By: Priyanka Bhatt, Katie Quigley, Azadeh Shahshahani, Gina Starfield, Ayano Kitano

Immigrants detained at the Irwin County Detention Center (ICDC) in Georgia have, for years, suffered egregious medical abuse, including invasive and medically unnecessary gynecological procedures without consent. Since Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) contracted with ICDC in 2011, advocates have consistently raised concerns about the treatment of immigrants at the facility, including the lack of adequate medical and mental health care. Yet, months after that announcement, immigrants were still being detained in inhumane conditions at ICDC, until the last ones were transferred to other facilities in early September 2021. This report highlights the stories of women who suffered lasting trauma and debilitating physical and psychological effects of the medical abuse they endured while detained at ICDC. The abuses they suffered were first brought to light in September 2020, when Project South, together with Georgia Detention Watch, the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, and the South Georgia Immigrant Support Network, filed a whistleblower complaint with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ICE, and ICDC detailing the gross disregard for the health and medical well-being of immigrants detained at ICDC. The complaint, submitted on behalf of immigrants held at ICDC and whistleblower Dawn Wooten, a licensed practical nurse at ICDC, publicized multiple accounts of immigrant women subjected to non-consensual, medically unnecessary, or invasive gynecological procedures while in detention. Many women detained at ICDC did not understand the invasive medical procedures they were subjected to and, as a result, suffered not only lasting trauma but also debilitating effects of the procedures that they were not informed about. The complaint prompted more than 170 members of Congress to demand an investigation by DHS, which is ongoing. In October 2020, an independent team of medical experts, including board-certified obstetricians, reviewed the medical records of multiple women at ICDC and found a significant pattern of incorrect diagnoses and failure to secure informed consent for medical procedures.8 These abuses occurred despite the fact that the doctor who perpetrated them, Dr. Mahendra Amin, had already been investigated and prosecuted by the Department of Justice for similar abusive behavior, specifically for performing unnecessary medical procedures in violation of the False Claims Act. After these women and many others came forward, DHS and ICE retaliated by deporting and threatening to deport those who spoke out. These actions violate the First Amendment, which guarantees the right to petition the government and participate in federal investigations. By detaining these women for months on end during a global pandemic, DHS, ICE, and ICDC also failed to protect their health and safety, as mandated by the U.S. Constitution, statutes, and regulations. The non-consensual treatment of these women also violates fundamental human rights, including the right to informed consent and bodily autonomy, which may not be violated under any circumstances. The United States must be held accountable for failing to uphold its obligations under both domestic and international law.

Atlanta: Project South, 2021. 37p.

By Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program

The United States maintains the world’s largest immigration detention system, detaining tens of thousands of people in a network of facilities, including those managed by private prison corporations, county jails, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). At the time of writing, ICE is detaining over 35,000 people, including long-term residents of the United States, people seeking asylum, and survivors of trafficking or torture. Instead of finding refuge, these people are held in ICE custody for extended periods, enduring inhuman conditions such as solitary confinement (dubbed “segregation” by ICE), where they are isolated in small cells with minimal contact with others for days, weeks, or even years. In many instances, such conditions would meet the definition of torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under international human rights law. Solitary confinement causes a range of adverse health effects, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), self-harm, and suicide risks. Prolonged confinement can lead to lasting brain damage, hallucinations, confusion, disrupted sleep, and reduced cognitive function. These effects persist beyond the confinement period, often resulting in enduring psychological and physical disabilities, especially for people with preexisting medical and mental health conditions or other vulnerabilities. In recognition of this well-documented harm, ICE issued a directive in 2013 to limit the use of solitary confinement in its facilities, especially for people with vulnerabilities. A 2015 memorandum further protected transgender people, emphasizing solitary confinement as a last resort. In 2022, ICE reinforced reporting requirements for people with mental health conditions in solitary confinement, highlighting the need for strict oversight. Despite these directives, however, government audits and whistleblowers alike have repeatedly revealed stark failures in oversight. This report – a joint effort by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), Harvard Law School’s Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program (HIRCP), and researchers at Harvard Medical School (HMS) – provides a detailed overview of how solitary confinement is being used by ICE across detention facilities in the United States, and its failure to adhere to its own policies, guidance, and directives. It is based on a comprehensive examination of data gathered from ICE and other agencies, including through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, first filed in 2017, and partly acquired after subsequent litigation. It is further enriched by interviews with 26 people who were formerly held in immigration facilities and experienced solitary confinement over the last 10 years. Executive Summary The study reveals that immigration detention facilities fail to comply with ICE guidelines and directives regarding solitary confinement. Despite significant documented issues, including whistleblower alarms and supposed monitoring and oversight measures, there has been negligible progress. The report highlights a significant discrepancy between the 2020 campaign promise of U.S. President Joseph Biden to end solitary confinement and the ongoing practices observed in ICE detention. Over the last decade, the use of solitary confinement has persisted, and worse, the recent trend under the current administration reflects an increase in frequency and duration. Data from solitary confinement use in 2023 – though likely an underestimation as this report explains – demonstrates a marked increase in the instances of solitary confinement. This report exposes a continuing trend of ICE using solitary confinement for punitive purposes rather than as a last resort – in violation of its own directives. Many of the people interviewed were placed in solitary confinement for minor disciplinary infractions or as a form of retaliation for participating in hunger strikes or for submitting complaints. Many reported inadequate access to medical care, including mental health care, during their solitary confinement, which they said led to the exacerbation of existing conditions or the development of new ones, including symptoms consistent with depression, anxiety, and PTSD. The conditions in solitary confinement were described as dehumanizing, with people experiencing harsh living conditions, limited access to communication and recreation, and verbal abuse or harassment from facility staff. etc.....

