income of $150 million. However, this income decreased to just over €24 million in 2018, and to €12 million in 2019.7 Trafcking in persons For tra"cking in persons, the type of tra"cking actors, forms of exploitation and victim pro$les heavily in%uence the size, modalities, and directions of IFFs. !e most pro$t tends to be made in the exploitation phase, as the %ow of revenue is continuous rather than one-o&. Tra"cking for forced labour and sexual exploitation are the most common forms of exploitation and provide for repeated pro$ts from continued exploitation. For IFFs associated with tra"cking in persons, an important distinction can be made between domestic tra"cking and cross-border tra"cking. Domestic tra"cking is less likely to generate IFFs – which are cross-border in nature – unless the perpetrator, the victim or other actors involved have their centre of economic interest outside the country. !e UNODC Global Report on Tra"cking in Persons 2022 indicates that an overwhelming majority (99 per cent) of detected victims of tra"cking in South Asia8 are domestically tra"cked. However, the data also indicates an increase in the number of detected South Asian victims identi$ed in other regions of the world. In fact, the tra"cking victims from GLO.ACT partner countries are among the most commonly detected nationalities from outside the region in Western and Southern Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom, Türkiye and Italy.9 It can thus be assumed that IFFs associated with cross-border tra"cking in persons from the GLO.ACT partner countries have been increasing in the recent years. Furthermore, as UNODC Global Reports on Tra"cking in Persons records only the administrative data on cases identi$ed by the authorities in the respective countries, it is likely that a signi$cant proportion of tra"cking cases and attendant IFFs go undetected. In the case of smuggling of migrants and tra"cking in persons from GLO.ACT partner countries, IFFs are generated through cash payments, value transfers using the hawala system, and to a lesser extent, money transfer service providers. !is poses challenges in responding to IFFs related to smuggling and tra"cking, as the majority of cases involve payment and transfer methods that are not easily traceable. !e illicit income made by smugglers and tra"ckers are largely spent in three ways: (a) sent back to the country of origin, often invested in legal businesses such as restaurants, bars, or real estate; (b) used to support a lavish lifestyle, generating IFFs related to consumer goods; and (c) invested in other criminal or legitimate activities in the destination country. All such uses may generate IFFs. Not only do the crimes of migrant smuggling and tra"cking in persons seriously endanger the lives, safety and well-being of the individuals being smuggled or tra"cked, but they also generate signi$cant sums of illicit $nancial %ows. !is ultimately undermines state institutions, promotes impunity, and further bolsters the means of criminals involved. An enhanced understanding and investigation of illicit $nancial %ows is a crucial step towards more e&ective disruption, prosecution and dismantling of migrant smuggling and tra"cking networks.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - UNODC, 2023. 86p.

By Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, Doris Meissner and Andrew Selee

A new reality has set in across the Western Hemisphere since 2020 as migrant families, unaccompanied children, and adults from an increasingly diverse array of origin countries have embarked on journeys through the region. The United States, in particular, has faced significant challenges in managing its borders, but transit countries along migration routes and other existing and emerging destination countries have similarly faced new migration challenges and a need to fundamentally transform their policy responses. Many governments have responded to this new reality by building a sense of shared responsibility and deepening their collaboration on migration management, albeit at different levels given their uneven institutional capacities and resources. Whether and how the policies and hemispheric cooperation that have emerged will continue are now in the hands of the new administrations of U.S. President Donald Trump and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. Since taking office in January 2025, the Trump administration has been rewriting the U.S. relationship with Mexico, as well as with other partners across the Americas. The Biden administration’s focus on collaboration, which privileged a mixture of jointly negotiated migration controls, legal pathways, and selected returns, has been supplanted by a strategy based on large-scale deportations and tariff threats to compel Mexico to take even greater steps to stop unauthorized migration and drug trafficking. Despite the changed priorities and style, the basic truth remains that both governments fundamentally need each other to accomplish their policy objectives. But despite the changed priorities and style, the basic truth remains that both governments fundamentally need each other to accomplish their policy objectives, whether termed border control and migration management or national security. No country has been more critical to U.S. border enforcement efforts than Mexico, which has recorded more migrant encounters in its territory than the U.S. Border Patrol has at the southwest border every month since May 2024. Mexican policies have been central catalysts for sustained reductions in unauthorized migration at the U.S.-Mexico border that began in 2024 and have continued under the countries’ new administrations. Understanding the complexity of shifting migration patterns, institutional capacity in both countries, and other shared challenges is there fore crucial in the longer term to bilateral, and likely hemispheric, negotiations and goals. Drawing on interviews and two roundtables with U.S. and Mexican policy stakeholders, researchers, and leaders of international and civil-society organizations in 2024, this policy brief rounds out prior Migration Policy Institute work on U.S. border enforcement by providing an account of recent shifts in unauthorized migration and humanitarian protection trends, and the role the U.S.-Mexico relationship has played—and will continue to play—in responding to these new migration realities. To overcome future challenges in migration management, it contends that Mexico and the United States need to work together to: 1) establish a transparent infrastructure for border security and protection screening at the Mexico-Guatemala border; 2) break the grip of cross-national migrant smuggling organizations; and 3) strengthen labor pathways between Mexico and the United States. Given their geographic proximity and shared policy interests, the United States and Mexico are inseparable. Long-term management of migration requires working in good faith across both sides of the border and recognizing the successes of bilateral collaboration in recent years, which have illustrated how indispensable Mexican migration enforcement and protection operations are to U.S. policy aims and how vital unwavering U.S. support is for those operations. As the new administrations in Mexico City and Washington, DC set their courses for the period ahead, they would do well to advance their respective national interests by incorporating strategies that address the deeper complexities of irregular movement, consider the lessons from prior hemispheric collaboration and leadership models, and promote migration through channels that are legal, safe, and orderly

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute , 2025. 18p.

