By Helen Christensen, Aimy Slade, Alexis Whitton

Recent events have reignited debate over whether social media is the root cause of increasing youth self‐harm and suicide. Social media is a fertile ground for disseminating harmful content, including graphic imagery and messages depicting gendered violence and religious intolerance. This proliferation of harmful content makes social media an unwelcoming space, especially for women, minority groups, and young people, who are more likely to be targeted by such content, strengthening the narrative that social media is at the crux of a youth mental health crisis.

However, the parallel rise in social media use and youth mental health problems does not imply a causal relationship. Increased social media use may be a correlate, exacerbating factor, or a consequence of rising trends in youth self‐harm, which may have entirely separate causes. Despite its potential negative impacts, social media is also a source of information and support for young people experiencing mental health problems. Restricting young people's access to social media could impede pathways for help‐seeking. This complexity highlights the need for a considered approach.

Recommendations

• Understand why some individuals are more susceptible to social media harms.

• Assess alternative explanations for youth self-harm trends.

• Mitigate artificial intelligence (AI)-related risks.

• Evaluate interventions that restrict social media and ensure they are evidence-based.

Medical Journal of Australia Volume 221, Issue10 November 2024 Pages 524-526

By ALICE McINTYRE

Urban teens of color are often portrayed as welfare mothers, drop outs, drug addicts, and both victims and perpetrators of the many kinds of violence which can characterize life in urban areas. Although urban youth often live in contexts which include poverty, unemployment, and discrimination, they also live with the everydayness of school, friends, sex, television, music, and other elements of teenage lives. Inner City Kids explores how a group of African American, Jamaican, Puerto Rican, and Haitian adolescents make meaning of and respond to living in an inner-city community.

The book focuses on areas of particular concern to the youth, such as violence, educational opportunities, and a decaying and demoralizing urban environment characterized by trash, pollution, and abandoned houses. McIntyre's work with these teens draws upon participatory action research, which seeks to co-develop programs with study participants rather than for them.

New York: London: NYU Press, 2000. 255p.

By Clarence Okoh

Public and private actors are turning to artificial intelligence (AI) and other big data technologies to engineer new futures for structural racism and social inequality in the United States, a phenomenon that the sociologist Ruha Benjamin has termed the “New Jim Code.”

These technologies are upending decades of civil and human rights legal standards, expanding mass criminalization, restricting access to social services, and enabling systemic discrimination in housing, employment, and health care, among other areas.3 The New Jim Code carries unique threats to youth and young adults of color, especially in the context of K-12 public schools.

In recent years, federal policymakers have taken steps to address the societal implications of AI and big data technologies, including the White House Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights, President Biden’s Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence, and the U.S. Department of Education’s guidance on AI in schools. However, these efforts have largely failed to address the specific harms that these technologies raise for youth and young adults of color and youth from other historically marginalized communities.

As the infrastructure of police surveillance grows in public schools, communities must be prepared to safeguard the rights and freedoms of students and families. This report is designed to help youth justice advocates, youth leaders, educators, caregivers, and policymakers understand and challenge the impact of school surveillance, data criminalization, and police surveillance technologies in schools.

This report includes:

• An analysis of six key facts about the impacts of data criminalization and school surveillance technologies on education equity.

• A case study of an AI school surveillance technology that can land children in adult misdemeanor court.

• Key recommendations for education policymakers and school district leaders for advancing youth data justice.

Washington, DC:CLASP, 2024. 17p.