New York: Physicians for Human Rights, 2024.  50p.

By Brianna da Silva Bhatia, et al.

On December 23, 2020, Bella Quinto-Collins called 911, seeking help for her 30- year-old brother, Angelo Quinto, who was agitated and exhibiting signs of a mental health crisis at their home in Antioch, California. When two police officers arrived, they pulled Quinto from his mother’s arms onto the floor. At least twice, Quinto’s mother, Cassandra Quinto-Collins, heard him say to the officers, “Please don’t kill me.” Bella and Cassandra then watched in disbelief and horror as the two officers knelt on Quinto’s back for five minutes until he stopped breathing. Three days later, Quinto died in the hospital. It was not until August 2021 that the family learned the official determination of cause of death: a forensic pathologist testified during a coroner’s inquest that Quinto died from “excited delirium syndrome.” Angelo Quinto, a Filipino-American Navy veteran, is one of many people, disproportionately people of color, whose deaths at the hands of police have been attributed to “excited delirium” rather than to the conduct of law enforcement officers. In recent years, others have included Manuel Ellis, Zachary Bear Heels, Elijah McClain, Natasha McKenna, and Daniel Prude. “Excited delirium” even emerged as a defense for the officers who killed George Floyd in 2020. An Austin-American Statesman investigation into each non-shooting death of a person in police custody in Texas from 2005 to 2017 found that more than one in six of these deaths (of 289 total) were attributed to “excited delirium.” A January 2020 Florida Today report found that of 85 deaths attributed to “excited delirium” by Florida medical examiners since 2010, at least 62 percent involved the use of force by law enforcement.6 A Berkeley professor of law and bioethics  conducted a search of these two news databases and three others from 2010 to 2020 and found that of 166 reported deaths in police custody from possible “excited delirium,” Black people made up 43.3 percent and Black and Latinx people together made up at least 56 percent.7 When did the term “excited delirium” evolve to describe a distinct type of “delirium?" How did the corresponding term “excited delirium syndrome” become a go-to diagnosis for medical examiners and coroners to use in explaining deaths in police custody? What is the evidence that it is indeed a valid diagnosis? This report traces the evolution of the term from when it appears to have first been coined in the 1980s to the present. Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) reconstructed the history of the term “excited delirium” through a review of the medical literature, news archives, and deposition transcripts of expert witnesses in wrongful death cases. We evaluated current views and applications of the term through interviews with 20 medical and legal experts on deaths in law enforcement custody. Additionally, we spoke to six experts on severe mental illness and substance use disorders to better understand the context in which the term most often arises. Finally, we interviewed members of two families who lost loved ones to police violence for a firsthand account of the harms of the term’s continued use. This report concludes that the term “excited delirium” cannot be disentangled from its racist and unscientific origins. Dr. Charles Wetli, who first coined the term with Dr. David Fishbain in case reports on cocaine intoxication in 1981 and 1985, soon after extended his theory to explain how more than 12 Black women in Miami, who were presumed sex workers, died after consuming small amounts of cocaine. “For some reason the male of the species becomes psychotic and the female of the species dies in relation to sex,” he postulated. As to why all the women dying were Black, he further speculated, without any scientific basis, “We might find out that cocaine in combination with a certain (blood) type (more common in blacks) is lethal.”  
New York: Physicians for Human Rights, 2022. 95p.

By Eleanor Hope Emery. et al.

Although protection for refugees is a longstanding U.S. legal commitment under federal and international law, immigration policy has become a deeply politicized topic in the United States in recent years. Domestic violence and violence by organized gangs represent a major cause of forced displacement for those arriving at the U.S. border. Yet these forms of persecution are viewed skeptically by some policymakers who favor restricting immigration in spite of U.S. legal obligations to ensure the right to seek asylum. Extensive data demonstrates that the increase in migration from Central America to the United States in the past decade has been triggered by physical and sexual violence, death threats, and other abuses by organized gangs, domestic abusers, and government authorities, resulting in high levels of physical and psychological trauma. The Trump administration dismissed these claims as “meritless” and asylum seekers as “fraudsters” who exploit the “loophole” of asylum, alleging that they are actually criminals. Former attorney general Jeff Sessions flouted decades of domestic and international legal precedent by issuing a blanket statement, in a single case, that domestic and gang violence survivors will generally not qualify for asylum. This decision had the immediate impact of increasing denials of Central American asylum claims, in line with the political g  

New York: Physicians for Human Rights, 2021. 54p.

by Kathryn Hampton et al

For the last two years, the Trump administration’s Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), or “Remain in Mexico” policy, have forced almost 70,000 people seeking asylum in the United States to wait in dangerous Mexican border towns while their cases pend – in violation of U.S. and international law, which prohibits returning asylum seekers to places where they fear that they may be persecuted. With the indefinite postponement of immigration hearings due to COVID-19, asylum seekers in MPP face ever-lengthening periods of stay in Mexico, where many have experienced violence, trauma, and human rights abuses.

