By Suraj Lakhani, Jessica White and Claudia Wallner

The intersection between (violent) extremism and video-gaming – spanning across jihadist, farright, and other types of ideologies – is long-standing, though is an area that is under-researched. As part of this, particularly scant attention has been paid to the concept of ‘gamification’; i.e. the application of gaming and game-design principles within non-gaming environments (Lakhani and Wiedlitzka, 2022). The primary objective of this paper is to provide an understanding of how (violent) extremism can be (and has been) gamified, what emerging trends and future scenarios might be, and the potential influence (or lack thereof) that gamification has within (violent) extremism. On the basis of this understanding, this paper will outline relevant concepts of action through preventing and countering (violent) extremism (P/CVE) considerations and offer policy (and broader) recommendations on how to account for the element of gamification and potential actions to prevent and counter the phenomenon. Through existing literature and open-source materials – including academic articles, research reports, policy documents, newspaper articles, investigative journalism, government inquiries and previous relevant Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Policy Support (PS) deliverables, etc. – this paper will investigate the following key questions: what is gamification of (violent) extremism, what are the current and future threats it presents to the European Union (EU), and how can it be countered? In order to address this, the paper is organised into the following sections. SECTION 1 (‘CONCEPTUALISATION OF GAMIFICATION’) Section 1 (‘Conceptualisation of gamification’) will provide a conceptual overview of gamification, including outlining a working definition, in order to provide a foundation for the remainder of the paper. This section will also outline the concept’s origins and examine how these can be applied to the context of (violent) extremism. There will additionally be a contextualisation of the phenomenon in regard to the threat of (violent) extremism within EU Member States (MS) overall. SECTION 2 (‘CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS’) Section 2 (‘Current and future threats’) will discuss the potential ways in which (violent) extremism can be gamified, predominantly through outlining a range of current examples. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but do provide a sufficient overview regarding the types of gamification approaches taken within this context, by both (violent) extremist organisations and individuals. This section will conclude by considering the emerging trends and conceivable future scenarios in this field. SECTION 3 (‘ADDRESSING GAMIFICATION WITH P/CVE’) Section 3 (‘Addressing gamification with P/CVE’) outlines how gamified (violent) extremism can be addressed in P/CVE programming and whether or not it requires specifically tailored responses. This section will also inform discussions on whether current responses are fit for purpose and how these approaches potentially need to be tailored or evolve in order to deal with the threat posed by the gamification of (violent) extremism more effectively. SECTION 4 (‘POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS’) Section 4 (‘Policy and recommendations’) will then consider any current policy which relates to the gamification of (violent) extremism across EU MS. This will be followed by a number of relevant recommendations for policymakers stemming from existing research and literature. This includes providing recommendations for P/CVE based on promising approaches. This section will also discuss the current state of work in this area of study and make relevant research-related recommendations. CONCLUSIONS Finally, a ‘Conclusions’ section will discuss the potential value and limitations of gamification as a concept in relation to (violent) extremism. This is underpinned by the consideration of whether gamification is purposeful or relates to actions undertaken by those familiar with a particular subculture, i.e. gamers.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022 25p.

by Linda Schlegel

The concept of gamification is increasingly applied as a framework to understand extremist online subcultures and communications. Although a number of studies have been conducted, the theoretical and empirical basis to understand the role of gamification in extremist contexts remains weak. This article seeks to contribute to the development of a gamification of radicalization theory by exploring how Marczewski’s HEXAD, a user typology for gamified applications, may facilitate our understanding of individual variations in engagement with gamified extremist content. Five user types, named after their core motivational drivers for engagement, are discussed: Socializers, Competitors, Achievers, Meaning Seekers, and Disruptors. This typology may support future studies by providing a preliminary understanding of how different game elements may appeal to different users and increase their engagement with and susceptibility to extremist content in cyberspace.

Perspectives on Terrorism , August 2021, Vol. 15, No. 4 (August 2021), pp. 54-64 .

