By Rose Cuison Villazor and Pratheepan Gulasekaram

Resistance to the Trump Administration’s immigration enforcement policies in the form of sanctuary has increased and spread. In addition to the traditional types of sanctuary such as sanctuary cities and churches, the past year has witnessed the proliferation of novel sites of sanctuary—workplaces, school districts, universities, corporations, private homes, and social media—that collectively seek to protect vulnerable immigrants against immigration enforcement. To date, however, legal scholarship on sanctuary has focused almost exclusively on states and municipalities that limit participation with federal immigration authorities. Accordingly, doctrinal and theoretical discussion has centered on sanctuary’s constitutional dimensions, on Tenth Amendment and federalism concerns. This narrow framing is myopic. It fails to capture the varied legal and policy issues that surround the innovative and evolving concept of sanctuary today.

This Article is the first to comprehensively describe and theorize both conventional and emerging types of sanctuary. Adopting network governance theories developed by political theorists, this Article coins the term “sanctuary network” to argue that current public and private examples of sanctuary are best understood as part of a broader system of legal resistance characterized by a decentralized and distributed set of actors. By reframing sanctuary in this way, this Article makes three points. First, doctrinally, this framework forces a rethinking of the legal issues that animate these sanctuaries. Our recasting moves the sanctuary debate beyond federalism and draws attention to several underappreciated common law, statutory, and constitutional sources that support these variegated claims. Second, as a normative claim, this Article argues that when operating as a networked sanctuary, public and private actors are more effectively able to instantiate an alternative set of norms to challenge the federal government’s enforcement scheme. Finally, as a prescriptive matter, this Article concludes that sanctuary networks are desirable because they democratize our national debate over immigration policy, allowing multiple institutions and individuals to calibrate immigration enforcement. Ultimately, this new way of understanding modern day sanctuary networks encourages novel methods of legal resistance.

Minnesota Law Review, February 14, 2019

By the Congressional Research Service (CRS). 

There is no official or agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a “sanctuary” jurisdiction, and there has been debate as to whether the term applies to particular states and localities. Moreover, state and local jurisdictions have varied reasons for opting not to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement efforts, including reasons not necessarily motivated by disagreement with federal policies, such as concern about potential civil liability or the costs associated with assisting federal efforts. But traditional sanctuary policies are often described as falling under one of three categories. First, so-called “don’t enforce” policies generally bar state or local police from assisting federal immigration authorities. Second, “don’t ask” policies generally bar certain state or local officials from inquiring into a person’s immigration status. Third, “don’t tell” policies typically restrict information sharing between state or local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities. One legal question relevant to sanctuary policies is the extent to which states, as sovereign entities, may decline to assist in federal immigration enforcement, and the degree to which the federal government can stop state measures that undermine federal objectives. The Tenth Amendment preserves the states’ broad police powers, and states have frequently enacted measures that, directly or indirectly, address aliens residing in their communities. Under the doctrine of preemption—derived from the Supremacy Clause—Congress may displace many state or local laws pertaining to immigration. But not every state or local law touching on immigration matters is necessarily preempted; the measure must interfere with, or be contrary to, federal law to be rendered unenforceable. Further, the anti-commandeering doctrine, rooted in the Constitution's allocation of powers between the federal government and the states, prohibits Congress from forcing state entities to perform regulatory functions on the federal government's behalf, including in the context of immigration. A series of Supreme Court cases inform the boundaries of preemption and the anti-commandeering doctrine, with the Court most recently opining on the issue in Murphy v. NCAA. These dueling federal and state interests are front and center in numerous lawsuits challenging actions taken by the Trump Administration to curb states and localities from implementing sanctuary-type policies. Notably, Section 9(a) of Executive Order 13768, “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” directs the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General to withhold federal grants from jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373—a statute that bars states and localities from prohibiting their employees from sharing with federal immigration authorities certain immigration-related information. The executive order further directs the Attorney General to take “appropriate enforcement action” against jurisdictions that violate Section 1373 or have policies that “prevent or hinder the enforcement of federal law.” To implement the executive order, the Department of Justice added new eligibility conditions to the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) Program and grants administered by the Justice Department’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). These conditions tied eligibility to compliance with Section 1373 and other federal immigration priorities, like granting federal authorities access to state and local detention facilities housing aliens and giving immigration authorities notice before releasing from custody an alien wanted for removal. Several lawsuits were filed challenging the constitutionality of the executive order and new grant conditions. So far the courts that have reviewed these challenges—principally contending that the executive order and grant conditions violate the separation of powers and anti-commandeering principles—generally agree that the Trump Administration acted unconstitutionally. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a permanent injunction blocking enforcement of “Sanctuary” Jurisdictions: Federal, State, and Local Policies and Related Liti Section 9(a) against California. Additionally, two separate district courts permanently enjoined the Byrne JAG conditions as applied to Chicago and Philadelphia. In doing so, these courts concluded that the Supreme Court’s most recent formulation of the anti-commandeering doctrine in Murphy requires holding Section 1373 unconstitutional. These lawsuits notwithstanding, the courts still recognize the federal government’s pervasive, nearly exclusive role in immigration enforcement. This can be seen in the federal government’s lawsuit challenging three California measures governing the state’s regulation of private and public actors’ involvement in immigration enforcement within its border. Although a district court opined that several measures likely were lawful exercises of the state’s police powers, it also concluded that two provisions regulating private employers are likely unlawful under the Supremacy Clause. This ruling was mostly upheld on appeal, in which the Ninth Circuit additionally opined that a provision requiring the California attorney general to review the circumstances surrounding detained aliens’ apprehension and transfer to detention facilities within the state also violates the Supremacy Clause.

