By Karen Sands-O’Connor

Exploring a history of activists writing for and about children of colour from abolition to Black Lives Matter, this open access book examines issues such as the space given to people of colour by white activists; the voice, agency and intersectionality in activist writing for young people; how writers used activism to expand definitions of Britishness for child readers; and how activism and writing about it has changed in the 21st century. From abolitionists and anti-colonialists such as Amelia Opie, Una Marson and Rabindranath Tagore; communist and feminist activists concerned with broader children’s rights including Chris Searle and Rosemary Stones; to Black Panthers and contemporary advocates for people of colour from Farrukh Dhondy to Len Garrison, Catherine Johnson and Corinne Fowler, Karen Sands-O’Connor traces how these activists translated their values for children of colour. Beginning with historical events that sparked activism and the first cultural products for children and continuing to contemporary activism in the wake of the Windrush Scandal, this book analyses the choices, struggles and successes of writers of activist literature as they tried to change Britain and British literature to make it a welcoming place for all child readers.

London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022.  

By Joseph H. Jackson

Writing Black Scotland examines race and racism in devolutionary Scottish literature, with a focus on the critical significance of blackness. The book reads blackness in Scottish writing from the 1970s to the early 2000s, a period of history defined by post-imperial adjustment. Critiquing a unifying Britishness at work in black British criticism, Jackson argues for the importance of black politics in Scottish writing, and for a literary registration of race and racism which signals a necessary negotiation for national Scotland both before and after 1997.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020. 216p.

By Donald Kerwin and Evin Millet

This study examines the legal capacity available to low-income immigrants on national, state, and sub-state levels. Legal professionals working in charitable immigration service programs serve as the study’s rough proxy for legal capacity, and undocumented immigrants its proxy for legal need. The Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) compiled data on charitable immigration programs and their legal professionals from the:

• US Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) “Recognized Organizations and Accredited Representatives Roster by State and City,” which is maintained by the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s (EOIR’s) Office of Legal Access Programs (OLAP).

• Directories of two leading, legal support agencies for charitable immigration legal programs, the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC) and the Immigrant Advocates Network (IAN).

CMS supplemented and updated these sources with information from the websites of charitable immigration programs. It also added legal programs to its dataset that did not appear in any of these lists. It counted as legal professionals, attorneys, federally accredited non-attorneys, paralegals, and legal assistants. The paper finds that there are 1,413 undocumented persons in the United States for every charitable legal professional and far less capacity than the national average in:

• States such as Alabama (6,656 undocumented per legal professional), Hawaii (4,506), Kansas (3,010), Georgia (2,853), New Jersey (2,687), Florida (2,681), North Carolina (2,671), Virginia (2,634) and Arizona (2,561).

• Metropolitan areas (MAs) such as Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario (5,307), Dallas-Fort Worth Arlington (4,436), Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale (3,439) and Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land (3,099).

• San Bernardino County (6,178), Clark County (4,747), Riverside County (4,625), Tarrant County (3,955) and Dallas County (3,939).

The study’s introduction summarizes its top-line findings. Its first section describes the importance of charitable immigration legal programs to immigrants, families and communities. Its second details the study’s findings on charitable legal capacity and immigrant need. Its third compares the legal capacity of 1,803 charitable legal programs and their 7,322 legal professionals, with the US undocumented population by state and for the 15 largest MAs and counties. Its fourth describes CMS’s research methodology and data sources. The paper ends with policy recommendations on how to expand legal capacity for low-income immigrants and better assess legal capacity and need moving forward.

Journal on Migration and Human Security 2022, Vol. 10(3) 190-214

By David Goodhart

This report calls for a new safe and legal route for genuine refugees – which would only come into effect once illegal Channel crossings have dropped to below 10,000 a year.

Under the plan put forward by David Goodhart, the number of refugees admitted under this new route would be set by an annual cap from Parliament – placing the asylum system under democratic control.

It would be modelled after the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme, used for Syrian refugees, and focussed on women and girls in conflict zones, not healthy young male migrants attempting to cross from France.

The report argues that in order to address the numbers of migrants crossing the Chanel illegally in small boats, the Government must prioritise return agreements and rapid deportation of Channel crossers – if necessary, giving aid to countries in exchange for securing return agreements.

London: Policy Exchange, 2023. 31p.