By Linda Schlegel

The livestreaming of attacks, the use of Call of Duty footage in propaganda videos, the modification of popular video games to support extremist worldviews, and the development of games and playful apps by extremist organizations have all contributed to an increasing focus on the so-called ‘gamification of terror’. Since the live-streamed attack in Christchurch and the realization that subsequent perpetrators in Pittsburgh, El Paso and Halle not only copied the mode and style of attack but were embedded in and sought to appeal to similar online communities, in which gamified language and references to gaming were part of the subcultural practice, journalists, academics, and practitioners have begun to analyze the role games and gamified applications may play in radicalization processes. Understandably, as the Christchurch shooting has taken place less than two years ago, the analysis into the potential role of gamification in radicalization processes has only just begun and much confusion persists on both terminology and the exact mechanisms by which gamification may influence extremist thought and action. The fact that gamification itself is a fairly new concept, which has only been seriously researched for around ten years, complicates matters further. A large part of this report is therefore dedicated to organizing the current state of knowledge and to provide readers with a baseline of knowledge on gamification in extremist contexts. After a discussion on gamification as such and how it may or may not be differentiated from other gaming appeals, an overview of the current evidence of gamified radicalization processes is provided. Then, research findings on the psychological mechanisms of gamification are applied to the issue of radicalization. Lastly, the report flashlights some preliminary possibilities of applying gamification to preventing and/or countering extremism (P/CVE). Readers must be aware that this final part of the report lacks robust empirical grounding and is not meant to be taken as evidence of what should or should not be done. Rather, it is meant as an invitation to explore and discuss the implications of gamification for P/CVE.

MODUS | Working Paper 1/2021. Germany: MODUS, 2021. 20p.

By Daniela Sime, Naomi Tyrrell, Emmaleena Käkelä, Marta Moskal

The state-induced anti-immigration environment and the normalisation of xenophobia in political and media discourses have led to the increased othering of European migrants in the UK through new forms of social stratification, especially since the Brexit Referendum of 2016. For young people who migrated to the UK as children from Central and Eastern Europe, Brexit has represented a major rupture in the process of their identity formation, adding new insecurities in the context of increasingly uncertain rights. Based on a survey with 1,120 young people aged 12–18 who identified as Central or Eastern European migrants, followed by focus groups and case studies, we report on young migrants’ everyday experiences of xenophobia and racialisation. We explore the coping and resistance strategies young people used to integrate themselves in these racialized hierarchies. Drawing on insights from emergent theories of racialisation and whiteness, we add new evidence on the direct consequences of these experiences of marginalisation on young people’s sense of belonging and their own attitudes towards other ethnic groups.

JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES2022, VOL. 48, NO. 19, 4527–4546

By Sara Bundtzen

This paper reviews online gender-based violence (OGBV) as existing within a continuum of (on- and offline) violence, emphasising the connections with different extremist ideologies, including the dissemination of terrorist and violent extremist content (TVEC). It aims to prioritise a gender perspective in responding to TVEC so that social media platforms can better intervene in and mitigate misogynistic pathways to radicalisation that can begin (or be reinforced) online. The discussion recognises that the mitigation of OGBV and online pathways to radicalisation requires a whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach. Whilst there are steps that governments and civil society can and should take, such as overseeing and enforcing emerging regulatory frameworks and voluntary commitments, this paper and its recommendations emphasise the role and actions of platforms.

Outlining the impact of OGBV at micro (individual) and macro (societal) levels, the paper considers the role platforms can play in exacerbating the risks of OGBV, evaluating platform policies, content moderation practices, user interface design and algorithmic recommender systems. In this context, the paper asserts that researching and mitigating the risks of OGBV can enable earlier warning of and intervention in misogynistic pathways to different forms of violent extremism. Reiterating that any mitigation of risks must come in support of users’ fundamental rights, including their right to privacy and freedom of expression, the paper proposes and elaborates on the following key recommendations:

• Enable API access to publicly available data for public interest research;

• Develop gender-disaggregated and standardised transparency reporting;

• Apply a victim-survivor-centred Safety and Privacy by Design approach;

• Enhance cross-platform cooperation and information sharing of OGBV incidents (including actors and tactics);

• Review content moderation policies, processes, and systems to acknowledge the continuum of violence and misogyny as a vector for violent extremism;

• Apply intersectional feminist knowledge in risk assessments of AI-based systems;

• Strengthen and encourage multi-stakeholder dialogue and collaboration.

Berlin: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 31p....2023.

By Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Moustafa Ayad

In May 2019, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued an intelligence bulletin which included one of the first official acknowledgments of what they and other similar agencies in the West identified as an emerging violent extremist threat.  It warned that “anti-government, identity-based, and fringe political conspiracy theories” were playing an increasing role in motivating domestic extremists to commit criminal, sometimes violent, acts. Since then, officials have also noted the emergence of individuals acting on the basis of “salad bar ideology” extremism, a term used in 2020 by FBI Director Christopher Wray to describe the nature of some of the recent violent extremist threats. Their ideologies, according to Director Wray, “are kind of a jumble…a mixture of ideologies that don’t fit together.”  He went on to say that some extremists “take a mish mash of different kinds of ideologies often that don’t fit coherently together, and sometimes are even in tension with each other, and mix them together with some kind of personal grievance,” to justify their attack. Director Wray concluded that “it’s more about the violence than it is about the ideology.”

