By Yago Zayed and Grahame Allen

Police recorded crime figures in 2022/23 show that there were 145,214 offences where one or more of the centrally monitored hate crime strands were deemed to be a motivating factor. This represented a 5% decrease on figures::: for 2021/22. These figures do not include Devon and Cornwall police force who did not provide data this year due to the implementation of a new IT system.

The increase in police recorded hate crime over time prior to this year has partly been attributed to better recording methods used and greater awareness in reporting hate crimes.

This briefing paper looks at Hate Crime in England & Wales using figures provided by the Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW) and the Police Recorded Crime Series. The paper also presents data on hate crime rates per 100,000 population in each police force area and for each hate crime strand. It also looks at similar figures in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2024 51p.

By The Anti-Defamation League, Center for Technology and Society

The question of who is accountable for the proliferation of antisemitism, hate, and extremism online has been hotly debated for years. Are our digital feeds really a reflection of society, or do social media platforms and tech companies actually exacerbate virulent content themselves? The companies argue that users are primarily responsible for the corrosive content soaring to the top of news feeds and reverberating between platforms. This argument serves to absolve these multi-billion-dollar companies from responsibility for any role their own products play in exacerbating hate.

A new pair of studies from ADL and TTP (Tech Transparency Project) show how some of the biggest social media platforms and search engines at times directly contribute to the proliferation of online antisemitism, hate, and extremism through their own tools and, in some cases, by creating content themselves. While there are many variables contributing to online hate, including individual users’ own behavior, our research demonstrates how these companies are taking things from bad to worse.

For these studies, we created male, female, and teen personas (without a specified gender) who searched for a basket of terms related to conspiracy theories as well as popular internet personalities, commentators, and video games across four of the biggest social media platforms, to test how these companies’ algorithms would work. In the first study, three of four platforms recommended even more extreme, contemptuously antisemitic, and hateful content. One platform, YouTube, did not take the bait. It was responsive to the persona but resisted recommending antisemitic and extremist content, proving that it is not just a problem of scale or capability.

In our second study, we tested search functions at three companies, all of which made finding hateful content and groups a frictionless experience, by autocompleting terms and, in some cases, even auto-generating content to fill in hate data voids. Notably, the companies didn’t autocomplete terms or auto-generate content for other forms of offensive content, such as pornography, proving, again, that this is not just a problem of scale or capability.

What these investigations ultimately revealed is that tech companies’ hands aren’t tied. Companies have a choice in what to prioritize, including when it comes to tuning algorithms and refining design features to either exacerbate or help curb antisemitism and extremism.

As debates rage between legislators, regulators, and judges on AI, platform transparency, and intermediary liability, these investigations underscore the urgency for both platforms and governments to do more. Based on our findings, here are three recommendations for industry and government:

Tech companies need to fix the product features that currently escalate antisemitism and auto-generate hate and extremism. Tech companies should tune their algorithms and recommendation engines to ensure they are not leading users down paths riddled with hate and antisemitism. They should also improve predictive autocomplete features and stop auto-generation of hate and antisemitism altogether.

Congress must update Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to fit the reality of today’s internet. Section 230 was enacted before social media and search platforms as we know them existed, yet it continues to be interpreted to provide those platforms with near-blanket legal immunity for online content, even when their own tools are exacerbating hate, harassment and extremism. We believe that by updating Section 230 to better define what type of online activity should remain covered and what type of platform behavior should not, we can help ensure that social media platforms more proactively address how recommendation engines and surveillance advertising practices are exacerbating hate and extremism, which leads to online harms and potential offline violence. With the advent of social media, the use of algorithms, and the surge of artificial intelligence, tech companies are more than merely static hosting services. When there is a legitimate claim that a tech company played a role in enabling hate crimes, civil rights violations, or acts of terror, victims deserve their day in court.

