By the Institute for Strategic Dialogue

Key Findings • While occupying parallel digital spaces and producing similar types of harm, online subcultures of nihilistic violence are distinct from ideologically motivated extremism. This unique threat requires bespoke platform interventions rather than expansions and adaptations of existing terrorism‑ and violent extremism‑focused frameworks. • Nihilistic violence ecosystems are decentralised, cross‑platform and highly agile, leveraging mainstream and fringe platforms for grooming, propaganda and operational coordination. Platform strategies should not look to respond to the threat as new forms of dangerous organisations, but rather to understand this phenomenon as a more dynamic threat from nihilistic violent subcultures, of which ‘groups’ like 764 and the True Crime Community are just the latest manifestation. • Nihilistic violent communities produce a much broader range of harms than ideologically motivated extremist networks, spanning sexual exploitation, cybercrime and various forms of real‑world targeted violence, including self‑harm, animal abuse, interpersonal violence and mass casualty attacks such as school shootings. • New platform policies are not necessarily required to mitigate the threat, given that many of these harms are already covered in platform community guidelines. However, these should be knitted together as part of a cohesive platform strategy, as enforcement against ecosystems of nihilistic violence is currently fragmented and reactive, enabling ban evasion and rapid regrouping.

By Jason Blazakis

This research briefing by Jason Blazakis examines how advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and large language models (LLMs) could be exploited to support terrorist financing activity. The report argues that LLMs could act as powerful “force multipliers” by lowering barriers to persuasion, coordination and financial deception and that these technologies risk reshaping the economics of terrorist fundraising by enabling scalable, personalised and culturally tailored appeals at unprecedented speed. 

The report assesses how AI-enabled tools could be used for generating fundraising narratives or outreach materials as well as used to help enable assisted fraud, cyber theft and improved concealment of proceeds. It compares how leading LLM providers, including OpenAI, Google and Anthropic, address terrorism and illicit finance within their published policies, highlighting notable differences in regulatory specificity and enforcement approaches. To test whether these policies translate into practice, the author conducted limited baseline prompt testing across the three major LLM models offered by these companies, examining whether they refused overt requests related to terrorist fundraising and money laundering. 

By Noah Kuttymartin

SYNOPSIS

Far-right extremists are increasingly exploiting online gaming spaces and platforms to spread hate, coordinate violence, and radicalise youth. These digital environments offer anonymity, community, and ideological flexibility, making them powerful tools for extremist actors.

COMMENTARY

Online gaming spaces, from multiplayer games to chat platforms like Discord, have become fertile ground for extremist ideologies since the mid-2010s, particularly with the growth of social gaming. These communities often attract young, mostly male users, making them the key demographic under threat of radicalisation. What was once dismissed as harmless trolling in the early 2010s has, over the past decade, evolved into a pathway for radicalisation which, in some cases, leads to violence.

Extremists have not only gamified hate, embedding it in the language, aesthetics, and culture of gaming, but have also operationalised it by using gaming platforms as tools for recruitment, planning, and psychological conditioning. Anders Breivik, the perpetrator of the 2011 Norway terrorist attacks, claimed he used Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 as a “training simulator” and played World of Warcraft for social isolation.

While Breivik framed these games as instrumental in preparing for violence, scholars argue that these claims are overstated and reflect Breivik’s ideological narrative rather than evidence of actual tactical benefit. Participants in the 2017 Charlottesville rally used Discord to plan their violent actions. The 2019 Christchurch attacker, Brenton Tarrant, who killed 51 people in mosques, referenced games like Spyro the Dragon and Fortnite in his manifesto, signalling how deeply gaming culture had affected his mindset.

By The Council of Europe

Although the misuse of new technologies by terrorist actors has been a major concern for some time, the capabilities offered by (and the availability of) a range of new and emerging technologies – including gaming platforms, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), artificial intelligence (AI) and 3D-printed weapons – have heightened these fears even further. An analysis of how and why terrorists adopt new technologies suggests that it remains highly context specific, with the extent and speed of innovation affected by internal factors (for example strategic, structural and individual factors) and external factors, particularly relationships, resources and the effects of counter-terrorism. In combination, these factors can encourage or inhibit the adoption of new technologies by terrorist actors, resulting in significant variations in the adoption and use of key technologies of concern. Terrorist actors in or affecting Europe have adopted (or are beginning to adopt) many of these technologies. Social media platforms, small or micro platforms, terrorist-hosted websites and gaming or gaming-adjacent platforms are all playing critical roles in the radicalisation and recruitment process. Emerging technologies used in this process include the decentralised web, the dark web and, most recently, generative AI. Although many terrorist attacks in Europe use a low-tech modus operandi, technology plays a key role in their preparation, planning and subsequent promotion. Propaganda and instructional material – typically stored and shared online – play a prominent role in shaping attack targets and methodology. For example, the emergence of 3D-printed weapon usage by terrorist actors in Europe has been fuelled by instructional materials developed by an active online subculture. Other far-right online subcultures have also encouraged the live-streaming of attacks and sharing of manifestos online. Terrorist actors in Europe use a range of licit and illicit activities to fund their attacks and radicalisation and recruitment activities, some of which (but not all) require the use of new technologies. These include mobile payment systems, online exchanges and wallets, crowdfunding, peer-to-peer online funds transfers and the solicitation of donations on social media platforms. Simultaneously, terrorist actors outside Europe, notably ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)/Daesh, are increasingly encouraging donations via virtual assets, driving a rise in the presence of virtual assets in European terrorist financing arrests and prosecutions. Interviews with national, regional and international experts identified lessons learned and good practices when responding to terrorist misuse of new technologies. These include reducing the lag between terrorist exploitation of new technologies and counter-terrorism responses to it (through horizon scanning exercises and greater information sharing), the criticality of multistakeholder approaches, the importance of identifying and managing human rights-related risks, and the benefits of greater strategic clarity, which can lead to a focus on desired outcomes, rather than the steps required to reach them