Edited By S Irudaya Rajan

South Asia Migration Report 2024 documents key themes of remittances, resilience, and rehabilitation from the region. This volume: • Includes dedicated fieldwork to map migration within and outside South Asia; • Analyses the impact of Covid-19 on migrants and migration in South Asia; • Highlights the plight of Afghan migrants post-Taliban takeover in the country. This book will be indispensable for scholars and researchers of economics, development studies, migration and diaspora studies, gender studies, labour studies and sociology. It will also be useful to policymakers, think tanks and government institutions working in the area.

Oxford, UK: Routledge India, 2025. 242p.

By Cecilia Menjívar & Krista M. Perreir

Thousands of minors are migrating unaccompanied to high-income countries. This special issue focuses on unaccompanied migrant minors from the Global South to Europe and the U.S. In this introduction, we seek to complement the contributions to this special issue by shedding light on what resources and experiences unaccompanied migrants arrive with, stressing these young migrants’

challenges at each stage prior to arrival and the challenges they face navigating the receiving context. We first clarify how the international community defines ‘unaccompanied minors’ or ‘unaccompanied children’. We then provide brief histories of unaccompanied minors in immigration flows to the U.S. and the EU. Next, we review the literature on the experiences of

unaccompanied minors before, during, and after migration. Finally, we discuss key themes and insights from the articles provided in this special issue.

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 22p.

By Ahmed Hussain, Ayla Bonfiglio

This report focuses on the nature and dynamics of human smuggling along this Eastern Route from the Horn of Africa across the Red Sea between locations of origin in Ethiopia and points of arrival along the coast of Lahj Governorate in Yemen. It examines the role of smugglers, the services they offer, the financial aspects of the journey, and how migrants perceive their

smugglers. The study is based on 346 surveys with migrants in Lahj, Yemen and 16 with smugglers in Ethiopia.

The Eastern Route is widely regarded as among the most dangerous mixed migration routes originating from the African continent, in terms of migrants' exposure to violence, abuse, and exploitation. This report, based on 346 surveys with migrants in Lahj, Yemen and 16 with smugglers in Ethiopia, focuses on the nature and dynamics of human smuggling along this route between locations of origin in Ethiopia and points of arrival along the coast of Lahj Governorate in Yemen. It examines the role of smugglers, the services they offer, the financial aspects of the journey, and how migrants perceive their smugglers. Additionally, the report delves into the abuses associated with smugglers, migrants’ protection strategies, and the forms of assistance that migrants receive from smugglers. This study was carried out against the backdrop of reduction in recorded migrant arrivals in Yemen, not merely because of the joint military campaign in the Red Sea and anti-smuggling campaigns by Yemeni and Djiboutian coastguards since August 2023, but also owing to decreased access to data collection in key transit locations along this route. The data provide some insight into these dynamics, which is critical to informing the work of humanitarian actors and policymakers, and fundamental for developing interventions that address the vulnerabilities of migrants along this precarious route. The key findings include: • Smugglers played a limited role in influencing respondents’ migration decisions (9%) and route selection (11%) between Ethiopia and coastal departure points in Djibouti or Somalia. Indeed, more than half of the respondents (57%) stated that they were not influenced by anyone in their decision to migrate, indicating that their choice was largely self-motivated rather than driven by persuasion. • Far from being coerced into using smugglers, migrants reported hiring smugglers to make the journey easier (75%) and cheaper (45%), and they were often proactive in initiating contact (85%) themselves. • The vast majority of respondents (95%) employed the services of one smuggler on their journey to Lahj, Yemen. Of these, most (62%) employed them for one part of the journey—likely for the Red Sea crossing. • In contrast to 4Mi data from the Central Mediterranean Route or the Southern Route (towards South Africa), showing smugglers provide a range of services to migrants, the primary service provided by smugglers along this section of the Eastern Route was arranging transit across borders (99%). • On average, 97% of the respondents paid around 300 USD to the smuggler for their services, largely for the sea crossing. With an average of 100,000 migrants crossing annually, this would amount to a smuggling business worth 30 million USD annually, a significant source of income for smugglers operating out of Djibouti. • Over half of surveyed migrants (60%) paid their smuggler in full before starting the journey, which, according to past MMC research, can be a driver of vulnerability, as migrants deplete their resources at the start of the journey and fall victim to smugglers extracting further compensation. • Despite actively seeking to employ smugglers and reporting that smugglers helped them to achieve their migration goal (99%), strikingly, all migrants felt that smugglers intentionally misled them. This finding stands out for its stark contrast with other migration routes, which portray a more mixed picture of misinformation, underscoring the unique and exploitive dynamics of the Eastern Route. • Smugglers were rarely trusted (2%) by migrants as reliable sources of information; with this in mind, few respondents used smugglers as information sources before (12%) and during the journey (28%). • 72% perceived smugglers as perpetrators of abuse in dangerous locations along the route, identifying physical violence (82%), death (68%), and robbery (58%) as the top