Washington, DC: CRS. 2019. 44p.

By Margaret Monyani, Adamnesh Bogale and Ottilia Anna Maunganidze

Robust legal frameworks and migration management measures in Ethiopia and Kenya give these countries a strong basis for effective migration governance consistent with the rule of law. However, some policy improvements are needed, along with more consistent implementation and better protection of migrants’ rights. Filling these gaps is vital if Ethiopia and Kenya are to advance their role in continental migration governance.

Key findings : The Horn of Africa is a key source, transit and destination region for migrants. National, regional, continental and international multilateral processes to improve migration governance are in place in the region. Countries like Ethiopia and Kenya have developed frameworks to address evolving dynamics, aimed at enhancing legal migration pathways, responding to forced displacement, stimulating regional integration, and tackling the smuggling and trafficking of persons. In Ethiopia and Kenya, policies and practices are informed by regional and global mixed migration trends. While migration governance frameworks in Ethiopia and Kenya are fairly robust and factor in the rule of law, there are weaknesses that need to be addressed. These include gaps in practical migration governance and the inconsistent application of the rule of law. Migration governance should be factored across various government departments in a consistent and coherent manner. For good migration governance to enhance development and growth, gaps in policies and practices must be dealt with. 

Recommendations : The governments of Ethiopia and Kenya should: Review existing migration policies to identify inconsistencies with rule of law principles. Harmonise migration policies in line with international and continental standards and ensure the protection of migrants’ rights. Regularly evaluate the impact of policies and programmes to identify areas for improvement. Encourage community participation in migration-related initiatives to foster shared responsibility and ownership, including through awareness-raising campaigns. Invest in strengthening the capacity of law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders involved in managing migration, focusing on skills and knowledge of migration laws. Engage the private sector in migration governance, particularly regarding labour migration and migrant integration. While migration governance frameworks in Ethiopia and Kenya are fairly robust and factor in the rule of law, there are weaknesses that need to be addressed. These include gaps in practical migration governance and the inconsistent application of the rule of law. Migration governance should be factored across various government departments in a consistent and coherent manner.

EAST AFRICA REPORT 51 |  Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 23p.

By The European Parliament

In the past decade, continuous migration and asylum pressure on European Union Member States has made the external dimension of the EU's approach to migration management all the more important. The need to address challenges relating to external border management has reoriented EU migration policy towards extended and stricter border controls, combined with the externalisation of migration management through cooperation with third countries. In this context, the external processing of asylum claims has also been put forward as a possibility. External processing entails applications for international protection being processed beyond the EU's external borders, in third countries. An individual processed externally whose claim was successful would then, in theory, be resettled to an EU Member State. Asylum is governed by international, EU and national laws. Both EU and national asylum legislation must be aligned with the international legal framework. Although EU law does not provide for the processing of asylum applications outside the EU, the idea of 'transit' or 'processing' centres in third countries has been recurrent over the years. Examples of externalisation procedures can be found around the world. Some non-EU countries, such as Australia and the United States, have practical experience of the extra-territorial processing of asylum claims. Back in 1986, Denmark tabled a draft resolution in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to create UN centres where asylum claims could be processed, in order to coordinate the resettlement of refugees among all states. Later, in 2001 and 2002, when the EU experienced the first peak of migrant arrivals in the EU, this was followed by a series of proposals involving the external processing of asylum requests. Extraterritorial processing was first put forward by the United Kingdom in 2003, while Germany proposed the establishment of asylum centres in North Africa in 2005. Another upsurge of arrivals was experienced from 2014 to 2016; this led – among other things – to the signature of the EU-Turkey Statement. The series of proposals made over the years with a view to externalising migration policies, have raised concerns, not least in relation to the human rights implications, asylum procedures and EU and international law.