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2023. 39p.

By Jacob Ware

When a 13-year-old boy was caught by Estonian police in early 2020 for leading an international terrorist organization, shockwaves rippled through the Western counterterrorism community. But, it was merely the latest uncomfortable milestone in a long-term trend of extremist material growing increasingly accessible online. “Accessing a world of hate online today is as easy as it was tuning into Saturday morning cartoons on television,” Oren Segal of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) opined, offering a painful comparison illustrating how modern extremism has replaced more benign pastimes. The capture of Feuerkrieg Division’s leader provided perhaps the most shocking—if not outright damning—evidence yet of the ever-increasing impact of social media on the extremism and terrorism stage: individuals in their early teens were not just being recruited by neo-Nazis but were actively recruiting and leading their peers.

Although many scholars have tackled the question of online radicalization, far fewer have connected the nuances of the online world to their offline impacts beyond the simple question of whether terrorists inspired online commit violence offline. This article aims to assess how online extremism changes over time, and therefore, how it impacts terrorism and counterterrorism on the ground level. This longer-term and more strategic look at the history of online radicalization is worthwhile in part because it captures the array of research performed over several decades and sorts it into three overarching, chronological categories. Research conducted into key sub-elements such as platforms, groups, networks, moderation evasion, and radicalization patterns informs the framework and helps reveal the characteristics of each generation. The following paper should therefore be understood, in part, as a literature review highlighting important work on key factors in online radicalization. It also reflects the need to constantly reassess our understanding of the latest trends in extremism on the internet. As Meili Criezis writes, “Online environments can be fast-paced; with dynamics constantly shifting and evolving, researchers are required to frequently revisit and reassess these spaces.”

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2023. 36p.

Edited by Ayhan Kaya, Ayşenur Benevento and  Metin Koca

This book analyses the factors and processes behind radicalisation of both native and self-identified Muslim youths. It argues that European youth responds differently to the challenges posed by contemporary flows of globalisation such as deindustrialisation, socio-economic, political, spatial, and psychological forms of deprivation, humiliation, and structural exclusion. The book revisits social, economic, political, and psychological drivers of radicalisation and challenges contemporary uses of the term “radicalism”. It argues that neoliberal forms of governance are often responsible for associating radicalism with extremism, terrorism, fundamentalism, and violence. It will appeal to students and scholars of migration, minority studies, nationalisms, European studies, sociology, political science, and psychology.

New York: London: Routledge, 2023. 262p.

By Jonathan Kenyon,  Jens Binder, and Christopher Baker-Beall

This study explored the role of the Internet in radicalisation pathways of convicted extremist offenders in England and Wales, continuing the work previously reported in Kenyon et al. (2021b). Specific considerations included technological advances and changes in online activities, exploring the relevance of mental health including specific types of difficulties and disorders, and focusing on the sub-group of convicted extremist offenders identified as attackers. Methodological approach and interpreting findings The study built on an existing data set of 269 individuals from the study by Kenyon et al. (2021b) but expanded the numbers substantially by adding those with a completed initial Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG22+) report from January 2018 to December 2021. This resulted in a data set of 490 individuals who had been convicted of an extremist offence, equating to nearly all offenders who have been subject to either a Structured Risk Guidance (SRG) or initial ERG22+ report from October 2010 up to December 2021. The analysis focused on 437 individuals who were identified as ‘Radicalised Extremists’ following a review of all reports. Online behaviours commonly associated with radicalisation, demographic information and offence characteristics were coded for all cases. Professional ratings for overall levels of engagement, intent and capability to commit violent extremist acts were also included. Future offence data was obtained for all individuals by accessing up-to-date offending information and reviewing their current location. Statistical analyses were used to compare three radicalisation pathway groups: those who primarily radicalised online; those who primarily radicalised offline; and those subject to radicalising influences in both the online and offline domain  

London: Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service, Ministry of Justice Analytical Series , 2022. 70p.