dangers. • While smugglers were rarely regarded as trustworthy and were seen as perpetrators of abuse, only 22% of surveyed migrants viewed them as criminals. Indeed, most perceived their smugglers as service providers (64%), highlighting an inherent complexity in migrant-smuggler relationships. The same complexity can be seen in migrants’ strategies for keeping safe along the route: 18% cited hiring smugglers while 1% cited avoiding them to reduce the risk of abuse and crime.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 24p.

By Amnesty International
Tens of thousands of migrant workers travel every year to Canada in the hope of providing a better life for their families. They are promised labour opportunities and working conditions that very often they cannot enjoy in their countries of origin. Yet, many find a different reality upon arrival. This report investigates the human rights impact of Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP), a temporary migration scheme that allows employers to hire migrant workers, primarily in low-pay occupations.

London: Amnesty International, 2025. 71p.

By Mark Lusk

Hope Border Institute is proud to present “Witness to Forced Migration: The Paradox of Resilience,” a new report by Dr. Mark Lusk, professor emeritus of social work at the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP), and Georgina Sanchez Garcia, psychologist and Ph.D. candidate at UTEP.

Based on years of research into the lived experiences of migrants and refugees, the piece highlights the ways that people dealing with trauma and a broken immigration system build resilience and strength and find meaning in the midst of suffering. It also underscores the structural causes behind forced migration, including poverty and state failure to shield people from violence.

El Paso: Hope Border Institute, 2021. 36p.

By Jesus de la Torre, Blanca Navarrete and Diana Solis

On June 4, 2024, President Biden announced the Proclamation on Securing the Border. Together with the accompanying Interim Final Rule (IFR), the administration imposed a suspension of normal asylum processing at the U.S.-Mexico border when the sevenday average of encounters with migrants by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reached 2,500. This executive action significantly limits the chances of bona fide asylum seekers to present their protection claims and increases the chances of forced removal. These changes add to an already extensive list of actions which the administration has taken to significantly weaken the framework of asylum protection at the border, especially for those unable to access the 1,450 CBP One app appointments allotted daily In the State of Texas, these actions also come against the backdrop of Governor Greg Abbott’s parallel immigration enforcement operation, known as Operation Lone Star (OLS), which first began in March 2021. Since its implementation, OLS has led to harrowing levels of cruelty at the Texas-Mexico border. An obscene amount of dangerous concertina wire fortifies the border, National Guard soldiers fire projectiles at families stranded at the border wall, and the Texas Department of Public Safety regularly engages in deadly high-speed chases in border communities. In the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez region, many migrants who arrive at the Mexico-Texas border find themselves in a state of dangerous limbo, able to access safety neither in the United States nor in Mexico. In recent years, Mexico has also taken increasingly drastic action to militarize its border cities and migration routes, detaining up to thousands of migrating persons per day and reaching an unseen level of 1.4 million enforcement encounters in the first five months of 2024. At the U.S. request, Mexico also accepts nationals from third countries who have been deported from the U.S. Abuse of persons in immigrant detention in Mexico is widespread. In order to avoid detention, families seeking safety must maneuver through a terrain of omnipresent violence from statesanctioned unscrupulous criminal groups, who extort, kidnap and kill them. This report sheds light on the reality of people on the move in the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez region under the layered pressures of the recent Interim Final Rule; the Biden administration’s existing Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule (known as the ‘Asylum Ban’ and implemented in May 2023); Texas’ Operation Lone Star; and Mexico’s complex of immigration enforcement operations and systematic criminal exploitation of migrants. This report relies on in-person observations made during the course of HOPE’s medical interventions with migrants at the border wall between May and June 2024. It also draws from an analysis of joint U.S.- Mexican migration policies and monitoring exercises in temporary and permanent shelters and critical transportation infrastructures in Ciudad Juárez between 2023 and 2024. It is complemented by Jesuit Refugee Service Mexico data obtained during interviews with 841 family units and 2,278 individuals between June 2020 and May 2024. Although interrelated, this report presents the impacts of a multilayered border in El Paso-Ciudad Juárez in three sections: the impacts of Mexican enforcement actions before arriving to and while in Ciudad Juárez; the impacts of Texas’ Operation Lone Star at the border wall; and the impacts of the U.S. asylum bans. It also unmasks how criminal organizations prey on those who migrate while they wait in Ciudad Juárez. We conclude with critical immigration policy recommendations for the future U.S. and Mexican administrations.