Brussels, Belgium: European Parliament, 2024. 12p.

By Ludger Pries, Oscar Calderón Morillón, and Brandon Amir Estrada Ceron

Mexico is increasingly important as a country of transit migration between the Global South and the Global North. Migration dynamics from Central America to and through Mexico are mainly considered as economic or mixed migration of people looking for work and a better life in the USA. Nevertheless, since the 2010s the number of asylum applications in Mexico has sky rocketed. Based on a survey of Central American migrants in Mexico we demonstrate that some kind of (organized) violence was a crucial driver for leaving and a constant companion during their journey. After contextualizing the migration route from the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) toward Mexico, we present the design of the study, describe sociodemographic and general contexts of the 350 interviewees, and present the migration trajectories as long-lasting sequences of events and stays, where violence in quite different forms always is at play.

Journal on Migration and Human Security - Online First, , 2023.

By Syed Muhammad Ishraque Osman, Antonia Gkergki

Limited scholarly attention has been devoted to examining the impact of immigration on developing economies relative to developed ones. Even the impact of immigration on developed nations continues to be a subject of intense debate. The voluminous empirical literature that has emerged in this field is far from conclusive. In this paper we test the impact of an unprecedented increase in immigrants with dissimilar social, but similar human capital on the host country’s crime. To do this we explore the Syrian refugee influx in Turkey. Our work contributes to the new area of research in the literature by examining how immigrants with varying levels of social capital affect emerging economies rather than developed ones. We found no impact on violent crime, but found a significant impact on non-violent crime. Using a more machine learning approach of ‘Trajectory Balancing’, we found our significant impact result for the non-violent crime to be robust and strikingly close. We also use 'Causal Forest' which is one of the most sophisticated (if not the most) causal machine learning methods. Using Causal Forest, we effectively unmasked the average treatment effect on the non-violent crime rate and investigate the heterogeneous treatment effect depending on region level characteristics, which can greatly assist policymakers in this regard. We also argue that the higher impact on non-violent crime rate is due to the displacement of natives by migrants, from the more competitive informal job (agricultural) sector in the treated regions

Unpublished paper, 2023. 41p.

By Carolina Scaramutti https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4587-5316c.scaramutti@gmail.com, Renae Danielle Schmidt, et al.

Millions of Venezuelans have fled their country in hopes for a better future outside the political and financial turmoil in their home country. This paper examines the self-reported needs of Venezuelans in the United States and Colombia. Specifically, it looks at perceived discrimination in each country and its effect on the service needs of Venezuelan immigrants. The authors used data from a larger project conducted in October to November 2017 to perform a qualitative content analysis on the specific services that participants and others like them would need following immigration. The sample consisted of 647 Venezuelan immigrant adults who had migrated to the United States (n = 342) or Colombia (n = 305).

Its findings indicate statistically significant differences between the two countries. Venezuelan immigrants in the United States were more likely to identify mental health and educational service needs, while those in Colombia were more likely to list access to healthcare, help finding jobs, and food assistance. When looking at perceived discrimination, means scores for discrimination were significantly greater for participants who indicated needing housing services, who indicated needing assistance enrolling children in school and who indicated needing food assistance, compared to participants who did not list those needs. Venezuelans who had experienced greater negative context of reception were less likely to indicate needing mental health services, where 11.9 percent of those who did not perceive a negative context of reception responded that they needed mental health services.

Evaluating existing service networks will be essential in working to bridge the gap between the services provided to and requested by Venezuelans. Collaboration between diverse government actors, community-based organizations (CBOs) and other stakeholders can help identify gaps in existing service networks. CBOs can also facilitate communication between Venezuelan immigrants and their new communities, on the need to invest in necessary services.