We need more transparency. Users deserve to know how platform recommendation engines work. This does not need to be a trade secret-revealing exercise, but tech companies should be transparent with users about what they are seeing and why. The government also has a role to play. We’ve seen some success on this front in California, where transparency legislation was passed in 2022. Still, there’s more to do. Congress must pass federal transparency legislation so that stakeholders (the public, researchers, and civil society) have access to the information necessary to truly evaluate how tech companies’ own tools, design practices, and business decisions impact society.

Hate is on the rise. Antisemitism both online and offline is becoming normalized. A politically charged U.S. presidential election is already under way. This is a pressure cooker we cannot afford to ignore, and tech companies need to take accountability for their role in the ecosystem.

Whether you work in government or industry, are a concerned digital citizen, or a tech advocate, we hope you find this pair of reports to be informative. There is no single fix to the scourge of online hate and antisemitism, but we can and must do more to create a safer and less hate-filled internet.

New York: ADL, 2023. 18p.

By The Anti-Defamation League, Center on Extremism

Since the start of 2021, Texas has experienced a significant amount of extremist activity. One driver of this phenomenon is Patriot Front, a white supremacist group that has distributed propaganda across Texas – and the rest of the U.S. – with alarming frequency, using the state as a base of operations. Two other factors are extremists who continue to target the LGBTQ+ community and QAnon supporters who have gathered for conferences and rallies across the state.

Texas has also seen a significant increase in antisemitic incidents over the last two years. It recorded the country’s fifth-highest number of antisemitic incidents in 2022, at a time when ADL has tracked the highest-ever number of antisemitic incidents nationwide.

This report will explore a range of extremist groups and movements operating in Texas and highlights the key extremist and antisemitic trends and incidents in the state in 2021 and 2022. It also includes noteworthy events and incidents from the first half of 2023.

Key Statistics

• Antisemitic Incidents: According to the ADL’s annual Audit of Antisemitic Incidents, Texas has seen a dramatic rise in antisemitic incidents in recent years. In 2022, the number of incidents increased by 89% from 2021 levels, rising from 112 to 212 incidents. Since 2021, ADL has tracked a total of 365 incidents in the state.

• Extremist Plots and Murders: In 2021 and 2022, ADL documented two extremist murders in Texas and six terrorist plots. In 2023, a gunman who embraced antisemitism, misogyny and white supremacy opened fire in a mall parking lot in Allen, killing eight people and wounding seven more before police shot and killed him.

• Extremist Events: Since 2021, ADL has documented 28 extremist events in Texas, including banner drops, flash demonstrations, training events, fight nights, protests, rallies and meetings.

• White Supremacist Propaganda: In 2022, ADL documented 526 instances of white supremacist propaganda distributions across Texas, a 60% increase from 2021 (329). There have been 1,073 propaganda incidents since 2021. The groups responsible for the majority of the incidents were Patriot Front and the Goyim Defense League (GDL).

• Hate Crimes Statistics: According to the latest FBI hate crimes statistics from 2021, there were 542 reported hate crimes in Texas in that year, an increase of 33% from the 406 incidents recorded in 2020. Hate and bias crime data in Texas and nationally highlights how hate crimes disproportionately impact the Black community.

• Insurrection Statistics: Seventy-four of the 968 individuals logged by the George Washington University Program on Extremism who have been charged in relation to the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol are Texas residents, the second most in the nation.

• ADL and Princeton’s Bridging Divides Initiative Threats and Harassment Dataset: The Threats and Harassment Dataset (THD) tracks unique incidents of threats and harassment against local U.S. officials between January 1, 2020, and September 23, 2022 in three policy areas (election, education and health). Texas recorded seven incidents of threats and harassment against local officials.

New York: ADL, Center on Extremism, 2023. 23p.

By The Anti-Defamation League

In May 2023, a man outraged over abortion rights set his sights on a building in Danville, Illinois, that was slated to become a clinic offering women’s health services, including abortions. The man, Philip Buyno of Prophetstown, allegedly filled containers with gasoline and loaded them into his car. His alleged efforts to destroy the clinic – by ramming his car into the building and throwing a gas can into the space – failed, and he was arrested. He later told the FBI he’d “finish the job” if given the chance.