El Paso: Hope Border Institute and Derechos Humanos Integrales en Acción. 2024. 27p.

By Jeremy Slack and Daniel E. Martınez

What happens after deportation? What contexts must Mexican deportees navigate and contend with after removal from the United States? This article explores the challenges for people post-removal in Mexico, particularly by drawing on fieldwork conducted in Tamaulipas, which is home to the Zetas drug trafficking organization and the infamous massacre of seventy-two migrants. We argue that incidental exposure to violence and crime began as an implicit aspect of immigration enforcement and has grown into one of the central tenets of current policy. We take a feminist geopolitical approach to connect the post-deportation experiences of migrants to the policies of deportation, incarceration, and punishment levied against them by the U.S. government. Migrants, particularly those apprehended through the Criminal Alien Program, have been returned to Tamaulipas in concentrated numbers despite its violent reputation. The processes of criminalization have led to a system that prioritizes punishment for migrants, meaning that we cannot extricate experiences that occur after removal from enforcement measures that create those situations. These practices are directly connected to the current wave of policies aimed at stopping asylum seekers, including “metering,” where people are made to wait at the border to apply for asylum at the port of entry, and the Remain in Mexico program (otherwise known as the Migrant Protection Protocols). We argue that enforcement is more complex than “prevention through deterrence” narratives and exposure to nonstate violence in Mexico has slowly become a more integral part of enforcement plans.

Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 2020

By Paul Butcher, Alberto-Horst Neidhardt

Migration remains a salient political issue and a major topic of disinformation. Lies and half-truths about migrants spread freely across the EU. But the narratives and themes used by disinformation actors are not static. As events develop and public concerns shift, so do the types of stories pushed by those seeking to mislead. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a growing stream of articles linking migrants to infection risks and accusing them of receiving preferential treatment. Disinformation actors have certain advantages over other communicators, as they can promote simplistic or one-sided depictions of migration without regard for truth or accuracy. Rather than seeking to counteract specific claims, such as through fact-checking or counternarratives, communicators and policymakers should instead promote alternative narratives that can undermine the appeal of hostile frames and create ‘herd immunity’ against disinformation. Alternative narratives should especially target those in the ‘movable middle’ who are most open to changing their views, especially as these groups may also be more liable to being influenced by disinformation. This Issue Paper examines nearly 1,500 news articles from four EU member states (Germany, Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic) published between May 2019 and July 2020. It shows that disinformation narratives about migration seek to exploit readers’ fears to polarise public opinion, manufacture discontent, sow divisions and set the political agenda. Disinformation actors link migration to existing insecurities, depicting it as a threat to three partly-overlapping areas: Health (migrants as violent criminals, potential terrorists, or a COVID-19 infection risk); Wealth (migrants as social benefits cheats, unfair competition for jobs, or a drain on community resources); Identity (migrants as a hostile invasion force, a threat to European or Christian traditions, or the subject of a conspiracy to replace white Europeans). An effective communication strategy based on alternative narratives should take account of the following recommendations: The message should aim to reframe the debate. It should resonate with the target audience’s lived experience, acknowledging their values and concerns, but avoid amplifying anxieties. Messages promoting alternative narratives must be timely and reflect the news cycle. Like a vaccine administered at regular intervals, communicators should repeat simple, specific messages that can prompt the best immune response against hostile frames spread by disinformation. The medium should aim to restore trust among groups. Institutions, which are often subject to discrediting campaigns, should prioritise communication through trusted intermediaries who can get messages to the hard-to-reach. They should work in partnership with civil society and local actors to deliver coordinated messages in the right environments. They should seek to reach people ‘where they are’ using the most appropriate communication channel, taking into consideration where their audience consumes information. The selection of the audience should aim to reclaim readers from the fringes. Audiences should be targeted based on their values and what they feel is important. To gain a first hearing, communicators should find an ‘entry point’ where the messenger and audience share common ground. All communicators seeking to promote a more balanced debate should aim to develop messages that can support a single overarching meta-narrative: for example, that migration is a normal phenomenon that can bring benefits to European societies if managed effectively and in full respect of fundamental human rights. More effective communication strategies can help to undermine threat-based discourses about migration. But such narrative strategies must also be backed up by policy changes. Effective policies combined with alternative narratives will go a long way towards resolving the concerns that drive disinformation on migration. A more balanced debate will, in turn, facilitate the adoption of meaningful reforms in line with EU fundamental values and human rights, thus creating a mutually reinforcing cycle of alternative narratives and policymaking

Brussels, Belgium: Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS). 2020. 52p.

By PICUM

Migration policies are far from being racially neutral. They determine who is eligible for citizenship, regulate mobility across borders, and dictate the type of residence permits people may obtain, if any. These policies serve as gatekeepers of inclusion and exclusion within our communities, shaping individuals’ experiences of discrimination and marginalisation, and leave many individuals with undocumented or precarious statuses. The resulting patterns of marginalisation often follow racialised lines. This briefing explores EU migration policies and enforcement practices from the perspective of racial justice. It does so by drawing upon insights from a legal seminar that PICUM co-organised with the Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice in November 2023, which looked at the intersection of racial profiling, policing and immigration control. It also draws upon prior analysis conducted by a wide range of civil society organisations. The briefing shows both how the EU’s anti-discrimination legal and policy framework fails to adequately protect racialised communities, and how EU migration policies contribute to racial inequalities.

Brussels, Belgium: PICUM, 2024. 46p.

By Pilatowsky, Eynel; Ruiz Contreras, Juanita

This document analyses public perception regarding migration in the region for 2023, using data collected by the Public Perceptions Laboratory on Migration. Social media monitoring shows a slight decrease in the conversation about migration compared to the previous year, but security remains the most relevant topic for the public. Concerns about crime and unemployment continue to be common, influencing the perceptions of host societies. Additionally, xenophobia remains present in public discourse, with an increase in xenophobic responses to institutional tweets. The report focuses on two dynamics of continental mobility: the arrival of Venezuelan population in specific countries and changes in public opinion regarding new migratory flows in El Darién and the Central American corridor towards the United States. The Laboratory aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of perceptions in the region to support decision-making and grasp the overall state of public opinion on regional migration dynamics.

