By Maria Micaela Sviatschi

This paper provides evidence showing how deportation policies can backfire by disseminating not only ideas between countries but also criminal networks, spreading gangs, in this case, across Central America and spurring migration back to the US. In 1996, the US Illegal Immigration Responsibility Act drastically increased the number of criminal deportations. In particular, the members of large Salvadoran gangs that developed in Los Angeles were sent back to El Salvador. Using variation in criminal deportations over time and across cohorts combined with geographical variation in the location of gangs and their members’ place of birth, I find that criminal deportations led to a large increase in Salvadoran homicide rates and gang activity, such as extortion and drug trafficking, as well as an increase in gang recruitment of children. In particular, I find evidence that children in their early teens when the leaders arrived are more likely to be involved in gang-related crimes when they are adults. I also find evidence that these deportations, by increasing gang violence in El Salvador, increase child migration to the US–potentially leading to more deportations.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Working Paper, 2020. 52p.

By Eleno Castro and Randy Kotti

Despite the growing body of qualitative evidence suggesting collusion between gangs and political parties in various parts of the world, little has been done to study quantitatively the extent to which criminal organization may affect political elections in such context. Using police data and voting results in El Salvador, we find that homicides in gang-controlled neighborhoods tend to decrease by 24 percent of the mean during electoral seasons. We also estimate that gang control is associated with a 2.75 percentage point increase in electoral participation. These effects are especially significant in the neighborhoods where political parties have a strong voting base. Consistent with the interviews we conducted, this suggests that parties negotiate with gangs to mobilize electoral participation in the areas where they are more likely to receive electoral support and thus increase their chances of winning. To conduct our analysis, we geolocated the homicides reported daily in the registry of the National Civil Police from 2005 to 2019 crossed with electoral results reported at the voting-center level across El Salvador. We exploit the sudden and exogenous decrease in criminality resulting from the 2012 truce between the government and the two main gangs in El Salvador to identify gang-controlled neighborhoods. We also use penitentiary data from the General Directorate of Prisons for robustness measures. 

Pre-publication, 2022. 51p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

This policy note provides a brief background on gangs in El Salvador and the attempts of Salvadoran authorities to negotiate with them to reduce violence in the streets. It analyzes a March 2022 gang-led homicide spree with a particular focus on the government’s response, arguing how it has harmed citizens’ lives, turning fundamental human rights into bargaining chips between licit and illicit actors. Highly punitive responses to contain gang violence have been the norm in El Salvador. In addition, for the past decade, secret negotiations between state actors and imprisoned gang leaders have been conducted, but outcomes have yielded similar or worse results. Authorities must seek alternative avenues for peace, such as promoting restorative justice and community resilience, minimizing the risk of prison riots and providing reinsertion programmes. Mediation from the international community is also needed in order to prevent the situation from spinning out of control.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 14p.

By José Miguel Cruz, Jonathan D. Rosen, Luis Enrique Amaya and Yulia Vorobyeva

Can a member of a Salvadoran youth gang, locally known as “maras,” leave the gang and start a new life away from crime and violence? To answer this question, the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center and the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International University, with the support of the Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (FUNDE), conducted a study with Salvadoran gang members and former gang members across the country. The study, which is based on a survey with a combination of a convenience and purposive sample of 1,196 respondents with record of gang membership and 32 in-depth interviews, reveals that desistance from the gang is possible in El Salvador but, in the short-term, it depends on two factors. First, it depends on the individual and active commitment of gang members to abandon gang life and stop partaking in violent activities. Second, it depends on the tacit or explicit consent of the leaders of the gang organization. Hence, in El Salvador, gang desistance—which, according to some authors, is the declining probability of gang membership—involves the acquiescence of the group. The study builds on previous academic scholarship on gangs in El Salvador and Central America as well as on the general criminological literature on youth gangs. The results indicate that youth gangs remain a predominantly male phenomenon and that the average age of joining the gang does not seem to have changed significantly in comparison with data from 10 years ago. Nearly 40% of the subjects interviewed for this study are active members of the gang, while the rest are in different stages of calming down and leaving the gang.

Miami: Florida International University, 2017. 75p.