Since the start of MPP, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) has responded to more than 100 requests by attorneys for pro bono forensic evaluations of asylum seekers enrolled in the program, most in support of asylum claims and a few in support of requests for MPP exemption due to health issues. To quantify the extent of reported health and human rights violations affecting asylum seekers in MPP, PHR partnered with the University of Southern California’s Keck Human Rights Clinic (KHRC) to review 95 deidentified affidavits based on forensic evaluations of asylum seekers from Central and South America ranging in age from 4 to 67 years. We found that at least 11 people belonged to categories that should have been exempt from MPP enrollment.  Although most affidavits focused on the harms migrants fled in their home countries, most documented compounding harms to the migrants after they were returned to Mexico under MPP, including physical violence, sexual violence, kidnapping, theft, extortion, threats, and harm to family members. The affidavits also reported unsanitary and unsafe living conditions, poor access to services, family separations, and poor treatment in U.S. immigration detention. Nearly all of those evaluated were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, and many exhibited other debilitating psychological conditions or symptoms.

This study adds to the considerable evidence that it is not safe for migrants to remain in Mexico while their U.S. asylum cases are pending, and forcing them to do so violates U.S. and international law. The incoming Biden administration should immediately admit all people enrolled in MPP into community settings in the United States, rescind MPP, and initiate an investigation to determine appropriate redress for people harmed by this policy.

New York: Physicians for Human Rights, 

2021. 21p.

By Rashmi LuthraDeindustrialized cities in the United States are at a particular crossroads when it comes to the contest over refugees. Do refugees represent opportunity or danger? These cities are in desperate need to stem population and resource loss, problems that an influx of refugees could seemingly help address. However, the cities are simultaneously dealing with local communities that are already feeling internally displaced by economic and technological flux. For these existing citizens, the prospect of incoming refugee populations can be perceived as a threat to financial, cultural, and personal security. Few U.S. locations provide a more vivid case study of this fight than Metro Detroit, where competing interest groups are waging war over the meaning of the figure of the refugee. This book dives deeply into the discourse on refugees occurring among various institutions in Metro Detroit. The way in which local institutions talk about refugees gives us vital clues as to how they are negotiating competing pressures and how the city overall is negotiating competing imperatives. Indeed, this local discourse gives us a crucial glimpse into how U.S. cities are defining and redefining themselves today. The figure of the refugee becomes a slate on which groups with varied interests write their stories, aspirations, and fears. Consequently, we can figure out from local refugee discourses the ongoing question of what it means to be a Metro Detroiter—and by extension, what it means to be a revitalizing U.S. city in this age.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2024. 210p.

By  Maéva Clément 

This book addresses debates around radicalisation and political violence, and presents a timely analysis of the politics of emotions in narratives of political activism and violence. Drawing on extensive primary data consisting of texts, audios, and videos produced by five Islamist organisations active in the UK in the 2000s and Germany in the early 2010s, the book explores how collective actors move from moderate politics to (violent) extremism. The book develops an innovative theoretical and methodological framework at the intersection of world politics, peace and conflict studies, critical terrorism research, literary studies, and transdisciplinary emotion research. In the first part, Clément problematises previous categorisations of Islamist activism and reconstructs organisations’ phases of activism in a data-driven, systematic way. In the second part, the analysis centres on how organisations legitimise changes in activism narratively. Specifically, the book delves into the performance of collective emotions in and through narrative and interrogates their effects on (violent) collective action. By introducing the concept of ‘narrative emotionalisation’, Clément adds to our understanding of narrative deployments in the context of political violence. While organisations couch radical changes in activism in a strikingly similar romantic narrative, the compared analysis across cases reveals that ‘narrative emotionalisation’ fully unfolds only in phases of extremism. By exploring how non-state actors manage collective emotions, this book extends beyond the ideology-centric and strategic-rationalist approaches to group radicalisation. It offers an insightful and nuanced account of non-state agency and emotion dynamics in political conflicts

Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2023. 274p.

By  By Jess Zhang, Jacob Kang-Brown, and Ari Kotler

Electronic monitoring (EM) is a form of digital surveillance that tracks people’s physical location, movement, or other markers of behavior (such as blood alcohol level). It is commonly used in the criminal legal system as a condition of pretrial release or post-conviction supervision and for people in civil immigration proceedings who are facing deportation.

EM has been shown to carry substantial emotional and physical harms, place onerous restrictions on people’s lives, compromise people’s privacy, and present an ongoing threat of incarceration. However, in contrast to other aspects of incarceration and community supervision, there is no national survey or reporting requirement for the number of people on EM. This report fills a gap in understanding around the size and scope of EM use in the United States.