023 Inter-American Development Bank.IDB , 2023. 20p.

By  Ariel G. Ruiz Soto and Andrew Selee

Increasingly, research suggests that providing legal pathways for migration may reduce unauthorized migration pressures, especially when coupled with targeted enforcement. As policymakers across the Americas assess whether and how to expand legal mobility pathways, understanding the pathways that exist currently and how they are used is a vital starting point. This fact sheet examines the U.S. legal pathways that exist for nationals of Mexico and the northern Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which have long been among the top sources of unauthorized migration to the United States. By analyzing U.S. government data, the fact sheet provides an overview of the extent to which migrants from these countries are issued immigrant visas, for those who intend to live permanently in the country; nonimmigrant visas, for those who seek to enter temporarily for seasonal work, study, or business; and humanitarian forms of admission, including refugee resettlement and humanitarian parole.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2024. 15p.

By International Organization for Migration Regional Office for Central America, North America and the Caribbean San Jose, Costa Rica

The increase in irregular migration in the Central American and Mexican routes has generated an increase in the flow of migrants through dangerous zones, exposing migrants to various risks, from the use of dangerous means of transportation to situations of exploitation, violence and disappearances. In recent years, hundreds of migrants have been reported missing or dead in these zones. Protection services face challenges and limitations in providing comprehensive care to the large number of migrants passing through the region. These risks are increased for vulnerable populations such as unaccompanied minors, women and LGBTIQA+ persons. In response, governments recognize the need to ensure the physical, legal and emotional safety of migrants in transit through the region. This study, developed by the IOM Regional Program on Migration with the support of the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration of the United States Department of State, provides crucial information and lines of action to protect migrants in transit, contributing to the fulfillment of international commitments and the strengthening of coordination among member countries for the assistance and protection of migrants.

International Organization for Migration Regional Office for Central America, North America and the Caribbean San Jose, Costa Rica, 2024. 50p.   

By Matthias Lücke , Helena Hahn , Silvia Carta , Martin Ruhs , Mehari Taddele Maru , Paweł Kaczmarczyk , Karolina Łukasiewicz , Marta Pachocka , Tobias Heidland

Recent geopolitical events like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the instrumentalisation of migration from Belarus to Poland are re-shaping the EU's migration policy. To build a resilient migration and asylum system, the EU and its member states must find a way to balance ad hoc, crisis-oriented responses with a long-term, strategic approach. This is one of the main findings of the 2022 MEDAM Assessment Report “Refugee protection in the EU: Building resilience to geopolitical conflict”.

This final report concludes the Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM). Launched in 2016, the project aimed to develop concrete proposals to reform EU asylum and migration policy based on in-depth research. The report considers the most recent developments in the European migration system and reflects on how the numerous crises facing the EU influence the negotiations on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, proposed in 2020, and public perception of migrants and refugees.

As Russia continues to wage war against Ukraine, the report provides an insightful analysis of refugee movements from Ukraine to Europe since February 2022. The authors discuss the effectiveness of the TPD and future challenges that the war's outcome can pose.

The report also considers general, global migration trends. First, it looks more closely at the link between migration and development policies. The report advances the argument that the relation between economic development, foreign aid, and out-migration is a complex one, challenging the widespread belief that better economic conditions encourage migration. The report also explores the preconditions for effective cooperation on migration management with countries of origin and transit, with a particular focus on EU-Africa relations.

Recent geopolitical events have put migration and asylum back at the centre of EU policymaking. Yet, member states are still struggling to find a common, structured and effective response. Finding a way to bridge their deep-seated differences will be vital to ensure that the EU is ready to navigate future crises.

MEDAM Assessment Report . Kiel, Germany: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM). 2022. 92p.

Edited by Alejandra J Josiowicz, Irasema Coronado 

The Americas are witnessing an era of unprecedented human mobility. With their families or unaccompanied, children are part of this immense movement of people. Children Crossing Borders explores the different meanings of the lives of borderland children in the Americas. It addresses migrant children’s struggle to build a sense of belonging while they confront racism and estrangement on a daily basis.

Unified in their common interest in the well-being of children, the contributors bring an unrivaled breadth of experience and research to offer a transnational, multidimensional, and multilayered look at migrant childhoods in Latin America. Organized around three main themes—educational experiences; literature, art and culture, and media depictions; and the principle of the “best interest of the child”—this work offers both theoretical and practical approaches to the complexity of migrant childhood. The essays discuss family and school lives, children’s experience as wage laborers, and the legislation and policies that affect migrants.