By George Washington University, Program on Extremism

This report evaluates violent extremism inspired by or connected to the Black Hebrew Israelite (BHI) movement. Black Hebrew Israelites ascribe to the idea that modern-day African Americans are the descendants of the Israelites in the Old Testament of the Bible. However, an extremist fringe within the movement takes this idea one step further, arguing that white Europeans are the descendants of Satan and that white Jews are impostors. Situating the role of extremist interpretations of BHI ideology within domestic violent extremist incidents during the past several years, this report finds: ● Like other domestic violent extremist movements in the contemporary American landscape, Black Hebrew Israelite violent extremism has undergone a transformation over the past twenty years. The predominant threat today is from individuals loosely affiliated with or inspired by the movement rather than by groups, organizations, or institutions. ● Today’s violent extremists with a nexus to Black Hebrew Israelite extremism are usually not formal participants in any Black Hebrew Israelite organization, church, or group. They usually interpolate aspects of Black Hebrew Israelite ideology—particularly the idea that white Jews are impostors—into a personally-curated mix of viewpoints and ideologies that inspire violence. ● Despite ongoing controversy about how to classify domestic violent extremists who are motivated by racial ideologies but are not white supremacists, the “racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism” (RMVE) category used by federal law enforcement in the U.S. remains an apt descriptor for Black Hebrew Israelite violent extremists. ● Using the RMVE label for Black Hebrew Israelites yields important comparisons between this movement and other RMVE actors, particularly white supremacist violent extremists. Notably, Black Hebrew Israelite violent extremists and their white supremacist counterparts often share similar ideologies and core conspiracy theories, are examples of the role of religious ideas in domestic violent extremist movements, and often choose similar targets for attacks due to their mutual anti-Semitism.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 21p.

By Stuart Macdonald, Kamil Yilmaz, Chamin Herath, J.M. Berger, Suraj Lakhani, Lella Nouri, & Maura Conway

Focus on violent and non-violent activities and content in online spaces has yielded valuable insights into the evolution of extremist exploitation of social media and the internet. Over the past decade, much attention has been dedicated to understanding jihadist—particularly the so-called Islamic State’s—use of popular social media platforms and encrypted messaging apps to spread propaganda and entice followers. In recent years, however, attention to far-right extremist exploitation of online spaces has been growing. 1: As Conway, Scrivens, and Macnair have comprehensively documented, 2: right-wing extremist (a subset of the broader far-right) online communities have a lengthy history, transitioning from dial-up bulletin board systems; to static websites and online forums; to social media platforms, messaging and other communication “apps.” While far-right online communities were and still are largely decentralized, these communities can be considered loosely interconnected, their online interdependence tracing back to the “hot-links” page on the original Stormfront internet forum where outlinks to like-minded websites and forums were posted. Far-right, including right-wing extremist, online communities have since been described as an “ecosystem,” consisting of various types of online spaces or “entities” (e.g., websites, social media platforms). 3: Still, the actual extent to which these networks are interdependent or overlapping, as opposed to largely insulated groupings, platforms, and activities, remains to be fully interrogated. Doing so requires more localized research efforts, focused on identifying the nature of content shared and platforms used in far-right communities and ecosystems online to more fully examine interconnections between them.

Resolve Network, 2022. 48p.

By John D. Gallacher and Jonathan Bright

Online hate speech is a growing concern, with minorities and vulnerable groups increasingly targeted with extreme denigration and hostility. The drivers of hate speech expression on social media are unclear, however. This study explores how hate speech develops on a fringe social media platform popular with the far-right, Gab. We investigate whether users seek out this platform in order to express hate, or whether instead they develop these opinions over time through a mechanism of socialisation, as they interact with other users on the platform. We find a positive association between the time users spend on the platform and their hate speech expression. We show that while some users do arrive on these platforms with pre-existing hate stances, others develop these expressions as they get exposed to the hateful opinions of others. Our analysis reveals how hate speech develops online, the important role of the group environment in accelerating its development, and gives valuable insight to inform the development of counter measures.

Oxford, UK: University of Oxford, Oxford Internet Institute, 2021. 47p.

Edited by Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess, and Elmar Brahler

The Dynamics of Right-Wing Extremism within German Society explores the prevalence of right-wing extremist attitudes in Germany. The book provides a thorough psychosocial and sociological theory of general authoritarian dynamics to explain broader societal attitudes, particularly focusing on right-wing extremism. It provides a uniquely long-term perspective on the different dimensions of right-wing extremism—the affinity for dictatorial forms of government, chauvinist attitudes, the trivialisation or justification of National Socialism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and social Darwinism. The first chapter delineates the theoretical framework of authoritarian dynamics, while subsequent chapters provide an in-depth analysis of empirical findings and distinguish authoritarian and democratic typologies. The authors focus on recognition of authoritarian statehood and anti-Semitism; the relationship between religion and right-wing extremism; and support for the radical-right populist party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). The innovative theoretical approach of this book scrutinizes the theory of authoritarianism in the contemporary world. This book provides unique empirical data and will be of interest to scholars of German politics, anti-democratic attitudes and prejudices, sociology, political science, and social psychology.