By William D. Murphy, and Jacqueline Page

Nationally and internationally there has been a heightened awareness and response to the commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC)/domestic sex trafficking of children. CSEC “refers to a range of crimes and activities involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a child for the financial benefit of any person or in exchange for anything of value (including monetary and non-monetary benefits) given or received by any person” (Development Service Group, Inc., 2014). Within the United States, the response has included both federal and state governments’ recognition and efforts to address the issue. Many view the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) as a turning point in formal, organized recognition of the gravity of the issues of sex trafficking including minors. Efforts to combat and prevent CSEC and develop resources to meet the needs of victims of CSEC have continued. The PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008 required the Attorney General to develop and implement a National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction (National Strategy). The first report was published in 2010 and was updated in 2016. Each report included a National Child Exploitation Threat Assessment and identified how the federal government and its partners can address the issue of child exploitation. The 2016 report focused on changes to the child sexual exploitation threat since 2010 and examined potential threats for the next five years. In addition, the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), has provided significant funding to both combat human trafficking and assist in essential services being available to victims of trafficking. As a part of this funding, the Office for Juvenile Organizations provides mentoring services for children and youth who are victims of domestic sex trafficking or commercial sexual exploitation and projects focused on preventing the sex trafficking of girls. The National Judicial Institute on Domestic Child Sex Trafficking was created by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges with the goals of helping judicial officers understand the dynamics involved in child sex trafficking, examining legal considerations for victims, and connecting children at risk of, or who have been trafficked, to needed services. The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation launched a public awareness campaign in 2014 aimed at educating residents of Tennessee about human trafficking and what they could do to help end trafficking. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services’ provides a webpage about the commercial sexual exploitation of minors which includes links to resources and information from different organizations. Despite the increased focus and efforts, commercial sexual exploitation of children and domestic sex trafficking continue to be a serious issue impacting our children and youth. Research related to CSEC is ongoing and is important to our understanding of the issue and its impact. The research is also instrumental in developing strategies to prevent the sexual exploitation of children and youth, identifying needed services, and developing appropriate treatment frameworks and modalities for victims of CSEC. There continues to be significant discussion about how we as adults, professionals, and as a society can best help and support the children and youth at risk of or impacted by CSEC. The purpose of this document is to 1) provide a review of the research related to what is currently known about the experiences of children and youth who are commercial sex exploited, 2) discuss possible factors impacting the child/youth’s exit from the sexual exploitation situation and 3) examine what is known about how to best help victims of commercial sexual exploitation including identifying their needs, appropriate approaches and possible interventions.  

Tennessee Joint Task Force for Children’s Justice and Child Sexual Abuse Treatment Committee  2021. 54p.

By Megan Davis and Craig Wright

This report summarises previously published insights from the Social Wellbeing Agency’s work assisting the New Zealand Government's response to youth crime. The report looks at wellbeing factors that are highly correlated to offending behaviour in young people and outlines ways that policymakers can reduce crime by targeting better support to young people and their families.

The report finds that the greater the exposure of young people to hardship and disadvantage, the more likely they are to offend. The authors conclude that public services are not providing enduring solutions for young people with high needs and that many solutions to youth crime lie in better support to families, whānau and communities.

Key findings

• Young people who are most likely to offend include those who have (in order of impact):

  • exposure to family violence and contact with Oranga Tamariki (NZ Ministry for Children)

  • experience of poverty

  • and parent(s) who have an alcohol or other drug issue, a mental health issue, and/or contact with Corrections.

• Over three-quarters of youth crime in Aotearoa New Zealand is committed by the 10% of young people who have greatest exposure to experiences of hardship and disadvantage.

• Most factors correlated to offending behaviour by young people reflect the characteristics of their environment (their families and communities). This suggests solutions to youth offending should consider family and community wellbeing.

• Over 60% of young people in the highest needs group first came to the attention of a government agency for a relatively serious issue by age 5.

• Young offenders are concentrated in areas of higher deprivation.

• Repeated referrals to the social system suggest that current approaches are not addressing their underlying needs to stop their offending or prevent resulting harm to communities.

Supports that are shown to help prevent youth crime

• Early intervention and prevention programmes that aim to identify and support young people and their families, whānau and communities before they engage in criminal behaviour

• Positive youth development programmes that focus on building the social and emotional skills, resilience, and positive relationships of young people

• Restorative justice – an approach that aims to repair the harm caused by crime by involving victims, offenders, and the community in the process of addressing the harm caused by offending behaviour

• High levels of collaboration between and among government agencies, community organisations and Iwi to ensure the right services are provided in the right way at the right time

• Providing positive education and employment opportunities to young people – including giving them a sense of purpose and a confident future outlook.

Social Wellbeing Agency (New Zealand), 2023. 12p.