By: Team from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), including (in alphabetical order) Lucia Bird, Giulia D’Amico, Sarah Fares, Alex Goodwin and Tuesday Reitano

As of January 2024, over 100 000 people had crossed the English Channel using small boats since 2018. The current peak came in 2022, when over 45 000 people were detected arriving in the UK illegally using small boats launched from the coast of northern France. Although small in comparison with the flows of migrants risking the journey across the Mediterranean to reach Europe each year, this figure marked a record high for the UK since records began in 2018. The spike in the number of arrivals can be largely explained by the ‘industrialization’ of a system of smuggling migrants by boat, a process that began in 2018.

This report explores how the English Channel has become a commercialized human smuggling route. It analyzes the shift in human smuggling transportation from land to sea, from trucks using the Channel Tunnel to rigid inflatable boats (RIBs).

Geneva, SWIT: 2024 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.2024. 34p.

By Oreva Olakpe

  This paper examines the literature on cities, citizenship and performative rights claiming through the lens of undocumented migrant status, using ethnographic research of the Nigerian community in the city of Guangzhou, China as an example. It begins with a background of the research, delineating the context of migration in China and the factors shaping the perceptions of citizenship and undocumented status in that locale. Next, it delves into the literature on citizenship and rights claiming, looking at the approaches to citizenship and tries to situate undocumented migrant status in these approaches. It then relies on examples for the city of Guangzhou to illustrate how undocumented migrant communities perform citizenship and negotiate legal and legitimate status through alternative channels and resist hegemonic structures in big cities in real life. This paper unpacks the ways in which undocumented migrants exhibit citizenship, belonging and agency from below to demonstrate the different meanings and manifestations of agency, marginality and asymmetries of power in big cities in the Global South.

Toronto: Toronto Metropolitan University, 2020. 23p.

By Jess Zhang, Jacob Kang-Brown, and Ari Kotler

  Electronic monitoring (EM) is a form of digital surveillance that tracks people’s physical location, movement, or other markers of behavior (such as blood alcohol level). It is commonly used in the criminal legal system as a condition of pretrial release or post-conviction supervision—including during probation, parole, home confinement, or work release. The United States also uses electronic monitoring for people in civil immigration proceedings who are facing deportation. This report fills a gap in understanding around the size and scope of EM use in the United States. The Vera Institute of Justice’s (Vera) estimates reveal that, in 2021, 254,700 adults were under some form of EM. Of these, 150,700 people were subjected to EM by the criminal legal system and 103,900 by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Further investigation revealed that the number of adults placed on EM by ICE more than tripled between 2021 and 2022, increasing to 360,000.1 This means that the total number of adults on EM across both the civil immigration and criminal legal systems likely increased to nearly half a million during that time. From 2005 to 2021, the number of people on EM in the United States grew nearly fivefold—and almost tenfold by 2022—while the number of people incarcerated in jails and prisons declined by 16 percent and the number of people held in ICE civil detention increased but not nearly as dramatically as EM.2 Regional trends in the criminal legal system reveal how EM has been used more widely in some states and cities but increased sharply from 2019 to 2021 across the country: The Midwest has the highest rate of state and local criminal legal system EM, at 65 per 100,000 residents; this rate stayed relatively constant from 2019 to  midyear 2021. In the Northeast, EM rates are the lowest of all the regions at 19 per 100,000 residents, but they increased by 46 percent from 2019 to 2021. The South and West have similar rates, 41 and 34 per 100,000 residents respectively, but the growth rate in the South has outpaced that of the West in recent years—up 32 percent in the South compared to 18 percent in the West. Prior to this report, the most recent estimate of the national EM population was from a 2015 Pew Charitable Trusts study—which studied the use of criminal legal system EM via a survey of the 11 biggest EM companies. For this report, Vera researchers collected data from criminal legal system agencies in all 50 states and more than 500 counties, as well as from federal courts, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and ICE. Therefore, Vera’s study represents the most comprehensive count of the national EM population to date, as it accounts for the rise of smaller EM companies, immigration system surveillance, and new EM technologies. For this report, Vera researchers also reviewed existing literature and spoke with local officials to better understand the impacts of EM programs. Vera’s findings contradict private companies’ assertions that EM technology is low-cost, efficient, and reliable. EM in the criminal legal system is highly variable and subject to political decisions at the local level. In many jurisdictions, EM is not used as a means to reduce jail populations. Rather, it is often a crucial component of highly punitive criminal legal systems. This challenges the dominant narrative that EM is an “alternative to incarceration.” Nonetheless, this report also highlights several jurisdictions that demonstrate how decarceration can occur alongside reduced surveillance. 

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2024. 54p.