 Journal on Migration and Human Security, 0(0).  (online 2023)

By Niloufer Taber, Lina Cook, Chris Mai and Jennifer Hill

Access to education is in high demand among the incarcerated population. There are clear benefits to students who are incarcerated, their families and communities, public safety, and safety inside prisons. Yet the gap in educational aspirations and participation has been largely driven by a lack of capacity due to limited funding.

The Manhattan District Attorney’s Criminal Justice Investment Initiative funded the College-in-Prison Reentry Initiative (CIP) to close this gap by expanding access to college education in prisons throughout New York State. In this report, Vera Institute of Justice (Vera) researchers unpack the impact of participation in degree programs offered by seven colleges participating in CIP and reveal the effects that college in prison can have on in-facility behavior, recidivism, employment, and income after release. Vera additionally presents a cost analysis of program delivery and potential expansion, in order to better understand the potential return on investment of such initiatives.

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2023. 52p.

By Christopher M. Campbell, et al.

In an effort to empirically explore and identify potential areas of reform that might exist in the Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (the Board) release process hearings and decision-making process, the Criminal Justice Reform Clinic at Lewis & Clark Law School (CJRC) launched a project funded by Arnold Ventures in November of 2020. This project aimed to understand how incarcerated potential parolees (petitioners) and parolees in the community are impacted by the Board’s process using a large-scale mixed method (qualitative and quantitative) research study. Moreover, the purpose of the study is also to examine how the Board’s decisions and processes may be related to certain outcomes (e.g., initial release and supervision failure). Where possible, special attention is given to differences in race/ethnicity of the parolee and subsequent outcomes of decisions and supervisions. The key research goals of this study were to (1) determine if there are any patterns in Board decisions to release an eligible person to parole supervision, (2) determine if there are any differences across cases brought before the Board, (3) identify how the hearing and decision-making process impact eligible parties/parolees, and (4) examine the degree to which release decisions are accurate in determining a parolee’s likelihood to reoffend. Below are summaries of each goal and a brief overview of the takeaway messages from each section. Please note that the data and findings associated with each goal capture cases released over the last several years. They encompass laws that have changed as well as many Board member cohorts that have long since turned over during the analyzed time-frame. For this report, the Board is examined and discussed as a living institution, the scope of which can be impacted depending on who serves on it. Thus, none of the conclusions provided here are directed at any one cohort of Board members, including the current Board. In fact, limited data were available on decisions made by the current cohort for this report due to several reasons (e.g., COVID-19 disruptions and lack of staffing resources). All findings and conclusions are drawn from data and reflections that incorporate multiple Board cohorts and governor administrations. As a result, all recommendations made here are focused on reforms to improve the fairness, transparency, and legitimacy of the Board as an institution while maintaining the mission of public safety. Recommendations are provided to emphasize the fact that the Board’s processes and policies transcend any single cohort of Board members and culture, and the codification of data-driven policies is the best way to safeguard fairness across Board cohorts. 

Portland, OR:  Criminal Justice Reform Clinic at Lewis & Clark Law School . 2020. 93p.

By John Bae

Housing is a human right. However, for many people in the United States, the right to safe and affordable housing is not secure. Discriminatory and restrictive policies bar admission to housing for millions of people with a history of arrest or conviction. But housing providers and policymakers are now taking steps to address this. In recent years, the agencies that administer the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program have started to adopt more inclusive policies. In this report, Vera consolidates state housing finance agencies’ rules and regulations that determine admission to affordable housing for people with conviction histories. The policies across the country reflect varying admissions standards, highlighting opportunities for jurisdictions to increase housing stability and public safety.

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2023. 26p

By Jacqueline Altamirano Marin, John Bae and Niloufer Taber

Housing is foundational for people to succeed post-incarceration. However, restrictive housing policies bar people with conviction histories from securing a home. To estimate the scope of this issue in Oklahoma, Vera analyzed criminal justice data and the admissions policies of public housing authorities and developments funded by the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program. The fact sheet sheds light on the number of people affected by these policies and offers recommendations to increase access to safe and affordable housing for all individuals.

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2023. 3p.