By Chris Trotter

Poor family environment, including child abuse and neglect, family criminality, family disruption, and severe family conflict are background factors for many children (and adults) involved in the justice system as evidenced in a large number of research studies (e.g. Katsiyannis et al., 2018). Family issues are also the concern of both adult probation and youth justice practitioners and others who provide community supervision. Two studies of community supervision, for example, found that family issues were the most, or at least one of the most, commonly discussed issues in interviews with both children and adults (Bonta et al., 2008; Trotter and Evans, 2012). There is also considerable support for the effectiveness of family interventions for children in the criminal justice system. Petrosino and colleagues (2009), in a review of the available research, found that family-based interventions have considerable impact on reoffending. They suggest that, on average, children involved in family-based interventions have recidivism rates 16% to 28% lower than comparable control groups. This is consistent with a detailed review by Lipsey and Cullen (2007) who considered four different meta-analyses on the effectiveness of family interventions for children, and found an average reduction in recidivism compared to untreated control groups of between 20% and 52%. Hartnett et al. (2016) and Petrosino et al. (2009) argue, based on their reviews, that family interventions may be more effective than other interventions for children facing family issues. Hartnett et al. (2016), for example, argue that family work is more effective than cognitive behavioural and group therapy interventions. Support for family interventions is also provided in earlier reviews by Latimer (2001) and Dowden and Andrews (2003), although both reviews suggest that the effectiveness of family interventions is dependent on the nature of the intervention which is offered; the interventions need to be consistent with evidence-based practice principles. Despite the research support for family interventions, they seem to be relatively rare in criminal justice settings. Specific interventions focused on issues such as drug treatment, anger management or employment are more common. Where family interventions are offered in youth justice, they tend to be delivered by licenced therapists trained in specific models such as multi-systemic family therapy or functional family therapy (Hartnett et al., 2017; Markham, 2018). In this paper, I focus upon an example of a project that uses youth justice workers to deliver a family intervention – Collaborative Family Work. This work is designed to be delivered as part of the routine offerings of a youth justice service.

Manchester UK: HM Inspectorate of Probation. HM Inspectorate of Probation Academic Insights 2021/02

By Summer Walker

This brief summarizes research conducted in December 2022 on gender-based violence (GBV) in Cité Soleil, an impoverished, high-density commune of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. GBV – and sexual violence, in particular – has escalated dramatically in Port-au-Prince in recent years, as gangs have multiplied and taken greater control over communities, local economies and many aspects of daily life. Clashes between armed gangs, including attempts to take over territory, have severely affected security, particularly for women and girls.

A report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), published in October 2022, documented how gangs have used rape and other forms of sexual violence in their quest for power and to instill fear in communities. Meanwhile, a breakdown in public safety across Port-au-Prince is a risk factor associated with increasing levels of GBV and reduces the ability to respond in an effective way.

This brief focuses on research collected in and around Cité Soleil (in the areas of Brooklyn, Sarthe and Village des Rapatriés), using a questionnaire, focus groups and a round table discussion. The study assesses five aspects of vulnerability: safety, legal protection, mental well-being, economic empowerment and education. This research was undertaken under very difficult conditions, and with a high degree of sensitivity to the subject matter and involvement of participants.

This brief offers insight into the current state of GBV in Cité Soleil and identifies potential areas of support for donors and organizations interested in improving the situation. It offers three overarching recommendations, as outlined in the conclusion: building the capacity of institutions that women trust, identifying the ways women organize locally, and developing cross-sector cooperation.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2023. 27p.

By Romain Le Cour Grandmaison; Ana Paula Oliveira and Matt Herbert

Over the course of 2023 and early 2024, security has continued to deteriorate alarmingly in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and in rural areas in the center and south of the country.

The Haitian crisis worsened critically in 2023. UN reports indicate that in 2023, over 4 789 people were murdered, 1 698 injured, and 2 490 kidnapped, with a 2023 homicide rate of 40.9 per 100 000, more than double the 2022 rate. Besides these figures, the nature of the criminal actors has been profoundly transformed, posing a series of challenges to international intervention.

Over the past years, gangs have undergone a radical evolution, going from rather unstructured actors dependent on resources provided by public or private patronage to violent entrepreneurs who have been able to convert their territorial power into governance capabilities. This shift has been fueled by the gangs’ unprecedented access to firearms and the Haitian state’s inability to halt their expansion, professionalization, and propensity to impose their rule over ever-larger territories, as well as by ongoing collusion by elements of the country’s political and economic elites.

In October 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution authorizing a non-UN multinational security support (MSS) mission to Haiti. After lengthy negotiations, the Kenyan government agreed to lead the deployment to support the Haitian National Police (HNP) in addressing gang violence and re-establishing security. However, the planned operation is currently being challenged in the Kenyan courts. This resolution came after the UNSC agreed on a sanctions regime for Haiti in October 2022 and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on key gang leaders, businessmen, and politicians. The UN sanctions have been supplemented by unilateral designations issued by Canada, the US, and the European Union (EU). Further, UN sanctions were levied on gang leaders in December 2023 as the preparations accelerated for the MSS deployment.