By Kelsie Chesnut and Jennifer Peirce

  From 2019 to 2022, the Vera Institute of Justice (Vera), along with Black and Pink National, developed and conducted a large-scale survey of currently incarcerated transgender people regarding their experiences in state prisons. In 2015, Black and Pink National published a landmark survey of more than a thousand LGBTQ+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer/questioning) incarcerated people, Coming Out of Concrete Closets. The present survey provides updated information on similar issues as Black and Pink’s 2015 survey but focuses solely on transgender people. Vera and Black and Pink National are grateful to the incarcerated people who took the time to thoughtfully respond to the survey, often sharing sensitive and traumatic experiences. The survey used regular mail to reach participants, who were already connected with Black and Pink National, and this allowed people to respond in 2021–2022 despite ongoing COVID-related constraints on inperson access to prisons. This report highlights the key findings from the survey responses and open-ended comments shared by the 280 people who participated. 1 Vera and Black and Pink National codesigned all stages of this project, with input from researchers and advocates working on this topic. Vera independently managed the data collection, analysis, and production of findings included in this report, with guidance and input from Black and Pink National and an external expert research consultant.2 The goals of this report are to • share the experiences and insights of transgender people living behind bars in state prisons in their own words, • provide policymakers and people who work with incarcerated people with findings that update and expand their understanding of how transgender people in state prisons experience conditions of confinement, • improve correctional policy and practice as it relates to transgender people who are incarcerated in the United States, and  • contribute to a larger national discussion about incarceration and decarceration in a way that advances transgender justice.  

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2024. 96p.

By Cecilia Esterline  

The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 is the policy playbook for a second Trump administration, and its impacts on immigration would be far more complex and destructive than previously reported. It isn’t simply a refresh of first-term ideas, dusted off and ready to be re-implemented. Rather, it reflects a meticulously orchestrated, comprehensive plan to drive immigration levels to unprecedented lows and increase the federal government’s power to the states’ detriment. These proposals circumvent Congress and the courts and are specifically engineered to dismantle the foundations of our immigration system. The most troubling proposals include plans to: • Block federal financial aid for up to two-thirds of all American college students if their state permits certain immigrant groups, including Dreamers with legal status, to access in-state tuition. • Terminate the legal status of 500,000 Dreamers by eliminating staff time for reviewing and processing renewal applications. • Use backlog numbers to trigger the automatic suspension of application intake for large categories of legal immigration. • Suspend updates to the annual eligible country lists for H-2A and H-2B temporary worker visas, thereby excluding most populations from filling critical gaps in the agricultural, construction, hospitality, and forestry sectors. • Bar U.S. citizens from qualifying for federal housing subsidies if they live with anyone who is not a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident. • Force states to share driver’s licenses and taxpayer identification information with federal authorities or risk critical funding. These proposals, along with the others discussed herein, mark a significant divergence from traditional conservative immigration priorities like promoting merit-based immigration, fostering assimilation, and enhancing interior enforcement. Instead, they are designed to cripple the existing immigration system without regard for the extraordinarily harmful effects on the health and wealth of our country. They would weaken our nation’s prosperity and security and undermine the vitality of our workforce, with far-reaching consequences for future generations of Americans. 

New York: The Niskanen Center, 2024. 17p.

By  Ximena Canal Laiton

This paper explores the use of smugglers by Latin American and Caribbean migrants on their journeys to North America. It is based on responses to more than 3,000 4Mi surveys conducted in Costa Rica, Honduras and Mexico in 2022 and 2023 and includes findings on profiles of migrants who hired smugglers as well as information on the services they sought and their general perceptions of smugglers. As such, this paper provides a wealth of solid empirical evidence with a view to informing the work of policymakers and humanitarian actors.

Geneva, SWIT: Mixed Migration Centre. 2024, 14pg

By Shreya Bhat and Hui Yin Chuah

Mixed migration from Myanmar to countries in South and Southeast Asia has become a common phenomenon driven by various factors, including violence, insecurity, conflict, deprivation of rights, and economic reasons. The complexity of migration journeys is evident, often involving transit through multiple locations over extended periods. This report underscores the integral role of smugglers in facilitating migration from Myanmar to Malaysia and Thailand, influenced by a complex interplay of factors that result in considerable variation in the dynamics of smuggling among different population groups and on different routes. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing targeted interventions aimed at addressing the vulnerabilities and challenges faced by refugees and migrants in the region.