This report fills a gap in understanding around the size and scope of EM use in the United States. The Vera Institute of Justice’s (Vera) estimates reveal that, in 2021, 254,700 adults were under some form of EM. Of these, 150,700 people were subjected to EM by the criminal legal system and 103,900 by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Further investigation revealed that the number of adults placed on EM by ICE more than tripled between 2021 and 2022, increasing to 360,000.1 This means that the total number of adults on EM across both the civil immigration and criminal legal systems likely increased to nearly half a million during that time. From 2005 to 2021, the number of people on EM in the United States grew nearly fivefold—and almost tenfold by 2022—while the number of people incarcerated in jails and prisons declined by 16 percent and the number of people held in ICE civil detention increased but not nearly as dramatically as EM.2 Regional trends in the criminal legal system reveal how EM has been used more widely in some states and cities but increased sharply from 2019 to 2021 across the country: The Midwest has the highest rate of state and local criminal legal system EM, at 65 per 100,000 residents; this rate stayed relatively constant from 2019 to  midyear 2021. In the Northeast, EM rates are the lowest of all the regions at 19 per 100,000 residents, but they increased by 46 percent from 2019 to 2021. The South and West have similar rates, 41 and 34 per 100,000 residents respectively, but the growth rate in the South has outpaced that of the West in recent years—up 32 percent in the South compared to 18 percent in the West. Prior to this report, the most recent estimate of the national EM population was from a 2015 Pew Charitable Trusts study—which studied the use of criminal legal system EM via a survey of the 11 biggest EM companies. For this report, Vera researchers collected data from criminal legal system agencies in all 50 states and more than 500 counties, as well as from federal courts, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and ICE. Therefore, Vera’s study represents the most comprehensive count of the national EM population to date, as it accounts for the rise of smaller EM companies, immigration system surveillance, and new EM technologies. For this report, Vera researchers also reviewed existing literature and spoke with local officials to better understand the impacts of EM programs. Vera’s findings contradict private companies’ assertions that EM technology is low-cost, efficient, and reliable. EM in the criminal legal system is highly variable and subject to political decisions at the local level. In many jurisdictions, EM is not used as a means to reduce jail populations. Rather, it is often a crucial component of highly punitive criminal legal systems. This challenges the dominant narrative that EM is an “alternative to incarceration.” Nonetheless, this report also highlights several jurisdictions that demonstrate how decarceration can occur alongside reduced surveillance. 

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2024. 54p.

By  I. Kulu-Glasgow, M. van der Meer, J.M.D. Schans,  M.P.C. Scheepmaker 

Unaccompanied minors (UM) coming to Europe form an especially vulnerable group of migrant children, traveling without their parents or other adults exercising authority over them. In many European countries, asking for international protection is the main way for them to receive accommodation and a residence permit. However, minors coming from so-called safe countries, where in general there is no (fear of) persecution (e.g. Morocco, and in the Netherlands until June 2021 Algeria) have little or no chance of receiving a residence permit. Some of these mostly North African youngsters travel from one European country to another, in search of opportunities to work and earn money. According to Dutch supervisors (legal guardians and mentors in the accommodation centres), this group of nomadic minors often face multiple problems, such as drug addiction and mental health problems. This is also the group that sometimes causes incidents at or outside the accommodation centres or is involved in criminal activities (see also Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid, 2021). Studies in the Netherlands show that many of these youngsters go off the radar either before or during the asylum procedure and it is suspected that they stay in the Netherlands or move on to different European countries. In general, knowledge about this group is both limited and fragmented. The aim of this study was to learn more about the background of this group of minors, and gain knowledge about the experiences of other European countries with this specific group of minors. Aims and research questions The general aims of this study were: • to paint a picture of the nomadic existence of UMs with (multiple) problems in Europe; • to investigate the underlying reasons of their nomadic behaviour and the (multiple) problems they have; and • to explore the type of (policy) measures that are taken regarding the supervision and care of this group in other European countries.

Cahier 2023-9  The Hague: Netherlands Ministry of Justice and Security, Report, 2023. 146p.

STUESSY, MEGHAN M.

The passage that follows includes several links embedded in the original text. From the document: "On October 30, 2023, President Biden issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14110 on 'Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence.' This E.O. advances a coordinated approach to the responsible development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) and directs agencies to mitigate privacy risks and bias potentially exacerbated by AI, including 'by AI's facilitation of the collection or use of information about individuals, or the making of inferences about individuals.' [...] The E.O. focuses on three priorities relating to privacy: 1. Identifying and evaluating agency use of commercially available information (CAI); 2. Revising existing privacy requirements for the adoption of AI, including privacy impact assessments (PIAs); and 3. Encouraging agency use of PETs [privacy-enhancing technologies]."

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. 2024.

By Iryna Bogdanova

Are unilateral economic sanctions legal under public international law? How do they relate to the existing international legal principles and norms? Can unilateral economic sanctions imposed to redress grave human rights violations be subjected to the same legal contestations as other unilateral sanctions? What potential contribution can the recently formulated doctrine of Common Concern of Humankind make by introducing substantive and procedural prerequisites to legitimize unilateral human rights sanctions? Unilateral Sanctions in International Law and the Enforcement of Human Rights by Iryna Bogdanova addresses these complex questions while taking account of the burgeoning state practice of employing unilateral economic sanctions.

Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2022. 378p.

By Stephen Schulhofer

In recent years, efforts to update and improve the criminal laws governing sexual assault have been a high priority throughout the world. This article recounts how one facet of that process unfolded in the United States, the compromises and contradictions it generated, and the final upshot of that effort. Although this facet of the American reform process has reached its end-point, efforts to reform the law of sexual assault are inevitably an ongoing work-in-progress. The conclusions reached could be viewed differently by others and might even be revisited at some later date by ourselves. The article also identifies several areas where the conclusions discussed could benefit from further research and analysis.

Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law Working Paper No. 11/2023

By Pew Charitable Trusts

The business of state civil courts has changed over the past three decades. In 1990, a typical civil court docket featured cases with two opposing sides, each with an attorney, most frequently regarding commercial matters and disputes over contracts, injuries, and other harms. The lawyers presented their cases, and the judge, acting as the neutral arbiter, rendered a decision based on those legal and factual arguments. Thirty years later, that docket is dominated not by cases involving adversaries seeking redress for an injury or business dispute, but rather by cases in which a company represented by an attorney sues an individual, usually without the benefit of legal counsel, for money owed. The most common type of such business-to-consumer lawsuits is debt claims, also called consumer debt and debt collection lawsuits. In the typical debt claim case, a business—often a company that buys delinquent debt from the original creditor—sues an individual to collect on a debt. The amount of these claims is almost always less than $10,000 and frequently under $5,000, and typically involves unpaid medical bills, credit card balances, auto loans, student debt, and other types of consumer credit, excluding housing (mortgage or rent). For more than a decade, the American Bar Association and legal advocacy organizations such as the Legal Services Corporation and the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association have sounded alarms about worrisome trends underway in the civil legal system. And court leaders have taken notice. In 2016, a committee of the Conference of Chief Justices, a national organization of state supreme court heads, issued a report recommending that courts enact rules to provide a more fair and just civil legal system, especially with respect to debt collection cases. Chief justices of various supreme courts, with support from private foundations, have established task forces to probe the issue further. However, until relatively recently, these discussions were largely confined to court officials, legal aid advocates, and other stakeholders concerned about the future of the legal profession. In most states, policymakers have not been a part of conversations about how and why civil court systems are shifting; the extent to which the changes might lead to financial harm among American consumers, especially the tens of millions of people in the U.S. who are stuck in long-term cycles of debt; and potential strategies to address these issues. To help state leaders respond to the changing realities in civil courts, The Pew Charitable Trusts sought to determine what local, state, and national data exist on debt collection cases and what insights those data could provide. The researchers supplemented that analysis with a review of debt claims research and interviews with consumer experts, creditors, lenders, attorneys, and court officials. The key findings are: • Fewer people are using the courts for civil cases. Civil caseloads dropped more than 18 percent from 2009 to 2017. Although no research to date has identified the factors that led to this decline, previous Pew research shows lack of civil legal problems is not one of them: In 2018 alone, more than half of all U.S. households experienced one or more legal issues that could have gone to court, including 1 in 8 with a legal problem related to debt. • Debt claims grew to dominate state civil court dockets in recent decades. From 1993 to 2013, the number of debt collection suits more than doubled nationwide, from less than 1.7 million to about 4 million, and consumed a growing share of civil dockets, rising from an estimated 1 in 9 civil cases to 1 in 4. In a handful of states, the available data extend to 2018, and those figures suggest that the growth of debt collections as a share of civil dockets has continued to outpace most other categories of cases. Debt claims were the  most common type of civil case in nine of the 12 states for which at least some court data were available— Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. In Texas, the only state for which comprehensive statewide data are available, debt claims more than doubled from 2014 to 2018, accounting for 30 percent of the state’s civil caseload by the end of that five-year period. • People sued for debts rarely have legal representation, but those who do tend to have better outcomes. Research on debt collection lawsuits from 2010 to 2019 has shown that less than 10 percent of defendants have counsel, compared with nearly all plaintiffs. According to studies in multiple jurisdictions, consumers with legal representation in a debt claim are more likely to win their case outright or reach a mutually agreed settlement with the plaintiff. • Debt lawsuits frequently end in default judgment, indicating that many people do not respond when sued for a debt. Over the past decade in the jurisdictions for which data are available, courts have resolved more than 70 percent of debt collection lawsuits with default judgments for the plaintiff. Unlike most court rulings, these judgments are issued, as the name indicates, by default and without consideration of the facts of the complaint—and instead are issued in cases where the defendant does not show up to court or respond to the suit. The prevalence of these judgments indicates that millions of consumers do not participate in debt claims against them. • Default judgments exact heavy tolls on consumers. Courts routinely order consumers to pay accrued interest as well as court fees, which together can exceed the original amount owed. Other harmful consequences can include garnishment of wages or bank accounts, seizure of personal property, and even incarceration. • States collect and report little data regarding their civil legal systems, including debt cases. Although 49 states and the District of Columbia provide public reports of their cases each year, 38 and the district include no detail about the number of debt cases. And in 2018, only two states provided figures on default judgments in any of their state’s debt cases. Texas is the only state that reports on all types of cases, including outcomes, across all courts. • States are beginning to recognize and enact reforms to address the challenges of debt claims. From 2009 to 2019, 12 states made changes to policy—seven via legislation and five through court rules—to improve courts’ ability to meet the needs of all debt claim litigants. Examples of such reforms include ensuring that all parties are notified about lawsuits; requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that the named defendant owes the debt sought and that the debt is owned by the plaintiff; and in some states, enhanced enforcement of the prohibitions on lawsuits for which the legal right to sue has expired. Based on the findings of this analysis and these promising efforts in a handful of states, Pew has identified three initial steps states can take to improve the handling of debt collection cases: • Track data about debt claims to better understand the extent to which these lawsuits affect parties and at which stages of civil proceedings courts can more appropriately support litigants. • Review state policies, court rules, and common practices to identify procedures that can ensure that both sides have an opportunity to effectively present their cases. • Modernize the relationship between courts and their users by providing relevant and timely procedural information to all parties and moving more processes online in ways that are accessible to users with or without attorneys. In 2010, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a report on the lack of adequate service to consumers in state courts that concluded, “The system for resolving disputes about consumer debts is broken.”1 In the decade since, this problem has not abated and if anything has become more acute. Furthermore, the challenges that this report reviews regarding debt collection cases epitomize challenges facing the civil legal system nationwide. This report summarizes important but inadequately studied trends in civil litigation, highlights unanswered questions for future research, and outlines some initial steps that state and court leaders can take to ensure that civil courts can satisfy their mission to serve the public impartially. 