The UN’s current initiatives on Haiti potentially augur a new international approach to how organized crime actors can be tackled both from a security and human rights perspective. Ensuring international tools are effective in mitigating harm caused by gangs in Haiti is therefore vitally important for the people of the country and the international community.

Therefore, the various international tools must be tailored to the rapidly evolving criminal and violence dynamics on the ground and implemented in a strategically coordinated fashion.

This policy report is intended to further efforts to tailor both the MSS mission and the sanctions regime to the current operational challenges in Haiti, support Haitian and international decision-makers in their mission, and provide strategic backing to the country’s civil society.

It begins by detailing the current situation on the ground, including gangs and other violent groups’ operations, governance, and territorial domination. The following section describes the mandate and operations of the two primary international tools: the sanctions regime and the MSS mission. The third section flags key issues that need to be considered by both the sanctions regime and the international force and presents opportunities to align the two more comprehensively to strengthen public security responses and public policy initiatives to resolve the crisis.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 50p.

By Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, Ana Paula Oliveira and Matt Herbert

Over the course of 2023 and early 2024, security has continued to deteriorate alarmingly in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and in rural areas in the centre and south of the country.1 Criminal gangs, the main drivers of this degradation, have grown in strength and capacity, enabling them to supplant in part or in full the control of government forces.2 The gangs’ domination of critical infrastructure, such as commercial and oil port terminals, major roads, and population centres has heightened their influence over Haiti’s economy and political system. The gangs have also imposed governance on major parts of Port-au-Prince, leading both to rising criminal predation and human rights violations, including gender-based violence.3 Moreover, 2023 saw the development of particularly strong vigilante movements while the first weeks of 2024 witnessed the rise of violent political leaders, adding to an already disastrous security situation. As one United Nations (UN) report bluntly noted: ‘The situation is unravelling.’4 The Haitian crisis worsened critically in 2023. UN reports indicate that in 2023, over 4 789 people were murdered, 1 698 injured and 2 490 kidnapped, with a 2023 homicide rate of 40.9 per 100 000, more than double the 2022 rate.5 Besides these figures, the nature of the criminal actors has been profoundly transformed, posing a series of challenges to international intervention. Over the past five years, gangs have undergone a radical evolution, going from rather unstructured actors dependent on resources provided by public or private patronage to violent entrepreneurs who have been able to convert their territorial power into governance capabilities. This shift has been fuelled by the gangs’ unprecedented access to firearms and the Haitian state’s inability to halt their expansion, profession alization and propensity to impose their rule over ever larger territories, as well as by ongoing collusion by elements of the country’s political and economic elites. In October 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution authorizing a non-UN multinational security support (MSS) mission to Haiti. After long negotiations, the Kenyan government agreed to lead the deployment, aimed at supporting the Haitian National Police (HNP) in addressing gang violence and re-establishing security,6 although the planned operation is currently being challenged in the Kenyan courts.7 This resolution came after the UNSC agreed a sanctions regime for Haiti in October 2022, and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on key gang leaders, businessmen and politicians. The UN sanctions have been supplemented by unilateral designations issued by Canada, the US, and the European Union (EU). Further UN sanctions were levied on gang leaders in December 2023, as the preparations accelerated for the MSS deployment.

Intervention by the UN in Haiti is not new, with the embryonic MSS mission representing the third initiative in as many decades. However, the proposed international mission stands out, both for Haiti and more broadly for international responses to organized criminal violence. Historically, the UN has become involved in Haiti in response to political crises, worsening insecurity and repeated natural disasters.8 While the 2004-2017 United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) engaged in counter-gang operations, largely in and around Port-au-Prince, this came after the force had been on the ground for several years and was generally intermittent.9 In contrast, the prospective 2024 intervention will be conducted outside the auspices of the UN and has been motivated by, and focuses on, criminal gangs as the main threat to peace and security. This reflects the substantial change in gangs’ power, structure and capacity for territorial governance since the MINUSTAH era. These entities are nowadays far more economically autonomous and territorially powerful, making them less controllable. As one Haitian entrepreneur described the contemporary evolution of the gangs: ‘We saw a lion being born, we fed it and watched it grow, we tried to domesticate it, but the animal eventually escaped from the cage, and here we are.’10 Nonetheless, the focus by the UNSC on profit-oriented criminal entities as primary conflict actors in their own right, in both the resolutions setting up the sanctions regime and the MSS mission, is a substantial conceptual shift for the UN.11 Given the growth of transnational organized crime, and expansion of instability and violence linked to such crime, situations like the present one in Haiti are likely to become more common. The UN’s current initiatives on Haiti potentially augur a new international approach to how organized crime actors can be tackled both from a security and human rights perspective. Ensuring international tools are effective in mitigating harm caused by gangs in Haiti is therefore vitally important for the people of the country, and for the international community