This volume draws much-needed attention to the plight of migrant children and their families, illuminating the human and emotional toll that children experience as they crisscross the Americas. Exploring the connections between education, policy, cultural studies, and anthropology, the essays in this volume navigate a space of transnational children’s rights central to Latin American life in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2022. 255p.

By Nicole Ward and Jeanne Batalova

The United States is in the midst of an historic period in its immigration history, facing a changing composition of the immigrant population, pandemic-related pent-up demand for permanent and temporary visas resulting in extensive backlogs, record pressure at the U.S.-Mexico border, and somewhat decreasing public support for expanded immigration. Legal permanent and temporary immigration rose in 2022 after a few years of chill brought about by the COVID-19 public-health crisis and the Trump administration’s restrictive policies and rhetoric. Amid crises around the world, the Biden administration extended or expanded Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for certain eligible immigrants already in the United States and announced special humanitarian parole programs allowing some migrants from several countries to enter the United States and stay temporarily. At the southwest border, record numbers of migrant encounters in 2022 accompanied court orders preventing the Biden administration from revoking the Title 42 public-health order authorizing the rapid expulsion of asylum seekers and other migrants. The administration has proposed a revised system to govern asylum at the border, but as of this writing the situation remains in flux. To promote orderly arrival and processing of asylum seekers and expedite the expulsion of unauthorized migrants, in January 2023 the Biden administration announced another humanitarian parole program to include up to 30,000 authorized newcomers from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela every month if they have a U.S. sponsor. This program was followed by controversial proposed changes to U.S. asylum system. Worldwide, the United States is home to more international migrants than any other country, and more than the next four countries—Germany, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the United Kingdom—combined, according to the UN Population Division’s mid-2020 data. While the U.S. population represents about 5 percent of the total world population, close to 20 percent of all global migrants reside in the United States. This Spotlight offers information about the approximately 45.3 million immigrants in the United States as of 2021, by compiling the most authoritative and current data available. It provides an overview of historic immigration trends in the United States, sociodemographic information about who is immigrating, through which channels, and how many immigrants become naturalized citizens. It also provides data on the government’s enforcement actions and adjudication efforts to process visas.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2023. 34p.

By James Rochlin

The near collapse of the Venezuelan economy since 2015 and the concomitant erosion of public order have led to an exodus of over seven million people by mid-2023, the largest forced migrant flow in recent Latin American history and the second largest globally after Syria. It occurs against a global backdrop of a 400 percent increase in persons displaced across borders between 2010 and 2021. Colombia hosts the largest number of Venezuelan refugees — with about 2.5 million officially recorded by the government. This has occurred during a politically tumultuous period in Colombia, which has featured the reconfiguration of competing illegal armed groups since the signing of the 2016 Peace Accord between the government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a major COVID-19 outbreak in 2020–2021, and a crippling and protracted national strike in 2021.

Within the hemispheric context, Colombia serves as a stop-gap to stem the flow of Venezuelan refugees northward, roughly similar to the role played by Mexico to intercept and diminish migration to the United States. This has especially been the case since the January 5, 2023 announcement by US President Biden, which specified that refugees cannot declare asylum in the US if they attempt to cross the US border without first seeking asylum in their initial transit country. For Venezuelan refugees, the first country they enter is typically Colombia. Further, in May 2023, the Biden administration announced it was considering sending US troops to the Darien Peninsula in Panama, and will perhaps train Colombian forces, to diminish the “trafficking” of Venezuelan refugees and other refugees passing through Colombia and headed north. The result, according to leaders of NGOs and other who work directly with refugees, has been more pressure on Colombia to retain them.