By Frédéric Docquier, Hillel Rapoport.

We investigate the relationship between immigration and right-wing populism, which we characterize as a self-reinforcing process. Anti-immigrant rhetoric and populist policies lead to a deterioration in the skill level of immigrants. This in turn fuels populist support. Historical and contemporary studies are suggestive of such dynamics. In particular, recent cross-country evidence shows that low-skill immigration tends to exacerbate populism, while high-skill immigration tends to mitigate it. Conversely, populist policies and xenophobic attitudes have a strong repulsive effect on highly-skilled immigrants and result in adverse immigrant selection. We use the empirical results from those studies to inform a theoretical model of joint determination of immigrants’ skill-ratio and right-wing populism levels. The model displays multiple equilibria. In this framework, structural trends such as internet penetration, erosion of the middle class, demographic pressure from poor countries or adverse cyclical shocks make the inferior equilibrium – the vicious circle of xenophobia -- more likely.

IZA DP No. 17754

Published in: Economic Policy, 2025, 40 (122), 551–573.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2025. 21p.

By CJ McKinney

A white paper is a government document that proposes important policy changes, including new legislation. The attached briefing summarises seven white papers on immigration, asylum and citizenship issued over the past 60 years: Immigration from the Commonwealth, August 1965 Proposals for revision of the immigration rules, November 1979 British nationality law, July 1980 Fairer, faster and firmer, July 1998 Secure borders, safe haven, February 2002 The UK’s future skills-based immigration system, December 2018 Restoring control over the immigration system, May 2025 While the list provides a snapshot of issues that were important at different points in recent history, it is not a comprehensive survey of shifts in immigration policy. Many major changes were not preceded by a white paper.

London: House of Commons Library, 2025. 9p.

Edited by Bridget Anderson

This collection investigates how to rethink migration without reinforcing it as a problematic subject. The book illustrates that conceptually based, critical and creative thinking is as important for practice as it is for theory and can help us understand and respond to migration as a force that connects rather than divides.

Bristol, UK: Bristol University Press, 2025.

By the Human Rights Watch

The 38-page report details how donor withdrawal and Taliban policies have decimated Afghanistan’s healthcare infrastructure, particularly affecting women and rural areas.

The Human Rights Watch, February 12, 2024, 38 pages

By the Human Rights Watch

The 29-page report documents increased restrictions and state interference with the press under Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s government.

The Human Rights Watch, February 13, 2024, 29 pages

By the Human Rights Watch

The 52-page report documents barriers faced by pregnant and parenting adolescent girls in Mozambique in continuing their education, including lack of services and stigma.

The Human Rights Watch, February 13, 2024, 52 pages

By the Human Rights Watch

The 67-page report documents the significant policy gaps that remain in Nepal’s implementation of legal gender recognition despite being a global leader in third-gender acknowledgment.

The Human Rights Watch, February 15, 2024, 67 pages

By the Human Rights Watch

The 46-page report, “‘We Will Find You,’” is a rights-centered analysis of how governments are targeting dissidents, activists, and political opponents abroad, through surveillance, abductions, and digital attacks.

The Human Rights Watch, February 22, 2024, 46 page

By the Human Rights Watch

The 118-page report, “Carbon Offsetting’s Casualties,” concerns a project carried out by the Cambodian Ministry of Environment and the conservation group Wildlife Alliance, operating without consent from the Chong people, who face forced evictions and criminal charges.

The Human Rights Watch, February 28, 2024, 118 pages

By the Human Rights Watch

The 74-page report, “Everything is by the Power of the Weapon: Abuses and Impunity in Turkish-Occupied Northern Syria,” documents abductions, arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention, sexual violence, and torture by the various factions of a loose coalition of armed groups, as well as Turkish forces.

The Human Rights Watch, February 29, 2024, 74 pages

By the Human Rights Watch

The 40-page report, “‘My Marriage was Mistake after Mistake’: The Impact of Unregistered Marriages on Women’s and Children’s Rights in Iraq,” documents the impacts of unregistered marriages on women and girls who enter them, and the downstream effects on their children.

The Human Rights Watch, March 3, 2024, 40 pages

By the Human Rights Watch

The 50-page report, “Breaking Barriers to Justice: Nepal’s Long Struggle for Accountability, Truth and Reparations,” describes the decades-long struggle for justice by survivors and victims. Human Rights Watch and Advocacy Forum analyzed the proposed law and reviewed some emblematic cases that faced obstruction by the authorities.

The Human Rights Watch, March 5, 2024, 50 pages

By the Human Rights Watch

The 60-page report, “‘We Can’t See the Sun’: Malaysia’s Arbitrary Detention of Migrants and Refugees,” documents Malaysian authorities’ punitive and abusive treatment of migrants and refugees in 20 immigration detention centers across the country. Immigration detainees can spend months or years in overcrowded, unhygienic conditions, subject to harassment and violence by guards, without domestic or international monitoring.

The Human Rights Watch, March 5, 2024, 60 pages

By the Human Rights Watch

The 60-page report, “‘I Just Want to Contribute to Society’: The Need for Legal Gender Recognition in Tabasco, Mexico,” documents the pervasive socioeconomic disadvantages that trans people experience due to a mismatch between their gender and their identity documents. A lack of accurate documents, often in combination with anti-trans bias, has led to discrimination, harassment, and violence for trans people.

The Human Rights Watch, March 6, 2024, 60 pages