Buyno was an extremist, intent on attacking his perceived enemy no matter the cost. Over the past several years, Americans have witnessed a barrage of extremist activity: attacks on our democratic institutions, antisemitic incidents, white supremacist propaganda efforts, vicious, racially motivated attacks, bias crimes against the LGBTQ+ community and violent threats to women’s healthcare providers.

Illinoisians have watched these same hatreds – and more – manifest in their own state.

This report explores a range of extremist groups and movements operating in Illinois and highlights the key extremist and antisemitic trends and incidents in the state in 2021 and 2022. It also includes noteworthy events and incidents from the first half of 2023.

There is no single narrative that tells the story of extremism and hate in Illinois. Instead, the impact is widespread and touches many communities. As in the rest of the country, both white supremacist and antisemitic activity have increased significantly over the last two years, but that’s not the whole story.

The Prairie State is also home to a sizeable number of current and former law enforcement officers who have at one point belonged to or associated with extremist organizations or movements. Our research additionally shows a continued threat to Illinois’s women’s health facilities, which have been targeted with arson and other violent plots by anti-abortion extremists. This reflects the broader, national threat to reproductive rights.

Key Statistics

Antisemitic Incidents: According to ADL’s annual Audit of Antisemitic Incidents, Illinois has seen a dramatic rise in antisemitic incidents in recent years. In 2022, the number of incidents increased by 128% from 2021 levels, rising from 53 to 121. The state’s total was the seventh-highest number of incidents in the country in a year when ADL tracked the highest-ever number of antisemitic incidents nationwide. This is a dramatic increase from 2016, when there were 10 incidents. Preliminary numbers through June 2023 indicate that there have been at least 33 additional antisemitic incidents in the state.

Extremist Plots and Murders: In 2021 and 2022, ADL documented one extremist murder in Illinois. In November 2022, a man allegedly intentionally drove the wrong way on an interstate highway and crashed into another car, killing the driver. The man said he wanted to kill himself after being convicted for crimes committed while participating in the January 6 insurrection, and he has been charged with additional crimes, including first-degree murder.

Extremist Events: Since 2021, ADL has documented four white supremacist extremist events in Illinois, predominately marches and protests.

White Supremacist Propaganda: In 2022, ADL documented 198 instances of white supremacist propaganda distributions across Illinois, an increase of 111% from 2021 (94). Through May 2023, there have been an additional 64 white supremacist propaganda incidents. Patriot Front was responsible for a large majority of white supremacist propaganda throughout Illinois.

Hate Crimes Statistics: According to the latest FBI hate crimes statistics available, there were 101 reported hate crimes in Illinois that targeted a variety of communities, including Jewish, Black and Asian American and Pacific Islander. This total was an increase of 80% from the 56 incidents recorded in 2020.

Insurrection Statistics: Thirty-six of the 968 individuals logged by the George Washington University Program on Extremism who have been charged in relation to the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol are Illinois residents.

ADL and Princeton University’s Bridging Divides Initiative Threats and Harassment Dataset: The Threats and Harassment Dataset (THD) tracks unique incidents of threats and harassment against local U.S. officials between January 1, 2020, and September 23, 2022, in three policy areas (election, education and health). Illinois recorded six incidents of threats and harassment against local officials.

New York, ADL, Center on Extremism, 2023. 24p.