By Daniel LaChance

It was a compromise that admitted Missouri into the Union as a state in 1821, temporarily settling a question that would soon divide the country into civil war: was it moral for white people to own Black people as property? In Missouri, the answer was yes, and it joined the Union only with assurance that white people could lawfully continue to own enslaved Black people in the territory. A few decades later, the United States Supreme Court told one of those enslaved men, a man named Dred Scott, that not only would he remain in slavery in Missouri, but also that he was not, and never would be, a citizen of the United States. From the beginning, therefore, race was a critical part of Missouri’s origin story, and racial bias in all its forms — segregation, discrimination, con#ict, and violence – informed its future. "is report focuses on the death penalty — its past and present use. By studying who are targeted, prosecuted, and executed  in Missouri, both legally and illegally, clear patterns emerge. "e data show that the race of defendants and the race of their victims has always played an outsize role in determining who will be sentenced to death in Missouri. "ere are also strong correlations suggesting that charging decisions, crime solving, and policing are also in#uenced by Missouri’s historical treatment of Black people. "e areas of concern identi!ed in this report are deserving of careful study, and may be of particular interest to researchers, legislators, and advocates. Early death penalty statutes identified specific crimes that were only punishable by death if committed by an enslaved person. Historically, a person’s race was the most important factor in determining whether they would be punished by death in Missouri. In 1804, the territory encompassing present-day Missouri adopted “"e Law Respecting Slaves,” which outlined a series of crimes punishable by death only if they were committed by an enslaved person. "ese crimes included slave conspiracy to rebel, make insurrection, or murder; slave preparation, exhibition, or administration of any medicine; and stealing a slave. Black people and white people alike were eligible to receive death sentences for any of the following crimes: treason, murder, arson, and burglary or robbery where an innocent person died.1 "en in 1820, white delegates in the territory attended the Missouri Constitutional Convention and drafted the !rst state constitution. Among the provisions they adopted was a death penalty statute that purported to eliminate these racial distinctions. Article III, Section 27 of the constitution read in part, “...a slave convicted of a capital o%ence shall su%er the same degree of punishment, and no other, that would be in#icted upon a free white person for a like o%ence...” "e subsequent section dictated that “Any person who shall maliciously deprive of life or dismember a slave, shall su%er such punishment as would be in#icted for the like o%ence if it were committed on a free white person.”2 While this provision super!cially eliminated racially speci!c death sentences, the reality was that race continued to play a critical role in determining who would live or die in Missouri, either at the hands of the state or by a murderous mob. 

Washington, DC: Death Penalty Information Center, 2023.   43p.

By Susanne Brandtsta¨dter, Peter Wade and Kath Woodward

This special issue arose from a concern with the political logic of the foregrounding of collective culture(s) in the context of changing citizenship regimes. 1 Its key focus is the conjuncture in which ‘culture’ Á claims of a collective distinction concerning heritage, location, moralities and values Á has become the terrain of political struggles over the subject of rights in national and international politics, the re-allocation of entitlements, definitions of value and new forms of political representation. This appears to be linked to contemporary processes of neoliberalization, the politics of which are often defined in terms of economic policies promoting private accumulation, entrepreneurship and free markets, but which typically also include a project of governance in which not only individuals, but also collective agents Á which may be ‘cultural’ entities Á are charged with increasing responsibility for their own regulation, welfare and enterprise, but in a depoliticized and bureaucratized mode (Santos, 2005).

Routledge Taylor and francis. 2011. 18p.

By Yves Guermond

The crisis of citizenship in democratic countries is a topic that I am accustomed to study and that I have developed in a recent book [1]. A definitive definition of the concept is hazardous as as it it continuously evolves across the centuries. It is presently caught in the crossfire between two emerging trends: the the diversification of the public sphere with the extension of critical analysis, and and on on the the other side the growth of various kinds of cosmopolitism.

Academia Letters. 2024. 3p.

By Daniel LaChance

In the immediate aftermath of Reconstruction, coverage of executions in the Atlanta Constitution and the New Orleans (Times-)Picayune occasionally portrayed African Americans executed by the state as legally, politically, and spiritually similar to their white counterparts. But as radical white supremacy took hold across the South, the coverage changed. Through an analysis of 667 newspaper articles covering the executions of Black and white men in Georgia and Louisiana from 1877 to 1936, I found that as lynching became the principal form of lethal punishment in the South, accounts of Black men’s legal executions shrank in length and journalists increasingly portrayed them as ciphers, nonentities that the state was dispatching with little fanfare. In contrast, accounts of white men’s executions continued to showcase their individuality and their membership in social, political, and religious communities. A significant gap between the material reality and the cultural representation of capital punishment emerged. Legal executions in Georgia and Louisiana overwhelmingly targeted Black men. But on the pages of each state’s most prominent newspaper, the executions of white men received the most attention. As a result, capital punishment was increasingly represented as a high-status punishment that respected the “whiteness” of those who suffered it.

Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 48 , Issue 3 , August 2023 , pp. 999 - 1022

By The World Rainforest Movement

Almost 30 years of UN climate negotiations have resulted in the establishment of policies and practices that facilitate the constant expansion of the fossil fuel-based economy (and its profits) while hiding its implacable negative impacts for the territories where it expands. Almost 30 years of UN climate negotiations have resulted in the establishment of policies and practices that facilitate the constant expansion of the fossil fuel-based economy (and its profits) while hiding its implacable negative impacts for the territories where it expands. Particularly, the fantasy of carbon offsetting as a solution to the climate crisis is ever more present among the methods of corporate greenwashing for expanding their businesses, despite the mounting evidence of its complete failure to reduce emissions or deforestation - as recently denounced by several organizations. However, the strategies adopted by corporations are unable to hide the oppressive and colonial essence of their advances in the Global South. Precisely for this reason, they keep encountering much resistance when they arrive in the territories of the Peoples and communities. This issue of the WRM Bulletin shares articles that can be divided in two parts. The first part exposes four initiatives that dress themselves up as ‘green’ or ‘socially beneficial’ so as to ensure that extractive and production activities carry on unhindered. After all, these are the engine of the capitalist economy, which in turn is the main cause of the problems that such ‘green’ ventures claim they help solving. The second part highlights three experiences of resistance from the territories to such corporate assault. The first article highlights the embedded contradictions of the so-called “energy transition” by exposing how “the largest green industrial area in the world”, in Kalimantan, Indonesia, will in fact lead to an increase in coal extraction in the region. At the same time, this multi-billion dollar project threatens to appropriate and destroy the livelihoods and interconnected spaces of life on land and sea from which grassroots communities depend upon. These communities are at the frontlines resisting this industrial park in order to defend life. The next two articles show the different consequences of two kinds of projects that claim to be offsetting carbon and which largely depend on community territories. One exposes the trend to expand problematic tree plantations, above all in the Global South, with the argument that the trees will “offset” the pollution emitted somewhere else. This includes the whole gamut from large-scale monoculture plantations sponsored by the pulp industry to those nicely sounding plantations promoted by investment funds by means of abusive contracts with indigenous communities. The other article reflects on the abusive contracts for establishing REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) projects in the brazilian Amazon region, specifically on how they compromise millennia-old indigenous practices and communities’ future generations.  The fourth article presents an overview of the perverse logic of certification schemes that over the last 30 years have given ‘sustainability’ and ‘responsibility’ seals to companies from different industries that cause destruction, such as the pulp and paper, palm oil and carbon offsets industries, among others. Such seals often completely ignore violations caused by corporations and legitimize their presence in community territories. The following two articles also expose the greenwashing of industrial monoculture plantations through certification, yet, the focus is turned to highlight the experiences of people’s resistance and organization. In Cameroon, women organized in the Afrise association have shouted a fearless and determined “Enough!” against oil palm plantation company Socapalm/Socfin, which is responsible for decades of “suffering, abuses, violations, theft, hunger, frustration and violations” of their bodies, rights and dignity. We express our full solidarity with these women who, with each others’ support, have declared that they will not tolerate the replanting of oil palm monoculture plantations in their territories. The next article reflects in an interview with Pablo Reyes Huenchumán, member of a Mapuche community in Chile, on the impacts of the violent forestry model imposed on the country which is based on large-scale monoculture plantations. But also, on the achievements and challenges of the Indigenous Mapuche to defend their communities and lives. Pablo explained how the Mapuche have been reclaiming their territories for over 20 years, showing that self-organization and resistance are key.