The argument here is twofold. First, human security threats for Venezuelan refugees should be viewed intersectionally in the particular spaces through which they pass — from the collapse of order in their home countries (which qualifies them as refugees), through the borderlands with Colombia that pose specific threats to their safety and wellbeing, and to their destinations within Colombia that offer their own peculiar array of opportunities and human security challenges. Second, regularization programs such as the Estatuto Temporal de Protección de Migrantes Venezolanos (ETPMV) are the best way to promote human security for refugees in Colombia in the short and medium terms, but this process needs to be more inclusive.1 The first half of this paper discusses the conceptual underpinnings that link power/mobility/space to human security for refugees. The second part brings those concepts to life through interviews with an assortment of refugees.

The paper draws from a database of interviews with 72 Venezuelan refugees in Colombia in 2022 and 2023 regarding the intersectional nuances of human security. It also relies on interviews with dozens of security, migration, and human rights experts in Colombia since 1997. A unique conceptual perspective is developed regarding critical human security for Venezuelan refugees. Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 11, Issue 4, December 2023, Pages 333-355

By Susan Schmidt

While gang violence, community violence, and domestic violence have been recognized as contributing factors to Central American migration, less is known about the intersection between child maltreatment and migration. This article uses secondary data from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) interviews with unaccompanied minors from Central America and Mexico to examine child maltreatment. It provides information on the abused children, their abusers, and the questions that led to their disclosure of maltreatment. It finds that girls reported maltreatment at higher rates than boys; only girls in this sample reported sexual abuse and intimate partner violence; and boys experienced physical abuse more than any other form of maltreatment. Overall, girls experienced all forms of abuse at higher rate than boys. Fewer than half of this sample described maltreatment as an explicit reason for migration, even those who viewed it as a type of suffering, harm or danger. In addition, some disclosures suggest that childhood transitions, such as in housing, schooling, or work status, warrant further inquiry as a potential consequence of or contributor to maltreatment. The article recommends that professionals engaged with migrant children in social services, legal services, or migration protection and status adjudications should inquire about maltreatment, recognizing that children may reveal abuse in complex and indirect ways. Protection risks within the home or family environment may provide the grounds for US legal immigration protections, such as Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) or asylum. Practitioners working with unaccompanied migrant children should use varied approaches to inquire about home country maltreatment experiences. Maltreatment may be part of the context of child migration, whether or not it is explicitly mentioned by children as a reason for migration. Policy Recommendations • US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) should update SIJS regulations to reflect changes in the law, and modify application procedures to incorporate research knowledge on the impact of trauma on children. • The US Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and Health and Human Services (HHS), should ensure that all children in immigration proceedings receive legal representation through public-private partnerships overseen by the HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement  (ORR). Passage of Senate Bill 3108, the Fair Day in Court for Kids Act of 2021,1 would at least guarantee legal representation for unaccompanied minors. • Codify legal standards (via USCIS regulation, or Congressional statute) for granting asylum based on gender and gender-based violence, and include standards for children and youth. • Adjudicators from USCIS, Asylum Offices, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) should consider new information about painful, traumatic, or shame-inducing experiences—such as child maltreatment—as part of the gradual process of disclosure, rather than negatively reflecting on the credibility of the applicant. • Federal agencies with immigration responsibilities such as USCIS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and ORR, should be included in the federal government’s Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s (SAMHSA) Interagency Task Force for Trauma-Informed Care. These agencies should require new trainings for immigration adjudicators, including immigration judges, asylum officers, Border Patrol agents, and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) officers, on interviewing and making decisions related to children. • Legal service providers should adopt a holistic approach to service provision that includes social workers as part of the child’s legal team. 