Washington, DC: Pew Charitable Trusts, 2020. 44p.

By Prem Mahadevan, Maria Khoruk, and Alla Mohamad Mohmandzaï

The fall of Kabul in August 2021 marked the onset of a fourth wave of distress migration from Afghanistan in the last 50 years, a departure from the relative stability during the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2001-21). This research, conducted in collaboration with the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), unveils the pervasive features of Afghan migrant smuggling and examines the ramifications of the Taliban's resurgence on human mobility.

Drawing from extensive interviews with successful migrants, those who attempted but failed, as well as the smugglers and financiers integral to their journeys, the study elucidates the enduring presence of an illicit economy crucial not only for Afghanistan but also for the broader region and the Global North.

This research study pursues a twofold objective: firstly, it analyses preliminary findings, providing insights into the evolving dynamics of human mobility post-Kabul's fall on August 15, 2021. Secondly, it addresses a literature gap by exploring the role of informal value transfer systems (IVTS) in clandestine Afghan migration. Although the study doesn't offer a comprehensive overview, it paints a vivid, albeit impressionistic, picture of contemporary Afghan clandestine movement, shaped by the experiences of migrants, their families, and those offering migrant smuggling services. These insights pave the way for a future research agenda.

Key takeaways emphasise the volatile nature of the irregular migration market in Afghanistan, requiring adaptability from those seeking an escape. The study underscores the significant role of IVTS like hawala in the Afghan human smuggling economy, with hawala brokers' trust and credibility further legitimising human smugglers. In irregular migration hotspots, IVTS serve as an integral part of the human smuggling infrastructure. Additionally, shared ethnic backgrounds establish trust relationships and are frequently leveraged by human smugglers and money transfer service providers. While enhanced barriers may increase migration costs and risks, they are unlikely to deter further migration driven by perceived economic and security imperatives, further deepening migrants' reliance on smuggler services.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2023, 33pg

By Jessica Garrick and Andrew Schrank

This study explores the relationship between “sanctuary policies” that bar local law enforcement agencies from cooperating with federal immigration authorities and immigrant attitudes toward law enforcement agencies. It draws upon original survey data collected in New Mexico in 2019 and finds:

• First, that immigrants who believe they are protected by sanctuary have more trust in their police and sheriffs than immigrants who anticipate collaboration between local law enforcement and immigration authorities;

• Second, that awareness of sanctuary policies is nonetheless the exception to the rule, particularly among immigrant men.

The study therefore highlights not only the limits to sanctuary policies sensu stricto but the limited scope and gendered nature of legal consciousness among immigrants in a multilayered enforcement regime.

Our findings suggest that promoting sanctuary policies to immigrant communities, particularly through immigrant-serving agencies, may be nearly as critical in improved immigrant-police relations, as adopting sanctuary policies. The Department of Homeland Security and the courts should therefore adopt a uniform definition of sanctuary and disseminate it to state and local officials — especially in law enforcement — throughout the country. Furthermore, localities that adopt sanctuary policies should publicize them as widely as possible so that they have the desired effect in immigrant communities and facilitate the improvement of police-community relations in particular.

Journal on Migration and Human Security, 2023.