The situation presents an extremely difficult test. Haitian armed groups today are more militarily powerful, networked, and resilient than those during the MINUSTAH intervention. It is therefore essential that the various international tools be tailored to the rapidly evolving criminal and violence dynamics on the ground, and be implemented in a strategically coordinated fashion. Meetings between Kenyan and Haitian police teams have taken place, as well as trainings, and vetting processes prior to deployment. However, the proposed mission, the UNSC and the Haitian government have yet to present a public plan and strategy for the intervention, either for short-term engagement on the ground or for a long-term political solution.12 This policy report is intended to further efforts to tailor both the MSS mission and the sanctions regime to the current operational challenges in Haiti, support Haitian and international decision-makers in their mission, and provide strategic backing to the country’s civil society. It begins by detailing the current situation on the ground, including gangs and other violent groups’ operations, governance and territorial domination. The next section details the mandate and oper ations of the two primary international tools, the sanctions regime and the MSS mission. The third section flags key issues which need to be considered for both the sanctions regime and the interna t ional force, and presents opportunities to align the two more comprehensively, to strengthen public security responses and public policy initiatives so as to resolve the crisis. This report is the first of several planned publications on the political economy of violence in Haiti and the international cooperation that seeks to uproot it. It follows a 2022 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) report on gang evolution and a 2023 GI-TOC report on gender-based violence in the country.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 50p.

By David C. Brotherton and Rafael Gude

In 2008, the Ecuadorian Government launched a policy to increase public safety as part of its “Citizens’ Revolution” (La Revolución Ciudadana). An innovative aspect of this policy was the legalization of the country’s largest street gangs. During the years 2016–2017, we conducted ethnographic research with these groups focusing on the impact of legalization as a form of social inclusion. We were guided by two research questions: (1) What changed between these groups and society? and (2) What changed within these groups? We completed feld observations and sixty qualitative interviews with group members, as well as multiple formal and informal inter views with government advisors, police leaders and state actors related to the initiative. Our data show that the commitment to social citizenship had a major impact on gang-related violence and was a factor in reducing the nation’s homicide rate. The study provides an example of social control where the state is committed to polices of social inclusion while rejecting

Critical Criminology, Volume 29, pages 931–955, (2021)

By: The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Foreign security personnel are expected to begin arriving in Haiti in early 2024 to assist the national police in fighting the gangs besieging much of the country. UN-authorised, Kenyan-led and designed with U.S. support, this multinational mission aims to restore security and enable long overdue elections.

Why does it matter?: Haiti’s wave of violence and political breakdown have deepened the country’s humanitarian emergency. With police outnumbered and outgunned by criminal groups, foreign assistance is needed. But the mission must overcome daunting operational and political challenges for it to be effective.

What should be done?: The mission should not deploy in force until it has sufficient troops, training and equipment to overpower the gangs. It should prepare for urban combat, and develop community-level sources of intelligence, to help minimise civilian harm. A political settlement and major reforms will be required for gains to endure.

Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Briefing N°49, Port-au-Prince/New York/Washington/Brussels, 5 January 2024 . 24p.

By James A. Densley

Drawing on extensive interviews with gang members, this book provides a vivid portrayal of gang life. Topics include the profiles and motivations of gang members; the processes of gang evolution, organization, and recruitment; gang members' uses of violence, media, and technology and the role of gangs in the drugs trade and organized crime

Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 226p.