By The Anti-Defamation League, Center for Technology and Society

Executive Summary Do social media and search companies exacerbate antisemitism and hate through their own design and system functions? In this joint study by the ADL Center for Technology and Society (CTS) and Tech Transparency Project (TTP), we investigated search functions on both social media platforms and Google. Our results show how these companies’ own tools–such as autocomplete and auto-generation of content–made finding and engaging with antisemitism easier and faster.1 In some cases, the companies even helped create the content themselves. KEY FINDINGS: • Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube are each hosting dozens of hate groups and movements on their platforms, many of which violate the companies’ own policies but were easy to find via search. Facebook and Instagram, in fact, continue hosting some hate groups that parent company Meta has previously banned as “dangerous organizations.” • All of the platforms made it easier to find hate groups by predicting searches for the groups as researchers began typing them in the search bar. • Facebook automatically generated business Pages for some hate groups and movements, including neo-Nazis. Facebook does this when a user lists an employer, school, or location in their profile that does not have an existing Page–regardless of whether it promotes hate. Our researchers compiled a list of 130 hate groups and movements from ADL’s Glossary of Extremism, picking terms that were tagged in the glossary with all three of the following categories: “groups/ movements,” “white supremacist,” and “antisemitism.”2 The researchers then typed each term into the respective search bars of Facebook, Instagram and YouTube, and recorded the results. The study also found that YouTube auto-generated channels and videos for neo-Nazi and white supremacist bands, including one with a song called “Zyklon Army,” referring to the poisonous gas used by Nazis for mass murder in concentration camps. • In a final test, researchers examined the “knowledge panels” that Google displays on search results for hate groups–and found that Google in some cases provides a direct link to official hate group websites and social media accounts, increasing their visibility and ability to recruit new members.

New York: Anti-Defamation League, Center for Technology and Society, 2023. 18p.

By Anti-Defamation League, Center on Extremism

ince the start of 2021, Texas has experienced a significant amount of extremist activity. One driver of this phenomenon is Patriot Front, a white supremacist group that has distributed propaganda across Texas – and the rest of the U.S. – with alarming frequency, using the state as a base of operations. Two other factors are extremists who continue to target the LGBTQ+ community and QAnon supporters who have gathered for conferences and rallies across the state. Texas has also seen a significant increase in antisemitic incidents over the last two years. It recorded the country’s fifth-highest number of antisemitic incidents in 2022, at a time when ADL has tracked the highest-ever number of antisemitic incidents nationwide. This report will explore a range of extremist groups and movements operating in Texas and highlights the key extremist and antisemitic trends and incidents in the state in 2021 and 2022. It also includes noteworthy events and incidents from the first half of 2023.

New York: ADL, 2023. 23p.

By Sara Bundtzen

This paper reviews online gender-based violence (OGBV) as existing within a continuum of (on- and offline) violence, emphasising the connections with different extremist ideologies, including the dissemination of terrorist and violent extremist content (TVEC). It aims to prioritise a gender perspective in responding to TVEC so that social media platforms can better intervene in and mitigate misogynistic pathways to radicalisation that can begin (or be reinforced) online. The discussion recognises that the mitigation of OGBV and online pathways to radicalisation requires a whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach. Whilst there are steps that governments and civil society can and should take, such as overseeing and enforcing emerging regulatory frameworks and voluntary commitments, this paper and its recommendations emphasise the role and actions of platforms.

Outlining the impact of OGBV at micro (individual) and macro (societal) levels, the paper considers the role platforms can play in exacerbating the risks of OGBV, evaluating platform policies, content moderation practices, user interface design and algorithmic recommender systems. In this context, the paper asserts that researching and mitigating the risks of OGBV can enable earlier warning of and intervention in misogynistic pathways to different forms of violent extremism. Reiterating that any mitigation of risks must come in support of users’ fundamental rights, including their right to privacy and freedom of expression, the paper proposes and elaborates on the following key recommendations:

• Enable API access to publicly available data for public interest research;

• Develop gender-disaggregated and standardised transparency reporting;

• Apply a victim-survivor-centred Safety and Privacy by Design approach;

• Enhance cross-platform cooperation and information sharing of OGBV incidents (including actors and tactics);

• Review content moderation policies, processes, and systems to acknowledge the continuum of violence and misogyny as a vector for violent extremism;

• Apply intersectional feminist knowledge in risk assessments of AI-based systems;

• Strengthen and encourage multi-stakeholder dialogue and collaboration.

Berlin: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 31p....2023.