WRM Bulletin 268 December 2023

By Polaris

We have long known human trafficking to be a pervasive and versatile crime, as traffickers and exploiters adjust to changing environments. The COVID-19 pandemic showed us the profound adaptability of human trafficking. A global pandemic did not stop or impede trafficking from happening and, with few exceptions, did not seem to change how it happens or to whom it happens. In this report, we examine data from the National Human Trafficking Hotline from January 2020 through August 2022 and explore a snapshot of the top findings of human trafficking during the calamitous pandemic years. We provide top trends and answers to questions we typically report on as a part of our data analysis, and introduce how select trends that began early in the pandemic changed or continued as the crisis evolved. 

Washington, DC: Polaris, 2024. 10p

Josiah Heyman, Chair; Roberto Álvarez; Julie Peteet; Reinhard Bernbeck ; Zahir Ahmed;Fabian Crespo

Themes:

Connection between displacement and borders/walls ➢ Historical depth to structural means of inclusion/exclusion ➢ Walls include/exclude and define parameters of belonging and rights/privileges ➢ Violence – pervasive - overt and always a potential ➢ Climate change and its impacts are going to trigger massive flows north (We haven’t done much on this topic, but it is certainly on the horizon) ➢ North-South global divide – fortress north; global apartheid continues to take shape and adapt to changing circumstances ➢ Unevenness in mobilities ➢ Booming and lucrative industry around control over mobility from actual building of walls to surveillance technologies (i.e., vested interests are at work) ➢ Documentary regimes – as an accompaniment to borders and walls from identity cards to passports to possible, impending health passports. ➢ Environmental impact is serious ➢ Human Rights violations – mobility as a human right; the right to seek asylum

Arlington, VA; American Anthropological Association, 2021. 131p.

By: Anja Radjenovic

In recent years, the migration policy of the European Union (EU) has focused on strict border controls and the externalisation of migration management through cooperation with third countries. Although states have the right to decide whether to grant non-EU nationals access to their territory, they must do this in accordance with the law and uphold individuals' fundamental rights. Not only do the practices and policies of stopping asylum-seekers and migrants in need of protection at or before they reach the European Union's external borders ('pushbacks') erode EU values as enshrined in the EU Treaties, they may also violate international and European humanitarian and human rights laws. National human rights institutions, international bodies and civil society organisations regularly report cases of pushbacks at the European Union's land and sea borders. According to those reports, pushbacks often involve excessive use of force by EU Member States' authorities and EU agencies operating at external borders, and degrading and inhuman treatment of migrants and their arbitrary detention. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for Member States and EU agencies to comply with fundamental rights in their activities to protect the EU's external borders. Several international organizations and other stakeholders have condemned or filed legal actions against the practice of pushbacks carried out at the EU's external borders. In September 2020, the European Commission presented a pact on migration and asylum, including a proposal on pre-entry screening of third-country nationals at EU external borders, in a bid to address these potential breaches of fundamental rights.

Strasbourg, France: European Parliament, 2021. 8p.

By: The European Parliament

The number of border walls and fences worldwide has increased dramatically in recent decades. This also holds for the EU/Schengen area, which is currently surrounded or criss-crossed by 19 border or separation fences stretching for more than 2 000 kilometres (km). Between 2014 and 2022, the aggregate length of border fences at the EU's external borders and within the EU/Schengen area grew from 315 km to 2 048 km. Two main official reasons are put forward for building border fences: to prevent irregular migration and combat terrorism. The construction of fences at EU borders raises important questions as to their compatibility with EU law, in particular the Schengen Borders Code, fundamental rights obligations, and EU funding rules on borders and migration. While border fences are not explicitly forbidden under EU law, their construction and use must be in accordance with fundamental rights (such as the right to seek international protection) and the rights and procedural safeguards provided by EU migration law. Amid renewed pressure and tensions at the EU's external borders, in 2021, several Member States asked the European Commission to allow them the use of EU funds to construct border fences, which they regarded as an effective border protection measure against irregular migration. According to Regulation (EU) 2021/1148, EU funding can support 'infrastructure, buildings, systems, and services' required to implement border checks and border surveillance. The Commission has so far resisted demands to interpret this provision as allowing for the construction or maintenance of border fences. The European Parliament has condemned the practice of 'pushbacks' at the EU borders consistently, expressing deep concern 'about reports of severe human rights violations and deplorable detention conditions in transit zones or detention centers in border areas'. Moreover, Parliament stressed that the protection of EU external borders must be carried out in compliance with relevant international and EU law, including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Strasbourg, France, European Parliament 2023. 8p.