Abingdon, Oxon, UK:Routledge, 2022. 194p.

By Beka Parsadanishvili, Ana Leladze

Recent events in Georgia - including the acts of violence committed against media representatives in July 2021 at a street rally organised by Georgian far-right groups and the arrest of 5 young people upon charges of joining a terrorist organisation in the Pankisi Gorge on 24 August - indicate that not only is violent extremism actively disseminated in the territory of Georgia, but it also endangers the national security architecture. This research report provides a detailed description of the key characteristics of the jihadist and far-right narratives disseminated in Georgia. It is noteworthy that this document does not study far-left narrative as it has been less violent and fairly infrequent in Georgia. In order to study violent extremist narrative disseminated in the territory of Georgia, semi-structured interviews were conducted with subject-matter experts, content and language of the disseminated narrative were intensively studied through qualitative and quantitative, relevant literature as well as secondary and tertiary data were researched and processed.

Tbilisi: Georgian Centre for Strategy and Development (GCSD),2022. 74p.

By Eden Cole

Commissioned by the Georgian Centre for Strategy and Development (GCSD) as a component of a four-year multi-tier programme on ‘Enhancing the Capacity of Georgia in Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalization’ funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway, this Handbook was developed to facilitate Georgia’s ‘Permanent Interagency Commission on Elaboration of the National Counterterrorism Strategy (CNCS)’ Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) policy development and cooperative programming processes. In a field crowded with documentation and narratives on diverse P/CVE approaches, this Handbook’s objective is to focus the audience’s attention on counter-terrorism and P/CVE best practice at international and European levels. At the same time, the Handbook enables practitioners from state institutions to sustain institutional P/CVE knowledge and to develop capacity to address P/CVE issues across Georgian society. The Handbook can also be used for training purposes, as well as by other stakeholders to develop their own capacity to implement projects aimed at understanding and limiting the threat of violent extremism. Beginning with an introduction to the evolution of terrorism over the last fifty years, the Handbook outlines the challenges of terrorism to democratic states, and the legal and policy dimensions of effective counter-terrorism and extremism prevention. The Handbook then addresses specific thematic issues, including institutional frameworks for P/CVE, cooperation between state and society, radicalization prevention, the return of foreign terrorist fighters and their families, and broader counter-terrorism and P/CVE communication challenges. Placing an emphasis on developing original material and incorporating a variety of relevant and easily accessible best practice materials, the aim across all seven chapters is to ensure that a ‘Whole-of-Society’ approach to P/CVE issues is emphasised in a user-friendly format. Against the background of fifty years of terrorism, democratic societies are still exposed to a variety of risks posed by local and strategic terrorism. Although waves of terrorism occur in peaks and troughs, as contested and ungoverned spaces continue to harbour often well-funded and supplied terrorist and insurgent groups, social and technological developments compound the significant risks posed by even small terrorist movements and cells.

Tbilisi: Georgian Centre for Strategy and Development (GCSD), 2019. 77p.

By Michael Jensen, Patrick James, Gary LaFree, Aaron Safer-Lichtenstein, Elizabeth Yates

Emerging communication technologies, and social media platforms in particular, play an increasingly important role in the radicalization and mobilization processes of violent and non-violent extremists (Archetti, 2015; Cohen et al., 2014; Farwell, 2014; Klausen, 2015). However, the extent to which extremists utilize social media, and whether it influences terrorist outcomes, is still not well understood (Conway, 2017). This research brief expands the current knowledge base by leveraging newly collected data on the social media activities of 479 extremists in the PIRUS dataset who radicalized between 2005 and 2016.[1] This includes descriptive analyses of the frequency of social media usage among U.S. extremists, the types of social media platforms used, the differences in the rates of social media use by ideology and group membership, the purposes of social media use, and the impact of social media on foreign fighter travel and domestic terrorism plots.

We define social media in the PIRUS dataset as any form of electronic communication through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content, such as videos and images. This form of online communication is distinct from other types of internet usage in that it emphasizes online user-to-user communication rather than passively viewing content hosted by an online domain. Additionally, our definition of social media does not include file-sharing sites (e.g., Torrent networks, Dropbox, P2P networks, etc.).

College Park, MD: START, University of Maryland, 2018. 20p.