By The Anti-Defamation League

Over the last two years, extremist activity in Massachusetts has mirrored developments on the national stage. Like the rest of the country, Massachusetts has seen white supremacists – including the Nationalist Social Club – increasingly make their presence known. The Bay State has also reported extensive propaganda distribution efforts, especially by Patriot Front, which resulted in Massachusetts recording the country’s second-highest number of white supremacist propaganda incidents in 2022.

Amidst increasing nationwide threats to the LGBTQ+ community, Massachusetts has also witnessed a spike in anti-LGBTQ+ activity, including waves of harassment against Boston Children’s Hospital, drag performances and LGBTQ+ events. And as the numbers of antisemitic incidents continue to rise across the country, Massachusetts was no exception. According to ADL’s annual Audit of Antisemitic Incidents, it was the sixth most affected state in the country in 2022.

This report will explore the full range of extremist groups and movements operating in Massachusetts and highlight the key extremist and antisemitic trends and incidents in the state in 2021 and 2022.

New York: ADL, 2022. 18p.

By Aoife Gallagher

Research by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) has found that in the year since June 2022, anti-drag mobilisation in the UK has become a key focus for a variety of groups and actors. Anti-vaxxers, white nationalist groups, influential conspiracy theorists and “child protection” advocates have at times formed an uneasy – even fractious – coalition of groups opposing all-ages drag events. The driving force behind these protests is a mix of far-right groups and COVID-19 conspiracists.

While public debate about what is appropriate entertainment for children, and at what ages, is absolutely legitimate and deserves fair hearing, the identified tactics used by these actors only serve to undermine that discussion with chilling consequences for free expression, and create fertile ground for a potential uptick in violence. Furthermore, our analysis has found evidence that the UK is importing anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric and strategies from similar movements in the US, with the “groomer” slur – used to frame LGBTQ+ people as a danger to children – becoming commonplace among anti-LGBTQ+ campaigners. Even though UK activity has not reached the level of violence seen in the US, abuse and harassment of hosts, performers and attendees at such events is a regular occurrence, and multiple events have been cancelled due to safety concerns. This report documents anti-drag activity in the UK by searching news reports, Twitter mentions and messages shared in relevant UK Telegram channels and groups. It outlines the actors involved, the tactics used and the impact of such activity between June 1, 2022 and May 27, 2023

Amman; Berlin; London; Paris; Washington DC: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2023. 20p.

By Clara Martiny and Sabine Lawrence

This country profile provides an analysis of on- and offline anti-drag mobilization in the United States; key tactics used by groups and individuals protesting drag events; and principal narratives deployed against drag performers. Through ethnographic monitoring of relevant US-based Telegram channels, Twitter profiles, Facebook groups, and use of external resources such as the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), Crowd Counting Consortium, and previous reports on anti-drag activity by groups such as GLAAD and the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), ISD analysts compiled, categorized and analyzed anti-drag protests or online threats against drag events from June 1, 2022 to May 20, 2023.

The findings of this research reveal that the first five months of 2023 have seen more incidents of anti-drag protests, online and offline threats, and violence (97 in total; average of 19.4 per month) than in the last seven months of 2022 (106 in total; average of 15.1 per month).1 Notably, ISD analysts find that the actors behind anti-drag activity are not just traditional anti-LGBTQ+ groups but include growing numbers of assorted other actors, from local extremists and white supremacists through to parents’ rights activists, members of anti-vaxxer groups, and Christian nationalists. ISD also finds an increasing number of incidents where online hate speech has manifested in offline activity – for example, a popular online slur being found spray painted on a location hosting a drag event. This report also shows the concerning upward trend of anti-drag mobilization across the US, and shows how it harms the LGBTQ+ community, small business, parents, and poses serious risks to community security throughout the nation. And, while public debate about what is appropriate entertainment for children, and at what ages, is absolutely legitimate and deserves fair hearing, the identified tactics only serve to undermine that discussion, with chilling consequences for free expression, and create fertile ground for a potential uptick in violence.