By Rose Cuison Villazor and Pratheepan Gulasekaram

Resistance to the Trump Administration’s immigration enforcement policies in the form of sanctuary has increased and spread. In addition to the traditional types of sanctuary such as sanctuary cities and churches, the past year has witnessed the proliferation of novel sites of sanctuary—workplaces, school districts, universities, corporations, private homes, and social media—that collectively seek to protect vulnerable immigrants against immigration enforcement. To date, however, legal scholarship on sanctuary has focused almost exclusively on states and municipalities that limit participation with federal immigration authorities. Accordingly, doctrinal and theoretical discussion has centered on sanctuary’s constitutional dimensions, on Tenth Amendment and federalism concerns. This narrow framing is myopic. It fails to capture the varied legal and policy issues that surround the innovative and evolving concept of sanctuary today.

This Article is the first to comprehensively describe and theorize both conventional and emerging types of sanctuary. Adopting network governance theories developed by political theorists, this Article coins the term “sanctuary network” to argue that current public and private examples of sanctuary are best understood as part of a broader system of legal resistance characterized by a decentralized and distributed set of actors. By reframing sanctuary in this way, this Article makes three points. First, doctrinally, this framework forces a rethinking of the legal issues that animate these sanctuaries. Our recasting moves the sanctuary debate beyond federalism and draws attention to several underappreciated common law, statutory, and constitutional sources that support these variegated claims. Second, as a normative claim, this Article argues that when operating as a networked sanctuary, public and private actors are more effectively able to instantiate an alternative set of norms to challenge the federal government’s enforcement scheme. Finally, as a prescriptive matter, this Article concludes that sanctuary networks are desirable because they democratize our national debate over immigration policy, allowing multiple institutions and individuals to calibrate immigration enforcement. Ultimately, this new way of understanding modern day sanctuary networks encourages novel methods of legal resistance.

Minnesota Law Review, February 14, 2019

By the Congressional Research Service (CRS). 

There is no official or agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a “sanctuary” jurisdiction, and there has been debate as to whether the term applies to particular states and localities. Moreover, state and local jurisdictions have varied reasons for opting not to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement efforts, including reasons not necessarily motivated by disagreement with federal policies, such as concern about potential civil liability or the costs associated with assisting federal efforts. But traditional sanctuary policies are often described as falling under one of three categories. First, so-called “don’t enforce” policies generally bar state or local police from assisting federal immigration authorities. Second, “don’t ask” policies generally bar certain state or local officials from inquiring into a person’s immigration status. Third, “don’t tell” policies typically restrict information sharing between state or local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities. One legal question relevant to sanctuary policies is the extent to which states, as sovereign entities, may decline to assist in federal immigration enforcement, and the degree to which the federal government can stop state measures that undermine federal objectives. The Tenth Amendment preserves the states’ broad police powers, and states have frequently enacted measures that, directly or indirectly, address aliens residing in their communities. Under the doctrine of preemption—derived from the Supremacy Clause—Congress may displace many state or local laws pertaining to immigration. But not every state or local law touching on immigration matters is necessarily preempted; the measure must interfere with, or be contrary to, federal law to be rendered unenforceable. Further, the anti-commandeering doctrine, rooted in the Constitution's allocation of powers between the federal government and the states, prohibits Congress from forcing state entities to perform regulatory functions on the federal government's behalf, including in the context of immigration. A series of Supreme Court cases inform the boundaries of preemption and the anti-commandeering doctrine, with the Court most recently opining on the issue in Murphy v. NCAA. These dueling federal and state interests are front and center in numerous lawsuits challenging actions taken by the Trump Administration to curb states and localities from implementing sanctuary-type policies. Notably, Section 9(a) of Executive Order 13768, “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” directs the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General to withhold federal grants from jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373—a statute that bars states and localities from prohibiting their employees from sharing with federal immigration authorities certain immigration-related information. The executive order further directs the Attorney General to take “appropriate enforcement action” against jurisdictions that violate Section 1373 or have policies that “prevent or hinder the enforcement of federal law.” To implement the executive order, the Department of Justice added new eligibility conditions to the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) Program and grants administered by the Justice Department’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). These conditions tied eligibility to compliance with Section 1373 and other federal immigration priorities, like granting federal authorities access to state and local detention facilities housing aliens and giving immigration authorities notice before releasing from custody an alien wanted for removal. Several lawsuits were filed challenging the constitutionality of the executive order and new grant conditions. So far the courts that have reviewed these challenges—principally contending that the executive order and grant conditions violate the separation of powers and anti-commandeering principles—generally agree that the Trump Administration acted unconstitutionally. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a permanent injunction blocking enforcement of “Sanctuary” Jurisdictions: Federal, State, and Local Policies and Related Liti Section 9(a) against California. Additionally, two separate district courts permanently enjoined the Byrne JAG conditions as applied to Chicago and Philadelphia. In doing so, these courts concluded that the Supreme Court’s most recent formulation of the anti-commandeering doctrine in Murphy requires holding Section 1373 unconstitutional. These lawsuits notwithstanding, the courts still recognize the federal government’s pervasive, nearly exclusive role in immigration enforcement. This can be seen in the federal government’s lawsuit challenging three California measures governing the state’s regulation of private and public actors’ involvement in immigration enforcement within its border. Although a district court opined that several measures likely were lawful exercises of the state’s police powers, it also concluded that two provisions regulating private employers are likely unlawful under the Supremacy Clause. This ruling was mostly upheld on appeal, in which the Ninth Circuit additionally opined that a provision requiring the California attorney general to review the circumstances surrounding detained aliens’ apprehension and transfer to detention facilities within the state also violates the Supremacy Clause.