By Charlotte Gill, David Weisburd, Denise Nazaire, Heather Prince, Claudia Gross Shader

Research Summary

This paper describes Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth (ABSPY), a community-led, place-based, data-driven initiative to improve community safety and reduce crime involving young people at hot spots in Seattle, Washington. The ABSPY model puts crime prevention into the hands of the community, compared to traditional problem-solving approaches that may involve community stakeholders but are led by the police. We evaluated the initiative using a quasi-experimental research design comparing the five hot spots in the Rainier Beach neighborhood, where ABSPY was implemented, to five similarly situated hot spots elsewhere in the city. We used 9 years of police calls for service and offense reports, from 2011 to 2019, to assess ABSPY's effects on crime and a five-wave community survey conducted pre- and 4 years post-implementation to examine community perceptions. Although there were no significant effects on calls for service or crime, ABSPY significantly improved community members’ perceptions of serious crime and the police in the short and medium term.

Policy Implications

Our results show positive changes in community perceptions that offer a foundation for relationship and capacity building in problem-solving efforts. Although ABSPY is not associated with reductions in crime, our results suggest that even communities with entrenched crime problems can leverage this capacity to reduce crime in the longer term. Community coalitions also offer some benefits relative to police-led efforts, such as shared culture and values; stability; and consistency. However, community coalitions must build capacity for action as well as community engagement, and consider if and how the police should be involved, ensuring that the specific expertise of each coalition member is leveraged. Furthermore, our study highlights the importance of identifying measures of crime that are not affected by increased trust and collaboration between the police and the community.

Criminology & Public Policy Early View, 2024.

By Tyson Whitten, Jesse Cale, Russell Brewer, Katie Logos, Thomas J. Holt and Andrew Goldsmith

A disproportionally large number of adolescents engage in cyber-deviance. However, it is unclear if distinct patterns of adolescent cyber-deviance are evident, and if so, whether and to what extent low self-control is associated with different patterns of cyber-deviance. The current study addressed this research gap by examining the relationship between self-control and distinct latent classes of adolescent cyber-deviance net of potential confounders among a cross-sectional sample of 1793 South Australian adolescents. Four latent classes were identified, each characterized by varying probabilities of involvement in six types of cyber-deviance that were measured. The versatile class (n = 413) had the lowest average level of self-control, followed by the harmful content users (n = 439) and digital piracy (n = 356) classes, with the abstainer class (n = 585) characterized by the highest self-control. Analysis of covariance indicated that the abstainer group had significantly higher self-control than other classes of cyber-deviance. Although the versatile class had noticeably lower average self-control scores than the harmful content users and digital piracy groups, this difference was not significant after correcting for multiple comparisons. Collectively, these findings suggest that self-control appears to distinguish between those who do and do not engage in cyber-deviance but may not distinguish between distinct patterns of cyber-deviance net of other factors.

International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology Volume 0: Ahead of Print, 2024.

By The Sentencing Project

For a decade, incarceration disparities between Tribal and white youth have remained stubbornly high. As of 2021, Tribal youth were 3.7 times as likely to be detained or committed in juvenile facilities as their white peers, according to nationwide data collected in October 2021 and recently released. This ratio is essentially unchanged from 2011.1 There are 11 states with at least 8,000 Tribal youths (a cutoff that allows for meaningful comparisons), and Tribal youth are more likely than their white peers to be in custody in eight of these states. For the purposes of this fact sheet, all “Tribal youth” are by definition non-Hispanic/Latinx. (The underlying dataset labels them as American Indian.2 ) Juvenile facilities, including 1,323 detention centers, residential treatment centers, group homes, and youth prisons3 held 24,894 youths as of October 2021. These data do not include the 291 people under 18 in adult prisons at year-end 20214 or the estimated 2,000 people under 18 in adult jails at midyear 2021.5 Nationally, the youth placement rate was 74 per 100,000 in 2021. The Tribal youth placement rate was 181 per 100,000, compared to the white youth placement rate of 49 per 100,000. Between 2011 and 2021, overall juvenile placements fell 59%. In the 11 states with at least 8,000 Tribal youths between the ages of 10 and 17, between 2011 and 2021, disparities grew by at least 50% in two and decreased by at least 50% in two

Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2023. 3p.