Amman; Berlin; London; Paris; Washington DC: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2023.24p.

By Tim Squirrell and Jacob Davey

Internationally, rising hate and extremism pose an existential threat to human rights and democratic freedoms. LGBTQ+ communities are often the first group to come under attack, and understanding the contours of these assaults matters both for the protection of these communities and to be better able to safeguard human rights and democracy more broadly. In new research by ISD, including four country profiles, we examine the trends in anti-LGBTQ+ hate and extremism with a particular focus on harassment targeting all-ages drag shows. In this report, ISD analyses the narratives, themes, actors and tactics involved in anti-drag activism in the US, UK, Australia and France. It examines the footprint of 274 anti-drag mobilisations: 11 in Australia, 3 in France, 57 in the UK and 203 in the USA. Anti-drag activity was also found in Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland as well as other European countries during the reporting period, usually in isolated cases. Due to finite resources these instances were not analysed in depth, but would merit further research. This research draws on ethnographic monitoring of over 150 Telegram channels, Twitter profiles and Facebook groups, as well as external resources such as news reports, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) and Crowd Counting and previous reports on anti-drag by GLAAD and the Southern Poverty Law.

Amman; Berlin; London; Paris; Washington DC: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2023. 19p.

By Aoife Gallagher

Research by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) has found that in the year since June 2022, anti-drag mobilisation in the UK has become a key focus for a variety of groups and actors. Anti-vaxxers, white nationalist groups, influential conspiracy theorists and “child protection” advocates have at times formed an uneasy – even fractious – coalition of groups opposing all-ages drag events. The driving force behind these protests is a mix of far-right groups and COVID-19 conspiracists. …This report documents anti-drag activity in the UK by searching news reports, Twitter mentions and messages shared in relevant UK Telegram channels and groups. It outlines the actors involved, the tactics used and the impact of such activity between June 1, 2022 and May 27, 2023.

Amman; Berlin; London; Paris; Washington DC: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2023. 20p.

By Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The purpose of this Guide is to describe and analyze hate incidents and hate crimes faced by Roma and Sinti, as well as the corresponding security challenges. Considering cases from many of the 57 OSCE participating States, this Guide highlights measures that promote safety and security without discrimination, in line with OSCE commitments. This Guide provides relevant stakeholders - government offcials, political representatives, civil society and the broader public - with an overview of the situations Roma and Sinti communities face, an analysis of their corresponding security needs and areas where positive actions could improve their access to rights.

Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) , 2023. 138p.

By The Center for Countering Digital Hate; Anti-Defamation League

  Press TV, a broadcasting brand founded by Iran’s state-controlled media corporation, is a platform used to promote the Iranian state’s hateful views of Jewish people, Holocaust denial, and LGBTQ+ and women’s rights to the rest of the world. Founded in 2007, the network’s self-professed aim was to break “the global media stranglehold of Western outlets”. Press TV uses social media to promote ‘Palestine Declassified’, a video series which focuses its hatred towards British Jews, but spreads hateful narratives and lies about Jewish people as a whole. We argue this constitutes a ‘foreign state hate operation’, that is, a foreign influence campaign by one state designed to sow division among audiences abroad, this time with an overt strategy that uses the enormous audiences and algorithmic biases towards contentious material on social media to maximize visibility. Palestine Declassified’s hosts, British ‘useful idiots’ who have previously faced allegations of antisemitism, perpetuate what the Anti-Defamation League has called the antisemitic myths of “power” and “antiZionism” to their followers. The project’s episodes, promoted through social media channels operated by Press TV, target Jewish people with antisemitic tropes and attack charities, schools, journalists, academics, and individuals by promoting the conspiracy that they are part of a coordinated “Zionist movement” – one of a number of phrases used indiscriminately with the aim to homogenize and flatten an otherwise ideologically nuanced and diverse set of people, groups, and communities. Half of the programme’s episodes promote antisemitic narratives – purporting antisemitic myths that “Zionists’’ control world events, “groom” young people in schools and universities, and the well-worn conspiracy that “Zionists” exercise a network of control in the world, specifically in the UK. Its comment section is rife with antisemitism, ranging from abuse to inciting violence against Jews. Banned by regulators from television networks, its .com domain seized by US authorities, and removed from YouTube, Press TV relies on the indifference of social media executives to the spread of hate on their platforms, to funnel traffic to its website. This research clearly demonstrates that social media platforms are providing the Iranian state with the infrastructure to spread its propaganda to millions globally. While platforms claim to have rules against antisemitism, time and time again Big Tech have proven that they will only enforce their rules when convenient. In 2021, CCDH found that major social media platforms failed to remove 84% of antisemitic content reported using platforms’ own tools – ranging from Holocaust denial to conspiracies fueled by anti-Jewish hatred. Thanks to social media platforms, Press TV’s vitriol has gained new ground in the West: the US, the UK, Canada, France and Australia make up 51% of Press TV’s total web traffic, according to data from Similarweb. Palestine Declassified has leveraged social media audiences to disseminate dangerous hate to up to 11.5 million followers, the majority on Twitter and Facebook. Social media companies allow it – and profit from its popularity.  