  Journal on Migration and Human Security 2022, Vol. 10(1) 77-92  

By: Anja Radjenovic

In recent years, the migration policy of the European Union (EU) has focused on strict border controls and the externalisation of migration management through cooperation with third countries. Although states have the right to decide whether to grant non-EU nationals access to their territory, they must do this in accordance with the law and uphold individuals' fundamental rights. Not only do the practices and policies of stopping asylum-seekers and migrants in need of protection at or before they reach the European Union's external borders ('pushbacks') erode EU values as enshrined in the EU Treaties, they may also violate international and European humanitarian and human rights laws. National human rights institutions, international bodies and civil society organisations regularly report cases of pushbacks at the European Union's land and sea borders. According to those reports, pushbacks often involve excessive use of force by EU Member States' authorities and EU agencies operating at external borders, and degrading and inhuman treatment of migrants and their arbitrary detention. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for Member States and EU agencies to comply with fundamental rights in their activities to protect the EU's external borders. Several international organizations and other stakeholders have condemned or filed legal actions against the practice of pushbacks carried out at the EU's external borders. In September 2020, the European Commission presented a pact on migration and asylum, including a proposal on pre-entry screening of third-country nationals at EU external borders, in a bid to address these potential breaches of fundamental rights.

Strasbourg, France: European Parliament, 2021. 8p.

By: The European Parliament

The number of border walls and fences worldwide has increased dramatically in recent decades. This also holds for the EU/Schengen area, which is currently surrounded or criss-crossed by 19 border or separation fences stretching for more than 2 000 kilometres (km). Between 2014 and 2022, the aggregate length of border fences at the EU's external borders and within the EU/Schengen area grew from 315 km to 2 048 km. Two main official reasons are put forward for building border fences: to prevent irregular migration and combat terrorism. The construction of fences at EU borders raises important questions as to their compatibility with EU law, in particular the Schengen Borders Code, fundamental rights obligations, and EU funding rules on borders and migration. While border fences are not explicitly forbidden under EU law, their construction and use must be in accordance with fundamental rights (such as the right to seek international protection) and the rights and procedural safeguards provided by EU migration law. Amid renewed pressure and tensions at the EU's external borders, in 2021, several Member States asked the European Commission to allow them the use of EU funds to construct border fences, which they regarded as an effective border protection measure against irregular migration. According to Regulation (EU) 2021/1148, EU funding can support 'infrastructure, buildings, systems, and services' required to implement border checks and border surveillance. The Commission has so far resisted demands to interpret this provision as allowing for the construction or maintenance of border fences. The European Parliament has condemned the practice of 'pushbacks' at the EU borders consistently, expressing deep concern 'about reports of severe human rights violations and deplorable detention conditions in transit zones or detention centers in border areas'. Moreover, Parliament stressed that the protection of EU external borders must be carried out in compliance with relevant international and EU law, including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Strasbourg, France, European Parliament 2023. 8p.

By: DUMBRAVA Costica

More than 90 % of people who cross the external borders of the European Union (EU) irregularly do so with the assistance of migrant smugglers. The facilitation of irregular migration is a highly profitable criminal activity, given the relatively low risks incurred by the perpetrators. Detections of irregular border crossings are at their highest levels since 2016, yet demand for migration facilitation services has also risen to a new high. This high demand is not only due to the fact that people in severe distress – whether because of genuine fear for their lives or for economic reasons – keep trying to reach the EU, by irregular means if necessary. Demand is also high because it has become harder to cross the EU's external borders illegally, because of increased external border controls and other measures put in place to prevent irregular migration. This is where migrant smuggling networks step in. Migrant smugglers are among some of the most agile criminals. They go to great lengths to avoid getting caught, quickly adapting the routes and methods they use to smuggle migrants into, within or beyond the EU. The facilitation of irregular migration is a complex crime, interconnected with many other criminal activities, such as document fraud, trafficking in human beings and other types of illicit smuggling. The criminal organisations involved in smuggling migrants are increasingly sophisticated, professional and violent. Although people willingly pay smugglers to help them cross borders, they do so at great personal risk. Too many lose their lives, or are at risk of serious harm or exploitation. Preventing and combating migrant smuggling and related crimes is therefore one of the key priorities of EU action against irregular migration and organised crime. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for more and better operational cooperation, data sharing and legal migration channels. The European Commission has just proposed new legislation to break the smugglers' business model. This is an update of a briefing from 2021.

Strasbourg, France:European Parliament , 2023. 12p