By The Sentencing Project

For a decade, incarceration disparities between Latinx and white youth have fallen, though disparities still remain. As of 2021, Latinx youth were 16% more likely to be placed (i.e., detained or committed) in juvenile facilities as their white peers, according to nationwide data collected in October 2021 and recently released. These data reveal a sharp decline in Latinx-white youth incarceration disparities since 2011; that year, Latinx youth were 76% more likely to be in placement than white youth.1 Juvenile facilities, including 1,323 detention centers, residential treatment centers, group homes, and youth prisons2 held 24,894 youths as of October 2021. (These data do not include the 291 people under 18 in adult prisons at year-end 20213 or the estimated 2,000 people under 18 in adult jails at midyear 2021.4 ) Nationally, the youth placement rate was 74 per 100,000 youth in 2021. The Latinx youth placement rate was 57 per 100,000, compared to the white youth placement rate of 49 per 100,000. A total of 20% of youths in placement are Latinx, and Latinx youth comprise 25% of all youth across the United States.5 Latinx youth are more likely to be in custody than white youth in half of states with at least 8,000 Latinx youth (between the ages of 10 and 17), a cutoff that allows for meaningful comparisons Between 2011 and 2021, juvenile placements fell by 59%. During these years, Latinx youth placements declined slightly faster than white youth placements (a 65% decline vs. 57%), resulting in a smaller but still considerable disparity.

Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2023. 3p.

By The Sentencing Project

For a decade, incarceration disparities between Black and white youth have remained stubbornly high. As of 2021, Black youth were 4.7 times as likely to be placed (i.e., detained or committed) in juvenile facilities as their white peers, according to nationwide data collected in October 2021 and recently released. This disparity has hardly changed over the past decade.1 Juvenile facilities, including 1,323 detention centers, residential treatment centers, group homes, and youth prisons2 held 24,894 youths as of October 2021. (These data do not include the 291 people under 18 in adult prisons at year-end 20213 or the estimated 2,000 people under 18 in adult jails at midyear 2021.)4 Nationally, the youth placement rate was 74 per 100,000 in 2021. The Black youth placement rate was 228 per 100,000, compared to the white youth placement rate of 49 per 100,000. Forty-two percent of youths in placement are Black, even though Black Americans comprise only 15% of all youth across the United States.5 Among all states with a population of at least 8,000 Black youth, (between 10 and 17), a cutoff that allows for meaningful comparisons, Black youth are more likely to be in custody than white youth. Black and white youth have similar juvenile placement rates in the District of Columbia.

Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2023. 3p.

By The Southern Poverty Law Center

Mississippi’s youth legal system is a study in extremes. While the state is currently experiencing its lowest youth arrest rate in decades, it simultaneously has markedly expanded its use of youth incarceration. Rather than being met with needed services and support, Mississippi students are being pushed out of the classroom at nation-leading rates and into the carceral system – a pipeline that has disproportionately impacted the state’s Black youth. Overall, Mississippi’s failure to invest in successful community-based programs that provide noncarceral alternatives for youth in need of rehabilitation leaves the state with incarceration as the first option for far too many young people. This overincarceration harms youth and their communities and is an expensive use of precious taxpayer funds. There is a better way. This report delves into the history and context behind Mississippi’s current youth legal system,  expands on its harmful impacts, and recommends policy  changes for reform.

Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2023

By The Southern Poverty Law Center

The impact of mass incarceration on children and families in Louisiana is significant. As the mass incarceration capital of the world, Louisiana has an estimated 94,0001 children with a parent who is behind bars. The devastating effects of incarceration on children and families are evidence that incarceration is a sentence that the entire family will serve. Parental incarceration is a growing epidemic. Nationally, one in 28 children experiences parental incarceration today, compared to one in 125 children in 1985.2 Black children are particularly affected by caregiver incarceration, as 11.4% of Black children experience parental incarceration, compared to 1.8% of their white peers.3 This is of little surprise, as Black people are disproportionately represented in the prison system, due to historic social and economic inequality.

Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center.  2021. 16pg

By Maria Micaela Sviatschi

This paper provides evidence showing how deportation policies can backfire by disseminating not only ideas between countries but also criminal networks, spreading gangs, in this case, across Central America and spurring migration back to the US. In 1996, the US Illegal Immigration Responsibility Act drastically increased the number of criminal deportations. In particular, the members of large Salvadoran gangs that developed in Los Angeles were sent back to El Salvador. Using variation in criminal deportations over time and across cohorts combined with geographical variation in the location of gangs and their members’ place of birth, I find that criminal deportations led to a large increase in Salvadoran homicide rates and gang activity, such as extortion and drug trafficking, as well as an increase in gang recruitment of children. In particular, I find evidence that children in their early teens when the leaders arrived are more likely to be involved in gang-related crimes when they are adults. I also find evidence that these deportations, by increasing gang violence in El Salvador, increase child migration to the US–potentially leading to more deportations.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Working Paper, 2020. 52p.