 New York: The Center for Countering Digital Hate; Anti-Defamation League, 2023. 49p. 

By U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Massachusetts Advisory Committee

Hate crimes and harassment targeting Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders surged during the pandemic, demanding action, and on May 21, 2021, President Biden signed the COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act. Memorializing the women murdered in attacks on Atlanta massage parlors, the Act focuses partly on improving reporting, data collection, and prevention and education at the federal and state level. Its strong bi-partisan support was a welcome acknowledgment of the dangers confronted daily by Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders. As press reports have made clear, a recent spate of violent attacks have made some people, especially the elderly, fearful of venturing outside. How distressing, if not dangerous, is daily life for them? Harassment and hate-fueled acts are difficult to count, even when they might constitute crimes or civil offenses, since accurate data requires self-reporting. Still the numbers indicate a worrisome trend: Between March 2020 and March 2021, Stop AAPI Hate compiled some 6600 reports of hate incidents; the Public Policy Institute of California survey found that one in eight Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders reported being targeted by hate incidents in 2020, amounting to about 2 million people. But AntiAsian hate incidents in Massachusetts were increasing disproportionately before the pandemic, starting in 2015. For many people in the AAPI community, hate crimes and harassment are inescapable parts of daily life. In addition to being targeted by racist taunting and slurs, people report being threatened, assaulted, and having garbage thrown at them. In Massachusetts, AAPI identifies residents numbering over 450,000. People of Chinese descent constitute the largest sub-group, followed by refugees -- Vietnamese, Cambodian, Thai, and Hmong. Many are underserved and vulnerable to hate crimes and harassment. Current data shows a 47 percent increase in anti-AAPI hate crimes in Massachusetts between 2015 and 2020, while total hate crimes have increased only 2 percent over the same period.

Washington, DC: The Commission, 2021. 23p.

By Desmond Ang

This paper documents the impact of popular media on racial hate by examining the first American blockbuster: 1915’s The Birth of a Nation, a fictional portrayal of the KKK’s founding rife with racist stereotypes. Exploiting the film’s five-year “roadshow”, I find a sharp spike in lynchings and race riots coinciding with its arrival in a county. Instrumenting for roadshow destinations using the location of theaters prior to the movie’s release, I show that the film significantly increased local Klan support in the 1920s. Roadshow counties continue to experience higher rates of hate crimes and hate groups a century later.

HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP20-038, November 2020 (Updated July 2022)

By Amy Farrell and Sarah Lockwood

Hate crimes, often referred to as bias-motivated crimes, have garnered greater public attention and concern as political rhetoric in the United States and internationally has promoted the exclusion of people based on their group identity. This review examines what we know about the trends in hate crime behavior and the legal responses to this problem across four main domains. First, we describe the legal framework and recent attempts to expand hate crime protections beyond historically disenfranchised groups. Second, we examine recent trends and patterns of hate crime victimization. Third, we review what is known about those who perpetrate hate crimes and those who experience hate crime victimization. Finally, we examine the efficacy of efforts to respond to and prevent hate crime. This review examines a wide range of bias-motivated harms and suggests how future research and policy can be more inclusive of victimization extending beyond traditionally understood hate crimes.