Geneva, SWIT: Mixed Migration Centre. 2024, 17pg

By Julia Black

Nearly 60 percent of deaths documented during migration are linked to drowning. Search and rescue capacities to assist migrants in distress at sea must be strengthened to help save lives, while working with IOM, partners, and governments to facilitate regular migration pathways. More than two-thirds of those whose deaths were documented through IOM’s Missing Migrants Project are unidentified. Without knowing the fate of migrants from their households and communities, families and those communities of origin must face the lasting impacts of the ambiguous loss of a loved one. More than one in three migrants whose country of origin could be identified come from countries in conflict. This implies attempts to leave areas of conflict without safe pathways to do so. One of IOM’s strategic priorities is to work with countries to facilitate safe, regular, and orderly pathways to ameliorate unnecessary loss of life through dangerous, irregular means.   

Berlin: Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2024, 19pg

By Polaris

We have long known human trafficking to be a pervasive and versatile crime, as traffickers and exploiters adjust to changing environments. The COVID-19 pandemic showed us the profound adaptability of human trafficking. A global pandemic did not stop or impede trafficking from happening and, with few exceptions, did not seem to change how it happens or to whom it happens. In this report, we examine data from the National Human Trafficking Hotline from January 2020 through August 2022 and explore a snapshot of the top findings of human trafficking during the calamitous pandemic years. We provide top trends and answers to questions we typically report on as a part of our data analysis, and introduce how select trends that began early in the pandemic changed or continued as the crisis evolved. 

Washington, DC: Polaris. 2024, 10pg

By Andy Shen and Loria-Mae Heywood  

A new report published today by UNU-CPR’s Finance Against Slavery and Trafficking (FAST) initiative argues that a small but significant change to the international anti-money laundering regime – the laws, regulations, and procedures used to tackle money laundering – could have enormous consequences for the fight against human trafficking and forced labour.    

Making knowingly benefitting from human trafficking or forced labour a predicate offense to money laundering, the report stresses, would close the gap between the billions generated from these crimes and the meagre compensation provided to its victims and survivors. This is a challenge that persists despite international law codifying remedy for human rights violations.

New York: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research. 2023, 112pg

By OSCE - Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings

First of its kind, this report was designed to identify — in 40 OSCE participating States — the market-leading online sites and platforms for the explicit and non-explicit selling of sexual services where victims of THB for sexual exploitation could be advertised. The report's findings are based on the mapping and analysis of almost 2,900 sex services websites across the OSCE region, containing over 3 million advertisements; detailed information about how these websites operate is provided. The research also lists information and data associated with the sites and, through an analysis based on trafficking indicators, examines whether they can be exposed to human trafficking's risks.

Vienna: OSCE. 2023, 40pg

By Robin Ghertner, Suzanne Macartney and Meredith Dost

Between 1990 and 2022, the United States welcomed over 2.1 million refugees and accepted over 800,000 asylees. While the purpose of granting visas to refugees and asylees is humanitarian, they do impact the United States economically. This analysis estimates the fiscal impact of refugees and asylees on federal, state, and local governments from 2005 to 2019.

Key Points

• The net fiscal impact of refugees and asylees was positive over the 15-year period, at $123.8 billion. This means that refugees and asylees contributed more revenue than they cost in expenditures to the government. The net fiscal benefit to the federal government was estimated at $31.5 billion, and the net fiscal benefit to state and local governments was estimated at $92.3 billion.

• Governmental expenditures on refugees and asylees totaled an estimated $457.2 billion over the 15-year period. Expenditures by the federal government represented 72.5 percent of the total, at $331.5 billion. State and local government expenditures were 27.5 percent of the total, at $125.7 billion.

• Refugees and asylees contributed an estimated $581 billion in revenue to federal, state and local governments. They contributed an estimated $363 billion to the federal government through payroll, income, and excise taxes, and $218 billion to state and local governments, through income, sales, and property taxes.

• Including refugees and asylees and their spouses and children under age 18, most of whom are U.S. citizens, expenditures totaled $723.4 billion. Refugees, asylees, and their immediate families contributed an estimated $739.4 billion in revenue to all levels of government.

• When compared with the total U.S. population on a per capita basis, refugees and asylees had a comparable net fiscal impact.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2024. 53p.

By  Ramón Rey, Günther G. Schulze, Nikita Zakharov   

This paper investigates the effect of Venezuelan transit migration on crime rates in Colombia. We exploit the reopening of the Venezuela-Colombia border in 2016, which has led to a surge in transit migration, and geospatial information about the distinct routes through which the migrants crossed Colombia. Employing a difference-in-differences approach and propensity score matching, we find that transit migration increased property crime rates in crossed municipalities, with both native Colombians and Venezuelan refugees seeing higher victimization rates. Violent crimes remained unaffected. This is the first study to document a link between transit migration and crime.