Washington, DC: CRS. 2019. 44p.

By Margaret Monyani, Adamnesh Bogale and Ottilia Anna Maunganidze

Robust legal frameworks and migration management measures in Ethiopia and Kenya give these countries a strong basis for effective migration governance consistent with the rule of law. However, some policy improvements are needed, along with more consistent implementation and better protection of migrants’ rights. Filling these gaps is vital if Ethiopia and Kenya are to advance their role in continental migration governance.

Key findings : The Horn of Africa is a key source, transit and destination region for migrants. National, regional, continental and international multilateral processes to improve migration governance are in place in the region. Countries like Ethiopia and Kenya have developed frameworks to address evolving dynamics, aimed at enhancing legal migration pathways, responding to forced displacement, stimulating regional integration, and tackling the smuggling and trafficking of persons. In Ethiopia and Kenya, policies and practices are informed by regional and global mixed migration trends. While migration governance frameworks in Ethiopia and Kenya are fairly robust and factor in the rule of law, there are weaknesses that need to be addressed. These include gaps in practical migration governance and the inconsistent application of the rule of law. Migration governance should be factored across various government departments in a consistent and coherent manner. For good migration governance to enhance development and growth, gaps in policies and practices must be dealt with. 

Recommendations : The governments of Ethiopia and Kenya should: Review existing migration policies to identify inconsistencies with rule of law principles. Harmonise migration policies in line with international and continental standards and ensure the protection of migrants’ rights. Regularly evaluate the impact of policies and programmes to identify areas for improvement. Encourage community participation in migration-related initiatives to foster shared responsibility and ownership, including through awareness-raising campaigns. Invest in strengthening the capacity of law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders involved in managing migration, focusing on skills and knowledge of migration laws. Engage the private sector in migration governance, particularly regarding labour migration and migrant integration. While migration governance frameworks in Ethiopia and Kenya are fairly robust and factor in the rule of law, there are weaknesses that need to be addressed. These include gaps in practical migration governance and the inconsistent application of the rule of law. Migration governance should be factored across various government departments in a consistent and coherent manner.

EAST AFRICA REPORT 51 |  Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 23p.

By The European Parliament

In the past decade, continuous migration and asylum pressure on European Union Member States has made the external dimension of the EU's approach to migration management all the more important. The need to address challenges relating to external border management has reoriented EU migration policy towards extended and stricter border controls, combined with the externalisation of migration management through cooperation with third countries. In this context, the external processing of asylum claims has also been put forward as a possibility. External processing entails applications for international protection being processed beyond the EU's external borders, in third countries. An individual processed externally whose claim was successful would then, in theory, be resettled to an EU Member State. Asylum is governed by international, EU and national laws. Both EU and national asylum legislation must be aligned with the international legal framework. Although EU law does not provide for the processing of asylum applications outside the EU, the idea of 'transit' or 'processing' centres in third countries has been recurrent over the years. Examples of externalisation procedures can be found around the world. Some non-EU countries, such as Australia and the United States, have practical experience of the extra-territorial processing of asylum claims. Back in 1986, Denmark tabled a draft resolution in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to create UN centres where asylum claims could be processed, in order to coordinate the resettlement of refugees among all states. Later, in 2001 and 2002, when the EU experienced the first peak of migrant arrivals in the EU, this was followed by a series of proposals involving the external processing of asylum requests. Extraterritorial processing was first put forward by the United Kingdom in 2003, while Germany proposed the establishment of asylum centres in North Africa in 2005. Another upsurge of arrivals was experienced from 2014 to 2016; this led – among other things – to the signature of the EU-Turkey Statement. The series of proposals made over the years with a view to externalising migration policies, have raised concerns, not least in relation to the human rights implications, asylum procedures and EU and international law.

Brussels, Belgium: European Parliament, 2024. 12p.

By Ludger Pries, Oscar Calderón Morillón, and Brandon Amir Estrada Ceron

Mexico is increasingly important as a country of transit migration between the Global South and the Global North. Migration dynamics from Central America to and through Mexico are mainly considered as economic or mixed migration of people looking for work and a better life in the USA. Nevertheless, since the 2010s the number of asylum applications in Mexico has sky rocketed. Based on a survey of Central American migrants in Mexico we demonstrate that some kind of (organized) violence was a crucial driver for leaving and a constant companion during their journey. After contextualizing the migration route from the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) toward Mexico, we present the design of the study, describe sociodemographic and general contexts of the 350 interviewees, and present the migration trajectories as long-lasting sequences of events and stays, where violence in quite different forms always is at play.

Journal on Migration and Human Security - Online First, , 2023.