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2023. 6:107–30

By Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, Marharyta Zhesko

The Analysis includes in depth review of the case-law of the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR), in regards to hate speech and hate crimes. Considering the ever-growing jurisprudence of the ECtHR in this area, it looks into the most significant and impactful decisions and the recent landmark judgments on the topics.

Vienna: Austria: OSCE, 2021. 108p.

By The Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry.at Tel Aviv University,

The Antisemitism Worldwide Report for 2022 informs of both increases and decreases, some more meaningful than others, in the number of antisemitic incidents in different countries. The United States, where the largest Jewish minority in the world lives, saw a particularly alarming rise in anti-Jewish violence and slander. These data are not encouraging. The record-levels of 2021 were attributed in part to the exceptional social tensions created by the Covid-19 epidemic and the political tensions created by the Guardian of the Walls operation in Gaza. The data for 2022 suggest that the motivations for present-day antisemitism are not transient as some may have hoped. Despite the investment of substantial legal, educational, and political efforts, thousands of antisemitic incidents took place across the globe in 2022, including hundreds of physical assaults. Everyone who cares about human dignity and justice must recognize the need to prevent this reality from becoming normalized. Antisemitic incidents are not an abstract phenomenon. Whether physical or virtual, they affect real people in the real world. As with other hate crimes, fighting them requires a combination of broadly applied agendas along with tailor-made, targeted initiatives. It requires establishing who is attacked, who are the attackers, where the attacks occur, and what motivates the offenders. These questions must be treated with great caution and sensitivity. But they cannot be ignored if we are to achieve results. This year’s Report examines the location and affiliations of victims of antisemitic physical assaults in several cities that were major theatres for such incidents (p. 23). Our comparative study suggests physical attacks tend to occur in specific areas in major urban centers on streets and public transportation (rather than in or outside synagogues); usually do not appear to be premeditated; and target in the vast majority of cases visibly-identifiable Jews, particularly ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Jews. Whether attackers are motivated by strong antisemitic sentiments, by hatred of Israel (which, ironically, in some cases preys on anti-Zionist Jews), or by a bullying impulse that targets those who appear most different and vulnerable, their offenses fall under the category of antisemitic hate crimes.

New York: Anti-Defamation League; The Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry.at Tel Aviv University, 2023. 86p.

By Lu-In Wang

The concept and naming of “hate crime,” and the adoption of special laws to address it, provoked controversy and raised fundamental questions when they were introduced in the 1980s. In the decades since, neither hate crime itself nor those hotly debated questions have abated. To the contrary, hate crime has increased in recent years—although the prominent target groups have shifted over time—and the debate over hate crime laws has reignited as well. The still-open questions range from the philosophical to the doctrinal to the pragmatic: What justifies the enhanced punishment that hate crime laws impose based on the perpetrator’s motivation? Does that enhanced punishment infringe on the perpetrator’s rights to freedom of belief and expression? How can we know or prove a perpetrator’s motivation? And, most practical of all: Do hate crime laws work? This Essay proposes that we reframe our understanding of what we label as hate crimes. It argues that those crimes are not necessarily the acts of hate-filled extremists motivated by deeply held, fringe beliefs, but instead often reflect the broader, even mainstream, social environment that has marked some social groups as the expected or even acceptable targets for crime and violence. In turn, hate crimes themselves influence the social environment by reinforcing recognizable patterns of discrimination. The Essay maintains that we should broaden our understanding of the motivations for and effects of hate crimes and draws connections between hate crimes and seemingly disparate phenomena that have recently captured the nation’s attention.

112 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 847 (2023)