Discussion Paper Series, No. 44, University of Freiburg, Department of International Economic Policy (iep), Freiburg i. Br. 

By Amnesty International

In recent years, human rights defenders and civil society organizations that have helped refugees and migrants have been subjected to unfounded criminal proceedings, undue restrictions of their activities, intimidation, harassment, and smear campaigns in several European countries. Their acts of assistance and solidarity have placed them on a collision course with European migration policies. These policies are aimed at preventing refugees and migrants from reaching the EU, at containing those who make it to Europe in their first country of arrival, and at deporting as many as possible back to their countries of origin.

By rescuing refugees and migrants in danger at sea or in the mountains, offering them food and shelter, documenting police and border guard abuses, and opposing unlawful deportations, human rights defenders have exposed the cruelty caused by immigration policies and have become themselves the target of the authorities. Authorities and political leaders have treated acts of humanity as a threat to national security and public order, further hindering their work and forcing them to divest their scarce resources and energy into defending themselves in court.

This report shows how European governments, EU institutions and authorities have deployed an array of restrictive, sanctioning and punitive measures against individuals and groups who defend the rights of people on the move, including by using immigration and counter-terrorism regulations to unduly restrict the right to defend human rights.

London, Amnesty International. 2020, 92pg

By Marta Gionco and Jyothi Kanics 

The European Union (EU) is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.8 The Treaty on European Union (TEU) underlines that these values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and gender equality prevail.9

Yet, in recent years, these values have been under threat within the EU, as many Member States’ policies and actions have led to a “shrinking space” for civil society. Perhaps this trend is nowhere more evident than in the treatment of migrants in Europe and the human rights defenders working to assist them. The “criminalisation of solidarity” strikes at the heart of European values and contributes to the erosion of rule of law and democracy, while seriously impacting the rights and welfare of the most vulnerable in our societies and those who seek to protect and assist them. The criminalisation of solidarity with migrants remains a widespread phenomenon across the EU. According to our media monitoring, at least 89 people were criminalised in the EU between January 2021 and March 2022.10 Out of them, 18 people faced new charges, while the other 71 were ongoing cases from previous years. Four of them are migrants themselves. Three people were convicted and 15 acquitted, while all the other cases are still ongoing. People have been criminalised for actions including providing food, shelter, medical assistance, transportation and other humanitarian aid to migrants in dire conditions; assisting with asylum applications; and rescuing migrants at sea. In the vast majority of the cases (88%), human rights defenders were charged with facilitation of entry, transit or stay, or migrant smuggling (depending on how the crime is defined in the national legislation).11 It is also notable that the criminalisation of solidarity has continued, and in certain cases even soared (see section 1.2), during periods in which many countries adopted COVID-19 restrictions, at a time when human rights defenders risked their own personal safety and health to leave their homes to help others. Emergency measures adopted to address the COVID-19 pandemic have been used to limit access to reception facilities and detention centres, to impose fines on organisations providing services during lock-downs or after the curfew, and to limit the right to freedom of assembly. National data further contributes to give an idea of the magnitude of the criminalisation of solidarity in the EU. For example, according to the Polish civil society network Grupa Granica, nearly 330 people were detained for helping people crossing borders irregularly between Belarus and Poland between August and November 2021.12 Those detained include EU nationals as well as migrants and their family members, many of whom had residence permits in Belgium, Germany and Poland. Many are likely to have been motivated by humanitarian reasons, including helping family members. In another example, a total of 972 people were convicted in Switzerland in 2018 on grounds of facilitation of irregular entry or stay.13 The vast majority, almost 900 people, acted out of solidarity or family reasons.

Belgium, PICUM. 2022, 66pg

By  Alyna C. Smith and Michele LeVoy

  Impact of insecure residence status on safety and access to justice The criminalisation of irregular migration makes people who are undocumented fearful of engaging with public authorities, and especially with the police, because of the risk that they will be detained and ordered to leave the territory as a result. This distrust is worsened by policing and surveillance of migrant and minority communities. The detention and deportation of people who have experienced abuse and mistreatment is a form of secondary victimisation. The systematic failure of the state to recognise, investigate and remedy abuses committed against undocumented victims denies them recognition and accountability.   

Belgium, PICUM, 2021, 44pg